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OCTOBER, 1891.

THE UNITY OF THE ETHICS OF ANCIENT GREECE.

NINE years ago, when I published my work, "The Ethics of the Ancient Greeks" ("Die Ethik der alten Griechen"), I introduced it with the following words:

"The presentation of the ethics of the ancient Greeks, that is attempted in the sequel, presupposes, of course, that throughout the centuries of their existence the Greeks were governed by a number of similar moral ideas; for, without such a presupposition, it would be unjustifiable to speak either of a Greek nation or of a Greek civilization. Undoubtedly, their views on particular matters were subject to many a variation in the course of time; undoubtedly, the changes which their religious conceptions were undergoing, the progressive development of the functions of the state, the gradual humanizing of customs, the increasing points of contact between the thought of the people and the problems opened by philosophy, had also had a mighty influence on the ideas relating to what a man ought to do; but he would no longer have been a Greek, who, in the midst of his pondering and striving (the moment it rose above the commonplace), had not felt himself standing under the spell of the Homeric songs, who had not looked at a maxim of Theogenes as addressed to him. It is just this powerful influence of the poets, and the world of myth of which they treated, on the moral ideals of the people, that gave these ideals a stability which, in concrete instances, would otherwise be surprising and inexplicable. Indeed, on this influence rests, in no small degree, the truth of the saying of Aristotle, so strikingly characteristic of the Greeks, that 'poetry is more philosophical and more serious than history.'"

In the review of my book, in vol. i. pp. 256, 257 of this journal (January, 1891), Mr. Davidson has combated the fundamental thought expressed in the foregoing paragraph. Ac-

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cording to him, it is as impossible to set up a unified ethics of Greece as it would be to delineate one of England or of France. The great differences of time and the great difference between individual provinces, he thinks, prevent this.

But this objection leaves out of sight the immense importance which the difference of nationalities had for the life of antiquity, whose development followed in this respect quite other laws than those of modern times. Not only religions, customs, and tastes, but also moral ideas, divided individual nations; while, within the nations themselves, they were a common bond, uniting together their comrades who lived away from them, and also their ancestors and posterity. And for this reason I like to look upon my work as an introduction to comparative ethics, as defined by Professor Höffding in his "Ethik."* To carry on this preliminary task, it would be necessary to do for the Egyptians, the Persians, the Jews, and the Romans, what I have attempted to do for the Greeks; for though Ihering's "Geist des römischen Rechtes" offers much that is valuable with regard to the Romans, there is yet need of a comprehensive summary of their ethical ideal.

In a study of the ethics of the Greeks only those conceptions, of course, can be taken account of which have been formed within the great current of their national civilization, and have governed the minds of the people. The imperfection of our knowledge of facts has, along with its disadvantages, certain advantages, enabling us better to fix our attention on the important and characteristic features of the national spirit. In the fifth and fourth centuries before Christ there were some provinces, perhaps, in the highly divided Greece, where homage was still paid to a crude religious fetichism, where men were not averse to human sacrifices, and where wholesale robbery and theft were regarded as harmless; but

* Professor Höffding writes (page 7 of the German translation): "Historic or comparative ethics seeks to present positive morality as it appears in a given time and among a given people; it seeks to prove what development positive morality undergoes under differing conditions, and to compare the several forms it may assume at different times among different peoples."

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the thought of such a possible state of things must not divert our attention from the ideals of life prevalent in those regions within which the historic mission of Greece fulfilled itself. In giving an account of the moral ideas of Christian Europe in the nineteenth century, it would not be necessary to modify essentially the ideas held in respect to property and state supremacy, merely because the population of Calabria, for a long period, saw nothing wrong in the encouragement of robbery, or because a great part of Sicily allowed itself to be influenced by the Mafia rather than by the lawful authority of the state. Moreover, it must not be forgotten that morality has to do, not with the actual conduct of men, but with the standards according to which one estimates the desires and deeds of others and of one's self, if the latter is made the subject of conscious reflection. And in most parts of Greece the moral standards were undoubtedly more uniform than the habits of life. Mr. Davidson maintains, though hardly with justice, that the morality of Corinth and that of Sybaris was altogether different from that of Athens or Sparta. In all probability an intelligent Sybarite estimated virtues, which he did not practise and rarely saw, as well as faults he himself committed and frequently met with, not otherwise than the Athenian, whose surroundings were quite different from his own; for nothing is truer than the saying of Plato (Laws, 12, 950*b*.): *Οὐ γὰρ ὅσον οὐσίας ἀρετῆς ἀπεσφαλμένοι τυγχάνουσιν οἱ πολλοί, τοσοῦτον καὶ τοῦ κρίνειν τοὺς ἄλλους οἱ πονηροὶ καὶ ἄχρηστοι. θεῖον δέ τι καὶ εὔστυχον ἔνεστι καὶ τοῖσι κακοῖς. ὥστε πάμπολλοι καὶ τῶν σφόδρα κακῶν εὖ τοῖς λόγοις καὶ ταῖς δόξαις διαιροῦνται τοὺς ἀμείνους τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τοὺς χείρονας.**

Differences of time are undeniably of far greater importance in moral considerations than those of locality. It is quite in place here to ask whether a treatment, comprising the moral ideas of all periods, ought not to be replaced by one ar-

* "For the many are not so far wrong in their judgment of who are bad and who are good, as they are removed from the nature of virtue in themselves. Even bad men have a divine instinct which guesses rightly, and very many who are utterly depraved form correct notions and judgments about the difference of good and bad."—*Jowett's translation.*

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ranged according to periods which would separate the Homeric age from the centuries that elapsed between Solon and Aristotle, and that, again, from the post-Aristotelian period. But, in attempting to carry out such a task, greater difficulties would arise than one at the first glance would expect; for, in spite of the differences in their conditions of life and in their ideals, there is yet much upon which their minds are united, from the time of Homer down to the rise of the Roman emperors. Homer stands on the threshold of a social development which goes on uninterruptedly till the time of Plutarch, who was the last person of whom we have any knowledge, who felt like a genuine Greek. The expressions of this development are by no means confined to practical views of life and to literary taste. For the first trace of that sense of symmetrical arrangement and plastic art, which culminated in the master-work of the Acropolis of Athens, may already be recognized in the description of the shield of Achilles in the Iliad.* The peculiar national type of Greece is stamped on everything, and in the realm of moral ideas it is more important to keep in view this type than to lay stress on the changes of different periods. Even the philosophers, at least until Aristotle's time, were subject to this common type, although they opposed in many details the popular ideas. Plato especially offers, in this respect, a distinct proof of the German proverb, "Niemand kann aus seiner Haut springen."

First of all, we must take into consideration the fact that the moral ideas are indissolubly bound up with the most primitive and most striking production of the national spirit, viz., with language. The meaning and motives of moral judgments can often be recognized only by reference to the words chosen to express them. No language, perhaps, is so rich as the Greek in finely shaded means of expressing praise and blame, and, although in the course of time these words have not remained unchanged in their meaning or in the frequency

* This has been justly pointed out by Professor Brunn in his treatise, "Die Kunst bei Homer und ihr Verhältniss zu den Anfängen der griechischen Kunstgeschichte."

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of their use,—indeed, though they partly owe their finer and more perfect signification to the people of Attica,—they are yet, as a whole, common national property of the first rank, and all judgments of the Greeks are influenced by the world of thought expressed by them. The variety of principles which are authoritative for approval or disapproval are unmistakably reflected in them. At one time the attention is directed more towards man as a whole, at another more towards individual action. Right conduct appears now as that which conforms to the will of the gods, and now as that which is obedient to the civil order, and now again as that which rejoices and inspires the human heart. It is also frequently treated as being the outcome of a normal mental constitution, of moral delicacy, of inherited disposition, or of thorough education. The blame for wrong conduct, on the other hand, is generally based on opposite suppositions, and not seldom implies pitiful conditions or expresses various degrees of condemnation. Yet language by no means establishes fixed limits between the different points of view referred to above. It rather favors their flowing into each other. Thus, the facts show clearly that the popular mind of Greece held up, as the basis of valuation, a moral ideal which was approved by the gods, corresponded with the social order, made a deep impression upon the people, and recognized personal worth; although contemplation dwelt now more on one aspect and now more on another. Few things mark more clearly the dependence of posterity on the heritage of their ancestors than the way in which the philosophers use a word to designate virtue which the older poets use to embrace everything that gives a person or a thing special value (ἀρετή). Consequently the idea of moral worth implied that of value. It is perhaps the greatest defect of my book that I did not consider the technical language of good and evil at the beginning of the whole work, instead of in the concluding chapter of the first volume, in order to make clear from the beginning the meaning of the Greek expressions of valuation, and their connection with the national cast of mind.

If we turn away from this important and essential aspect

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of ethical development, to the psychological, social, and religious conditions of life, and to the details of moral demands, it will be readily noticed that there is more resemblance than difference between the poetry of Homer and the Attic period. No doubt a man of the Homeric age is not conditioned in all his relations, like the man of the Attic period, by the civil community to which he belongs, but he is always conscious that civilization and the legal order of the state are inseparable and almost synonymous terms. No doubt the Greek of the Homeric age does not share the convictions of the contemporaries of Solon and Plato about combining into a unit all the generations of a family by connecting the living descendants and the ancestors who abide in Hades; but he, too, thinks it necessary to pay special honor to the dead. The views prevailing in Homer's time are almost wholly identical in numerous other points with those of the historic period. In both periods the belief in a recompensing and avenging justice of the gods forms the basis of religion. One of the main-springs of moral action at both times, was the judgment of their fellow-men, connected with the memory of those who had filled prominent positions in the past. Indeed, even that fine distinction which Attic authors make between the two related but not identical emotions of αἰδώς and αἰσχύνη is not foreign to the Homeric poems.

The tendency to choose a term to express conscience that implied a judging self accompanying the acting self as spectator, and to regard its verdict with similar respect as the opinions of others, is common both to the language of Homer and of Attica. According to the Homeric usage, consciousness (εἰδέναι) is identical with conscience, and to say that one knows what is equitable or unjust expresses a national mode of thought which appears in various forms, and in its last theoretical conclusion in the ethical rationalism of Sokrates. It is a truth recognized in the Odyssey as well as in the philosophy of Attica that the ability to distinguish good from evil is the characteristic of manly maturity. The conception of evil in the Attic period was largely under the influence of the Homeric conception of Ate and is brought out most fully in Æschylus.

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One of the peculiarities of the intellectual life of the Greeks is the high value which they attached to emulation as an important stimulus to activity in all spheres of life. That this view was already peculiar to the Homeric world, is not only shown by the races held at Scheria and Ithaca, and in the camp of the Achaians before Troy, but also by the advice with which, in the Iliad, Hippolochos parts from his son, namely, that he should always try to be the first and to surpass his rival. In Homer, as later, the monogamic marriage distinguishes the customs of the Greeks from those of the barbarians. In both periods the defence of the native country (recommended in a typical way by a saying of Hector in the Iliad), the sacredness of the oath, the considerate protection of guests, were regarded to be primary duties. In both periods it was held obligatory that the suppliant who uttered his petitions in the solemn form of ἱκεσία should not be injured without penalty, and that the common meal was a sacred religious bond. Similarly the truly Greek conception that the veritable ideal of friendship can only be realized by two friends is at the basis of Homer's description of the relation between Achilles and Patroklus, as well as of the utterances of the philosophers relating to this subject.

But perhaps it may be objected, that although the centuries from Homer to Aristotle are connected by an abundance of similar views, the victory of the Macedonian military monarchy marks the beginning of a new epoch. It weakened the feeling of membership in the civil community, which was organized on a religious basis and bound together like a family, and which had hitherto occupied the central place in the moral consciousness. This objection would be perfectly valid, if, soon after Alexander the Great, all Greeks had become Stoic or Epicurean philosophers. But however much, in course of time, the influence of the schools had grown, they by no means exclusively or even predominantly determined the total character of the age. Generally, it is in the nature of ethical development that an epoch is never exclusively under the dominion of a single moral tendency; its main current is opposed in some way by a counter-current;

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or it may be that views destined to prevail later on are now in their initiatory stages, or that the currents which have been wholly checked have left their after-effects. It will be readily noticed that in this ideal of life, after which the Homeric Greek fashioned the image of his gods, the slow beginnings of the later Epicurean conception are portrayed, as well as a certain undervaluation of the power of impulse, which is apparent in the judgments of the Attic writers and contains a germ of the Stoic mode of thought; also, that the individual-eudemonistic philosophy of life is already foreshadowed in the systems of much older philosophers. But more important is the fact that the ideas prevalent in the prime of Greece continued to exist and to have an influence through a series of centuries. They were no longer so closely and intimately connected as in the classical period, and their efficiency was therefore weakened and unequal in intensity, but they were by no means immediately displaced by a different view of the universe. The *polis*, it is true, ceased to be the centre of all human existence; but its forms continued to live, and it still remained an object of attachment, and, in some cases, of devotion. Religious worship was no longer so much as before felt to be interwoven with political life; the number of those increased who turned aside from it, but for the majority it still remained the medium of a blissful intercourse with the gods, and the repugnant instances of the deification of men —the worst effects of vanishing republicanism—remained isolated. The duties and cares of family life commanded the same respect as formerly. They received growing attention with the decrease of public interest.

Although the number of non-philosophic works, preserved from those centuries, which might supply us with the necessary information, is not considerable, they still suffice to confirm the above statement and enable us to see that the destructive feature of their average mode of thought lies in the way in which the moral ideas prevalent in the preceding period still continue to have influence in a weakened form. It is not the positive predominance of a new kind of sentiment or judgment, but the absence of a specifically national

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shade of thought, that distinguishes the numerous moral reflections of Polybius from those of Thukydides, Xenophon, and Isokrates. Even the way in which this historian makes Tyche interfere with human destiny is mostly due to a weakened adherence to the ancient Greek conception of retribution. For only very rarely does he make her the guardian of an historical teleology by tracing the growth of the Roman power, considered as benefiting mankind, to her special contrivance. The epigrams of Greek anthology lead us among men whose love of family, whose reverence for their dead, whose gratitude towards the gods, are of the same nature as those of the Attic citizens of the fifth and fourth centuries; yet with the latter it is not so perceptible as with the former, that their family life and their worship was based on a political community. Many peculiarities in the fables of Babrius indicate the continuing effects in the late centuries of the ethical ideals of Greece during her prime.

Even the different forms of philosophic thought of the period of which we speak stood in nowise in so sharp a contrast with the prevailing modes of thought of the preceding centuries as did the philosophy of the Stoics and Epicureans. That of the Peripatetics approaches it much closer. For not only does the founder of this school in his ethical considerations start from the question as to what is actually approved of by men, recognizing thus the voice of the people as the natural and proper judge, and sees in the welfare of the state the end of life, but also in the successive development of the doctrines of his school one notices a remarkable divergence from the Stoic teaching at a point on which both seemingly agree. The love of the human race is laid down as a law by both schools, but the Stoics demand it with absolute indifference to the smaller communities to which a man belongs; the Peripatetics, on the contrary, demand it on the basis that as the household of the family is to expand into that of the state, so the latter is to expand into that of mankind. The Peripatetics consequently adhere to and build upon the view of the older Greece, according to which the family and the state form the true values of life.

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The individualistic hedonism of the Stoic and Epicurean systems is evidently the natural theoretical outcome of the intellectual condition of an age in which the moral fellowship of the civil community had ceased to supply the full meaning to human life, while as yet no other centre gave a new aim to the age. He, therefore, who investigates in every age those elements of mental development which contain the germs of future promise and in which an historical progress is going on, will be obliged, in considering the Hellenic age, to place those two schools into the foreground. But he who attempts to unite into one comprehensive picture the moral ideas that form the character of a people, must also, in this period, seek to find what it has in common with early Greece. Just as the expounder of ancient art is often enabled to recognize the character of a statue of the prime of Greek art by following its copies into the period of the Roman empire, so the historian of ethics must also follow ethical ideas on beyond the time when they acted with undiminished vigor and completeness. And if, as a result, a strict boundary line to them in time becomes impossible, this would agree with the general nature of intellectual development. The peculiar stability of the Southern peoples, in connection with the traditional character of Greek literature, enabled the older mode of thought and sentiment to extend over a long period.

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THE PROBLEM OF UNSECTARIAN MORAL INSTRUCTION.*

IT will be the object of the present course of lectures to give in outline the subject-matter of moral instruction for children of the school age, and to discuss the methods by which this kind of instruction should be imparted. At the outset, however, we are confronted by what certainly is a grave, and what seems to many an insuperable, difficulty. It is the firm conviction of many serious persons that morality depends on religious sanction, and that rules of right conduct can be taught neither to adults nor to the young, except in the name and under the authority of some religious belief. To such persons the very name of unsectarian or independent morality seems to savor of infidelity. It seems to them that the attempt to accomplish, without the aid of religion, what has always been regarded as the most precious prerogative and the most valuable service of religion to mankind, is tantamount to an attack on religion, and argues a deliberate design to depose it from the position of pre-eminence which it has heretofore occupied. The friends of unsectarian morality are chargeable with no such secret machinations; they are not necessarily either irreligious or anti-religious. In fact, as will appear later on, the principle of unsectarian moral teaching may be made to rest on purely educational grounds, with which the religious bias of the educator has nothing whatever to do. But there are also grounds of expediency, which in the United States compel us to face the problem of unsectarian moral education, and to these let us first devote attention. Admit *argumenti causa* the justice of the proposition that moral truths must be taught in the name of some form of religious

* Introductory lecture of a course on Moral Instruction, given before the School of Applied Ethics at Plymouth, Mass., July 3, 1891. [The complete course of sixteen lectures will be published by D. Appleton & Co., New York.]

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belief, the question at once arises, To which form of religious belief shall we give the preference? I am speaking now of the public schools of the United States. The public schools are supported out of the general fund of taxation, to which all the citizens are compelled alike to contribute. It will clearly be an act of gross injustice to compel a citizen of one denomination to pay for instilling the doctrine of another denomination into the minds of the young, in other words, to support and assist in spreading religious ideas in which he does not believe. This would be doing violence to the rights of private conscience, and the act of injustice would become simply monstrous if a parent were compelled to aid in instilling religious opinions, to him repugnant, into the minds of his children. There is no state religion in the United States. All shades of belief and of disbelief are on a par. There are in this country Jews, Catholics, Episcopalians, Presbyterians, Methodists, Baptists, and Christians of other names. They are alike citizens. They contribute alike to the maintenance of the public system of education. With what show of fairness, then, can the belief of any one of these churches be adopted by the state for the purpose of inculcating moral truths into the minds of the pupils? The case seems, on the face of it, a hopeless one. But the following devices have been suggested to remove, or rather circumvent, the difficulty.

The first device is, that representatives of the various theistic churches (including Catholics, Protestants, and Jews) shall meet in concert, agree to eliminate all the differences by which they are divided, and formulate a common platform, containing only such articles of belief as they can agree upon. This platform would include, for example, the belief in the Deity, the belief in the immortality of the soul, and the belief in future reward and punishment; and upon it as a foundation the edifice of moral instruction might then be erected. There are, however, two obvious objections to this proposal. In the first place, this *Dreibund* of Catholicism, Protestantism, and Judaism would leave out of account entirely the party of the agnostics, whose views may be indeed erroneous, who may be the objects, in turn, of compassion and detestation, but whose

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rights as citizens must, nevertheless, be respected. *Neminem læde*—"hurt no one"—is a cardinal rule of justice, and should be observed by the friends of religion in their dealings with their opponents as well as with one another. The agnostic party has attained considerable proportions in this country; but if it had not, if there were only a single citizen who held its opinions, it would still be inexcusable on the part of the majority to attempt to trample on his rights. In respect to political differences, the majority rules, and must rule; in respect to religious differences, the smallest minority possesses rights on which even an overwhelming majority, arrayed on the other side, cannot afford to trespass. It is one of the most noted achievements of the American commonwealths, that they have so clearly and distinctly separated between the domain of religion and of politics,—in the one case adopting the maxim of coercion, in the other case allowing the full measure of individual liberty.

But the second objection is even more cogent. It is proposed to eliminate the differences which divide the various churches, and to formulate their points of agreement. But the life of a religion is usually to be found precisely in those points in which it differs from its neighbor, and an abstract shadowy scheme of religious belief, such as has been sketched, would, in truth, satisfy no one. Out of respect to the sentiments of the Jews, it is proposed to omit the doctrines of the divine Saviour and of the Atonement. Again, out of respect to the Protestants, it is proposed to omit the distinctive Roman Catholic doctrines, such as the efficacy of prayer to the Virgin and the saints. But to eliminate the distinctive doctrines of the different sects would be to eliminate what many regard as the most essential part of their faith, and consequently the part they hold to be particularly important as a basis for the proper moral instruction of the young. When one affirms his desire to base the moral teaching of the young on religious belief, does he not bear in mind, above all and before all, those religious beliefs which are to him dearer than any other, in which the life-blood of his faith pulsates? This first device, therefore, is to be rejected. It implies a gross

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injustice to the agnostics, and it will never content the really religious minds of any denomination. It will be acceptable only to the class of so-called rationalists or theists pure and simple, whose creed is practically limited to the three articles mentioned: the belief in Deity, immortality, and future punishment and reward. But this class constitutes a comparatively small portion of the community, and they have no right, under the specious plea of reconciling the various creeds, in effect, to force their own creed upon the rest of the community.

The second device seems to promise better results; it provides that religious and moral instruction combined shall be given in the public schools by clergymen of the several denominations, or, at any rate, by persons appointed by the church authorities. The pupils, divided into Catholics, Protestants, and Jews, are assembled in separate class-rooms. The high authority of Germany is invoked in favor of that system. The president of a leading American university has spoken in its favor. It is likely that an attempt will be made to introduce it in this country. Already in some of our public institutions, reformatory schools, for example, religious services are held by the ministers of the various sects for the benefit of those inmates of the institution who belong to their sect, and we may expect that an analogous arrangement will be proposed for the common schools. It will be necessary, therefore, to pay some attention to the German system, and to explain the reasons which have induced or compelled the German government to adopt the compromise above referred to.

In Germany, church and state are united. The King of Prussia is the head of the Evangelical Church. This constitutes a vital difference between America and Germany. Secondly, in Germany the schools existed before the state took charge of them. The school system was founded by the church, and, for instance, in Prussia, the problem was how to convert church schools into state schools. The attempt was made to do this by limiting the influence of the clergy to certain branches and certain hours of instruction, and securing the supremacy of the state in respect to all other branches

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and all other hours. In America, the state founded the schools *ab initio.* In Germany, the state has encroached upon the church, has entered church schools, and reconstructed them in its own interest. In this country the church is trying to encroach upon the state, is seeking to enter into state schools, and subordinate them to its own purposes. The example of Germany cannot, therefore, be quoted as a precedent in point. The system of compromise in Germany marks an advance in the direction of increasing state influence. Its adoption in this country would make a retrograde movement in increasing church influence.

Nor is the system, when considered on its own merits, a happy one. Professor Gneist, in his valuable treatise "Die Konfessionelle Schule" (to which I refer those who desire to inform themselves on the historical evolution of the Prussian system), maintains that scientific instruction must be unsectarian, and that religious instruction must be sectarian. I agree to both propositions. But to my mind it follows that, if religious instruction must be sectarian, it ought to have no place in state schools, at least in a country where the separation of church and state is complete. Moreover, the kind of religious instruction provided for in the Prussian scheme can never satisfy the earnest sectarian. He demands, and, by the logic of his faith, he is compelled to demand, that the religious influence should permeate the entire school. The Catholic, for example, demands that history be taught from the Catholic point of view; that reading-books be filled with Catholic legends; that the science-teaching be subordinated, and, if you like, mutilated to fit requirements of Catholic doctrine. Of what avail is it to allow the Catholic priest to come in twice or three times a week and teach the catechism to the Catholic pupils, if the rest of the instruction given in the school is wholly beyond his control, and informed by a spirit alien to his own? This kind of compromise can never be heartily endorsed. It may be accepted under pressure, but will always be submitted to under protest.

The third arrangement suggested is, that each sect should build its own schools, and draw upon the fund supplied by

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taxation according to the number of children which it educates. This seems just, but is not really so. Take the case of the Catholic population in New York; there are, perhaps, 100,000 children of the school age. It would follow that the Catholic parochial school would receive from the public treasury an amount sufficient for teaching 100,000 pupils. The state might prescribe certain rules and set up certain standards to which the school must conform; it might also send its inspectors into the schools and thus attempt to secure obedience. But there are two objections to this system. In the first place, it is the experience of history that in sectarian schools religious interest is accentuated and secular knowledge comparatively neglected. As an instance of this, the provision of the school regulations at Kur-Hessen after 1848 required that twenty hours weekly be devoted to religious teaching in the public schools. And the power of sects and their influence, direct and indirect, is such, that the state inspectors would be helpless in the face of their opposition. The rules and regulations laid down by the state would simply not be enforced.

In the second place, the purpose for which the public school exists would be defeated. The sectarian schools tend to separate the members of one denomination from those of others, to prevent the growth of that national unit which it is the very business of the public school to create and foster. State support of public education is justified as a measure dictated by the instinct of self-preservation on the part of the state, and this is especially true in a republic. In a monarchy, the strong arm of a reigning dynasty, supported by the ruling class, may keep the discordant elements of the state together by force, as to some extent we can see in Austria to-day. In a republic the spirit of unity among the people alone can keep them one people. This spirit is fostered in those schools in which children of all classes and sects are assembled, and in which they are indoctrinated into the history, traditions, and aspirations of the nation.

We return to our problem. If sectarian schools are impracticable, then there is clearly no way remaining by which a

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morality based on religious belief can be taught. The only alternative would be to leave morality out of the scheme of instruction altogether, and this alternative has actually been adopted. A slight pretence is indeed made to inculcate religion by means of the morning exercises in the public schools. But this is so inefficacious as to be unworthy of being seriously taken into account. The Protestant Bible in the schools is equivalent to raising the Protestant flag above the schools. It is simply a demonstration, nothing more. But the teaching of morals ought not to be left out of the curriculum. How can we leave out the most important branch of instruction? How very important it is, will be, I trust, apparent in the course of these lectures. I may be permitted to take it for granted at present.

How, then, can we impart moral instruction in such a way as to satisfy all parties, in such a way as not to give offence to any religious belief, or any religious believer, nor to do violence to the rights of the agnostic, or of any sect or of any party whatever? The correct answer to this question will be the solution of the problem of unsectarian moral education. I can merely announce my answer to-day; the entire remainder of the course before us must substantiate it.

The answer is this: It is the business of the moral instructor in the school to deliver to his pupil the subject-matter of morality, but not to deal with the sanctions of it; to give his pupils a clear understanding of what is right and what is wrong, but not to enter into the question why the right should be done and the wrong avoided. Let us suppose that the teacher is dealing with veracity. He says to his pupil: Thou shalt not lie. He takes it for granted that the pupil feels the force of this commandment, and ought to yield obedience to it. A young child that should ask me, Why ought I not to lie? I should suspect of quibbling and dishonest intentions. I would hold up to the child the *ought* in all its awful majesty. The right to reason about these matters cannot be considered until after the mind has attained a certain maturity. And, as a matter of fact, every good child agrees with me unhesitatingly when I say, It is wrong to lie. There is an answer-

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ing echo in its heart that confirms my words. But what, then, is my business as a moral instructor? In the first place, to deepen the impression of the wrongfulness of a lie and the sacredness of truth, by the very solemnity with which I speak the words, by the spirit in which I approach the subject. My first business is to convey the spirit of moral reverence to my pupils. In the next place, I ought to quicken the pupils' perceptions as to what is right and wrong; in this case, as to what is a lie and what is not. I enumerate the different species of lies: the direct lie, the lie of equivocation, the lie of partial statements, the lie which is conveyed without the use of language, through silence and by mien and gesture. In other words, I ought to make my pupils see that whenever they intentionally convey a false impression, they are lying. I ought to make their conscience sensitive on this point, so that they may avoid those numerous ambiguities of which children are so fond, and which are practised even by many adults. I ought to invigorate the moral nature of my pupils with respect to truthfulness. In the next place, I ought to point out to them the most frequent motives which lead to lying, so that by being on their guard against the cause, they may escape the evil effect. Cowardice, for example, is one cause of lying; by making the pupil ashamed of cowardice we can often cure him of the tendency to falsehood. An unpruned imagination is another cause of lying, envy is another cause, so, too, is selfishness in all its forms. Direct the pupil's attention to the various evil tendencies in his nature which tempt him into the ways of falsehood.

Again, finally, I ought to explain to my pupils the consequences of falsehood: the loss of the confidence of our fellowmen, which is the immediate and palpable result of being detected in a falsehood, the general loosening of the bonds of mutual trust in society at large, the loss of self-respect on the part of the liar, the fatal necessity of multiplying lies and of inventing new falsehoods to make good the first. A vast amount of good can be done in this way in stimulating the moral faculty, enabling the pupil to discriminate the finer shades of right and wrong, helping him to trace temptation to its sources,

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and erecting in his mind barriers against evil-doing formed of a realizing sense of the consequences of evil-doing.

The same general method may be followed with respect to all the other chief heads of practical morality. The conscience can be enlightened, strengthened, and always without once raising the question why it is wrong to tell a lie. That it is wrong should rather, as I have said, be assumed. The ultimate sources of moral obligation need never be discussed at all. It is the business of religion and philosophy to make affirmations with respect to these ultimate sources and sanctions. Religion says: We ought to do right because it is the will of God that we should, or for the love of Christ. Philosophy says: We should do right for utilitarian reasons or transcendental reasons, or in obedience to the law of evolution, or what not. The moral teacher, fortunately, is not called upon to choose between these various metaphysical or theological asseverations. He may subscribe to the one or the other of them individually; but as a teacher he is to remain within the safe limits of his own proper province. He is not to explain why we should do the right, but to make the young, who are intrusted to his charge, see more clearly what is right, and instil into them his own love and respect for the right. There is a great body of moral truth upon which all good men, of whatever sect or opinion, are agreed. It is the business of the public schools to deliver to their pupils this body of moral truths,—but, I must beg you carefully to note,—to deliver it, not in the style of a preacher, but according to the methods of the pedagogue; that is, in a systematic way, moral lessons being graded to suit the varying ages and capacities of the pupils, and the illustrative material being selected and arranged accordingly. Conceive that the modern educational methods have been applied to the stock of moral truths accepted by all good men, and you will have the material for the moral lessons which a public school ought to supply.

FELIX ADLER.

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THE THEORY OF PUNISHMENT.*

THERE was a time when the notion that blood demands blood was held so firmly and so crudely that little distinction was made between intentional and unintentional acts of homicide. Ancient law abounds in traces of this inveterate instinct of primitive humanity. We see the legislator of the Pentateuch endeavoring to limit its operation by the institution of Cities of Refuge, whose walls protected the unintentional homicide against further pursuit by the avenger of blood. We see the same inability to distinguish between voluntary and involuntary homicide in the curious notions of the Canon Law (still, perhaps, theoretically in force) about the "irregularity" contracted by consecrated persons and consecrated places through the most unwitting bloodshed, and not contracted by the most atrocious violence which involves no physical effusion of blood. We see the same curious but once useful superstition in the old law of Deodand, which required the forfeiture of the inanimate object or the irrational animal which had, in the most accidental way, been the instrument of man's death. Thus even the horse from which a fatal fall had been sustained, or the boat from which a man had drowned himself, were made the subjects of this peculiar application of retributive justice. At the present day the cruder forms of this old-world cry of blood for blood are no longer heard; but what is, perhaps, after all only a more refined form of the same fundamental notion lingers in the theory which makes the primary object of punishment to be retribution. A man has done wrong, therefore for that reason and for no other, it is said, let him be punished. Punishment, we are told, is an end in itself,—not a means to any end beyond itself. Punishment looks to the past, not to the future. The guilt of the offence must be, in

* The substance of this paper was preached as an Assize Sermon at St. Mary's, Oxford, in February, 1891.

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some mysterious way, wiped out by the suffering of the offender, and that obliteration or cancelling of the guilt-stained record, be it noticed, is conceived of as quite independent of any effect to be produced upon the sufferer by his bodily or mental pain. For, the moment we insist upon the effect produced upon the sufferer's soul by his punishment, the retributive theory is deserted for the reformatory or the deterrent.

"Juridical punishment," says Kant, "can never be administered merely as a means for promoting another good, either with regard to the criminal himself or to civil society, but must in all cases be imposed, only because the individual on whom it is inflicted has committed a crime. . . . . The penal law is a categorical imperative; and woe to him who creeps through the serpent-windings of utilitarianism to discover some advantage that may discharge him from the justice of punishment, or even the due measure of it!" He goes on to defend the *lex talionis* as the only just principle for the allotment of penalty to crime, and to make the famous declaration that, "if a civil society resolved to dissolve itself with the consent of all its members (so that punishment would be no longer required for deterrent purposes), the last murderer lying in the prison ought to be executed before the resolution was carried out." *

There you have the retributive theory propounded by the prince of modern philosophers; and it is still defended by philosophers and philosophic jurists in Germany, England, and America. For most of us, whether or not we have consciously abandoned the theory, this view exercises but little influence over our ideas of *human* justice, though it is to be feared that it still casts a black shadow over men's conceptions of that future punishment, which reason compels the Theist to expect for unrepented sin.

It is difficult to argue against a theory whose truth or falsehood must be decided for each of us by an appeal to his own moral consciousness,—by the answer which he gives to the simple question whether he does or does not in his best

* Kant's "Philosophy of Law," E. T. by Hastie, 1887, p. 195 ff.

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moments feel this mysterious demand that moral guilt should be atoned by physical pain. That the sight of wrong-doing—particularly when it takes the form of cruelty—does inspire a sentiment of indignant resentment in healthy minds, and that it is right and reasonable that in all legal ways that sentiment should be gratified, no sensible person will deny. But that is only because experience shows that the infliction of pain upon offenders is one of the most effectual ways—and in some cases the only effectual way—of producing amendment. The question is whether, *apart* from its effects, there would be any moral propriety in the mere infliction of pain for pain's sake. A wrong has been done—say, a crime of brutal violence; by that act a double evil has been introduced into the world. There has been so much physical pain for the victim, and so much moral evil has polluted the offender's soul. Is the case made any better by the addition of a third evil,—the pain of the punished offender, which *ex hypothesi* is to do him no moral good whatever? If, as enlightened philanthropists sometimes seem to imagine, the direct effect of all punishment that really is punishment were to inspire the offender and others with a passionate desire to repeat the offence,—if in our prisons a liberal diet, genial society, free communication with the outside world, artistic cells, abundant leisure and varied amusement were found in practice to be more deterrent and more reformatory than solitude and plank bed, skilly and the narrow exercising yard, would the philosopher of Königsberg himself have forbidden the institution of a code of graduated rewards for our present barbaric system of pain-giving punishments?

Perhaps the simplest way of satisfying ourselves that it is impossible to reconcile the intuitive theory of punishment, either with the actual practice of our courts or with any practicable system of judicial administration, will be to notice a modification of the theory by Mr. Herbert Bradley. Mr. Bradley seems to be so much struck with the obvious disproportion between the moral and the legal aspect of various offences, that he actually gives up the doctrine that the *amount* of punishment should correspond with the amount of the offence,

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while still maintaining that punishment in general is justified only by the past sin, not by the future advantage.

"We pay the penalty because we owe it, and for no other reason; and if punishment is inflicted for any other reason whatever, than because it is merited by wrong, it is a gross immorality, a crying injustice, an abominable crime, and not what it pretends to be. We may have regard for whatever considerations we please,—our own convenience, the good of society, the benefit of the offender; we are fools, and worse, if we fail to do so. Having once the right to punish, we may modify the punishment according to the useful and the pleasant, but these are external to the matter; they can give us no right to punish, and nothing can do that but criminal desert. . . . Yes, in spite of sophistry, and in the face of sentimentalism, with well-nigh the whole body of our self-styled enlightenment against them, our people believe to this day that *punishment is inflicted for the sake of punishment*," etc. *

Now, in the first place, is this consistent? If punishment is "modified" for utilitarian reasons, does not that mean that it is inflicted partly for retribution and partly for some other reason? If so, we do not pay the penalty because we owe it, *and for no other reason.* And, secondly, is it logical? If sin by itself confers the right and imposes the duty of punishment, there must be a right to inflict either a definite amount of punishment or an infinite amount. If the latter, it is obvious that the state will always have the right to inflict any quantity of punishment it pleases upon any of its citizens at any time, since all have sinned and incurred thereby unlimited liability to punishment. "Use every man according to his deserts, and who should 'scape whipping?" Such a contention would render the whole theory nugatory. If, on the other hand, wrong-doing confers a right to inflict a merely limited amount of punishment, Mr. Bradley is open to the following objections:

(1) How can this amount be fixed? How can moral guilt be expressed in terms of physical pain? To any one who believes that punishment is justified by its effects, the right or just amount of punishment is that which will best serve the ends for which punishment exists,—*i.e.*, deterrence and reformation. But how, apart from its end, can the amount of punishment due to each offence be fixed? I find in my

* "Ethical Studies," 1876, pp. 25, 26.

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own mind no intuitions on the subject, and believe that if we were all to sit down and attempt to write out lists of crimes, with the number of lashes of the cat or months of imprisonment which they intrinsically merit, we should find the task an extremely difficult one, and should arrive at very discordant results. At all events, such a task would be hopelessly out of harmony with the actual practice of the most enlightened tribunals. It is obvious that drunkenness in a "gentleman" will often be, morally speaking, as culpable as burglary in an hereditary criminal. But it is not so much the practical as the theoretical impossibility of the task that I wish to emphasize. The idea of expressing moral guilt in the terms of cat or birch-rod, gallows or pillory, hard labor or penal servitude, seems to be essentially and intrinsically unmeaning. I can see no commensurability between the two things.

(2) Assuming this difficulty removed, it is clear that when the proper amount of punishment has been inflicted, the right to punish has been exhausted. If any further punishment is inflicted for utilitarian reasons, it will be simply, as Mr. Bradley premises, so much unjustifiable cruelty. If forty stripes save one is the proper punishment for any offence, the fortieth will be simply a common assault, no matter whether it is inflicted by the private individual or by the public executioner.

(3) The only way of escape open to Mr. Bradley would be to contend that though the state may not for utilitarian reasons increase, it may for utilitarian reasons reduce the ideally just punishment. The position is obviously an arbitrary one, and it is open to this objection: it involves the admission that in all cases wrong-doing confers a right, but does not impose a duty of punishment. Can it be moral that society, if it might, without failure in duty, remit punishment, should punish just because it pleases so to do? This would be to admit that whether we shall punish or not is to be determined by mere caprice. So, if you say that it is duty to punish, except where utilitarian considerations demand that less than the ideal amount should be inflicted, you practically admit that whether any punishment should be inflicted at all, and how much, must be determined by utilitarian considerations.

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The theory of an intuitive command to punish will have reduced itself to the somewhat barren assertion that you have no right to punish except where there has been wrong-doing. This is a proposition which it is hard to dispute, since, as a general rule, the public purpose is served by hanging the wrong man. There are, however, cases where it must be admitted that suffering may lawfully be inflicted on innocent persons,—*e.g.*, where a barony or a hundred is made to pay compensation to persons injured in a riot, or where a savage village that has sheltered a murderer is burnt by a European man-of-war. These are two exceptional crises in which it is necessary, in the interests of society, to be less exacting in the matter of evidence than a civilized state ought to be in quiet times.

We are here, however, straying into difficult and disputable questions of ethics, and it is best to be content with simply pointing out that when we have applied to the theory the qualifications which are demanded by the obvious facts, it is reduced to very modest limits. It amounts simply to the assertion that punishment should be inflicted only on the guilty; it admits that in its infliction the legislator should be governed by utilitarian considerations, that is, by the end which punishment actually serves.

From the point of view which we have hitherto been taking, the retributive theory will appear to most of us a mere survival of by-gone modes of thought. Yet, as is often the case with theories on whose vitality refutation seems to have no effect, the retributive theory of punishment contains a good deal of truth at the bottom of it,—deeper truth perhaps than the Benthamite view, which has taken its place in popular philosophy. There are, I think, three elements of truth which the retributive view of punishment recognizes, and which the ordinary utilitarian view often ignores.

(1) Firstly, it possesses historical truth. It is correct as an explanation of the origin of punishment. Criminal law was in its origin a substitute for private vengeance. That is shown by the Jewish law of homicide, by the Saxon system of Wergilt, and by the Roman law, which punished the thief

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caught red-handed twice as severely as the thief convicted afterwards by evidence taken in cold blood. The theory was that the owner would naturally be twice as angry in the first case as in the second, though, of course, the injury done either to himself or the community would be precisely the same. And this connection between punishment and vengeance is not simply a matter of history. It is still (as Sir Henry Maine has insisted*) one of the purposes of punishment to serve as an outlet, a kind of safety-valve, for the indignation of the community. All laws ultimately depend for their enforcement upon the public sentiment in their favor; hence the legislator cannot afford to take no account of popular sentiment in their administration. There are many features of the modern criminal law which can only be defended on account of the desirability of keeping up a certain proportion between the measure of public indignation and the measure of legal penalty, for instance, the distinction made between accomplished crimes and attempts at crimes which have failed through causes independent of the offender's volition. Public opinion will sanction capital punishment when the blood of a brother man seems to cry for vengeance from the ground; it would not tolerate an execution for an attempted murder which has failed through a pistol missing fire. It may be doubted whether this irrational mode of estimating punishment by the actual and not by the intended effects of an act, is not sometimes carried unnecessarily far, as when, for instance, a magistrate remands a prisoner to see how his victim's wounds progress. Whence it would seem to follow that since a total abstainer's wounds heal sooner than a drunkard's, a man is to be punished more severely for stabbing a drunkard than for stabbing a total abstainer. In ways like this, deference to popular sentiment may be carried too far, but there can be no doubt of the soundness of the principle that the criminal law, while it seeks to guide, must not go too far ahead of popular sentiment, nor yet (as American lynch law occasionally reminds us) lag too far behind it.

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* "Ancient Law," 4th ed., 1870, p. 389.

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(2) The second half-truth held in solution by the retributive theory is the fact that punishment is reformatory as well as plainly deterrent. Very often, indeed, it will be found on examination that those who most loudly clamor for reformatory punishments do not really believe in the reformatory effect of punishment at all. Punishment is necessarily painful, or it ceases to be punishment. Those people who denounce any particular punishment on the ground that it is painful, really mean that you ought to reform criminals *instead of* punishing them. Now, of course, it is the duty of the state to endeavor to reform criminals *as well as* to punish them. But when a man is induced to abstain from crime by the possibility of a better life being brought home to him through the ministrations of a prison chaplain, through education, through a book from the prison library, or the efforts of a Discharged Prisoners' Aid Society, he is not reformed *by punishment* at all. No doubt there are reformatory agencies much more powerful than punishment; and without the cooperation of such agencies it is rarely that punishment makes the criminal into a better man. But it is none the less true that punishment does help to make men better, and not simply to induce them to abstain from punishable acts for fear of the consequences. At first sight this may seem to be a paradox; but it seems so only when we forget that every man has in him a better self, as well as a lower self. And if the lower self is kept down by the terror of punishment, higher motives are able to assert themselves. Fear of punishment protects a man against himself. If in the treatment of criminals we have to think much more of the deterrent than of the reformatory effects of punishment, it is otherwise in education. Fear of punishment by itself will seldom turn an idle boy into a diligent one; but there are few boys who could be trusted to work their best at all times, if in their weaker moments they were not kept to their duty by a modicum of fear; and there are few of us, perhaps, whose conduct would not fall still further behind our own ideal than it actually does, if our better selves were not sometimes re-enforced by fear of punishment, —at least in the form of social disapprobation or loss of repu-

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tation. And in the case of actual crime, that conviction of the external strength of the moral law which punishment brings with it is usually at least the *condition* of moral improvement; though that conviction will not make a man morally better, unless the external judgment is ratified and confirmed by the appellate tribunal of his own conscience. Nevertheless, this external respect for the moral law is the first step to the recognition of its internal, its intrinsic authority.

Plausible as it looks to deny *a priori* that mere pain can produce moral effects, the absurdity of the contention becomes evident when it is seen that it involves the assertion that no external conditions have any moral effect upon character. Yet it is matter of common experience that men's characters are powerfully affected by misfortune, bereavement, poverty, disgrace. Adversity is not, of course, uniformly and necessarily productive of moral improvement. But no one will deny that under certain circumstances and with men of certain temperaments, great moral changes are often produced by calamity of one kind or another. In some cases the effect is direct and immediate; in other cases it operates indirectly through the awakening of religious emotions. In either case, of course, all that the misfortune does is to create conditions of mind favorable to the action of higher motives and considerations, or to remove conditions unfavorable to their action. Punishment, on its reformatory side, may be said to be an artificial creation of conditions favorable to moral improvement. The artificial creation of such conditions has, of course, this advantage over ordinary misfortune, that it is seen to be the necessary consequence of the wrong-doing, which is not necessarily the case with other alterations of circumstances.

In view of these considerations, we may, perhaps, go one step further and maintain that even in cases where punishment will not have a reformatory effect, where the tendencies to evil are too strong to be kept in check by fear, even then, punishment may be, in a sense, for the moral good of the offender. Wickedness humbled and subdued, though it be only by external force, is a healthier moral condition than

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wickedness successful and triumphant. That is the extremest point to which we can go with the advocates of the vindictive theory. This is, I suppose, the truth which underlies the hackneyed expressions about avenging the insult offered to the moral law, vindicating the moral law, asserting its majesty, and so on. We recognize that punishment may sometimes be right, in the interests of the offender himself, even when it fails to deter. But still, it is always a certain effect on consciousness that constitutes its justification, not merely the satisfaction of an impersonal and irrational law.*

A word will suffice to indicate the third and the highest truth which the vindictive theory of punishment caricatures. It is the truth—the great Aristotelian truth—that the state has a spiritual end.

We all know that experience sets tolerably strict limits to the extent to which it is desirable that the state should interfere with personal liberty and private life in the pursuit of moral and spiritual ends. There are many grave moral offences which the state may reasonably refuse to punish for quite other reasons than indifference to moral well-being. The offence may be incapable of exact definition. It might require for its detection a police-force which would be a public burden, or involve an inquisitorial procedure, or give rise to black-mailing and false accusation to an extent which would constitute a greater evil than the offence itself. The experience of the ecclesiastical court, which continued in full operation in this country down to 1642, would afford plenty of illustrations of the evils incident to such attempts to extend police supervision to the details of private life.† Very

* I should be prepared to recognize a larger amount of truth in the *a priori* view of punishment, if the idea of punishment were to be confined simply to the withholding of good things, to what theologians have called a *pœna damnæ*. That the bad ought not to be made happy, is a more reasonable proposition than the contention that they ought to be made miserable with no ulterior object. Further discussion of this thesis would seem, however, to belong rather to the theory of reward than to the theory of punishment.

† Since the penances imposed by the ecclesiastical courts were (and theoretically *are*) enforceable by imprisonment, no distinction in principle could be drawn between their action and that of the state.

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often, no doubt, the difficulty arises largely from the fact that the attempt puts too great a strain upon the moral sense of the community. Many offences may be, on the whole, condemned by public opinion which are not condemned with sufficient earnestness to secure the enforcement of the criminal law against them. With all these admissions, it must still be contended that the state is perfectly entitled to repress immorality. If an act is not inconsistent with the *true* well-being either of the individual or that of society, it is not immoral; and, even if it were admitted that the state should not interfere with conduct affecting only the well-being of the individual, it is impossible that any act which affects the well-being of an individual should be without consequences for others also. The distinction between crimes and sins can be found only in considerations of social utility. A crime is simply a sin which it is expedient to repress by penal enactment.* Every civilized state punishes some offences which cannot be said to be injurious to the "public good," unless moral well-being is considered to be part of the public good.

It must be remembered that it is not merely by actual and direct intimidation that the state can promote morality. The criminal law has an important work to do in giving expression to the moral sense of the community. Popular ideas as to the moral gravity of many offences depend largely upon the punishment which is awarded to them by the criminal courts. There are probably thousands who have hardly any distinct ideas about sin except those which are inculcated at Assizes and Petty Sessions. It is no uncommon experience for a clergyman to be told by a dying man—notorious, it may be, for fornication or drunkenness or hard selfishness—that he has nothing to reproach himself with, his conscience is quite clear, he has never done anything wrong that he knows of, he has no reason to be afraid to meet his God, and so on. Then upon inquiry it turns out that what the poor fellow

* In practice, of course, this term is usually reserved for the graver kinds of such offences. We do not talk about the *crime* of having one's chimney set on fire.

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really means is that he has done nothing for which he could have been sent to prison.

There are many offences which the state can do little to check by the directly deterrent efforts of punishment, but which it can do much to prevent by simply making them punishable. Since a few persons with good coats have actually been sent to prison for bribery at elections, the respectable public has really begun to suspect that there must be something wrong in the practice. A very little reflection upon the different estimates which are formed of these forms of immorality or of dishonesty for which people go to prison, and of those for which they do not go to prison, will show at once the enormous importance of the criminal law in preventing the moral education of the public mind. While, therefore, there are some kinds of wrong-doing which, either from their essential natures or from collateral considerations, cannot be wisely dealt with by the criminal law, we may expect that with the necessary moralization of a community, the sphere of criminal law ought gradually to extend. In the growing disposition to enact and enforce laws against gambling, to assist, if not to enforce, temperance by act of Parliament, and to protect by the criminal law the chastity of young girls, we may recognize an instalment of moral progress.

HASTINGS RASHDALL.

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AN INTERPRETATION OF THE SOCIAL MOVEMENTS OF OUR TIME.

It is my purpose to interpret in this lecture,* so far as it lies in my power, the social movements of our own times. In undertaking such a task, it is necessary at the outset to choose between two ways of thinking on what is happening about us, or, stated in a personal manner, between two classes of thinkers.

On the one hand, there are those who profess to explain the unrest in modern society by referring it to the spirit of jealousy on the part of those whose possessions are small, and to the love of power and aggrandizement on the part of those who force their way into leadership. "There is no just ground for complaint," exclaim these self-appointed representatives of the great middle class. "Are not workmen, as a whole, better off than they once were,—do they not have more to eat and more to wear,—are not prices cheaper and wages higher? Why, then, should they complain? It is envy which leads them to complain,—it is ambition that voices their complaint. What they need is a parson or a prison, and it makes little difference which."

I do not care to say a word respecting this interpretation of social unrest. My opinion is that the increase of material comforts for the great mass of men is less than many seem to think; but for this morning I purpose bringing the discussion upon a higher plane. The life is more than meat. The benefits of a civilization are not synonymous with an appeased appetite. The cause of discontent lies in the minds of men, and the source of unrest is found in the aspirations of men. A social movement is not explained by saying that agitators take advantage of the spirit of envy to stir up strife. A great man

* This paper was given before the School of Applied Ethics, at Plymouth, Mass., August 12, being the closing lecture of a six weeks' course on the History of Industrial Society and Economic Doctrine in England and America.

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is he who voices the will of the people; he cannot construe that will. A successful leader is one who points the way by which a popular ideal may be realized; he cannot create the ideal. "No man can make a revolution," exclaimed Lasalle, that prince of revolutionists, and he was right; a social movement must spring from the condition in which men live.

From such assertions you may readily appreciate that I ally myself with those who hold that a social movement is sure to arise whenever there is a lack of harmony between the realities of life and the ideals of living. It becomes my duty, therefore, in undertaking to interpret the social movement of our own times, to disclose, first, those changes in industrial methods by which harmony in industries has been disturbed, and then to trace the influence of such changes into the structure of society. In this manner we shall discover, I think, that we are dealing with a permanent historical force, and not with a passing whim.

In seeking to understand modern industrial society, it is necessary to go back to the last quarter of the last century, and inquire respecting the changes that have taken place in the processes of industry. We are in these days so accustomed to the use of machinery, and so familiar with great industries, that it is difficult to picture a society in which tools were used and in which industries were small. Yet it is scarcely a hundred years since the era of inventions began. In the textile industry, for example, at the time when Adam Smith wrote his great work, "The Wealth of Nations," the manufacture of cloth was but four steps removed from most primitive methods. Thus, the distaff had given way to the spinning-wheel; a fulling machine had come into use, by which the boys and girls were relieved from tramping about with bare feet on the cloths thrown into a running stream; a frame for holding warp had been contrived, and the flying shuttle invented. This short list completed the list of inventions which the history of the textile industry records from the Trojan war to the vandalism of Napoleon. Penelope would have been quite at home among the textile workers of the last century in England.

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The flying shuttle, invented in 1738, was a contrivance as important as it was simple. It consisted of two springs fastened to the loom in such a manner that the weaver could easily snap the shuttle from side to side. Not only did this increase the efficiency of his work, but it relieved him from the most tedious part of his labor. Before this he had been obliged to bend first to the right, and throw the shuttle through, and then to the left, and throw it back again. Is it not remarkable that for centuries men should have endured the fatigue of such unnatural labor, when, by means of a hickory stick and a hempen string, and so much of ingenuity as a Yankee calls into play every day of his life, the difficulty could have been easily overcome. I bring this to your notice for the purpose of illustrating the fixedness in industrial habits.

But with the year 1760 all this was changed. It happened that a weaver by the name of Hargreaves, coming home late one night, pushed the door of his cabin suddenly open, and toppled over the spinning-wheel at which his wife sat at work. She, doubtless accustomed to such sudden entrances, did not scream or drop the yarn, and the spindle, although thrown into a perpendicular position, continued its merry hum. A bright idea flashed into the mind of the weaver: if the good wife had a dozen hands she could spin a dozen yarns at once; and upon this idea it is that England has since built her commercial and manufacturing greatness. The machine which Hargreaves invented was called the Spinning-Jenny; some say because his daughter's name was Jenny, some say because his wife's name was Jenny, while others declare it was in honor of a neighbor's wife. The exact truth regarding the domestic relations of Jenny we do not know, but of one thing we are certain, the name of this female will not be forgotten as long as people wear cottons and woollens.

This invention was the first of a long series of inventions which resulted in an industrial revolution, and the difficulty is for us to appreciate that so small a thing could bring about a revolution. You have doubtless seen a child playing with his blocks upon the floor, setting up one after another in a row. So long as no accident occurs they all stand, but should the

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skirt of the child or a breeze from the door topple one of them over, they all fall. So it is with industries before disturbed by the restless genius of the nineteenth century. Somehow, trades had been established,—the spinner, the weaver, the fuller, and the dyer. Somehow, accustomed methods of work had been set up. Somehow, men had adjusted themselves to certain ways of doing business. The son entered the trade of his father, and the father taught the son rules of trade that had been followed for generations. Precedent was thus crystallized into habit, and the thought of change in the methods of work did not enter the minds of men. Thus for centuries, if we except agriculture, the habits of workmen remained unchanged.

It was into such a society as this that the accident of Hargreaves's invention was thrown. The spinning-jenny increased the efficiency of the spinners a hundred-fold, and thus gave the weavers more yarn than they could weave. The adjustments that had grown up with centuries were destroyed in a moment. It was essential that yarn spun by machinery should be woven by machinery, and the power-loom, thus becoming a necessity for society, was quickly invented. But economy in the use of machinery demands the best power for driving machinery,—a demand which was met by what is commonly known as the invention of the steam-engine, but which was merely the refitting of an old model that up to this time could have had no profitable commercial use had it been perfected. These are but illustrations of how one process of work depends upon another, and how a change in one part of industry demands a change throughout. It would be futile for me to mention even all the inventions of this era of invention. The spinning-jenny was followed by the water-frame, by roller-spinning, the power-loom, the engine, the safety-lamp (without which the engine could not have been supplied with coal), chemical bleaching, printing in colors from rollers, and I know not what else besides; but this genius for invention did not cease until, upon the ruins of the old domestic system of industry, there had been established what we now know as the factory system.

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The most apparent of the results following upon the changes referred to is the marked increase in the efficiency of labor; but to measure that increase is by no means a simple task. It is reflected in the rapid expansion of population which began with 1790. But figures are dry and uninteresting. It is observable also in the increased exports and imports, in the growth of property values, in the number of factories built, in the number of miles of railway opened. But again we say that figures are dry, and, more than that, they are an unknown language to those not familiar with them.

Fortunately, there is another method more interesting in itself by which the increased efficiency in labor may be clearly expressed. The secret of the productiveness of modern methods of industy is that the forces of nature have been brought under the control of man. Thus it may be said that our industrial system is founded on coal, for it is this which permits man to bring such tremendous forces to his assistance. There is in a ton of coal latent energy equal to eleven million times its own weight, one-eleventh of which is rendered available by means of the ordinary steam-engine. This means that a miner in Pennsylvania who digs five tons of coal a day gains for society what is equivalent to five million tons of energy, and this he does for one dollar and fifty cents.

The most surprising results are observed when we trace the use of coal in the transportation of goods. A cube of coal which will pass through a ring the size of a twenty-five-cent piece will carry a ton of cargo two miles on its ocean voyage. A ton of freight may be drawn a mile on a railway by the burning of two ounces of coal. It is said there is carbon enough in a postage-stamp to carry a letter on its average journey. Is it, then, any occasion for surprise that the world is growing rich when nature's forces thus serve the industrial purposes of men?

We might also measure the effect of new methods of work by estimating the increased efficiency of labor in the textile industry. For example, it was possible for a man to weave by hand from forty-two to forty-eight yards of cloth in a day. Now, one man can tend power-looms and weave fifteen hun-

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dred yards of cloth in a day. The effect of machinery in agriculture is no less surprising. In our own country, seven men can grow, mill, bake, and distribute bread enough to feed a thousand. The last estimate on this point, however, is that of Carroll D. Wright. In 1880 there were in the United States fifty millions of people, but they produced an amount of value which would have required the labor of two hundred and twenty-seven millions of people working under the old methods, and this estimate does not take into account the increased population to supply the demand for increased food.

My only purpose in presenting such facts as the above is to leave upon your minds the impression that important changes have taken place in business methods and in mechanical appliances. There is greater difference between 1790 and 1890, in all matters of business procedure, than between the twelfth century and 1790. Arnold Toynbee is right in calling this stupendous change an industrial revolution.

But if a revolution, what has been its effect on society? Upon the difficult task of answering this question, I scarce know how to enter. We are dealing with the forces which give character to the nineteenth century. In a sense, indeed, we are bringing the nineteenth century to trial. The stern, unyielding spirit of commerce has gained for men the possibility of a higher and a fuller life. Do we realize the possibilities of that life, or are we like a man who, having built a fine house, is content to live in the kitchen?

Although the interpretation of this revolution in methods of industry is a difficult task, we may at least approach it in a simple manner. Resisting the invitation to indulge in grand generalization, I ask your attention to three questions. First, what does the industrial revolution mean for the workingman? Second, what does it mean for the statesman? Third, what interpretation may be placed upon it by the scholar? By this manner of approach we may gain a complete statement of the case. For, from the laborer we may learn what class interests are involved; from the statesman we may discover what public interests are placed in jeopardy; while the scholar, standing apart from any special interest, will be able to tell

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us whither the struggling forces of the nineteenth century are urging our civilization.

The appropriate answer to the first of these questions is suggested by the fact that a laboring class was born out of the changes which made modern society what it is. This appears to be paradoxical. Why should the invention of machinery, the object of which is to save labor, have resulted in the creation of a laboring class? The meaning of my statement, however, becomes clear when it is learned that by the phrase "laboring class" is not meant a class of men who labor, but a class of men who, having no property in anything but themselves, are obliged to seek an opportunity for working from those who are the proprietors of the agencies of production. It is true that in agriculture there had come to be the germ of a laboring class, but in the textile industries, in the hardware industries,—indeed, in all the trades,—there was no decided separation between employers and employés. The master and wage-earner worked side by side; both had served the same apprenticeship; and most frequently the workman was a member of the family of his master. And since no great amount of capital was required to set up a competing business, the earnings of the master could be at no time much higher than the wages of his journeyman. The point to be held in mind is that all who had to do with industries were workers, and the workers, therefore, were able to control the conditions under which they worked.

But when machinery came to be used, all this was changed, and there sprang into existence a class of proprietors over the mechanism of production, and all others engaged in manufacturing pursuits were forced to come to these proprietors for employment. Many years did not pass before a complete separation took place between these two classes. The factory system gradually arose, and by its growth independent workers were forced to the wall. There was thus created a great class of non-possessors who depended upon daily wages for the means of livelihood. Under the old system, these men were proprietors of the material on which they worked, of the tools with which they worked, and of

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the houses in which their work was carried on. But under the factory system, they are proprietors of nothing. They work in a building owned by their employers, upon material owned by their employers, with machines owned by their employers. This, then, was what was meant in saying that the development of machinery had given rise to a distinct laboring class. It is the reverse of the statement that the industrial revolution has given rise to a distinct capitalist class. It means that the industrial community of this century for the first time is divided into possessors and non-possessors, whose interests seem to be identical so far as production is concerned, but whose interests are opposed to each other when questions of distribution come up for settlement.

This same fact may be presented more vividly in another manner. Did you ever think of the difference between a tool and a machine, and endeavor to understand why a society based on tools must be unlike a society based on machinery? A tool is an implement which enables a man to use to better advantage the strength that lies within him. It may be regarded as a newly-added organ by means of which his physical powers are more efficiently expended. A machine, on the other hand, is an implement or a mechanism which enables a man to bring under his control those forces external to himself. When working with machinery, or, as it is sometimes called, with capital, a man no longer relies on the force within him,—he reduces to servitude the forces without him. Now it is plain that in a society based on tools the element of labor is relatively of more importance in production than the element of capital, from which it follows that the workmen are in a position to control the conditions under which they work. But in a society based on machinery, human power is not the most important factor. It is control over the forces of nature that now measures the degree of industrial efficiency, and it follows that they who own the machinery through which natural forces work are able to determine the conditions of industry. This, then, is the significance of the change from tools to machinery. In a society adjusted to manual labor, it is absolutely impossible that a labor problem, as a class prob-

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lem, should take its origin; but in a society adjusted to machinery, provided the English law of property be maintained, the development of class lines will surely make its appearance in industries.

Holding in mind the comparison thus brought to our notice, we are in a position to state in a sentence what the industrial revolution means for the laboring class. It means that the worker has lost control over the conditions of labor, and the labor agitation of our own times, so fearful in its tendencies, so demoralizing in the bitterness of hatred engendered, is but the effort of workingmen to gain again control over the conditions in which work shall be done.

We now come to consider the meaning of the industrial revolution for the statesman, or, to present the question as stated above, to ask what new duties are imposed upon government by the industrial changes which have taken place. The appropriate answer to this question is suggested by recurring to a well-known historical fact. The characteristic difference between industrial life in the Middle Ages and in the nineteenth century is that in the former period competition did not exist,—it was not allowed to exist, for law, or custom having the force of law, impeded its workings at every step. But by the last half of the eighteenth century most of the laws regulating business had become inoperative. Indeed, more than this is true. Not only had men freed themselves from the old restraints, but they had come to believe that in competition society had discovered a principle of control which, while inviting progress, secured justice. Thus, the practice of individualism was converted into the philosophy of individualism; a new social principle was accepted in place of the old.

All this is familiar to every student of history, but there is one fact which seems to have been overlooked. At the time when individualism in industry was promulgated by Adam Smith, industries were small and widely diffused. Men were using tools, and the business relations were personal and direct. Under such conditions there is greater likelihood that competition would work with equity than at the present.

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But without attempting to develop this thought, let me call your attention to the significant fact. The truth is, the theory of industrial liberty, framed to meet a *régime* of hand-work, has been accepted and developed by a society which knows only machine labor. A social philosophy adjusted to a scheme of domestic industry has been maintained, notwithstanding the fact that domestic industry has given way to the factory system. There is no better illustration in the whole range of history of the illogical application of a social principle. The privileged classes in the nineteenth century have no right in reason, or in honesty, to urge in defence of their privileges a principle that took its origin in a society whose destruction was the occasion of their birth.

We are not, however, concerned with the ethics of history, nor have we time to follow out the abuses arising from this mal-adjustment of a social principle to social conditions. The question in hand pertains to the meaning of the industrial revolution for a statesman, and this is surely indicated by what has been said. A statesman knows, or should know, that a nation cannot expect a healthful growth when the philosophy of rights and duties on which its laws are based is out of harmony with the every-day life of men; and it becomes his duty, as the guardian of rights and the formulator of law, to work to restore harmony in the social organism. When, shortly after the independence of the colonies, Thomas Jefferson became Governor of Virginia, he set before himself the task of reorganizing the colonial government to meet the necessities of a free commonwealth. So, the statesman of to-day, recognizing the industrial revolution to be an accomplished fact, should set before himself the task of so adjusting the structure of government, and of so modifying the law of industrial rights and duties, that symmetry in structure and harmony in rights may be realized for modern society.

It is possible to present this thought a little more definitely. The period intervening between 1790 and 1830 in England, was a period of social disintegration, and the suffering of the dependent classes, on whose shoulders the burdens of change rested most heavily, was so great as at last to arouse the

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ethical sense of society. Many who themselves did not feel the burdens of change, but awakened by sympathy for the degraded condition into which English workingmen had fallen, exerted all their energies to alleviate the suffering about them. It was the degradation of the English laborer that gave rise to a school of workers and writers known as Christian socialists. The names of Frederick Maurice and of Charles Kingsley are sufficient to suggest the sweetness and light which permeated its teachings. The attention of English philanthropists was first drawn to the condition of children in factories. If you would know the horrors to which children were subjected by unregulated competition in the production of cottons, read the description which Harriet Martineau has left in her "History of England." It was for factory children that Elizabeth Barrett Browning wrote that stanza so often quoted, a stanza full of impassioned pathos to one who knows the state of affairs which brought it forth.

> "Do ye hear the children weeping, O my brothers,
> Ere the sorrow comes with years?
> They are leaning their young heads against their mothers,
> And that cannot stop their tears.
> The young lambs are bleating in the meadows;
> The young birds are chirping in the nest;
> The young fawns are playing with the shadows;
> The young flowers are blowing towards the west,—
> But the young, young children, O, my brothers,
> They are weeping bitterly.
> They are weeping in the playtime of the others,
> In the country of the free."

I should not have drawn your attention to the philanthropists were it not that the legislation to which their efforts gave rise is typical of what government can do. The truth is, competition has not worked in the nineteenth century as Adam Smith, writing for the eighteenth century, said it would work. Shall we on that account abandon it and return to those minute regulations of early England? This is the alternative which presents itself to many, but I imagine the question is not one of unbridled industrial license or of complete governmental control, for either of these methods leads to tyranny.

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There must be a middle course which leads to industrial liberty. Much that has been said in favor of competition is beyond controversy. Mobility of movement is essential to a highly-developed society. Without personal liberty there can be no hope, and hope is the only abiding motive to action. But we make a sad mistake if, from such a premise, we exclude the sovereign power of the state from the industrial field. That is not the best government which governs least, but which governs the most wisely.

Consider now in what a position the changes of the last one hundred years have left the statesman. Forced to admit the benefits of competition, and at the same time to admit that competition fosters evils, he is obliged to trace with faltering step a path lying midway between the policy of action and the policy of inaction. He must decide under what conditions competition works well and see that for those conditions its actions are unimpeded; he must, on the other hand, determine under what conditions competition works badly, and either regulate its actions by law or exclude it altogether.

From this it appears that there are at least two lines of policy upon which government may enter:

First, government must regulate the plane of competition, for without legal regulation the struggle between men for commercial supremacy will surely force society to the level of the most immoral man who can sustain himself. The fittest to survive unregulated competition will be he who is morally the least fit to live. For purpose of illustration,* suppose ten manufacturers competing with each other to supply the market with cottons. Assume that nine of them, recognizing the rights of childhood, would gladly exclude from their employ all but adult labor. But the tenth man has no moral sense. His business is conducted solely with a view to large sales and a broad market. As child labor is actually cheaper than adult labor, he gives it a decided preference. What is the result? Since his goods come into competition with the goods

* This illustration is taken from my pamphlet entitled "The State in Relation to Industrial Action."

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of the other manufacturers, and since we who buy goods only ask respecting quality and price, the nine men whose moral instincts we commend, will be obliged, if they would maintain themselves in business, to adopt the methods of the tenth man, whose immoral character we condemn. Thus the moral tone of business is brought down to the level of the worst man who can sustain himself in it.

What, now, can government do in such a case? One of the duties of government is to express and enforce the ethical sense of society, and in this case government may, acceding to the wishes of the nine manufacturers, pass a law saying that children shall not be employed in factories. By such interference, society is not deprived of the advantages of competition, but the plane of competition is adjusted to the moral sense of the community. Such, at least, is the defence of factory legislation, and such interference on the part of government is typical of a new line of duties which the development of great industries has imposed upon the statesman of the nineteenth century.

The second class of duties imposed on government by the changes which have come over modern business life are of a wholly different character. There are some industries which from their very nature are superior to competition, and for such the public has no guarantee of fair treatment. It is absurd to argue that commercial laws will insure equity in the dealings of railway companies, telegraph companies, electric-lighting companies, street-railway companies, and the like. It lies in the structure of such businesses to be conducted as monopolies and in disregard to the comparative rights of men. The important point for us to hold in mind, however, is this: The existence of monopolies proves the existence of an anti-social interest. It shows that the interest of individuals is not always identical with that of the public. Now government stands for public interest, and, among the new duties imposed on government by the industrial revolution which we have described, is the duty of protecting citizens against the encroachments of such monopolies as are the fruit of that revolution.

We have thus answered directly the question, what new

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duties the changes in modern life have imposed on government. These duties are two. First, the government must determine the plane on which competition may take place in those businesses in which it is potent. Second, it must by all possible means protect the community from those evils that arise from the uncontrolled management of a business, which from the nature of the case is superior to competition.

We come, then, in the third place, to inquire what meaning this wonderful social and industrial change has for the scholar.

As already remarked, the scholar differs from either the laborer or the statesman when contemplating modern society, in that he is not retained to represent any particular interest. He views the movements of society as it were from a height, and, though his mastery of detail may not be as complete as that of the laborer or the statesman, he will be more apt than they to discover the general trend of events. History to him is like a river lying at the base of a mountain on which he stands. He can see whence it comes from among the upland hills, he can see whither it is flowing on towards the sea. It is, then, a wholeness of view that we have a right to expect from the student. And on this account, what he says, if he be a truthful watchman on the mountain, must be of use to those whose closer connection with the affairs of life does not permit so broad an outlook.

When considering the social movement from the stand-point of the laborer, it might have been stated that trade organizations appeared to him necessary for protection. He felt rather than understood the evils which machinery brought, and joined hands with fellow-workmen for resistance. This suggests a very interesting question, and one that will serve as a key to the scholars' view of social movements. Does the rise of trades-unions bear any peculiar significance, or is it to be regarded merely as an outcry from those upon whose shoulders the burden of industrial development rested most heavily? To this question I will give a direct answer. In my opinion, combination among workingmen is a necessary step in the re-crystallization of industrial rights and duties. From the sixteenth century to the beginning of the nineteenth

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century, the tendency has been towards disintegration in all matters of property and industries. In early society, when men worked wholly for local markets, when the relation between employer and employé was a personal relation, competition was kept in restraint by custom and by law. But with the downfall of feudalism, with the discovery of the new world, with the new spirit of personal independence infused into life by the great religious reformation and by the political struggles, all this was changed. Localism gave way to nationality, competition took the place of custom, and wealth came to be used as capital. It was at this point in the development of English society that the era of inventions made its appearance, and the result was what might easily have been expected. The power and the energy previously shown in religious and political controversies now made itself manifest in trade. Great industries sprang into existence, and under the theory of property then prevalent it naturally followed that the new social power generated by the use of machinery fell into the hands of those who were so fortunate as to become proprietors of the mechanism of production.

This is a most important fact if we would understand the industrial armament in which the world stands to-day, for it shows that the concentration of industrial power did not begin with the workmen when they organized themselves into unions, but was an inevitable result of the use of machinery in a society whose legal structure was shaped to meet the conditions of personal competition. It began when employers came to be exclusive proprietors of machinery, of material, and of factory. My point is this. The birth of a capitalist class, freed from the restraints formerly imposed by custom and law, was the first step in industrial armament, while the organization of labor into unions of trades is to be regarded as a second step, a counter-movement on the part of those whose interests were endangered by the rise of great industries. This is the historical explanation of trades-unions.

Did you ever ask under what conditions it is possible for competition to work justly? "A fair bargain," says Professor Clark, "demands either a desire for justice on the part of the

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participants, or strategic equality between them." Now, for fifty years after the introduction of machinery there was no approach to the realization of either of these conditions. Wherever the doctrine of *laissez-faire* holds sway (and it held sway during the fifty years we are considering) an effective desire for justice is impossible. Indeed, according to the doctrine, it is absurd to strive for justice in business affairs, for, according to the doctrine, justice must result from the interplay of self-centred motives. Nor was there strategic equality between the sellers and the buyers of labor. The ability to control the conditions of work lay wholly with the employers. An individual workman was swallowed up and overwhelmed in the vortex of competitive forces. Laborers found that they had lost the importance which they formerly enjoyed, and it was to recover their lost ground that they organized themselves into unions. It was to obtain strategic equality with their masters that they entered into combinations. It was to mass their brute force against the brute force of machinery that they submitted to the military discipline of trade organizations. Thus the growth of trades-unions is to be regarded as a counter-movement, not an aggressive movement. It marks the second step in the crystallization of industrial power, not the first step.

Of course you will ask what will be the outcome of this industrial armament in which the Christian world now lives. That question cannot be answered. What the future has in store is known only to Him who holds the destiny of nations in his hands. But of one thing we may be sure. Unless some way be discovered by which the deep ethical purpose of society can be brought to bear upon industrial questions, our magnificent material civilization will crumble to ashes in our hands. Some advocate the destruction of trades-unions. Stop organization among workmen, they cry, and all will go on in harmony and quiet. I will not stop to show that this would bring back the state of affairs existing in the first quarter of the century, which resulted in forcing the workman to the bottom of the abyss. Such a proposal is childish, for the thing proposed is impossible. As well might

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we call on the waters of the Niagara to roll back. Organization is the most potent fact in the industrial history of the nineteenth century, and it must either be used for the good of society or society must bear the ills which it brings.

The only practical question, then, asks how to use organization. One hears a great deal these days about the relation of ethics to economics. Certainly many foolish things have been said on this point, but at bottom the talk rests on the eternal truth that a peace born of justice can never be realized by balancing brute force against brute force. And yet this is what the men who control the business affairs of to-day are endeavoring to do. To my mind, the ethical sense of society must be brought to bear in settling business affairs. Indeed, I am willing to go further. In many cases the ethical principle must supplant the competitive principle, and it is an encouraging thought, to say the least, that possibly the growth of organized labor has provided the machinery by which this may be done. Above the interest of the contending parties stands the interest of the public, of which the state is the natural guardian, and one way to realize the ethical purpose of society in business affairs is by means of legislation to bring the ethical sense of society to bear on business affairs. Such a statement, of course, opens up a wide field of discussion. I will only say, in illustration of my meaning, that the long list of statutes known as factory acts, by which the plane of competition is legally determined, or the establishment of commissions whose duty it is to guard the interests of the public when endangered by the growth of monopolies, are to be regarded as the legal expression of the ethical sense of society.

Laws of this sort, however, do not touch the labor problem. That problem has to do with the rights and duties under which work shall be done. Its solution, then, is beyond the law. The object held in view by the workmen, when they organized themselves into unions, was to gain again that control over the conditions of labor which they lost when machinery took the place of tools. How such an end will be attained we cannot say. Some advocate co-operation, others

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urge the extension of the principle of profit-sharing, while still others seem to think all difficulties would disappear should wages fluctuate with the price of goods. We must pass these proposals without discussion. A thought of more promise, as it appears to me, but by no means as familiar, is that the prevalent tendency towards crystallization of industrial power should be carried one step further, until employers and employés are all to be found in the same organization. This is a simple idea, but it is far-reaching in its tendencies. Its realization would require that employers should recognize unions and deal with the men in a body; that they should be willing to submit all matters of internal organization to arbitration; that men already employed in industry should have preference over men outside; and, what is perhaps of most importance, all these should come to the workingmen as their right, and not by the grace of employers. This seems like giving up everything to the workmen, and it would indeed result in a new form of industrial organization in which the wage-earner would receive greater consideration. But it would, I am sure, increase rather than decrease the efficiency of industry and be of mutual advantage to all concerned.

Without attempting to develop the idea thus suggested, let me, in closing, bring the social movement of our time into harmony with the observed tendencies of modern industry.

In matters of religion and government the characteristic tendency of modern history has been towards the development of personal liberty. The power of organized dogma has given way before the assertion of the individual to think for himself, and the doctrine of the divine right of kings has been supplanted by the theory of representative government. Now it requires no very profound study to see that the theory on which industries are organized is not in harmony with the theory realized in the other departments of our democratic society. The actual control over industries lies with those who possess property. There is no industrial liberty for those who possess no property, except the liberty to seek employment. The idea which now maintains with regard to industrial rights is analogous to the idea entertained by

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Charles I. with regard to political rights. The question at issue between this king and our Puritan ancestors was: Is control over political power a right or a grant? It is a right, said the English ruler, and I will exercise it as I please. It is a grant, said the Puritan, and you will please to exercise it as we will. You are familiar with the result, and how out of the controversy responsible government was established.

Now it seems to me that the social movement of our own times is a movement of the same sort. The power which men of property now claim they have the right to use in an irresponsible manner is the power generated by the development of machinery. But this claim is denied by the great class of non-possessors. The power of capital, it is asserted, is a social power, and the laws of property which grant irresponsible control over it to individuals are unjust laws. Thus, the question which now confronts the industrial world is this: Is control over industrial power a right or a grant; are capitalists proprietors or are they agents? No one can say how these questions will be answered; but if the future may be read from the past, and if the spirit of history regards either logic or equity, it requires no great intellectual courage to assert that the social movement of our own times will not rest until there has been established in supreme authority that triumvirate of ideas, Religious Liberty, Political Liberty, and Industrial Liberty.

HENRY C. ADAMS.

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THE PREVENTION OF CRIME.

(First Article.)

I. In every department of life, science, and the culture arising from it are in modern times asserting their claim to universal importance. It was especially necessary in politics and morals that this should be asserted. A year before the International Journal of Ethics appeared, the International Criminological Association was founded. Although there was no outward, there was an inward connection between the two. Moral problems concern everybody. The special moral problems are alike, in proportion as the conditions of civilization in different countries are similar. Penal law must be recognized as a direct moral problem, or, at least, as having pre-eminently moral consequences. The Criminological Association has found numerous supporters in about twenty countries of Europe and America. Membership implies assent to a number of propositions, the first three of which are as follows:

1. The object of punishment is the suppression of crime as a social phenomenon.

2. The results of anthropological and sociological investigations must, therefore, be taken into account both in the science of punishment and in penal legislation.

3. Punishment is one of the most effective means of suppressing crime. But it is not the only means. Accordingly, it must not be taken out of connection with the other means of suppressing, and especially the other means of preventing, crime.

In these propositions the old philosophical doctrine—*Puniendum esse non quia peccatum est sed ne peccetur*—assumes a new and striking form. It is natural that the opposite doctrine also should be set up anew. This latter is expressly a moral doctrine, since it explains punishment as a postulate of justice and demands that it should be equal to the deed, or—put more

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exactly—to the quantity of the *guilt* contained in the deed. The evil which the punishment decrees should cancel the good which the criminal would wrongfully procure for himself; it should be an equivalent of the wrong done. This is without doubt the primitive intention of all penal law, so far as it originated in revenge and has risen above it. Revenge demands *satisfaction*,—that is, it wishes to inflict as much pain as it has suffered. The man who is insulted or injured, will, in the simplest case, only try to get back what had been taken from him, or to do to the other what had been done to him. Whatever the angry man takes or does, over and above this, may be to the satisfaction of his own feelings and those of the spectators, and may be called just, because the effects of the aggressor reach beyond the limited object, and the condition of the person attacked cannot be restored by the mere return of like for like. In daily life, as well as in the intercourse of states, revenge is continually met with either under the name of retribution or under that of punishment, and in the wide domain of civil law it has maintained its position in the legal claim to indemnification. *Just* retribution is a universally recognized ideal: its realization is desired and lauded by him who wants to take the law in his own hand, and is required as a duty of the judge who dispenses justice. The idea of justice postulated by our conscience does not exclude vivid emotions. There are such things as righteous indignation and righteous anger. But the will, bent on a just action, does not get its standard from any emotion, but through the simple perception of the right which it is to realize. The function of the judge is to perceive the right, and we Germans call the verdict itself a "perception" (*Erkenntniss*). The question is, By what means does the judge perceive the justice of an act? Let us consider this question as applied to penal law. When the judge has before him the written law, which prescribes definite punishments for definite classes of actions, the answer is simple enough. The judge classifies the given case whose reality is presupposed. His "perception" or judgment is a syllogism of the first figure; and it is possible to imagine that the rules are specialized in such a way that no case can occur

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whose general features could not be foreseen, thus *forcing* the judge to a definite verdict. Frederick II., king of Prussia, thought that a code of law must be brought to this perfection. The judge would then resemble an executive officer. His judicial activity, like that of modern juries, would be limited to a perception of the fact and *the guilt.* Actually, however, considerable latitude is allowed to the judge for the adjustment of punishment, according to the special circumstances of the case and the individuality of the criminal. Within this latitude he is bound, independent of positive right, to administer justice,—viz., to perceive the right. What guides him in this process? It may be laid down as the *notio communis* that the height of the punishment must correspond to the stubbornness of the criminal will (gradually rise from *culpa* to *dolus*, from *dolus indeterminatus* to *dolus determinatus*). It is tacitly implied that this is the opinion of the law-giver himself, or, in other words, that the judge interprets the law-giver's intention in a supplementary way. The law-giver intended to have decreed the just and proper punishment; but a contradiction is still possible between the verdict of the judge and the law-giver's intention. Nevertheless, the judge's verdict remains valid, even if it should be contrary to the law-giver's intention. The modern theory of the state pays special regard to the *independence* of the judicial from the legislative, as well as from the executive power. It is, therefore, conceivable that only the judge, within the latitude allowed to him, is bent on the *right* penalty, and that the legislator's views vary widely from those of the judge's.

II. Justice, as a fact, will not be claimed in the same sense from the law-giver as from the judge. The law-giver—or what is equivalent to it, the state—is the representative of the collective body, and is regarded as threatened and injured by crime. As public prosecutor, the state wants to be partial, as between itself and the accused person, but as judge it wants to be impartial. What does the state represent in the person of the law-giver? I hold it for certain that in this capacity the state stands *historically* nearer to the judge than to the public prosecutor. The state, according to the conception

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underlying it, aims, like the ideal judge, both at proportioning the punishment to the guilt of the criminal, and at deterring and combating the criminal and making him harmless, which should be the aim of the public prosecutor. But the judge, considered as a supreme law-giving power, is older than the state, and before the state existed he was considered as bound, on the whole, by positive law. Yet all positive law derives its life and authority from custom and the faith of the people. The state only assumes the formal representation of this law, which is considered unchangeable in its essence. But the criminal law is not only exposed to being put into writing and codified, but also to being consciously changed. It is looked upon as *jus publicum*, and as such, according to the classical saying, *ad statum rei romanæ spectat.* The state, by means of the public law, governs its own affairs. The written form, which otherwise only serves to help the memory, becomes a declaration. Here, too, there is consequently a transition which passes through many phases. A code, like that of the celebrated "Carolina," is, according to its contents, mainly a law of usage. Though it be specifically civic according to its form, its object is to serve as a guide to the tribunals (its title is "Special Tribunal Regulation)," and hardly to constitute a warning to evil-doers. With modern legislation, undertaken gradually and systematically in most European countries, since the second half of the eighteenth century, the idea of *threat* of punishment comes into the foreground. It is one of the conditions of a rational state contract, and, therefore, one of the most important rights of the citizen, that he should know beforehand to what penalty he is liable if he wilfully transgresses the law. *Nulla pœna sine lege.* And hence arises the law-giver's duty to make threats as efficacious as possible. This, again, may collide with the other duty, which aims at fixing the right penalty for every offence, for these two seem inseparable from each other. The *quia peccatum* is the fundamental thought underlying all punishment; the *ne peccetur* is the necessary conception of the threat of punishment. To this antithesis corresponds the antithesis of the so-called absolute and relative theories of penal legislation.

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They are met with, in an easily-explained connection, in the doctrine of the freedom of the will, and its negation, the doctrine of determinism. The older doctrine asserts itself here also as the moral one in the traditional sense; for the common view makes the conception of responsibility depend on the freedom of the will. He who is forced to do a thing, so runs the reasoning, cannot be held responsible; and, in the same way, he is irresponsible who was not master of his will on account of not having had any knowledge of the criminality of his action. On the contrary, an action *willed freely*, when good, should be recompensed, and when evil, punished. The state fulfils at least the second half of this moral demand.

III. Determinism may undertake to save the meaning of punishment in two ways. First, in the direction already referred to, by declaring the threat as the essential feature. The value of this reasoning is more evident if the action of the individual is deduced from his constitution and the motives actuating him; for the evil he may incur serves then as a counter-motive. If the threat was inefficacious in one case, the punishment must be inflicted to keep it operative in other cases and to serve as a deterrent in the future. This has been the opinion of determinists, as formulated most vigorously by Hobbes, and by Schopenhauer who followed his footsteps. Feuerbach and Bentham, among the specialists, have perfected this doctrine. The threat of punishment is, in any case, judicious,—indeed, necessary. It fulfils its aim, in spite of numerous cases in which it is inefficacious, as long as it is reasonably supposed that without it crimes would occur in far greater number. The prevention of crime fulfils the purpose of the threat and the purpose of punishment as its corollary. The celebrated proposition should rather read,—*pœnæ constituendæ sunt ne peccetur.* The theory in itself is, without doubt, free from contradiction; but it cannot be denied that it presents the infliction of suffering on the individual only as a *means* for furthering the common weal,—in Bentham's words, as an "indispensable sacrifice."

Determinism may attempt, in the second place, to defend the justice of punishment, even as regards the involuntary

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actor. It may contend that the value of the difference between men who cannot be made responsible, on account of their mental condition, and the normal man whom we do make responsible, is independent of the disputed point. The normal man is aware of what he does, and knows the penalty as a probable, and,—if its aim alone be considered,—a certain consequence of his action. When he resolves to do a punishable act, he takes into account the risk of the penalty, as well as the good he expects to derive from it. He hopes to escape the penalty, just as every one tries to reach the favorable and escape the unfavorable results of the natural consequences of his actions. When he is punished, he could no more complain of injustice than he could say that his money had been taken from him unjustly when he risked it in a lottery and lost. This line of argument is fortified by the reflection that every member of the state is himself a subject of the state, and has, therefore, transferred the right of punishment to the government. He is punished with his own consent; no injustice is done to him.

The following criticism may be made of this line of reasoning:

a. It is true that the conception of the priority of thought, and the act of the will as conditioned by thought, has a limited and relative validity. The will here is probably considered as wholly conditioned, but the involuntariness of thought is not taken account of. It appears to follow its own laws and to be conditioned by itself. And though it be admitted that back of thought lie perceptions, which in their turn rest on the impressions of objects, yet, according to this conception, men are regarded as essentially *alike*, each one striving after happiness and choosing in his own mind the means for its attainment, each one being *equally* master of his will. This theory of the intellect, though it denies metaphysical freedom, restores empirical liberty. The conception implies nothing beyond the ruling of the intellect, and the likeness of men in this respect. Both the psychology of the will and that of the intellect admit this conception as an applicable idea within certain limits; but in the investigation of the reality of this conception psychology meets with a highly multifarious

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inequality of man in this as well as in every other respect. It does not find an uncaused will; it rather finds that the significance of the will (the resolution, the determination, etc.) as a cause has been exaggerated in an extraordinary manner. On the other hand, as a normal phenomenon, it does not meet with an abstract, calculating, balancing man; but with a concrete, illogical, idiosyncratic personality, with his likes and dislikes, passions, habits, whims, and associated ideas, his faith and superstition, his manifold and confused thoughts, which often approach closer to insanity than to a logical order. It restores the significance of individuality as an important cause of human activity, but only to show that individuality *is* necessarily what it has come to be. The facts of heredity come to light, and these indicate a much deeper, one is tempted to say a much coarser, causality of the will than the power of perceptions and thoughts, and yet these facts are much more mysterious. "L'hérédité," says Ribot, "*c'est à dire, le déterminisme, nous envahit de toute part,—par le dehors, par le dedans.*" And further: "*Nous la retrouvons dans ce germe même qui est en nous ce qu'il y a de plus intime, de plus essentiel, de plus personnel.*" * The faculty of self-restraint, of self-determination, of the clear and distinct weighing of the consequences of our resolutions, is also an inherited aptitude, conditioned in its development and relative power by education, surroundings, fortunate and unfortunate accidents, health and illness. For the imperfection of these faculties a man cannot be made responsible. They *constitute* the man.

b. So far, however, as that conception is valid, what can be deduced from it? One thing, of course,—namely, that the penalty cannot be called unjust in the juristical sense. The philosophy of the last century—now too little known or honored—made special endeavors to separate entirely the sphere of natural right from that of ethics. Thomasius, Gundling, Kant, and Feuerbach, among the Germans, brought their penetration to the discussion of the problem. The theory, as sometimes happens, has been rejected, while the practice has

* "L'hérédité psychologique," 3me edition, p. 322.

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continued to progress in that direction. To-day we understand more clearly than ever how something may be judicially quite unassailable—and this whether recognized or not in positive law—and yet present itself to the moral feelings and our moral perception as in the highest degree unjust, revolting, and wicked. And thus the moral justification of punishment is not saved by basing it on natural right. In view of the total dependence in which we find the human being, with his desires and capacities, the question must be raised anew, Is it right and proper to requite with pain and suffering the wickedness (which we admit to be altogether a misfortune) of the unfortunate man, who, born perhaps with a weak understanding and coarse feelings, grown up in want and misery, surrounded by vice, dragged lower down by his every-day companions, has sinned against the life and property of his fellow-man? Is it right and proper to treat him thus when we admit unhesitatingly that the evil deed was the necessary result of all his antecedents?

IV. The more he who punishes gains an insight into the causes, and the higher, consequently, the level from which he views the doings by which he, as the representative of the whole, is to feel himself injured and provoked, the less will he experience a desire for retribution, and the more will he, as an impartial spectator, be moved by a feeling of *pity*, and wish to help the erring one and to heal him.

Now the theory of reformation—elaborated as far back as Plato, prominent in Grotius, Montesquieu, Beccaria, and other celebrated writers, and in accord with Christian as well as modern philosophic ethics—answers such a tendency, independent of strict determinism. One of the ablest representatives of the reformation theory among the moderns expressly rejects the theory of threat of punishment "because logically it would have to consider the punished individual as a mere *means* to the welfare of society," and goes so far as to regard reformation as the pedagogical theory of punishment. "The state, by punishment, vouchsafes a *good* to the individual." *

* Höffding, "Ethik," Germ. transl., pp. 442 and 445.

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So long as capital and corporal punishments for all heavy offences preponderated, this theory, of course, could not come into vogue. But the aim of reforming the criminal has entered into our present system of punishment, where deprivation of liberty occupies the foremost place, in consequence of the humane direction connected with the name of Beccaria, and the improvement of prisons connected with the name of Howard. "As far as I am acquainted with the German criminal law, it is built on the principles of the Criminological Association. . . . According to these principles, punishment is an act of justice, and the essence of punishment is retribution. From their stand-point satisfaction is the primary object of punishment, and the other objects include reformation and deterrence." * *Syncretism* is the characteristic mark of the mode of thought of the nineteenth century, and, more especially, of its European codes of law and constitutions. In the twentieth century we shall have to eliminate many of the component parts so as to attain to clearer thoughts and purer actions.

Now some people may think that the deprivation of liberty should improve the criminal under all circumstances. Facts, nevertheless, go to show that the result depends mainly on the manner of the execution of the punishment. There is a belief abroad that the obligation to work, which is almost everywhere coupled with imprisonment, combined with the constraint to order, cleanliness, obedience, and decency, have an educating influence. Efforts are made in the prison to make up for the neglected and forgotten school education. By divine services and religious exhortation we endeavor to purify and elevate the heart of the prisoner. He gets permission, indeed, is encouraged, to keep up his relations with his family by receiving visits, by being in communication with them, and by helping them with the surplus of his earnings. And, lastly, when he is dismissed, efforts are made to improve his chances in life, either by good advice or, as sometimes, by

* Dr. Wirth, governor of the prison of Plötzensee, speaking at the first general assembly of the International Criminological Association in Germany ("Report," p. 27).

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active help. Along with these attentions to the prisoner sufficient care must be expended on his bodily well-being. When all is said, there remains the fact that the measure of humane treatment is in a high degree dependent on the personality of the prison officials and especially the jailers; for between principles and their performance—between what is called theory and practice—there is, indeed, often a yawning gulf, which under unfavorable circumstances continually widens. An important factor is the superior insight of the superintendent of a prison, who may cause a deep reaction in favor of humanity and justice. It is a sad state of affairs, which it is our duty to denounce, when governments, partly from financial reasons and partly from a blunted sense of all moral motives, so frequent in governments, display very little appreciation of the responsibility and dignity of such a position. But the more the government and its executive officers approach the ideal which we have before us, the more may be expected in the way of reformation, though a value must be assigned to the former which is independent of the latter.

V. It is evident that the humane treatment—which is desirable in itself—and more especially the aiming at reformation, tend to lighten prison penalties. And it will be evident, also, that a more humane execution of punishment will somewhat weaken the effect of threats. If the punishment, then, is both to deter and to reform, it may happen easily enough that these two aims come into conflict. It is true that prolonged terms of imprisonment are accompanied by a feeling of disgrace,—a result that varies greatly with individuals, and is wholly absent in entire classes of society. This disgrace did not lay in the intention of the law-giver, the judge, or the administration, but is rather a necessary consequence of the opinion of the different strata of society, for whom a good reputation is of some importance. This secondary result, though it may serve as a deterrent, easily nullifies the criminal's desire to reform. If it is the object of material and moral reform to facilitate a lawful course of life and counteract fresh temptations, it will yet be very hard for it to battle successfully against the pressure of social disgrace which tends,

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with other circumstances, to force the individual back to a criminal career.

The reformatory treatment may perhaps be the primary cause of arousing in the prisoner a heart-felt conviction of the infamy of crime, and of his own crime in particular, and of helping him to overcome his moral disgrace by inward repentance; the social disgrace of punishment it cannot remove. And when the punished criminal returns to the circle where crime and punishment are looked upon rather as an honor than otherwise, the inner reformation itself will most likely prove illusory. The idea of reformation, the significance and the necessity of which we cannot but highly esteem, will, like so many other ideas, be able to accomplish little in the actual world. Its resources are too insignificant, the obstacles too great, and the task too hard. The great number of offences against the law are of a light nature, and the consequent punishments are of short duration; but even if the terms of imprisonment were to be doubled, it would yet be unreasonable to expect, merely as a result of the manner of treatment, a true change of character and a steeling of the will against the numberless unbending influences of life. If many of those thus punished do not return to prison, or return to it only after a long period of absence, we are not justified to conclude that they have not been transgressing the law since their dismissal, for many offences never come to the knowledge of the authorities. We must also bear in mind that a course of life that is not illegal is far from being necessarily, therefore, not immoral, much less moral in conduct. There are many tolerated yet abominable professions open to unsteady and dissolute men, especially in the great cities; and, besides, it is precisely the intellectual originators of crime who know best how to keep at arm's length from the authorities. Under present circumstances it remains very doubtful whether a progressive legislation that looks upon a criminal deed as a sharply-defined fact could succeed in making "responsible" those secret sowers of evil. But granted that a purely legal attitude were reformatory in its effects, this *post* would by no means make probable a *propter*. For, apart from the fact that

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it is, for instance, more convenient to gain one's livelihood as a *soutcneur* than to procure it by burglary, it is also true that the legal proceedings and subsequent convictions, though they offer little that is terrible, yet are sufficiently objectionable; and it can hardly be contended that the more artful person who circumvents these dangers owes his dexterity to the preachers and teachers in the penal establishment, even if these latter, as is often the case, have not been more ardent than their duties compelled them to be. Finally, even in the most favorable case, when the non-punishable conduct is not grossly immoral, when it means, perhaps, a return to an honest livelihood, the former prisoner may, it is true, gratefully remember the kind person who stood by him in his misfortune and express himself accordingly, and this not seldom happens. The psychologist, nevertheless, will be bound to ascribe by far the greatest part of the cause of such a result to other outer and inner factors; though, most assuredly, there are some extraordinary instances in which the humanity and energy of a single man, especially when it extends itself beyond the term of imprisonment, give a decisive turn to the whole life of a "prodigal son."

If these extraordinary cases, which are the only ones that fulfil the reform purpose, were somewhat more frequent, or what is more, were normal, the threat of punishment would turn into an invitation to punishment. The law-giver would have to say, "Ye who dwell in slums, who earn your money perhaps honestly, perhaps dishonestly, only to squander it; ye in whom a vulgar life deadens any finer feelings you may have possessed, only commit a theft or a fraud—it will not weigh heavily on your consciences—and I, the state, will have the opportunity to reform you by punishment and open a new course of life to you."

VI. The facts stand rather as follows: It is true that a great many of those who are punished with imprisonment for venial offences * (how large a number is here of no impor-

* The convictions for begging, theft, etc., do not concern us here. In Germany these trespasses are not counted as transgressions against the imperial

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tance) do not relapse. Still, no specialist believes this to be the work of reformation. There is almost unanimity on the point that short terms of confinement are really *deteriorating*. The most prominent representative of the reform of the criminal class in Germany, one of the founders of the International Association, Herr Franz von Liszt, has collected a goodly number of testimonies of specialists from various countries, —a number which could be easily augmented and which embrace our whole century,*—that may be summed up in a sentence: "*A punishment which furthers crime*,—that is the latest and ripest fruit of 'avenging justice.'" † "*La prison corrompt*," says Lacassagne, the professor of medicinal law. Many think that the real cause of this shocking result lies rather in the fact that the "art of prison management" has not yet had the help of governments to carry out its methods in the prisons, and in other establishments where culprits are sent for short terms of imprisonment. The isolation, so necessary especially for younger criminals and first offenders, is, we are told, yet far from being a rule, and would necessitate, of course, a great deal of expense. But in Belgium, where no expense has been grudged, and where the prisons are model establishments, people think differently. It was in that country that people first thought of abolishing by law short terms of imprisonment! And even those who believe in the relative utility of such prison reforms—which we may gladly give our assent to—only think of staying the recognized process of deterioration. Hardly any one believes in refor-

laws. When punishing these classes of culprits no one thinks of reformation. Deterrence and retribution alone determine the punishment. The thing combated is something which the mass of the people consider morally justifiable, and one is satisfied if but a minority of the actual culprits fall into the hands of "justice."

* Indeed, instances that go further back may be easily gathered, though the use of imprisonment was very limited in the last century. I read in Hanmel,* one of the most zealous champions of reform at that time, that "the prison reforms nobody, and the bad company found there corrupts. The thief is hardly set at liberty, and lo! he robs again."

† Zeitschrift für die gesammte Strafrechtswissenschaft, ix. pp. 743–754.

* In his translation of Beccaria, p. 510.

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mation during a few weeks' or months' stay in a model prison.

How now about imprisonment with hard labor and *long* terms of confinement? The demands of prison reformers are often in some measure realized in this department of punishment, though the methods vary still widely in different countries. The general plan is, by a rigid discipline, hard work, and deep humiliation (in Germany the criminal is addressed by the humiliating "*du*," and in all countries the beard and hair are cut off), to make the prison system, which takes the place of the former corporal and capital punishments, as painful and humiliating as possible. The recreant must suffer because he has caused suffering. It can be said with justice that the aim at reformation is *theoretically* reconcilable with such treatment. The secondary purpose, humanity, does not modify the main purpose, which is the infliction of suffering. And as for the success of this method of treatment, Dr. Paul Aubrey * tells us that here, too, "reformation is a fiction." If the longer terms of imprisonment and similar favorable conditions are advantageous to efforts at reform, yet the material to be improved is much more incapable of improvement. Every contemplation of the inmates of a penitentiary teaches this: The great majority have been frequently punished; they belong to the criminal class; they are thieves, cheats, and receivers of stolen goods by profession. They cannot and will not change. The more accustomed they are to the prison, the more indifferent they become to what is done there. Teaching, preaching, reading, kindly words, may inspire them with half-hearted intentions,—often not even with these,—and with these "intentions" we know "the way to hell is paved." But here, too, despair is not always in the right place. Some individuals, who as dissipating youths fall into bad company, and who are led to steal because they cannot find employment to meet their needs, will receive a healthy shock from prolonged imprisonment, which may be made still more beneficial by moral and material help. If the circumstances are favor-

* *La Contagion du Meurtre*, quoted by Ellis, "The Criminal," p. 250.

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able, and the *squalor carceris* does not cling to them, they may yet become honorable men and honest workmen; some are helped by the trade they learn in prison. So far as the great majority of this numerous class of criminals are concerned, they are lost beyond saving, and we find, nearly always, that they are characterized as such, partly by their social antecedents and partly by their moral nature, but oftenest by both. The moral nature manifests itself in marks which can be outwardly presented and even measured; this is the meaning of all criminal anthropology, which requires much critical acumen, and, rightly understood, is of great significance. But, likewise, "born" or "instinctive" criminals are found also in all other classes,—among murderers and assassins, among perjurers and incendiaries, and especially among transgressors of private morals. Even when among these, some do not fall back. The reason is partly because after long punishment they have left the prison broken down in body, grown old, without sufficient energy left to commit new crimes; in part, the opportunity is lacking, as in the case of perjurers, who are not again allowed to appear as judicial witnesses; and also in the case of incendiaries, who do not again acquire property on the insurance of which they can speculate; or their new deeds are not discovered; or, finally, they are in a position to buy off witnesses, which those experienced will understand how to do better than the novices. If, in cases of extreme criminality, punishment as a means of reform is almost entirely a failure, it acts as an evil (even on the supposition that a more humane treatment will equally benefit all) in a manner which stands in proper relationship, neither to the end of retaliation or prevention. For example, the disgrace, as well as the punishment itself, and especially the same length of punishment, is felt in very different ways by different individuals. What may act as a physical blessing for the vagabond is for the man who leaves a comfortable home (as happens not seldom in the case of special criminals) almost fatal. This is seen most clearly in respect to the quality of nourishment, but it holds good of the whole prison life.

But the professional thief or forger looks upon the discom-

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fort of incarceration for a number of years as a danger which is attached to his otherwise agreeable trade. He reconciles himself to the rotation of two years of free and even luxurious living, and two years in prison, as a form of existence which is more to his taste than the monotony of a laborious and virtuous career. But, as to the length of the term, not only is the effect of all long imprisonments very different, according to health, temperament, and outward condition of the individual, but it is generally true that the severity with which the punishment is felt increases out of all proportion to the increase in the length of the term. According to a law of the sensibilities, a pressure, which at first is scarcely perceptible, will gradually become irksome, and finally become a pain of unendurable violence; just as in respect to the physical effect, energy and vitality will return after an imprisonment of one or two years, or perhaps after one of five or six, but will be broken by eight or ten years of such a life. An imprisonment which exceeds ten years is, indeed, for most criminals, equivalent to not only a slow moral but also a slow physical decay. That this annihilating of a man is more humane than the former chopping off of a hand, or cutting off of a nose and ear, no one dare maintain. The effect is often no better even from an æsthetic point of view.

VII. If one renounces the soothing thought that this is, under the circumstances, a just punishment for the bad conduct of the man, then one will find one's self ever anew thrown back upon the final aim of law and order which makes such sad and hateful means necessary. If the threat of punishment, just as little as the execution of it, is able to hold certain individuals back from a repetition of their crimes, it nevertheless acts upon others in this way, and so much the more, the more terrible a long term is, in its consequences, and the more frightful it is to the mind. It protects the life, property, and honor of all against all, and prevents countless crimes. In proportion as an unconditional worth is assigned to this end, every means is allowable and must appear good; and, consequently, severer and even more cruel punishments could be threatened, and a corresponding execution of them should follow in those cases

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where the threat showed itself to be inadequate. Justice is limited to its formal meaning; accordingly, the form of the process is the protection of the suspected person, and also of the guilty one, against unjust punishment. In fact, modern penal codes show their preventive tendency very clearly, in the more severe punishments with which repetitions of crime are threatened. While it is the general supposition that all are equally inclined to commit crimes and need the same check upon their passions, a stronger impulse on the part of those who have already been punished is taken for granted, and should be met by a stronger threat. For, evidently, the wrong to be atoned for is not greater when it is committed by a person who has already been punished. The retaliation theory, of course, affirms a greater guilt, because a person already acquainted with the legal consequences of such a deed (the conception is generally limited to like or similar deeds) should have been so much the more careful,—as if he should be less expected to commit the deed than any one else. And this is at least rightly *thought*, provided a clear consciousness of deserving-to-be-punished is held to be the special ground of culpability, and that all other circumstances which might deter from crime are to be ignored. But this basis presents itself here in all its absurdity. For, in fact, the perpetuation of the same deed is *much more probable* among those who have already suffered punishment than among criminals as a class; (yet they argue: in itself *less probable*, because there is more than general knowledge of the liability of being punished; in individual cases, nevertheless, the crime is committed again; this proves an unusually bad character, which, even through such knowledge, would not allow itself to be checked.) Such a variety of causes force just these unhappy persons into crime, that the experience of being punished at the best can exercise only a very slight counter-force. The end of deterring through fear is shown to be still stronger and more effectual in the best penal codes,—the *military*,—which, against many by no means improbable, and under some circumstances (in spite of the oath) morally justifiable, violations of obedience, proclaims such hard punish-

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ments that they need almost never be applied. A milder analogy is found in the special punishments for crime with which officers are threatened. Here no special justice is practised towards some particularly violent wrong done (especially in cases of *delicta mixta*, where the holding of office occasions a higher punishment for common transgressions); but a kind of wrong which is especially dangerous is to be prevented by these means. The real standard of culpability is the damage, not of the separate deed, but of the human character as a cause of it and of similar deeds.

VIII. Now when we speak of *combating* crime as a social phenomenon, we ought to specify the exact object more closely. We have in mind crime as a phenomenon appearing among masses of people, as a kind of activity towards which the characters of certain groups of men or of individual men are directed permanently, or at least with a tendency that often reappears. This is especially expressed in the second paragraph of the programme of the Criminological Association: "The results of anthropological and sociological investigations are *therefore* . . . to be taken into account." The meaning is not that penal law is to be given up in respect to all or in respect to officers; but, on the other hand, that penal law should be raised into a higher significance in respect to men *known* to be criminals. They, without doubt, betray their criminal nature by other signs to the anthropological and sociological investigator. By the legislator and the judge they are recognized, in the first place, only by their repetition of crime and by their falling back into it. The more, however, these "results of anthropological and sociological investigations are taken into account," so much the more will even a single deed be enough for recognition. Only under that forced restriction is it allowable for the fourth paragraph in the programme of the International Association to read: "The distinction between occasional criminals and habitual criminals is of fundamental importance in theoretical and practical relations; it must, therefore, serve as a basis for fixing penal legislation." Punishment, as one of the most effectual means of "combating," applies itself expressly to the habitual criminal. Accordingly,

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the ninth and last paragraph returns to the subject again, with a qualification. It reads: "Penal legislation, even when it is a matter of the frequent repetition of petty trangressions, must render habitual criminals of the *incorrigible* class harmless for as long a period as possible." This is evidently a very daring innovation. Here for the first time the thought comes forward boldly that the criminal is to be met with "punishment" no longer, even in form, on account of his deed, but on account of his mental constitution. A thought, which was contained already in the severer threat against falling back into crime, now throws off the last vestige of apparent justice. The deed is no longer regarded as a cause, which must have the punishment as an effect, but only as a means of knowing the criminal and as an occasion for setting the will of the state in motion (in order to render the incorrigible habitual criminal harmless). One may say that the notion of punishment must itself hereby be transformed into a higher conception,—that of a *judicious treatment of the criminal.* Even capital punishment, with which ancient laws (as the Carolina) threaten the *fur famosus*, who is known as such through the *furtum tertium*, is a case of rendering harmless and ought to be so. But it is still everywhere regarded as a punishment; it lay at the basis of the popular notion that the stubborn villain has forfeited his life. When we speak to-day of incorrigible habitual criminals, no one of any insight thinks any more of an incomprehensible and arbitrary wickedness of character as the single cause of the repeated crimes. We know that we have to do with a pathological phenomenon in the anthropological and sociological sense, now more in the one, now more in the other sense. The question has already become the subject of discussion in the Second Congress of the Criminological Association (Bern, 1890), from which, indeed, very little has resulted. But the basis of it was an excellent report by Professor von Lilienthal of Marburg ("Reports," ii. p. 64), the first section of which closes with the following definition: "We must regard as incorrigible, persons who repeatedly fall back and whose crime appears as the outcome, first, of an inherited or acquired degeneracy; second, of a professional life of

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crime. (Here "first" signifies the anthropological, "second" the sociological cause of the crime, but both stand in continual interaction and community.) But if the second section begins, "Against incorrigible transgressors only the permanent rendering of the person harmless can come into consideration as a means of punishment," it is the jurist who is speaking and is operating with his customary conceptions. For it would have been more philosophical, and would have been enough to say: "The presupposition of a judicious treatment of incorrigibles must be the permanent rendering of them harmless." The punishment would here evidently not be put upon the once occurring, and perhaps "slight transgression," but (1) upon the degeneracy; (so far as this (*a*) rests upon heredity, it is, in the judicial sense, absurd, to make the person answerable for it; so far as it is (*b*) acquired, the person's "own fault" may surely be said to lie at the basis of it. This may be said, in the moral sense, to be "imputable;" it is in the judicial sense as incomprehensible as any youth's folly, which brings life-long illness upon him; besides this (*b*) is very often a consequence of (*a*); or (2) the professional criminal career is to be punished. This has certainly a judicial sense, as laws already threaten a single crime more severely when it is professional. But, in fact, just here, with no close connection with (1) (degeneracy), the oppressive weight of circumstances is so clear and evident that as a social inheritance it stands wholly on the same footing with psychological inheritance, not only as an inheritance of poverty but of aggravating conditions of life in general; to which there are added punishments as a sad and fatal acquisition.

IX. The proposal, cited above, for treating incorrigibles is evidently the complement of the reform theory. But while the latter holds fast to *punishment as an evil*, which it would transform into a good; with the former the purpose of inflicting pain is quite unessential. There, as a rule, it retains its necessity, in order that fear may remain; it fulfils the threat. Here, where the threat can be applied only to a narrowly limited circle of individuals, it loses its worth; the degenerate person will not be frightened by it; or, if it presents a great

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evil as the effect of a petty as well as of a great deed, it is in danger of inciting to the greater deed; it ought, therefore, rather to be avoided or made less frightful. And a criminal career is not begun with a conscious resolution; it grows out of its conditions, and spins about its subject a net which he cannot break through. But for the purpose of rendering criminals harmless, not only is the intention to inflict pain not essential, but it is even an obstacle. When we are ready to give up the notion of punishment as an equivalent of the guilt, or of the deed, it is not discernible why we ought to allow the person with a criminal nature to suffer any more than the person with a natural tendency to insanity; why we should inflict pain upon the man who leads a criminal career (so far as this does not consist in separate provable and punishable deeds) any more than upon the man who leads a dissolute life. These are all injurious or dangerous; we wish to make them harmless. This is a task for the state only in so far as the criminal is concerned. The psychological *physician* pronounces judgment as to the necessity of bringing an insane man under suitable treatment, but, as a rule, only at the solicitation of the family of the invalid. The judge ought to decide as to the necessity of caring for the criminal; but it would only be fair and would secure safety against an arbitrary decision, if, instead of or together with the charge, a well-founded petition should be required from the residents of the community to which the criminal belongs. We might add, it ought also be possible to give an authoritative judgment concerning the suitable treatment of the dissolute man, which would be the function of the moralist—until now called the priest—and which would have, as its presupposition, a request of those most concerned, namely, the moral-religious fellowship, without the boundaries of which no one would be permitted to live. In all these cases we have to do with men whom we dare no longer leave to themselves, but who must be given over to the care, direction, yes, the control of others. But this special control ought to resort to force only when all other means are denied; the no-restraint system of caring for lunatics must be recognized as in general

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the best. Unhappily, even in the most civilized lands, the treatment of the insane is not sufficiently regulated and secured. But the principle, nevertheless, holds good, that the uncured ought to be brought into the institutions and kept there, and that the incurables ought always to be kept there. From analogy, it is thought desirable to make the retention of criminals dependent upon " the results of the execution of the punishment." This has been, indeed, accepted as one of the principles of the Criminological Association (§ 8). The thought is right, although one ceases to regard the treatment as punishment. Only one ought not to regard "reformation" as the equivalent of "cure." On the contrary, it would be possible to bring many individuals into the relations of free society, in which one may expect to find their nature—after it has been thoroughly understood—better developed. But it will be indispensable to keep in hand a lever for their material interests. No one, that is, no habitual criminal, should be released until he has earned a considerable sum, the control of which should remain with the institution. As soon as well-founded complaints against him amount to a certain magnitude, or he falls again into crime, this property should be forfeited. The existing Houses of Correction and similar penal institutions must above all (the Criminological Association should make this its most emphatic demand) be relieved of all the insane, who are everywhere numerous. Special places for keeping insane criminals, such as here and there already exist, must be established everywhere. The danger that deception will in this way be increased can of course be met by careful attention. But next, a *change in the work pursued* must be demanded, at least on the continent,—since in England a better system is already followed. As the existing punishments now are, they have—together with all that is rightly blamed in them—at least one good point, namely, that the culprits during this period are " harmless,"—that is, incapable of perpetrating new crimes,—whether this ought to be regarded as the end of punishment or not. But against these advantages a considerable disadvantage of an economical kind must be considered. Their powers of labor are farmed

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out; manufacturers make use of the opportunity to gain cheap labor, with the products of which they can underbid competitors who pay higher wages; the public is served with goods which for the most part—from causes easily discerned —are still worse than the ordinary ones, and which satisfy their producer as little as their consumer. But cheapness constrains the buyers. And hereby the state is relieved of a part of its cost to the hurt of the community; not to its own honor, but as an illustration of its (especially in military states) notorious fiscal avarice, which is, from every higher political point of view, the merest folly. For the economic good of the community, and, therefore, finally, for that of the state, it would surely be more advantageous if all culprits were occupied in an unproductive manner. But this is by no means necessary. We should be satisfied with the principle that no business profit should be made out of these labor forces. For many kinds of work are necessary for the institution itself and could be considerably multiplied. For instance, I found that a shrewd director, who was not satisfied with his baker, established with good success his own bakery according to the newest system. And further, it will be met with no objection if articles for use also in other public institutions should be prepared.

Finally, industrial articles could be ordered by officials, for the purposes of the care of the poor, at cost price. No one would suffer, for instance, if poor widows who are unable to buy articles at the market price were assisted with household goods and clothes for themselves and children, to lift them out of extreme misery. And to what end could the compulsory labor (which costs nothing from a political, economical point of view,—since clothing and nourishment must in any case be given to the prisoners) be better applied than to this? But agricultural labor is especially capable of a wide extension through penal institutions. There are many kinds of cultivation which are not commercially profitable, but at the same time are highly useful, indeed, necessary. Vagabonds, partly under compulsion, partly in a state of partial freedom, have with great success been applied to such work in

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several districts in Germany. A great part of the culprits could without danger be occupied in the same way. These workers would be under military supervision. Those attempting to escape would be exposed to instant death, or, at least, to chains, and perhaps to branding. It might be recommended that, as a rule, every one should work chained for a short time in order to make him more sensitive to the benefit of free motion. With a right choice of individuals, the hygienic effect, together with the advantage obtained, might be very great. And in such a reform the judges could without harm increase the average length of the shorter periods of punishment (let us say up to three and five years) by thirty per cent. to fifty per cent., whereby public security would be gained. (A side consequence of this rendering of the criminal harmless, although only temporarily, would be that he would be hindered during this time from having children.) Furthermore, the term of punishment should be so arranged that no one who has been appointed to common labor shall be dismissed at a time of year when such labor is, even for free laborers, not to be obtained at all, or with difficulty. This point of view is much more important for a just measurement than the attempted and proposed plan to make the term equal to the guilt, concerning which it often requires self-control not to indulge in satire. I regard the most pressing reforms of the severe and long terms of imprisonment as a necessary condition in order to deal with the problem of rendering permanently harmless certain classes of so-called incorrigible cases. For, without these, the judicious treatment would retain a certain coloring of administrative justice, from which the idea itself ought to be freed with all earnestness. The object should be, not the destruction of justice, but the restoration of a higher justice. We wish to be just to the natures and circumstances of unhappy and dangerous men, and, for their own sake and for the good of all, separate them, kindly and with tenderness, like men who have contagious diseases, from the places where they would only sink the deeper in filth and draw others down.

X. Thus far the treatment of the lighter forms of delin-

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quency have occupied the foreground of our thought; or, in the words of the seventh paragraph of the criminological programme, the "substitution of short terms of imprisonment." The greatest attention, much support and much opposition, have been bestowed upon the suggestion to leave to the will of the judge a suspension of the execution,—which might have as a consequence the annulment of the punishment: the so-called conditional condemnation (*condamnation conditionelle*), which in Belgium * has been made a law. I regard the idea, although it is supported by pre-eminent authorities, to be a desperate means of remedy against the evils which confessedly attach to the short terms of imprisonment in a higher degree than to the long and severe. I also regard it as certain that the dangers of infection through the prison have been rated too high. We ought not to compare them with the effects which an honest society could have upon the same individual. An individual of this kind is, even in freedom, exposed to the greatest dangers. In most cases—and especially in those which most commonly terminate with a relapse—the deed itself is a proof that the person was already accustomed to criminal companionship, and did not need to become acquainted with it. Whoever was born in a purer sphere and returns to it will easily shake off from his feet even the dust of the prison. Nevertheless, there is contained in the complaint—that the punishment is often the school of crime—a terrible truth. The conditional condemnation conceived as a final, emphatic and individual warning would offer protection to some. Still, if a sharp police supervision did not follow it up (which would be worse than the punishment), the premium upon innocent conduct in the days of grace would succumb to all the objections which we have put forward against presumptive reformation. We shall look to the interesting experiment with attentive expectation, even though a discriminating knowledge of the actual result may disclose great difficulties.

XI. There has also been felt a doubt as to another substi-

* Recently (March 26, 1891), also in France.

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tute for the customary punishments. While I am writing, the German Convention of the International Association in Halle is considering this subject. The suggestion that those punishments should be made more terrible by increased severity, and that, indeed, something like corporal chastisement should be set up in their place, has, to our delight, been met with animated opposition. On the other hand, the right thought is contained in the proposal that there be a wider and more rational application of a system of *fines*. These would necessarily be measured according to the property and outward circumstances of the offender; for making them effectual when necessary (as in most cases it would be) compulsory labor (but as a rule without imprisonment) would be of service. At the same time (in the writings of the Association) the plan has been brought up, more than formerly, to consider *the interests of the injured party* in penal legislation. I believe that here, more than elsewhere, a point of contact is possible. All smaller thefts, embezzlements, frauds, and other, at least lighter, crimes against property, which come to the knowledge of the judge, should have as a consequence a *duty* for the perpetrators,—the duty of compensation and indemnity. The rational meaning of such a rule throws direct light on the subject. The rational meaning of punishment—to make the man *suffer* at public expense—is by no means of any help.

It will be objected, that this means a return to a private treatment of crime, which predominated so strongly among the Romans and in all ancient codes. Now what if this step backward were to prove a return to a healthy and wise apprehension? What if the whole penal law in its present form should represent an (historically indeed justifiable) amalgamation of morals and law? What if first, through a pure stripping of the real law, that is, of private law, and the reduction of the public law to a private *obligatio ex delicto* against the *state*,—if first, thus, the moral could attain to a strong and independent validity? As it is, penal law in all countries is on the verge of a collapse. For the purpose of acting as an evil, the punishments are not great enough in comparison with the attractions of the smaller transgressions; besides, their power

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of deterring through fear varies too much according to all the relations of the individual. Their evils certainly do not act as spurs to reform. Almost no one believes any longer in their justice. We ought to decide to drop entirely the aim of inflicting evil, and that is the essence of punishment. Justice will demand that whoever has committed injury should make compensation for the injury, and, perhaps, still more than that. Denial of liberty for a time should have its meaning only as a condition for the discharge of these duties, where it cannot also serve as an education (and this may be limited to persons under age, otherwise it might require the assent of the subject). This hard duty will have more force as a deterrent than threatened punishment. In this way it may come about in practice, that the criminals by nature and profession would be placed in lasting confinement as the condition suited to them. Whoever forces himself to that, because it is more attractive to him than repellent, gives evidence in that very preference that his moral or social condition is diseased. But all these reforms will at the same time tend towards a research for other means of preventing crime than can be found in the threatened or real consequences of what he has done.

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THE ETHICAL TEACHING OF SOPHOKLES.

"SOPHOKLES paints men as they ought to be, I paint them as they are," is said to have been the remark of his younger rival and contemporary. Sophokles was more an artist than Æschylos; but the moral world remained for him, as for the older poet, the sphere of tragedy; his works are dramas, but the motives they use and the interest they excite and the high purposes of their author are all drawn from the moral relations of men. In examining the ethical teaching of Sophokles, therefore, our work is not simply that of literary criticism, but rather it is a study of the moral sentiments of

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the age, as used and as elevated by the dramatist. And this was the earnest, vigorous age of Greek culture. The youthful enthusiasm of Sophokles was kindled by the victories of Greece over the Persians. Then came that wonderful growth of the Athenian democracy, until the Athenian state became all but an empire; in this life he was ever a quiet leader. He was the personal friend and colleague of Perikles, and of Thukydides. As an artist on the stage, he could know those artists with the chisel and the brush, to whom the perfection of Greek architecture and sculpture and painting is due. All that was Greek, the strength and the weakness of the Greek character, we find in Sophokles; through him we study his city and his age.

The question whether moral earnestness kept pace with general culture in Greece cannot be answered from tragedy alone. Lax moral practice was the frequent attendant of vigorous moral discussion; rarely would the Sokratic theory of virtue be found less true than in Greece; and tragedy was but one sphere of moral discussion. Again, it is easy to overestimate the moral teaching of such a writer as Sophokles, by reading into his moral terms a meaning only developed in later centuries of moral experience. These questions and difficulties do not lessen the value of tragedy as a witness to ideals, actual even when unconscious, and as the expression of an effort to advance these ideals through the medium of art.

I.

The fundamental fact of ethics is the sense of duty, the ought. The objects prescribed as duty, the mode in which duty is treated, and the phases of it emphasized, vary from time to time; but the fact remains. Philosophic Greek thought discussed the ends of action rather than the conscience which judges action right; but in Greek literature and in Greek life the prominent ethical fact is an æsthetic conscience. The fine nature revolts from sin, and the results of sin; sin is discord in a work of divine art, a discord in the world-harmony, and the very thought of it is repulsive.—The interest of the *Philoktetes* centres about Neoptolemos. He has been brought

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from his island home to take Troy, and for this he needs the bow of Herakles. The exiled possessor of this bitterly hates the Greek chiefs, his former comrades, and no persuasion or force can obtain it. Yet we wonder that even an Odysseus seeks to persuade the son of Achilles to deceit; * and Neoptolemos's answer does not disappoint us:

> "I was not born to act with evil arts,
> Nor I myself, nor, as they say, my sire.
> Prepared am I to take the man by force,
> But not by fraud. . . . . I wish,
> O king, to miss the mark in acting well,
> Rather than conquer, acting evilly." †

Motives of ambition, of respect for the army, and of reverence for the expressed will of the gods, are urged till the young man yields; but throughout the account of his deception we may read between the lines the rebellion of his pure, genuine nature. And at last it is too much; ambition, obedience, everything gives way, and the deception is confessed.

Such a revolt from evil is felt by Elektra, when she contemplates her mother's sin.

> "Ah, day of all that ever came to me,
> Most horrible by far!
> O night! O sufferings strange as wonderful,
> Of banquets foul and dark!
> Dread forms of death which he, my father, saw
> Wrought out by their joint hands,
> Who, traitorous, murdered him who was my life,
> And so brought death to me." ‡

Her sister lacks the moral force to support her in all the deprivation and suffering caused by this attitude, so that sister and mother alike are objects of scorn, subjected to severest reproaches. Elektra welcomes the thought of death or of solitary banishment, to relieve her from the proximity and thought of such evil.—Such, again, is Antigone's feeling towards a command which she regards as impious. Her whole

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* *Iliad, I.*, 312–313. † *Phil.* 88–90ª, 94ᵇ–95, Plumptre's translation.
‡ *El.* 201–208.

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nature rises in noble scorn at the thought of a brother lying unburied, and all the ties of obedience to the state, care for her own life, and love for her betrothed, are suddenly snapped.

The æsthetic character of this judgment is even better shown in the cases of Aias and of those about Œdipus. Aias, disappointed of a prize, has sought to slay the commanders of the Greek army; but Athene turned aside his blows, so that they fell on the cattle. Coming to himself, he feels that he can neither stay nor go home.

"The shame is past all bearing." *

His life is marred, the only thing he can do is to end it bravely; and the feeling is strong enough to overcome his love for wife and child.—When Œdipus's sin is revealed, and he appears on the stage with blinded eyes streaming with blood, it is hard to distinguish the moral from the æsthetic effect on the chorus. Jokaste had already committed suicide from horror of her own unconscious deeds, and Œdipus wildly blinds himself on seeing her dead. It is as much the revolting physical aspect of the man as the moral taint which makes them turn from him with the words, τοίαν φρίκαν παρέχεις μοι.† And in the long life of wandering which followed, it was physical mutilation oftener than moral evil which turned men against him.

Greek excellence lay in fineness of culture. Moral sensibility and sensitiveness was cultivated with delicate sensibility in every line. The feeling of shame ‡ rather than conviction of wrong was the result produced by this æsthetic conscience; *moral* perfection was not the controlling element in the ideal. I do not mean that the value of obedience to imposed law was entirely without recognition. The meaning of the *Antigone* lies in the conflict there depicted between this human law and the æsthetic law assigned to the gods. The commands of the ruler and the state demand obedience, § but every one sympathizes with her who disobeys these laws in

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* *Ai.* 466, οὐκ ἐστι τοὔργον τλητόν.

† *O. T.* 1306.

‡ Αἰδώς *El.* 249, 607; *Ai.* 1076, 338; *O. K.* 247, 1268.

§ *Ant.* 660, 870.

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obedience to her conscience. And this same play suggests that fineness of culture, and what I have called the æsthetic conscience, are not necessarily associated with weakness of moral fibre. Antigone dies in the effort to do her duty; Elektra welcomes the thought of death and banishment; Neoptolemos gives up the hope of future glory, all the dream of a young life; it is the *moral* and physical energy of Œdipus which impresses us, in his prosperity and in his blindness. It is devotion to duty which wakens moral enthusiasm, in æsthetic Greek no less than in sterner Teuton.

II.

The moral system. 1. Law and justice.

> "Oh that 'twere mine to keep
> An awful purity,
> In words and deeds whose laws on high are set
> Through heaven's clear æther spread,
> Whose birth Olympos boasts,
> Their one, their only sire,
> Whom man's frail flesh begat not,
> Nor in forgetfulness
> Shall lull to sleep of death;
> In them our God is great,
> In them He grows not old for evermore."*

Right and justice, the final laws of morality, rest back on the gods, or the reasonable order of things represented by the gods. These laws do not fluctuate with changes in the ideas of the gods, but are rooted in that controlling power which, when regarded as reasonable, is called divine, whatever be its further name. Ancient justice (δίκη) is seated in the heavens with Zeus.† Laws (νόμοι) rest back on the gods, and for this reason demand obedience.‡ Themis (right instituted by the gods) takes care that the wrong-doer suffer;§ reverence, truth, and faithfulness are θέμις, right by divine institution.‖ Eternal, divine law can never be set aside by man. As to Kreon's commands, Antigone says:

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* *O. T.* 863–873. † *O. K.* 1381, sq. ‡ *Ai.* 1343, sq. § *El.* 1064, sq.
‖ *Ant.* 880; *O. K.* 1556; *El.* 127; *Phil.* 812. Duty to parents, *Tr.* 809.

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"Nor did I deem thy edicts strong enough,
That thou, a mortal man, should'st overpass
The unwritten laws of God that know no change;
They are not of to-day or yesterday,
But live forever, nor can man assign
When first they came to being."*

Antigone dies by human law for obedience to divine law, but her course wins moral approval, nay, enthusiasm. Faith in this eternal order of things marks the moral man. Antigone dies in this faith. Elektra endures years of scorn and welcomes the thought of death in this faith. And by his trust in the gods and their oracles Œdipus lives through years of wandering, of exile from society and of suffering in every form, until his sin is atoned for, and he dies a glorious death.

2. Transgression of law is a subject of deep ethical thought; it is the ethical side of sin. Man may use the world for good or evil.

"So, gifted with a wondrous might,
Above all fancy's dreams, with skill to plan,
Now unto evil, now to good,
He turns."†

Transgression of law is sin against the gods;‡ it is folly,§ the common disgrace of reasonable beings.‖

The origin and motives of sin were carefully analyzed by the Greeks, and Sophokles emphasizes three allied causes, selfishness, self-assertion, and pride. (*a*) It is the selfish fondness for luxury (χλιδά)¶ and power which led Polyneikes to cast out his father from the state, and leave him to provide for himself during all the years of wandering. The daughters Antigone and Ismene care for him as best they can. They do the work of sons,** while Polyneikes and Eleokles in selfishness seek their own enjoyment and prosecute their own quarrels at the

* *Ant.* 453–457. † *Ant.* 365–367.

‡ *Ant.* 1070; *O. T.* 1329; *Ai.* 1129, "Saved by the gods, put not the gods to shame."

§ *Cf.* the Hebrew idea, *e.g.*, Ps. xxxv. 8. *O. T.* 874, 891; *Tr.* 586 and 565; the lustful centaur laid hold of Deianeira with *foolish* hands.

‖ *O. T.* 1023, 1024. ¶ *O. T.* 888. ** *O. K.* 342, sqq., 425–450.

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expense of the Theban state. (*b*) A more common cause of sin in men who are deemed worthy of the Greek tragedy, is self-assertion. The very fact that a large and vigorous manhood was the Greek ideal of excellence, opened the way for excess in this direction. It is the impetuosity of Aias which urges him to avenge himself on those who had defrauded and dishonored him. The resulting action would have been destructive in the extreme, so that with fine perception Sophokles lets the temper of the man defeat itself. His resentment is too much for him and drives him mad, and is satisfied only by the slaughter of the cattle.—Self-assertion was the cause of Œdipus's sin. He is not responsible for having slain his *father*. But the same impetuous nature which led him to turn from Corinth and his reputed father, led him to slay the old man and his servants at the Three Ways when struck by the charioteer's lash. The second sin, of incest, is but a part of the punishment for this murder, and the quick, impetuous temper which was shown in it. Again we recognize the genius of the poet, when an example of this temperament appears in the very picture of a noble, self-sacrificing king, which is the first half of this tragedy. He anticipates his people in seeking relief for them, and curses the murderer with all the vigor of his nature, but his impetuosity and sensitive temper lead him first to suspect the prophet, then to accuse Kreon and the prophet of an attempt to rouse rebellion and displace him. Jokaste has to point out to him the neglected suffering of his people. The audience see an example of sin, just similar to that which is finally to cause his utter overthrow.

(*c*) In the mind of a Greek the greatest sin and cause of sin was insolent pride, ὕβρις.

> "But pride begets the mood
> Of wanton, tyrant power;
> Pride filled with many thoughts, yet filled in vain,
> Untimely, ill-advised,
> Scaling the topmost height,
> Falls to the abyss of woe,
> Where step that profiteth
> It seeks in vain to take."*

* *O. T.* 873–878; *Cf. Ant.* 1348–1352; *Ai.* 129–134; *Tr.* 280.

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In careless presumption Philoktetes enters the shrine of Apollo at Chryse, and suffers ten years in solitude from the bite of the serpent. Kreon is the typical example. Asserting his independence as ruler he makes laws at variance with sacred custom and divine law, and demands absolute obedience to these. He condemns Ismene as well as her sister, until her innocence is finally forced on him. He disregards the pleas of his son betrothed to Antigone. He is blind to the warnings of the prophet, calling him an impostor. And when he finally yields in fright at the divine curses uttered against him, it is too late. Insolence has done its work; he finds Antigone dead; his son commits suicide before his eyes, and his wife hangs herself on hearing it. Only thus is the Greek sense of justice satisfied.

Sin is self-cumulative.

Τὸ δυσσεβὲς γὰρ ἔργον
*μετὰ μὲν πλείονα τίκτει, σφετέρᾳ δ' εἰκότα γέννᾳ.**

Sin tends to increase sin by calling for revenge. Aias revenges the insult offered him by the Atridæ; Œdipus says, "I did but requite the wrongs I suffered," † and Kreon, "I claim the right of rendering ill for ill." ‡ But we find in Sophokles a deeper thought, that one sin opens the way for a second, that one sin is punished by a second, and the taint lasts till the race is extinct. Ethical thought to-day is individualizing. "Whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he also reap." And too easily we forget that sin leaves a legacy of evil to the world. The penalty is paid, but the effect remains. The worst penalty of sin is sin.

We have dramas illustrating this in the case of the Pelopidæ, and the Labdakidæ. Pelops won his bride by bribing her father's charioteer, and then slew the latter, and the curses of Myrtilus followed the race. One sin led to another, till Agamemnon found it necessary to sacrifice his daughter to Artemis, till Klytæmnestra, using this as an excuse, joined the plot to slay her husband, and was herself slain with Ægisthos. So in the Theban race, Laios sinned by carrying

* *Æsch. Agam.* 758–760. † *O. K.* 271. ‡ *O. K.* 953.

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off a beautiful boy, some say a son of Pelops. In punishment for this comes another sin,—disobedience to the oracle which warned him against his own child. Œdipus, who was this child, fulfilled the oracle by slaying his father, and marrying one whom he found to be his mother. Of the children by this marriage, the sons perished by each other's hand in contest for the throne of Thebes, and Antigone was put to death for burying the brother to whom Thebes's ruler had denied this honor.

"Blessed are those whose life no woe doth taste!
For unto those whose house
The Gods have shaken, nothing fails or curse
Or woe, that creeps to generations far.
E'en thus a wave, (when spreads
With blasts from Thrakian coasts
The darkness of the deep,)
Up from the sea's abyss
Hither and thither rolls the black sand on,
And every jutting peak,
Swept by the storm-wind's strength,
Lashed by the fierce wild waves,
Reëchoes with the far-resounding roar." *

3. Retributive justice.

ἁμαρτίαι σφάλλυσι τὴν σωτηρίαν.†

"Where then the bolts of Zeus,
And where the glorious Sun,
If, seeing crimes like these,
They hold their peace, and hide?" ‡

ἔτι μέγας οὐρανῷ
Ζεύς, ὃς ἐφορᾷ πάντα καὶ κρατύνει.§

The central thought of the Greek religion, as of Greek ethics, is this,—that a penalty of suffering follows sin. It may come early or late, but it is sure.‖ Belief in it characterizes the virtuous, religious man; respect for it is the motive of religion; ¶ it is the very core of religiousness and righteousness.

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* *Ant.* 583–592. † *Eriph.* fr. 204.
‡ *El.* 824–826. *Cf. El.* 244, sqq., and *O. K.* 621, sqq., and *O. K.* 895.
§ *El.* 174, 175. ‖ *Ant.* 1103; *O. K.* 1536. ¶ *Ai.* 1036, sqq.

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Distributive justice, like law itself, centres in Zeus, but it often receives a personification of its own. It is called Nemesis: ἦ θεῶν βία καὶ νέμεσις, οἷπερ ἔργ' ἀμύνουσθιν κακά; * it is called Até, the calamity involving a tendency to do wrong, which is followed by suffering. Aias is "so tied and harnessed to an evil fate."†

> "Evil ever seems to be as good
> To those whose thoughts of heart
> God leadeth unto woe,
> And without woe, he spends but shortest space of time." ‡

Ἄτη meant definitely this punishment by blindness to right and impulse to sin, which was illustrated in the house of the Labdakidæ.

The personified goddesses of retribution were called Erinnyes. These were awful and divine,§ ever mindful of crime and untiring,‖ swift,¶ sure,** and crafty †† in punishing it. They had many feet and many hands, so that none could escape them.‡‡ They were the goddesses of just retribution, ποίνιμοι.§§

> "They wait,
> The slow though sure avengers of the grave,
> The dread Erinnyes of the mighty Gods,
> For thee in these same evils to be snared." ‖‖

Such passages might be cited indefinitely to illustrate a thought about which the Greek tragedy as a whole centres. The three Œdipus plays put on the stage three scenes in the downfall of the Labdakidæ, three scenes illustrating three prolific broods of sin and suffering which come from sin. Aias presumed to attempt the lives of the leaders of the army, and what suffering it brings! His father must lose an only son; his barbarian wife, so dearly beloved, and the infant boy, become but a slave-woman with babe to suffer with her; his

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* *Phil.* 601, 602.
† *Ai.* 123.
‡ *Ant.* 622–625.
§ *Ai.* 837; *El.* 112.
‖ *Ai.* 130; *El.* 491.
¶ *Ai.* 837, 843.
** *Ant.* 1074; *Ai.* 1034.
†† *Tr.* 1051; *Ant.* 1075; *Fr.* 508.4; *Ai.* 1034.
‡‡ *El.* 491.
§§ *Ai.* 843; *Tr.* 809; *Ant.* 1075.
‖‖ *Ant.* 1074–1076.

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brother-in-law, and the sailors of Salamis have no one to lead and protect them,—when honor demands the suicide of Aias.

Greek dramas were not sermons, but dramas with dramatic purpose and dramatic interest. Yet the religious element never faded out, for the current of life-events with which they dealt was determined by the gods, or rather its power was personified in the gods. This was the deepest thought they found in the world, and as such it stirred them intensely. As such it was almost the only possible key-note for a great tragedy.

The question of atonement, or redemption from sin, is hardly a question of ethics, nor does it belong to tragedy. The punishment of sin was the natural sequence of sin, and laws of nature are inviolable. Only sin against God can be forgiven by God. Right-doing may correct the evil tendencies that remain, but it does not cheat law of its penalty.

Œdipus was an exemplary ruler, but this did not abate the years of suffering and shame. We do find, however, that the penalty of sin spends its force in suffering, and that suffering has a sort of purifying influence. For Elektra and Antigone we feel that suffering has purified the character. Antigone dies, but for Elektra, the curse of the race has spent itself in suffering ; her spirit is moulded into sympathy with law and the government of the world. Philoktetes sinned by presumption, and only after ten years of solitary suffering is he fitted to take a necessary, important place in the capture of Troy. The moral sense of Greece recoiled from the evil in which Œdipus was involved, quite as much as we do to-day. Yet when he had wandered for many years in solitude, want, and shame, the moral sense of Greece recognized the effect of this on character. The Œdipus at Kolonos is a drama of reconciliation. Chastened and ennobled by suffering, he appears almost divine in the favors he is to bring to Attika ; but the sons of evil still remain to do and to suffer wrong.

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III.

The ideal man for Sophokles.

In the first *stasimon* of the *Antigone*, after praising man's power as shown in his control of earth and sea and animals, Sophokles sings:

> "And speech, and thought as swift as wind,
> And tempered mood for higher life of states,
> These he has learnt, and how to flee
> Or the clear cold of frosts unkind,
> Or darts of storm and shower,
> Man all providing. . . .
> So, gifted with a wondrous might,
> Above all fancy's dream, with skill to plan,
> Now unto evil, now to good
> He turns. While holding fast the laws,
> His country's sacred rights,
> That rest upon the oath of Gods on high,
> High in the state; an outlaw from the state,
> When loving, in his pride,
> The thing that is not good;
> Ne'er may he share my hearth, nor yet my thoughts,
> Who worketh deeds of evil like to this." *

Man's life is indeed intertwined with many other lines in the course of cosmic events. Few people have recognized the force of influences now called heredity and environment, as did the Greeks. These two influences were objectified in that stream of constantly exercised power, that dark background of life, if not its source, which is called fate. But man has a liberty beyond fate. Each sin that is fated has also its reason in his own character. Each excellence is self-won.

The quality most admired in man seems to be largeness of soul, a wide interest in the world, a noble, wise self-assertion.

Odysseus, with all that is tricky and mean, has a breadth of purpose and a success in carrying out his aims in every line that is attractive to the Greek. Orestes undertakes to avenge his father by slaying the king who usurped his throne, and shows that he is the man for the deed. Aias is a very Greek

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* *Ant.* 354–375.

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in this particular, vigorous, impetuous, with large desires and large power of satisfying them, with a sense of honor which could brook no insult. Single-handed he had rescued Agamemnon from the very stroke of Hektor; and it is the same man who would now slay Agamemnon to revenge his wrongs. There is a touch of barbarism in the man and in the ideal he represents, but the world is not yet beyond admiring greatness and energy. Œdipus also found keen sympathy with an Athenian audience. His very faults of noble impetuosity were faults that leaned towards virtue in the estimation of a Greek. He was so true a king, so watchful for every interest of his people and earnest in his efforts to do them good, so broad and so earnest a man. The same refined taste which made the Greek sense of duty æsthetic, introduced this standard of judgment here. The æsthetic ideal of character first demanded force and vigor, largeness of soul (*μεγαλοψυχία*).

And secondly, the æsthetic ideal of character demanded proper balance. Much of what was said of sin as the result of self-assertion might be repeated here. *Σωφροσύνη* was the check and balance corresponding to *μεγαλοψυχία*. For the perfect man, all faculties and powers stand in perfect balance. It is not unnatural that this phase of the ideal should be emphasized in the drama mainly by condemnation of sins against it. It was not the function of tragedy to depict perfect life, but that which appeals to men more deeply, grandeur of character in unfavorable circumstances.

The ideal man is *truthful* and *sincere*. The case of Neoptolemos, son of Achilles, shows that the Greeks with all their natural cunning knew the meaning of these words. The wily plans of Odysseus fail. Aias marching on the commanders by stealth goes mad. Herakles's death is attributed to treachery in slaying an enemy, while Zeus had always cared for his son in honorable contests.

It is only from poetry that we learn of *love* and *tenderness for one's family* as a Greek trait. The *Maidens of Trachis* turns on the unrestrained, intense love of Deianeira for her husband. The love of Elektra for her long-absent brother is beautifully depicted in those scenes where a false account of

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his death is recited in her hearing. The one bit of mildness and light in the *Aias* is the love of the fierce, brave warrior for the little son and his mother who had been a slave-woman. Death would be only pleasure instead of a necessity, if it did not bring pain to them. And Œdipus is as intense in his love for his wife and children as in reference to any great action. I need but refer to the scene where he meets his daughters just after having blinded his eyes.

The Greeks were enough a political people to recognize *devotion to the state* as an indispensable virtue; they were religious enough to make *reverence for the gods* an essential feature of their ideal. The whole public life of Œdipus testifies to the former, and indeed to the latter also. The Greek drama was religious in its origin, and breathes a religious spirit throughout. It was addressed to a political people, so that political virtue was never lacking in its approved ideals.

There are two types of women in Sophokles,—Antigone and Elektra on the one hand, Ismene, Chrysothemis, Deianeira, etc., on the other. Elektra and her sister, Chrysothemis, will serve as examples. Their mother has joined Ægisthos in slaying her husband Agamemnon, and the guilty pair rule in Mykenæ. Elektra's younger brother, Orestes, was saved by her care, and is her hope and their fear. Elektra and Chrysothemis live in the palace, but under constant indignities, with menial fare,—and having the family crime constantly before them. Elektra is by far the stronger. Her passions are deeper and more controlling, both the love for her father and brother, and that love for her mother which has become as intense a hatred since its betrayal. The thought of her father is constantly in her mind, and her love seeks revenge for him. Perhaps the most beautiful scene of the play is her recognition of that brother whom she had heard was dead, and the careless joy which might have wrought the ruin of them both but for the watchfulness of his attendant. The intensity of her moral feeling is evident in the noble speech answering her mother's attempt to defend her sin, and again in her condemnation of her sister for not laying aside woman's

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nature to avenge this crime. Many years she waited for Orestes to come and do his work of vengeance, and she saw only sorrow in the life which opened before her. The news of Orestes's death throws her on her own responsibility; she steels herself to action; the woman sinks before the soul and its duty,—she feels herself the instrument of divine justice. Intensity of emotion for the right, and single persistence in pursuit of it, condemn her sister, support her in adversity, and impel to action.

Such stern characters demand a milder counterpart as a foil, and as a relief, lest we forget that the play deals with human life. Chrysothemis, like Ismene, is more a woman, and more a Greek. She is Elektra's sister; we find the same traits of character, but her nature is not strong enough to carry her burden, or, indeed, to realize it. She is first a woman, and the difficulties in the way of unwomanly action are insurmountable; bounds set by nature define the limits of what law, natural or divine, can prescribe. She is one with whom the hearer can sympathize, when her sister kindles, the rather, a lofty enthusiasm in his breast.

As to the results of this investigation, we may say again that these ethical ideas are the product of that age. Moral reflection is characteristic of the Greeks; our records of it date back to the seven wise men. Discussion of action and theories of action interested a philosophic people even more than theories of the world. The moral code was developing towards the results in Plato and Aristotle. We should say, further, that the thoughts we find in Sophokles were undoubtedly far in advance of the actual ideals of his age, although but a development of these. Moral progress is ever introduced by great leaders, whose thoughts are realized only long after they have lived. Sophokles was such a leader, and his doctrines of law and duty, of sin and punishment, find truer sympathy to-day than when offered to his own people.

Much progress in ethical thought as Sophokles made, guided by a poet's intuition, he did not break through the

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sphere of Greek thought. His ideals, his conceptions of virtue and duty, may even yet be ideal and unrealized, but they are Greek in that their stand-point is æsthetic rather than ethical. A grand fault is approved more than a weak virtue. Herakles, in rage and pain slaying his attendant, his wife Deianeira, with her depth of passionate love, are more attractive than their perfect son. The sense of shame can at best only condemn what an educated popular taste condemns. Once assume this æsthetic stand-point, however, and the results reached can never cease to excite wonder and admiration. That combination of mental vigor, and sympathy with nature and life which produced Greek art may never be repeated; and the adequate successes of æsthetic morals are limited to those naïve beginnings of highest culture, before knowledge and cool calculation have supplanted life,—before the world of science has supplanted nature. Then right and wrong was instinctive for the "perfect" man, and his whole nature joined in the revolt against wrong; but ideas of right and wrong were limited by the point of view. The sublime and the beautiful in action excited moral admiration. Conscience was sense of conformity to an æsthetic ideal. The eternal relations of things, *natural law in the moral world*, embodied the æsthetic ideal. It was reserved for a sterner people than the Greeks to give its true meaning to the "ought," to turn attention beyond the best that *is* to what may be and must be.

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THE RIGHT OF PRIVATE PROPERTY IN LAND.

I HAVE been asked to express my views on the "Ethics of Property in Land," on which subject, during the brief existence of this journal, two treatises have already appeared. Those two treatises dealt mainly with the "right" of private property in land, and called this its "ethics." Whether this be admissible I will leave undiscussed. I recently asked several German and English scholars, what they understood by "the ethics of private property in land." None of them professed to know. It is indeed not my intention to discuss the views of my two worthy predecessors, who differ so profoundly from my convictions on nearly all political and economic opinions and principles of which they make mention, that, if I were to proceed critically, I should hardly leave a single proposition of theirs unquestioned. This would occupy too much space. Let us, therefore, instead of speaking of the ethics of property in land, put the seemingly more simple question: Is the holding of private property in land warranted, or not?

Private property in land is an essential ingredient of the total order of life of all civilized peoples of which we have any knowledge. It is an institution most intimately connected with the whole development of that order. Our question may, consequently, be extended with advantage to the more general one,—Is the law of civilized nations justifiable? This question seems simply absurd, for it is at bottom identical with the still more general, and surely inadmissible, question, Is the history of civilized nations justifiable?

The conception of right and wrong is not applicable to the constitution or the fundamental institutions of whole races, because it is precisely these institutions that create the standard by which the actions of individuals whose moral characters are here in question, may be judged. If the actions of the individual agree with them, he has acted rightly, otherwise

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wrongly. These institutions, again, are a product of the wants of men,—especially of the wants of those who are victorious in the struggle for existence, of those who at any given time are the most powerful, and, therefore, rule, and whose deeds, like the deeds of all, are wholly determined by the conditions under which they live and by the experiences which have been transmitted to them from past generations.

The events of history do not follow some system of law, or any ethical theories or moral principles; they are made up of the struggle of forces and wants, and he who is victorious in this struggle imposes his law on the conquered and makes his own bed as comfortable as he knows how. His knowledge depends here on the total development which his own nation, and other nations with which his fellows have come into contact, have undergone up to the moment in question. The notions, true and untrue, which men gradually formed about the conditions under which they lived and the events which they experienced or heard about, are partly the results and partly the causes of this development. These notions, too, do not owe their existence to chance, but result from the whole past with the same necessity as the events to which they apply. Based on the experiences of mankind, certain judgments about right and wrong, good and evil, form themselves at all times.

How man arrives at what we call a moral judgment is not the point to be investigated here, but only how he comes to call something right or wrong, good or evil. The answer, we believe, has been given above. From our theory it naturally follows that the abstract conception of right has no definite contents, but that the contents vary according to times and circumstances. When, consequently, we ask, to-day, whether any particular institution of the past had or had not been justifiable, we only mean to ask whether it would or would not conform to our present ethical conceptions. At all events, there would be no sense in the question, whether the men of the past had a right to introduce this or that system of government or institution. For in doing this, they obeyed the imperative demands of the struggle for existence, the law of

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history, the logic of historic causality, compared to which the special traits and possible moral ideas of some individuals who took part in the struggle may be considered as *une quantité négligeable.*

We cannot, therefore, reasonably ask, Were the Teutons justified in expelling the Celts from the Germany of to-day, and settling there? Were the Romans and Greeks, or any other nation you please, justified in introducing slavery? These questions would only make sense (unless we apply our own standard quite arbitrarily to the deeds of remote ages), if we were well acquainted with the moral principles of those far distant times and peoples, and were thus enabled to find a possible contradiction between their deeds and their maxims. But, as a matter of fact, we have to deduce their principles from their actions, and this, indeed, is the only permissible proceeding when nations are concerned. The braggart counts for nothing in history; principles that are perpetually given the lie by the lives of whole nations are not principles at all, but empty sounds, unconnected with reality and imported from without, just as, in our time, the precepts of Christianity have no application in the economic dealings not only of nations but of individuals. Looked at from this point of view we are the greatest braggarts the world has ever seen, for we are constantly setting aside the fine morals about which we talk so prettily. Among a hundred Christians, at least ninety-nine strive after little but property and money, and while doing this, they talk piously about the draught of fishes and the eye of the needle. It has not always been so, and, generally speaking, the further back we go the less do we find it. Man in a state of nature has not the slightest doubt of his natural right to prosecute what is advantageous to himself and to his tribe, with the help of any means that are likely to lead him to his end. History in the theoretical sense is anything but moral. It is as little moral as our modern business life,—the newest form of the struggle of existence,—is even in its general outlines, apart from particular failings of individuals. And thus the *origin* and *tendency* of property has nothing to do with morality, being originally a brutal fact,

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like manslaughter, and afterwards becoming an institution defended with bayonets, with the police, and with religious dogmas, just like any other useful thing,—useful, primarily, for those who rule, for those who have introduced it and understand its value.

It was by right of force and cunning that the modern nations originally took possession of their present abodes, partly exterminating and partly enslaving the former inhabitants, and it was in this manner, apart from everything we call right, that property in land originated. On a low stage of economic development, when there is little division of labor, and when the power of production is very limited, men have to live in larger groups; they form the clan, then, knitted together by ties of consanguinity, they work, manage the household, and consume. Under favorable circumstances, and when the settlement is a lasting one, the productivity of labor and the general culture increase. The households, becoming gradually isolated, every one with his slaves or without them, works more and more on his own account and consumes his own productions. This is why the land necessary for life and actually cultivated is fast divided, while the uncultivated land — forests, pastures, streams — yet remain common property for a long time. Along with the individualization of the family, the institution of private property, and the growth of the general welfare, there originates the desire for more, and the economic struggle, viz., the struggle for wealth among the members of the same tribe, begins. And as all wealth is attached to land, and as the product of land has to be gained directly by the isolated household, because there is as yet no trade or nearly none, therefore the striving of all is after more land and more laborers, for without the latter the land is valueless. In this fashion originated everywhere, where private property had been once introduced, a species of civil war, in which, in the main, the decision lay with brute force, even if not in quite the same manner as on battle-fields. As long as there exists no private property, all free members of the tribe are equal; all are armed, the army and the people being one. As soon as a part of the tribe has

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been weaned from the use of weapons by a prolonged settlement, and the other part—the nobility—alone remain armed, the latter use their power to subjugate those who are defenceless, to confiscate their land, and to force them to labor for them.

The cause of the ascendency of one part over the other may originate in many other ways; the subjugation may assume many forms, but the thing itself is always the same—a typical phenomenon in the history of all more highly-developed races. Along with private property there comes also oppression and exploitation, wealth and poverty. Critical minds, not satisfied with the existing state of affairs, knew this long ago, and expressed it with more or less accuracy, most of them attaching to their just criticisms impossible demands. Thomas More, in his "Utopia" (1516), says that wherever private property exists justice and social welfare are out of the question. The principle of equality, he contends, is irreconcilable with private property, for under its *régime* every one attempts, with various pretences and rights, to lay hold on as much as he can. The national wealth, however great it may be, falls into the possession of a few individuals, who leave their fellows in want and wretchedness.

The German printer, Sebastian Frank, writing about the same time (1531), says in his "Chronica" that God had designed all things to be common property, but that the tyrannical man had laid hold of them unjustifiably, whereupon God had sent other tyrants to wrench from him the stolen property, in the same way as he himself had abstracted it from the common stock.

About the same period the Anabaptists, and a century later the Calabrian monk, Campanella, in his "Civitas Solis" (first published in 1620), demand the abolition of private property, and in the same century many great minds, among them the Frenchman Vairasse ("Histoire des Sevarambes," 1677), make the same demands. J. J. Rousseau, in his "Discours sur l'origine et les fondements de l'Inégalité parmi les Hommes" (1754), uttered the words that have become so renowned. "The first man who enclosed a piece of land and

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said, This is mine! and found people simple enough to believe him, was the real founder of the *bourgeoisie.* How much misery, crime, war, etc., would have been prevented if another man had had the courage to pull out the posts, and had said, Take care, cheat! you are lost the moment you forget that the fruits of the earth belong to all, and the earth itself to no one." Helvetius, in his book "De l'Homme" (1781), which did not appear until after the author's death, finds the cause of the social evils and sufferings in the existence of property. Mably, in his work "De la Legislation" (1776), says that property is the source of all evils, that its introduction was a mistake "qu'il était presque impossible de faire." Similarly Morelly ("Basiliade," 1753, and "Code de la Nature," 1755) and Brissot de Warville ("Recherches Philosophiques," 1778) and a great many others whom I need not enumerate here.

There are, consequently, two fundamental types of property, —common and private property, both assuming various forms. Both of them originate mainly through force, that is to say, force is the general means of procuring them. Common property is everywhere the first phase, but no race that has stopped there has had a high development.

According to unanimous experience, man, in his natural state, is averse to labor (all explorers confirm this), and only force can drive him to his work. This force is applied by those who, by power or cunning, are able to make their interests prevail over the interests of the others. The primary object of the use of force is to secure property in land, and it leads logically to reducing to slavery those who are not proprietors; in the first instance, the conquered strangers, and afterwards, though necessarily in mild climates, their expropriated fellows. In the latter case, too, there is no thought, not even a pretence, of right.

But let private property have originated as it may, it had to come into existence, if there was to be a considerable advance in civilization, just as the very low races of Europe had to be exterminated or enslaved, if Europe was to reach a high stage of development. Progressive civilization, that is to say, the formation of states, the government of countries,—not, as in

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prehistoric times, over mere groups of men,—law, order, peace, and the development of private property,—all take place simultaneously in history. A historical fact of such universality and duration as private property, justifies the assertion that the rule of man over man, of the possessing classes over the non-possessing, was an absolute necessity, if the obstacles that confronted the development of culture and the productivity of labor were to be overcome.

Without doubt, private property does not owe its establishment and development to social impulses,—that is, to the demands of the permanent interests of mankind. Like its co-relative, slavery, it undoubtedly rests on the egoistic motives of a triumphant section of society. To those who were conquered, and who lost their land and their liberty,—the latter through the loss of the former,—it was at first, and for tens of centuries, a retrogressive step, at least as far as their happiness of life was concerned. Yet without the interposition of this highly immoral and selfish interest, great progress would probably have been impossible. Progress presupposes some wealth; that is to say, some men must be in a position to exercise their mental faculties freely, and thus to develop their higher capacities; but to do this they must be exempt from ordinary bodily labor. This presupposes that the remainder work more diligently than would be necessary if they had to care only for their own maintenance. The natural impulse to be disinclined to industrial labor had to be overcome, and was historically overcome by the victorious power of the selfishness of the stronger, or of the more fortunate. Merit is out of the question here. Labor is in this manner organized by property, especially by property in land and in slaves; it forces men to work, and makes labor more productive.

But if, in accordance with this view, it be true that force, war, oppression, and their product, property, appear in history as necessary means of education (whether another road leading to civilization was open we do not know, as we have no other human race and no other history with which we might compare ours), then this education, so far as history is a constant progress, must some day be complete, and its

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fruits, which have mostly benefited a small minority, must become free to all. Otherwise the means would miss its end, unless we assume that the great mass only exists to be sacrificed for the good of the few. But in that case the instrument of education becomes superfluous. Productive property, which controls labor, and which now and at all times has had the tendency to accumulate in a few hands and to become inaccessible to the great mass, can and must disappear, if all alike are to enjoy the fruits of civilization,—comfort, education, and independence.

This would be possible if the productivity of labor had become so great that, if all were occupied productively (and everybody should engage in bodily labor for the sake of health, if for nothing else), they could produce in a very short day's work such a quantity of commodities of all kinds as would satisfy every rational desire and all true demands of culture. When such a stage of labor-productiveness is reached, private property would no longer be an aid but a hinderance to further development and general culture, for, under its *régime*, a high productivity of labor cannot be permanently maintained and developed. This is because private property in means of production does not create objects of consumption as such, but simply commodities, and also because commodities can only be produced so far as there is a paying demand for them, even if we suppose the highest productive power, namely, the possibility of an almost unlimited increase of objects of consumption. But the demand of the great mass of the people is very limited, as long as—in consequence of private property in the means of production—they only live on their wages, and do not receive more than is necessary to keep them alive and at work. To produce more than can be sold at fair prices means—in a society based on property—a crisis, loss of wealth to the possessing class, starvation for the laborers,—a fatal inner contradiction, which becomes the more glaring and deeply-felt the more society progresses and labor increases in productiveness.

If there were no private property,—that is, supposing, what cannot be proved to-day, that production and distribution

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could be organized on a basis of common property,—greater production would mean greater consumption, or the shortening of the hours of labor, or both, according to the degree of progress. If we consider the progress of civilization and the general happiness of mankind as a moral demand, then, supposing a high productivity of labor, private property would be, indeed, something immoral. In the same way we denounced and abolished slavery when it became, generally speaking, an obstacle instead of a means of furthering the wealth of the community; yet it never occurred to the greatest moral philosophers of antiquity to condemn it. It would be wrong to conclude that the ancients were on that account less moral than we are. Their stage of civilization, in which agriculture by far preponderated, had slavery as a necessary basis; while our industrial life, with its fluctuations, requires a free labor contract that can be easily made and as easily dissolved. The early Christians regarded the teachings of Christianity, surely, with greater earnestness than we do (I have only to remind the reader of the communistic society in Jerusalem), nevertheless they did not oppose slavery; for there is hardly any one whose thoughts can go beyond those institutions of his time that are of native growth and which seem a necessity. But as soon as people seriously begin to criticise, to attack and to condemn, on moral grounds, old and fundamental institutions of society, and this is extensively done and widely approved of, it is a sign that these institutions are standing on the verge of dissolution, and that men are going to change them radically or abolish them. That is to say, people adapt themselves to fundamentally changed conditions. The length and end of the road of social reform can never be known accurately, nay, not even approximately, in periods of transition. What Frenchman in 1789 thought of the possibility of the swiftly-approaching Bonapartist empire, which gave its peculiar stamp to the France of the nineteenth century? "France is devotedly Napoleonic," said Heine, in the time of Louis Philippe, "for the Napoleon *d'or* reigns there;" and, on the other hand, Babœuf and his followers, in the year 1796, believed that the triumph of perfect equality and absolute communism was

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quite close at hand; and yet to-day we see only a few state railways, and these have precious little to do with equality and communism.

It is not moral considerations that nowadays move the state, or, to be more precise, the possessing classes, here and there to care for the non-possessing classes. Wherever there are rich men, poor and wretched people are also to be found, and if it were only that, we would talk as little of social reform to-day as formerly. But this oppressed class is gradually beginning to get insight into its condition, and to become conscious of its existence. As the interest of the possessing class, the *bourgeoisie*, at the time at least when it fought with feudalism for political supremacy, demanded political liberty and equality (democratic institutions, when once introduced, cannot be very easily abolished), so the working class, in proportion to its political insight and social understanding, attains political significance by its great numbers, and becomes, when it sees that its interests differ from those of the ruling classes, more and more dangerous to the latter. Here again there is a preparation for an inner struggle, the first beginnings of which people already believe they see,—a struggle in which the actors' parts are changed, and he who was victor formerly is put on the defensive. Under these circumstances, being by no means sure of victory, the upper classes begin to grant the more pressing demands of the lower classes,—not out of Christian love, or from a sense of justice—though some seem to think so,—but in their own interest and under the pressure of need; and this is called (somewhat euphemistically) social reform. The demands, the wants, of the lower classes, backed by a certain amount of power, naturally assume in their minds the shape of demands of justice, or the vindication of violated rights. To illustrate this, we need only think of the "natural right" of the third estate in the last century, which term was only a theoretical figure for their power and wants. Their "rights" were evidently more violated in the times of slavery and serfdom, but still no one spoke then of a violation of rights, for the simple reason that the want had no power to make itself felt, and that is why even the consciousness of the

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wrong was absent. The real right in our case, too, will only come into existence when there is enough power to procure the satisfaction of the desire and establish new institutions, which are in turn again dictated by the one who is victorious in the struggle for existence.

What we call morality in private life, very often with our lips only, hardly plays any part in the great affairs of the state and of society. We do not contend that this *should* be so,—though our wishes hardly come into consideration,—but only that it *is* so And how much of Christian morality—for in fact we have no other morals, in spite of philosophy—would be noticeable in Europe, if the long-feared international war were to break out? Of course the modern civilized man who lives in comfort, security, and peace, is not so ready to shed blood as the savage who fights daily for his life. He does not need to be. If this, and similar things, are called morality, we are very moral indeed, as long as we live in security and peace. I would not warrant more. We have only to recall how, in 1871, the French, one of the most civilized of nations, butchered one another! In hypocrisy we are certainly not wanting. We like to imitate those pious people in the United States who collect money to procure Bibles for unbelieving savages abroad, and who yet, by high tariff, make the acquirement of holy scriptures more difficult for their own countrymen.*

If, in conclusion, we ask, Can property be justified by Christian ethics,—which is supposed to be ours,—we find that the answer to this question does not touch the institution of property, nor, therefore, the fact that individuals, under this institution, possess property. For Christianity has no social order, no system of law, and is consistent with that lowest form of rulership of man over man, namely, property in human beings. The love of our neighbor, in itself, is possible under any political and social system, and it is this love that forms the real contents of Christian morality. Through love the despot becomes the father of his people, the master the pro-

* See Henry George, "Protection and Free Trade."

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tector of his slave, the rich man the treasurer and distributor of blessings to all, the manufacturer the representative of the interests of his workmen, the tradesman the worthy servant of the consumer.

In short, if we were what the Christian teaching wishes us to be, then all constitutions and laws would be equally good, and, even under those most unlike, human life would go on in equal harmony. But what use is teaching if it is not and probably cannot be obeyed? From the Christian point of view, therefore, one would have to say that an institution which enables some to own certain parts of the surface of the earth, or anything else, has nothing whatever to do with ethics, and does not, in fact, prevent the highest state of morals.

Considered in this light, where morals is purely an inner product of the spirit, it all depends on how you behave yourselves within the limits of that institution. And in general your behavior is extraordinarily bad. You have an economic system which you call free competition, and through which your economic life has assumed the character of a fierce contest,—a contest among the possessing classes for the market, and a contest between them and the workmen about the respective proportion of wages and rent. In this struggle no means is considered too wicked if it only leads to victory, that is to wealth, and he who has gained it is respected among you according to the amount he has accumulated, however great a rascal he may be.

We will not go on moralizing, but only remind the reader that when once the economic life has assumed the character of a struggle, nothing is left for the individual but to conquer or be conquered. In this struggle, individuals, of course, will behave very differently according to their inherited and acquired tendencies. The system of free competition, with all the terrible suffering it has caused in wide circles, here and there, has yet immensely furthered the development of society, by bringing about a tremendous rise in the productivity of labor, a growing clearness in regard to the relations of society, and a destruction of many of the illusions of the

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past. On the whole there has been considerable progress, but the struggle about the fruits of this progress has now set in. It is as much a matter of course that the victorious party will establish new institutions and create a new constitution, which will be nothing but the expression of their own interests, as that they will consider our institutions unjust and immoral from their point of view.

At all events, Henry George and the German land-nationalizers will not be the victorious party, for there is no logical order in their ideas, and no trace of a new conception of society. All their thoughts are fixed on land, and they do not see that property in the means of production, in any and every form, has the same tendencies and results, whether it be property in land, a steam-engine, or anything else; and that, therefore, the nationalization of the land would not materially alter our economic conditions, except, perhaps, that the state might not need to impose taxes. But who would benefit by this? The revenues of the state would still be abstracted from ordinary commerce, however they were raised, and only those would be gainers by this scheme who now are taxed *relatively* too heavily. But taxation is not an important question for the working-classes; it mainly concerns the various classes of possessors of property. And even this advantage would only be real, if we expropriated the landlords without giving them any compensation. But how can a society whose fundamental principle is the inviolability of property, proceed in such a summary fashion? To-day you have one hundred thousand dollars; they are sacred and inviolable; to-morrow you have but fifty thousand. They, too, are sacred. The other fifty thousand dollars have been expended in acquiring a piece of land in accordance with the laws of the state. And now comes Henry George and says, "You have stolen the piece of land; return it instantly to the state." This is nonsense!

J. PLATTER.

UNIVERSITY OF ZÜRICH.

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DISCUSSIONS.

THE OUTLOOK IN ETHICS.

As our journal passes on to its second year of life, it is natural for us all to give a moment's thought to the general situation of our whole department of study. The present writer, in suggesting what occurs to him at such a moment, can speak only from the point of view of the student of philosophy, and not from that of an expert in social problems. But a little retrospect of the course of discussion concerning ethical problems during the last twelve or fifteen years will show any one how prominent has become, within that period, the interest of the social problems for even the theoretical student of ethics.

During the seventies, we who studied philosophy were accustomed to complain of the comparative poverty of our ethical literature. There were books of note and, in a few cases, of great power published during that decade; but, on the whole, the period was not one of very active construction in this department. Since 1880 the scene has greatly changed. It is precisely the constructive aspect that is prominent in the books of Green, of Wundt, or of Paulsen, as well as in the second volume of v. Ihering's "Zweck im Recht." The critical patience of Professor Sidgwick taught us in 1874 the difficulties of our subject. Nowadays critical and even highly sceptical analysis is not neglected; but we also hear positive doctrine preached, and very industriously applied. The century bids fair to close with a period of extraordinary constructiveness in ethics. Many intelligent students of philosophy look nowadays to France as the country where the next great philosophical movement is to originate. And there are already numerous signs that the French philosophy of the near future will be as active in ethics as in the direction of psychology and of the philosophy of nature. In Germany,

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meanwhile, theoretical philosophy languishes, but not so ethics. The German, with the singular and merciless forgetfulness of his own recent past, that Wilhelm Scherer used to call a typical trait of his own nation and of its literature, profits all the while half unconsciously by the great thoughts of the idealistic age, but refuses to read with care the works of any constructive theoretical thinker of first rank since Kant, excepting Schopenhauer. Scherer used to compare such cases of forgetfulness to Siegfried's unconscious treason towards Brünnhilde; although even Scherer also saw in the works of the principal post-Kantian idealists only dreams and a more or less barbarous style. But this neglect of theoretical philosophy does not, at present, extend to ethics. It is an interesting sign of the times that those who thus find theoretical speculation fantastic, still regard the moral world, with all its hard problems and its unrealized ideals, as something very highly actual. This encouraging devotion to one side of philosophy may ere long lead men back to the other. Wundt, in the preface to his "Ethik," prophesies a revival of philosophy on lines that will be near those of the post-Kantian idealists, without repeating their extravagances.

This revival of ethical study has gone side by side with a number of interesting literary tendencies, in which more than one nation has participated. The tendency towards subjective analysis has given us, in the psychological novel, an art that attempts to furnish, as it were, a kind of classified museum of the secrets of the human heart,—a museum where either the psychologist or the student of ethics may find rich material for his scrutiny. The literature of confessions—diaries, autobiographical studies, and the like—has been of late large and increasing. The influence of Russian literature in Western Europe and in this country was, before 1880, still confined almost wholly to the one case of Turgénieff. Since then every one has come to know something of Gogol, of Dostojewsky, and of that wondrous problem, Tolstôi. The recent growth of the influence of Scandinavian literature, *e.g.*, of Ibsen, has been due in large part to the ethical paradoxes,

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and to the psychological skill shown therein. In literature, then, this is a time of ethical as well as of psychological awakening. We study the inner life in a more or less definitely scientific fashion, elaborately, lovingly, as we formerly had not learned to do. Above all, the pathological attracts our attention. The modern scientific literature of pathological psychology has been entirely revolutionized within fifteen years. The unwearied and benevolent devotion of a great alienist like v. Krafft-Ebing to the inner history of his patients' sorrows, is, in another sphere of work, characteristic of this deep and, as I am sure, thoroughly humane concern for the wounds of the inner life. The Spirit has suffered of late far less than was to be feared in the way of external physical calamities. Wars have come, but the Great War, so long awaited, has been awaited in vain. It is the inner warfare that now troubles our literature, attracts the close scrutiny of our science, and most of all concerns our ethical studies.

Let us suggest the unity of these varied tendencies of recent literature by means of a very obvious contrast that distinguishes our age from one former time of subjective analysis. The last century, too, had its subjective period, and that period extended also far into the beginning of the present century. But the subjectivism of that time stood in marked contrast to ours, in that, in those days, the principal ethical purpose of all this self-analysis was to free the human subject from the unjust bondage of convention and authority; while for us that aim is already, in theory, accomplished, and what we most need is to hunt out in a man's heart the passions that shall serve to tie him once more, and more closely, to his fellows and to the social order. The old Romantic Period was interested in loosening the chains of humanity. The intelligent man of to-day is praying hourly for proof that there are spiritual chains worthy enough and holy enough to bind his will and his reason. It is, therefore, the curious but obvious truth that our subjectivism has a social rather than a merely private and individual aim. We study the human heart to find what it is good for. When we despair, our pessimism is

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therefore much deeper than was, say, Werther's sorrow. He despaired of himself and of his personal environment. We, in such cases, despair of all spirituality. Werther was potentially Prometheus; for Goethe was both. But from the point of view of the modern pessimistic novelist, Werther and Prometheus are equally absurd,—since one lies in whining, and the other in boasting, but both lie. When, on the contrary, we are humane instead of pessimistic, when ethical doctrine concerns us, and hope inspires us, our modern method is indeed subjective, but our aim is all the while outer and social. We don't wish to indulge the human heart, but to cure it. We study mental pathology as never before; but we aim to save. We scrutinize the inner life unweariedly; but we do so for the sake of finding what spiritual use can be made of it. And the real Spirit lives, after all, not within so much as without,—in a man's business, in the social order, in service, in duty, in union. The wounds within hinder the social business; hence we must know and heal them. We do not dread authority as they did in that previous time of subjectivism. On the contrary, we have long been far too free from spiritual authority. What we nowadays want, in that loneliness of the inner life which, during our worse moments, we often feel so bitterly, is precisely this,—to learn to love authority, and to that end to find the authority that is worth loving. Hence our ethical inquirers, indeed, ask the old question of subjectivism, "Why should *I* obey the moral law?" But they ask not as the old romantic rebels asked, for the sake of escaping from any but the inner law. They ask longingly, just because the subject has learned, in his keen modern sensitiveness, to despise the merely inner law of his caprice, and because he wants to find the way back to an ethical order that can be verified in and through the world of hard facts,—an order that shall be external and still spiritual; an object of scientific experience, and still a kingdom of the ideal.

Hence, once more, this union of relatively impersonal social ideals in ethics, with intensely keen scrutiny of the individual in psychology and in literature. The two tendencies are, for us, not opposed, but are rather aspects of one tendency.

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Our readers will have seen in our own pages, during the past year, many signs of the social drift of modern ethical discussion. This is certainly not a time of individualism, notwithstanding the keen scrutiny that we give to individuals. Our honored contributor, Professor Toy, on page 310 of the previous volume, has expressed the common aim of many modern synthetic ethical thinkers when he says, "The aim to which human moral history points is a conscience absolutely independent, and yet absolutely dependent,—independent in that it refuses to recognize any other authority than its own ideals; dependent in that it receives its ideals from the life of man, which is the highest revelation of God." What we want, then, is to hold together, to bring into synthesis the clearest and most sympathetic consideration of the individual's heart and interest, with the deepest respect for the authority of the social order,—the fullest regard for the "independent" conscience of each man, with the sternest insistence that without dependence on the life of man, as embodied in the organism of society, the individual's ideals are worthless. It is a hard task, this one of to-day. The old-fashioned analysis of the "moral sense" is not enough for us. We want the whole world of moral facts; and we can find it only in the study of all sorts and conditions of men. "There is," says Professor James, on page 330 of our first volume, "no such thing possible as an ethical philosophy dogmatically made up in advance." "There can be no final truth in ethics any more than in physics until the last man has had his experience and said his say." In a similar spirit, our vigorous and ingenious contributor, Mr. R. W. Black, in his paper on "Vice and Immorality" (pp. 459–474 of the previous volume), warns us against the danger of solving moral problems by an appeal to the merely isolated individual, to his inner blessedness and dignity, as if these were for him a sufficient standard of right. The individual, in and for himself, reasons Mr. Black, is an indifferent sort of creature, in whom are all sorts of potentialities for good and evil. Leave him to himself, or appeal only to his inner nature by counselling him to avoid subjective vileness, or vice as such, and you do him an

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injury. "The normal and only sufficient appeal" that can be made to a man's truly moral instincts "is from without,—that is, from their normal objects, which, be it noted, are common objects for the individual and society." "Partaking of the nature of life itself, morality involves not only a recipient subject, but an active nature and an outer object." In consequence, as Mr. Black well holds, subjective or private evil, *i.e.*, vice, "can hardly be defined at all, if it be not the spending of the forces of one's own life to the detriment of its moral capabilities." And morality has reference to the outer, the social relations. "Unless they can be referred to moral [*i.e.*, once more, to social] aims, virtue and vice cease to be distinguished by any mark save it be of internal feeling."

All this abandonment of ethical dogmatism, this open-mindedness as to the moral facts, wherever they may come from, and this assurance meanwhile that such facts are to be found in the study of the Will of Mankind, as shown in the social order,—all these features, I repeat, seem to me common to the enlightened ethical students of to-day. We may and must differ as to many matters, but herein we are at one. The moral law is not a finished code, written on the tablets of the heart. Nor, again, is it to be found in any form of mere self-will. It is determined by the fact that there are many of us living together, and that, if we are rational beings, we are deeply concerned for one another,—concerned to comprehend one another, to respect one another, to organize our wills into some sort of universality, to live in spiritual union, to give our common life the most complete wholeness that is possible. The task is as endless as it is inspiring. There will always be something new to learn in ethics. There will always be something worth seeking and worth comprehending that we never yet have found or comprehended.

To such a task this journal is trying to contribute its own little share.

JOSIAH ROYCE.

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THEORY AND PRACTICE.

I READ with great interest Professor Dewey's article on "Moral Theory and Practice" in the January number of the journal (vol. i. No. 2), and entirely agree with him that practice is dependent on theory if by the latter is only meant "idea of action;" all mechanical, impulsive, unintelligent action, however useful it may be to one's self or others, is not moral action. A few pages of reference to certain views of mine (as expressed in the October journal, vol. i. No. 1, perhaps call, however, for a word of comment, or rather explanation from me. Professor Dewey says duty is determined by facts, by the actual relationships in which we find ourselves. I have never thought of doubting this. What I tried to say was something different, though by no means inconsistent. It was that a moral rule was necessarily an ideal rule, not an induction from or generalization of facts, after the manner of physical laws. Gravitation is a fact of observation or experience; the Golden Rule we should like to see reflected in the matter-of-fact conduct of men, but it is just as good and binding a rule whether it is so reflected or not,—it is a demand of the mind which may or may not be realized. The illustration of the street-car conductor will serve me excellently. Undoubtedly the "ought" in his case is determined by all the various considerations enumerated by Professor Dewey; but when the conductor has thus learned the "ought" completely, he may not have the courage to act accordingly. What becomes of the "ought" in such an event? Professor Dewey defines the "ought" as the "is of action;" but here it is the "is not." Certainly, "action or the following out of ideas is a fact;" but sometimes ideas are not followed out and the (right) action does not take place. In a word, we have to distinguish what ought to be (*i.e.*, "is to be" or "should be") from what is or will be: this was my whole contention. The fact has been on the side of what is wrong time and again in human history, and is often so to-day. Professor Dewey is apparently thinking of the "ought" as an intellectual conception, and as such I recognize that no

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single rule or set of rules can determine it; I am thinking of it as a regulative principle of action, which seems honored quite as often in the breach as in the observance. Define duty as closely as we may, on account of conflicting interests and passions, it may yet remain a "barren ideality," the "deadest of dead things." It is only saved from complete nonentity in that it is a command. And the command has grave sanctions. We are under orders, and if we do not obey we are sooner or later undone and the work of our hands comes to naught. Nothing out of harmony with justice can long stand in this world; but whether justice will ever be incorporated into an individual or a social order (*i.e.*, become an empirical reality) is another question. The "destiny and glory" of many a "present fact" may not be to pass into larger and fuller activity, but to be overturned and destroyed. Did not Burke speak of the punishment of tyrants as *consolatory* to the human mind? I am afraid that the "ought" as the "is of action" is a myth; it may be so and it may not be so, there seems to be no organic or necessary relation between them.

W. M. SALTER.

THE SCHOOL OF APPLIED ETHICS.

THE first summer session of the School of Applied Ethics, the program of which was given in the July number of this journal, was held in accordance with the announcements, and the results have been on the whole satisfactory to those who initiated and devised the plans. It was undoubtedly a venturesome undertaking. Summer schools in various forms already existed and their number had been rapidly increasing. It was a serious question whether still another could be added to the list and be able to establish itself in public recognition. The design was bold and broad in conception. Success was only possible by taking a departure in a new direction with features not yet provided for in similar institutions. It was questionable whether it could escape the charge of sectarian bias; and still further, whether it could avoid the criticism frequently made with reference to such efforts, that they are

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gratifying to the speculative interests of students or literary people, but of little practical value to the community.

It can fairly be said that the plans as carried out did reasonably meet these demands or objections. It set out on a strictly new purpose, and was to that extent a departure from other models. The distinctive feature was in the word "applied" as relating to ethics. It was not to be speculative but practical, not to deal so much with abstract problems as with concrete affairs. It appears to be generally accepted that the school did adhere to this purpose. It was probably owing to this circumstance that the effort has received so cordial an approval from the press all over the country as well as from business men, teachers, the professional classes,—from that part of the public, in fact, who feel the need of an application of the science of ethics to the practical affairs with which they have to deal. Not only that, but it was also shown that such an institution could be strictly non-sectarian in character.

The school has certainly proved its *right to be*. It will be continued another year at the same place, Plymouth, Massachusetts. The plans for next season include lecturers from European Universities, and that will make it international in character. There is a sense of fitness in the idea of an international institution for the study and application of the science of ethics established on ground linked in universal history with the principle of *truth to conscience*.

The attendance at the recent session was good, but not so large as it ought to be another year. The different parts of the country were well represented, there being students from twenty different States and the Dominion of Canada. Among these were some thirty clergymen, over forty teachers, as well as representatives of other professions.

It is important to note that the plans of the managers ultimately involve not merely a series of lectures at one season of the year, but a fully equipped school of ethics located at some one of the large cities in America, with complete courses of instruction given throughout the usual period of university work.

W. L. S.

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BOOK REVIEWS.

PRINCIPLES OF STATE INTERFERENCE. By D. S. Ritchie, M.A. Swan, Sonnenschein & Co. Social Science Series.

Mr. Ritchie has done well to republish these essays in Mr. Sonneschein's handy series. They are the best exposure of the prevalent "Spencerismus" that has appeared in English. The spritely attack which they contain is delivered on behalf of the "New Radicalism," of which Mr. Herbert Spencer is the most formidable intellectual foe. The main count in the indictment is that, while apparently Mr. Spencer takes his stand upon the side of the "organic" view of society and history, his doctrine throughout is interlaced with threads of that kind of thinking which he has otherwise done so much to discredit. Having declared war against all metaphysics, he yet turns out to be suffering himself from a peculiarly aggravated form of that malady, which is all the more dangerous because he does not know that he has it. This Mr. Ritchie proves by showing (1) that in his account of the social organism "Mr. Spencer (like Professor Drummond, who has found all the dogmas of Calvin in the System of Synthetic Philosophy) has mistaken an ingenious illustration for a scientific fact." As worked out by him in his celebrated essay, it reminds one of Plato's myths, but "if Plato's Socrates had told us a 'myth' of this sort, he would have introduced it by an apology about his not being very good at the making of images." Mr. Ritchie goes on to show at length how wavering and incoherent the whole doctrine is. (2) In his account of the individual's relation to society, Mr. Spencer has not advanced, in spite of all he says about the "organism," beyond the arithmetical and mechanical conceptions of society, which prevailed when it was still a striking thing to say "constitutions are not made, but grow." Compare Man *versus* the State, and all the talk about "aggregates" and "averages." (3) Hence in his treatment of history and natural rights, he represents the process of evolution as a "struggle in which the individual has gradually won his natural rights from the state." Whereas the truth is exactly the reverse: the "person" with his "rights" is the "product of the state." "The person is not a mere natural product; in part he is created by the *conscious* work of law and religion. The Roman jurists and the Christian teaching of several centuries have a share in the differentiation of the individual from his social environment. It is the function of the modern state to carry on this work." Mr. Spencer's "shy reference" to the German doctrine of *Naturrecht* (Man *versus* State, p. 87) gives Mr. Ritchie his opportunity. Here Mr. Ritchie is at home and at his best. He carries home the conclusion with some excellent sword-play, that Mr. Spencer has a quite magnificent perception of half-truths. What amazes the reader is how the halves do not oftener meet their other and sometimes better halves. The half-truth that Mr. Spencer has here perceived is well expressed by Mr. Ritchie on p. 99: "There *are* natural rights, but these are not behind but in front of political progress."

These conclusions are further illustrated and enforced in the second essay, where it is shown that Mr. Spencer partly overlooks and partly overstates important distinctions. Thus, in his "Sins of Legislators," he overlooks the distinc-

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tion between laws that are repealed because they have done their work and laws repealed because they have had no work to do, or because they have done it badly, between sumptuary laws and sanitary laws, between the state and the government. On the other hand, he treats distinctions, valuable in a limited field, as though they were universal and absolute,—*e.g.*, status and contract, order and progress, cohesion and liberty, compulsory and voluntary co-operation. "Is there not wanting," asks Mr. Ritchie, "a higher stage, in which there shall be at once order and progress, cohesion and liberty?"

The third essay is an examination of Mill's essay on "Liberty," and aims at showing (1) that Mill takes liberty in the merely negative sense. To exalt liberty in this sense is, as Sir J. F. Stephen says, like praising the centrifugal and blaming the centripetal force in the solar system. (2) That he misconceives the nature of individuality. "He seems to regard diversity and eccentricity as desirable in themselves." What says Sir J. F. Stephen again? "Originality consists in thinking for yourself, and not in thinking unlike other people." Mr. Ritchie might have added Hegel's saying, that "reasonableness" (the only originality worth having) is a highway whereon each travels but no one distinguishes himself. (3) That Mill confuses the action of the state with that of society and custom. He assumes that they act in the same direction in limiting and suppressing individuality, whereas the truth may be exactly the reverse. "It is often the law alone which can protect the individual against the excessive force of opinion and the tyranny of custom."

It would be an ungracious task, after finding so much that is excellent in these criticisms, to criticise the author himself. Yet it must be confessed that the section in which he hints at a constructive application of his principles is not so satisfactory as the critical parts of the book. It coheres but loosely with what goes before. Thus it is disappointing after all to be started in this section under the guidance of a pronounced individualist like Sir J. F. Stephen. As tests of the desirableness of any particular legislative measure, Mr. Ritchie adopts the three suggested by the latter writer: 1. Is the object aimed at good? 2. Is this measure likely to attain the object? 3. Does it do so at too great an expense? This is all well enough, but the whole question for the philosopher depends upon the notion of the "good." Mr. Ritchie's criticisms hitherto have been directed against an inadequate conception of the nature of social good, and we should have expected the constructive part of his essay to have been deduced from the more adequate one which he desires to substitute for it. If it is true, as we think he has established in the previous discussion, that the new radicalism aims at directly forwarding social well-being, not merely at abolishing restrictions upon individual liberty in the individualist's sense of the word, then what we wish to know from the political philosopher is the way in which we ought to conceive of that well-being. The application must always be a matter of insight into the particular conditions of the time and country. The help which a philosophical essay can give the practical politicians consists (1) in the criticism of current maxims (as in the essay before us of "*laissez-faire*"); and (2) in the suggestion of a true definition of the end of all legislation (*e.g.*, that given by Mr. Bosanquet in his excellent little volume of Essays and Addresses (p. 3), where the end is said to be "just to give people the rights and duties which belong to their characters").

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Any illustration of the actual mode of application must be in close connection with such a definition. Our complaint against Mr. Ritchie here is that he substitutes for such a deductive application a general exhortation to permit legislative interference only where economic considerations "conflict with considerations seriously affecting the physical, intellectual, . . . and moral welfare of the community." Whereas, when the question is, "How to apply our principles," the trouble just is to discover what constitutes a "serious interference." Nor is Mr. Ritchie more fortunate in introducing at this point the somewhat outworn distinction between production, exchange, and distribution, appearing to hint that in the first legislative interference is mischievous, while it may be beneficial in reference to the last. Does an eight hours' bill, it might be asked, deal with production or distribution?

He fares better in his excellent little essay on T. H. Green's "Political Philosophy," and his suggestive notes in the appendix on the "Distinction between Society and the State" and on "Utilitarianism." Speaking in the latter of evolutionist utilitarianism, he says that one of its great services is the re-establishment of the connection between ethics and politics. Mr. Ritchie's essays show that others besides evolutionist utilitarians may contribute to this desirable result.

J. H. MUIRHEAD.

JUSTICE: BEING PART IV. OF THE PRINCIPLES OF ETHICS. By Herbert Spencer, New York. D. Appleton & Company, 1891. Pp. vi., 291.

In June, 1879, Mr. Spencer published the now so well-known "Data of Ethics," Part I. of his projected "Principles of Ethics." A tedious period of ill-health has since then delayed, until recently, the long-suffering thinker's labors upon the Synthetic Philosophy. Between 1886 and the beginning of 1890, as he now tells us in the preface to the present work, all "further elaboration of the Synthetic Philosophy was suspended." Since the latter date it has again become "possible to get through a small amount of serious work daily." The result of this renewed activity has been the completion of the long-awaited book on Justice.

What has thus come to hand as the product of the latest phase of Mr. Spencer's heroic struggle with physical weakness is one of the most characteristic and easily comprehensible of all his books. Here one finds his personal temperament most transparently expressed, the teachings of his earliest period of authorship once more reviewed, given final shape, adjusted to all that he has since believed and taught. It is not often that a man is able at threescore and ten to restate so vigorously, and yet in large extent with a new foundation and new arguments, beliefs that, in their substance, he first set in order for the public forty years earlier. The book on "Justice" is, indeed, no mere repetition of the "Social Statics," and its opinions are in many ways modified from the original doctrines of the book of 1850, yet the man is the same. His rigid individualism is unaltered. His love of highly abstract principles as a basis for practical teachings is as noteworthy as ever. His combination of the temperament of the typical Englishman, loving private independence and living by instinct, with the aspirations of the typical system-maker, loving to give articulate reasons for everything,—this combination remains as curious and instructive a study as ever.

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The form of the book is, of course, determined by its place in the system of Synthetic Philosophy. Justice is a product of evolution. It has its "animal," its "sub-human," and, finally, its "human" types. To comprehend the latest type one must first comprehend the former types. As for "animal ethics," a study of the facts of nature shows (p. 4) that "animal life of all but the lowest kinds has been maintained by virtue of two cardinal and opposed principles." These are, first, that "during immaturity benefits received must be inversely proportionate to capacities possessed;" and that, secondly, "after maturity is reached, benefit must vary directly as worth; worth being measured by fitness to the conditions of existence." In case of mature animals, "the ill-fitted must suffer the evils of unfitness, and the well-fitted profit by their fitness." The reason for these two principles is "that if, among the young, benefit were proportioned to efficiency, the species would disappear forthwith; and that if, among adults, benefits were proportioned to inefficiency, the species would disappear by decay in a few generations." Passing over the matter of the care of the young, and considering the second of the above principles in its application to higher animals, we find as the "law of sub-human justice" (p. 9) that if the species is to be preserved and improved, "each individual ought to be subject to the effects of its own nature and resulting conduct." From this law, namely, results "survival of the fittest" (p. 13). And the law, moreover, "holds without qualification" "throughout sub-human life" (p. 9); "for there exists no agency by which, among adults, the relations between conduct and consequence can be interfered with." Among gregarious animals, however, this so far purely individualistic principle receives certain modifications. Gregariousness involves more or less co-operation, and co-operation depends first upon a certain instinctive restraint put upon acts of mutual interference (p. 12); and, secondly, in cases where the co-operation includes the defence of a group of animals against enemies, there may be needed for the purpose of co-operation a "further subordination" (p. 14) whereby the guardians of the herd run especial risks, or are sacrificed in numbers, for the preservation of the group, and so of the species. Thus one gets three laws of sub-human justice as holding in case of adult animals. The first law once more is (p. 15) "that each individual ought to receive the good and evil which arises from its own nature." This law "brings prosperity to those individuals which are structurally best adapted to their conditions of existence." Among gregarious creatures comes into play the second law, that "those actions through which, in fulfilment of its nature, the individual achieves benefits and avoids evils, shall be restrained by the need for non-interference with like actions of associated individuals." This law is subordinate to the first. "Later in origin and narrower in range is the third law, that under conditions such that by the occasional sacrifices of some members of a species, the species as a whole prospers, there arises a sanction for such sacrifices." The first law holds for all animals, the second for gregarious animals, the third for those gregarious animals that defend themselves in groups against enemies.

To these three laws the instincts of the animals concerned have adapted themselves in the fashion that Mr. Spencer has long since described in his psychology. It is true that in a few passages of the present book our author shows signs of

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recognizing the doubts that recent research have thrown upon his own doctrine of hereditary "race-experience" as a significant factor in the production of instincts. On p. 55 he says, speaking of a certain "fixed intuition," that it "must have been established by that intercourse with things which, throughout an enormous past, has directly or indirectly determined the organization of the nervous system and certain resulting necessities of thought." The phrase *directly or indirectly* is suggestive of an alternative to which Mr. Spencer makes several references in this volume (*e.g.*, on p. 25 and on p. 151). But the writer of the monograph on the "Factors of Organic Evolution" has already shown us that he is indisposed to abandon his former views on the heredity of acquired modifications. And, in fact, Mr. Spencer's whole theory of psychological evolution is far too completely bound up with the hypothesis of ancestral experience to admit of any such abandonment. On the whole, therefore, he remains, concerning this matter, where he was. The deeper instincts of all the higher animals, man included, are the products of the "intercourse with things," which has "determined the organization of the nervous system," and, on the whole, not indirectly determined it. And the instincts upon which the idea of justice is ultimately founded are of this sort, and have the "authority" that race-experience carries with it.

Passing to "Human Justice" proper, we learn that as human justice must be a further development of sub-human justice, the fundamental law of the former implies (p. 17) "that each individual ought to receive the benefits and the evils of his own nature and consequent conduct; neither being prevented from having whatever good his actions normally bring to him, nor allowed to shoulder off onto other persons whatever ill is brought to him by his actions." This law of justice may indeed be qualified by considerations of pity and mercy, not in this book especially treated. But common sense and philosophy so far (p. 18) agree that the foregoing statement stands for substantial justice, as distinct from mercy. Man is, however, a highly gregarious animal. Hence (p. 20) "the requirement that individual activities must be mutually restrained" is "more imperative among men, and more distinctly felt to be a requirement," so that it "causes a still more marked habit of inflicting punishments on offenders" than is to be observed in case of other gregarious animals. Thus the further modified principle of human justice takes the form of asserting "that each individual, carrying on the actions which subserve his life, and not prevented from receiving their normal results of good and bad, shall carry on these actions under such restraints as are imposed by the carrying on of kindred actions by other individuals, who have similarly to receive such normal results, good and bad." To the modification determined by the gregarious habits of the race comes the further modification required for purposes of self-defence when a community is attacked by foreign aggressors. Defensive warfare, not offensive, is relatively just. And defensive warfare, in a condition of human civilization in which "absolute ethics" must be regarded as still wholly impossible, renders relatively just the sacrifice of individuals in warfare, and many of the other burdens of the "militant type" of social organization. As peace grows with civilization, the need of such burdens will disappear. The "formula of justice" may then be developed for the social condition of a community at peace with its neighbors. In case of war the necessary modifications required for national defence can be easily sup-

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plied. The required formula of justice is (p. 46) that "every man is free to do that which he wills, provided he infringes not the equal freedom of any other man."

The foregoing summary may serve to suggest the relation between Mr. Spencer's ethical theory of justice and the general doctrines of the Synthetic Philosophy. From the point where this formulation of the doctrine of individualism is reached to the end of the book, the progress of the argument is extremely obvious and, as it were, fatal. The doctrine of the rights of the individual, beginning with the "Right to Physical Integrity" (Chap. IX.), and proceeding through the "Right of Property" (Chap. XII.) to the "Rights of Free Speech and Publication" (Chap. XVIII.), is developed in a fashion easily anticipated at every step by the attentive reader. One admires the facility with which large topics are treated in brief space. Mr. Spencer is thoroughly at home in these regions of his creed. He moves swiftly and with absolute assurance; he pauses seldom to consider at any length opposing points of view; he fears no adversary; one is even disposed to add that he in general comprehends no adversary. The case of property in land gives him most pause. He devotes not only a portion of Chapter XI., but also a brief appendix (B) to this problem; but comes to no extraordinary conclusions. It is in these chapters on rights that our author's personal temperament most obviously appears. One learns what noises he most hates, what odors, such as that of stale tobacco-smoke in railway carriages, he finds most unjust; and in general he uses the excellent fashion that Archbishop Whately and John Stuart Mill made at one time so familiar,—the fashion of illustrating an exposition of your philosophy by a very concrete showing of many of your private tastes and impressions. Throughout, therefore, these chapters are highly readable. After two episodical chapters on the "Rights of Women" and the "Rights of Children," Mr. Spencer passes, in Chapter XXII., to the consideration of "Political Rights so called," and concludes his book with a study of the nature, limits, and duties of the state, to which Chapters XXIII. to XXIX. are devoted. The author's opposition to officialism, and his hatred of state interference, are now too well known to need any fresh exposition in this place. His statement of his case has never been plainer than here, and his absolutely impenetrable indifference to opposing arguments has never been made more plausible.

So much for an inadequate sketch of this compact and attractive little book. It can hardly fail in just this day and time to do good. It must, for the rest, awaken and silence some who have dreamed too vaguely and spoken too lengthily concerning the marvellous ethical insights that the "philosophy of evolution" was yet to give our generation. This rigid individualism is not precisely a novelty in English discussion. Nobody has told the tale of it more frankly and courageously than Spencer; but surely he must be a very devout disciple indeed who, with this book before him, will continue to imagine that evolution, as such, is in any significant way responsible for Mr. Spencer's form of individualism. In naming himself the differences that distinguish the present treatise from the "Social Statics" of 1850, Mr. Spencer lays, indeed, great stress upon the "naturalistic interpretation," and the "biological origin for ethics," which now adorn his doctrine. "The elaboration" of the "consequences" of this "biological origin"

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is, he tells us in the preface, "the cardinal trait" of the present book. Yet it needs hardly a glance for a reader not wholly committed, as Spencer is, to the Synthetic Philosophy, to see that from the "biological" premises of this treatise any other reasonably plausible and sincere ethical doctrine could have received quite as rigid a demonstration. Evolution is a very complex affair. Survival has been attained by very numerous types of organisms. Even human evolution exemplifies for us all sorts of ethical products; and many of them survive even unto this day, and will long survive. To give a teleological estimate of any portion of so vast and complicated a physical process, it is necessary first to select the particular products and activities that you propose to approve. The Chinese and the Prussians, the Czar and the American political boss, the wise and the mighty of the earth, the pure in heart and the wreckers of railroads, are all alike survivals, are adapted to some sort of environment, are the products of ages of evolution. Approve on ideal grounds of any one of these types, as against its opponent, and nothing is easier than to show how, in the course of evolution, the stars in their courses and the tendencies of the ages have wrought and fought to bring to pass just this product. The "biological" view, as such, is, therefore, a very plastic doctrine. Spencer uses it to state the case for an excellent and manly form of individualism. How easy would it not be for, say, a modern Australian statesman to apply the same methods to vindicate as unanswerably his own beloved forms of what we should all call State Socialism? Not to dwell on less plausible, but possibly equally logical, formulations of the "biological origin of ethics," let us see for an instant the ease with which Spencer's fundamental principles could be altered, on "biological grounds," to reach relatively socialistic results, very remote indeed from those of his individualism.

"Among adults," says Mr. Spencer, speaking of animals in general, "there must be conformity to the law that benefits received shall be directly proportionate to merits possessed; merits being measured by power of self-sustentation." Does this mean merely that precisely those adult animals *ought* to survive and keep well which are physically so constituted that they *do* survive and keep well?" If so, is not the proposition dangerously near to an identical assertion? What is our *ought* but a mere stamp of private approval placed upon the *is* of nature? But is the proposition to be more than this, then, the way in which it may be more and may also become of practical significance is suggested by a case of considerable "biological" moment to which, curiously enough, this book of Mr. Spencer's makes hardly any reference. Consider namely that type of "sub-human justice" that is exemplified in the case of a domesticated breed of animals. Those who breed and maintain such animals give to them benefits which are in a fashion "directly proportionate to merits possessed." Only, among the traits presented by the individual animal's nature, the breeder chooses what ones *shall be* accounted, for *his* purposes, as true "merits." Is he breeding horses, then it may be *either* swiftness *or* draught-power that he regards as constituting the desirable "power of self-sustentation." Selecting accordingly, and breeding true to the selected traits, he violates no condition of the "survival of the species." On the contrary, he may greatly aid such survival. In so far he is "just" to that species as such; for he keeps it in life and improves its chances of survival in its domesticated environment. But now in all this is he

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quite loyal to Mr. Spencer's further maxim, "that the individual shall experience all the consequences good and evil of its own nature and consequent conduct?" The answer is yes and no, according as one interprets the principle. Does the principle mean that the individual animal, in order to get what for it is its own sort of justice, shall receive the "consequences" without any interference from the breeder or from any one else? Then, indeed, the breeder's selection is, in itself considered, an injustice to dogs and horses, and is only to be justified from our human point of view. But if interference with "consequences" *were* thus always relatively unjust to the species interfered with, the *ought* would become once more nothing but the *is* of wild nature. And sub-human justice would then be only the principle that the survivors in the wild state, whoever they are, justly survive, simply because they *do* survive.

If, however, on the other hand, the breeder's interference, aiding as it does the survival of the domesticated but much modified horses and dogs, is "just" to them, in the "sub-human" sense of the word justice,—"just" to them because it *does* make the species survive and improve, despite its own interference with the individuals,—*then* Spencer's maxim may still be regarded as fulfilled in this case. The individual of the domesticated stock does, namely, "experience all the consequences good and evil of its own nature and consequent conduct." Only now it is the breeder's choice that determines what *shall* be good and evil in nature and so in consequences. This dog retrieves, that one flies at an enemy's throat, another slumbers lazily all day by the fire. Each "receives the consequences;" but they are consequences as estimated by owners and breeders. Does one want watch dogs? One leaves the timid retrievers to find other owner or die, and one breeds from good watch dogs. Does one desire only the docile retrievers? One poisons the fierce dogs that fly at one's throat. Is the household pet and ornament the object? One encourages laziness, and its "consequences" survive in a breed of lap-dogs. What one of all these courses is the course of "justice" to the canine species as such? Measured by resulting survival of the various stocks, *all* the courses are just, even as it is also just to the horses to breed on the one hand fast trotters, on the other hand strong draught horses.

Well, in all this talk of "sub-human justice," wherein lies the application to man? Obviously, one may say, the application lies here: "As from the evolution point of view, human life must be regarded as a further development of sub-human life, it follows that human justice must be a further development of sub-human justice." Very good; the socialist, the lover of state-interference, may thank Mr. Spencer for that word. Let us consider the "biological origin" of human justice once again. What sort of an animal is man? One must answer: Civilized man at least is unquestionably a *domesticated animal?* There is no escaping this conclusion. To be sure, the human race has domesticated itself. None the less, however, is it sure that this self-domestication has been the work, in part, of man's leaders, his teachers, his chiefs, his strong and influential men, and in greater part still of the mutual neighborly and friendly criticism, counsel, reproof, and compulsion, which all men have exerted upon all in each organized community. No one man ever civilized himself; the thing has been done by endless interference. One man has domesticated another man, and, on the whole, every man his neighbor. Well, then, the sub-human justice

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exercised in case of other domestic animals, suggests (why not?) the right principle in case of "human justice." What the breeders do for horses and dogs, we should be glad to do, if we could, for man, viz., to breed the race from the best stocks, and for the purposes of the wisest and cleverest breeders! Why is not this a "just" ideal? Meanwhile, this ideal being so far rather impracticable, of course we have to put up with what Mr. Spencer calls sometimes "an empirical compromise." We can't just yet breed men as we want, or weed out the bad stocks, because the breeders are so many, and of so many minds, and the means at our disposal are so imperfect. But we shall do what we can in the way of "relative ethics" until we get nearer to the "absolute ethics" of the far-off future. On the way thither shall we minimize or forbid "interference" with individuals? Nay, it is strictly "biological" to interfere, if you do so after the fashion that has achieved such brilliant results with the other domestic breeds. That is, you ought forcibly to train, and, as far as may be, to select. To do so wisely is to help the domesticated race to survive. To do so unwisely is a little unfortunate, of course; but wisdom is learned only by trial; and they doubtless did not find out how to breed dogs for a long time. How much longer will it not need to learn how to complete the domestication of man? Here, then, is the case for social interference on "biological" grounds.

Such, stated very summarily, and therefore unconvincingly, is a suggestion of what one could do with the doctrine of evolution and with the nature of "sub-human justice," in case one were not Mr. Spencer, nor yet an individualist, but *were* misled, like Mr. Spencer, into supposing that a survey of the physical accidents of survival can of itself ever justify a coherent ideal. The reasonings here suggested could be made as elaborate as Mr. Spencer's, and would be probably as unsound. The doctrine of evolution has wrought a great wonder for our generation; but Mr. Spencer's special doctrine of the "biological origin" of justice can hardly be a large part of this wonder. For, as he here interprets this "origin," it furnishes a mere soil wherein any and every possible ideal of justice besides his own robust and manly individualism could take root and grow rankly.

To sum up: Mr. Spencer's personal ideal of justice is throughout interesting, often admissible, always admirably stated, highly representative,—sure, in this day of socialistic dreaming, to do excellent service by contrast. This ideal has, however, no essential relation to the doctrine of evolution. The "biological origin" of justice could be used, meanwhile, to give equal justification to other and opposed ideals. Solely to suggest this fact the present review has sketched such an opposing ideal of human justice as defined by the analogy of our justice towards domesticated breeds of animals. Far off be the day when that opposing ideal triumphs in the practical affairs of humanity! Far off, too, be the day when men shall regard Mr. Spencer's individualism as the last word of science!

JOSIAH ROYCE.

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"LABOR AND LIFE OF THE PEOPLE." Vol. II. London. Continued.) Edited by Charles Booth. With Maps and Appendix under a separate cover. Williams & Norgate, 1891.

Mr. Charles Booth's particular results, applying exclusively to London, are probably of less interest to the readers of this journal than the methods which he has employed, and the "moral," if any, of his researches.

It may be as well, however, to mention, for purposes of comparison, that the final result for all London, omitting inmates of institutions, is, in terms of Mr. Booth's well-known scale of classes, as follows: A (lowest), .9 per cent.; B (very poor), 7.5 per cent.; C and D (poor), 22.3 per cent. Total in poverty, 30.7 per cent. E and F (working class, comfortable), 51.5 per cent.; G and H (middle class and above), 17.8 per cent. Total in comfort, 69.3 per cent. The state of things thus described is probably better than was imagined before the East London figures were published, but worse than was anticipated, on the basis of those figures, for the rest of London. Having said thus much, I leave the question of particular results, and pass to methods and principles which are of universal applicability.

Mr. Booth, although—need I say it?—an accomplished statistician, has not the merely statistical mind. He knows that numbers are eloquent only to those who are precisely informed as to what the numbers represent. He therefore bestows the greatest possible pains both in checking figures by figures, and in supplementing figures by descriptions. Thus, the class-percentages, as estimated by the school-board visitors, who know the homes, are checked by class-percentages resting on the opinion of the school-teachers, who know the children directly and the homes only at second-hand. The teachers' tendency is to state the proportion of great poverty as higher than that obtained from those who know the homes. The discrepancy is marked, but not enormous or unaccountable. I note at this point that Mr. Booth has rightly aimed at giving the facts directly observable as regards conditions of life. A home where the man drinks his good wages is to the visitor's eye a poverty-stricken home, and the family lives as wretchedly poor; and, on his visitor's report, Mr. Booth classes it as such. He could not do otherwise without opening up the history of all his cases, and thus destroying the simple fidelity of his statistics, so far as the question "poor or not poor?" is concerned. But yet, as the classification is ostensibly by *earnings*, a real contradiction, to which Mr. Booth is quite alive, must thus be introduced into some of its details, and the reader must bear this in mind.

Such qualifications of the figures, and altogether a more life-like way of regarding them, are made possible by the second great characteristic of Mr. Booth's method,—the supplementation of statistics by description accurately relevant to them, a device which Mr. Booth may almost be said to have created. The great type of this supplementation is the checking of map 1, with its uniformly tinted blocks of thirty thousand inhabitants, by the huge map 2, in four parts, which shows London street by street, every street being colored according to the prevalent position of its inhabitants in the social scale, as judged by visitors familiar with the neighborhood.

The inhabitants of the same street, however, are not all of the same stamp.

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To give the reader a chance of picturing to himself the real variety of a London street, and checking the short method of the graphical representation, nearly two hundred pages are devoted to detailed description, house by house, of typical streets. These are actual places, but the right names are not given except in the case of a "black" trio at the top of Drury Lane, now in great part pulled down.

Special investigations on the same "joint method" are made into the model dwellings, the common lodging-houses of the homeless men,—in every case by those best qualified for the particular task. Thus a real conspectus is obtained both of all kinds of London homes, a quasi-home, and of the lives of that very small number of roving men who have none.

Perhaps the completest example, however, of the joint method is to be found in Mr. Llewellyn Smith's study, continued from the former volume, of the migration and immigration between London and the country. The figures which show that, on the whole, the provincial immigrants in the different parts of London vary inversely as the poverty of the districts, are supplemented by the extraordinarily opposite history (with changed names) of the family of "Mr. Patton, of Little Guilden," showing not only how a successful countryman in London becomes the centre of an immigration from his native place, which extends in geometrical ratio, but also from what motives a man who wishes to retire from active life may form a unit in the considerable migration from London to the country, which differs in kind from the immigration. I lay stress on this most important result, because, in upsetting a popular theory that the country immigrant is the sufferer by his immigration, it illustrates the superlative causal force of competence and character. If we wish to keep the countryman out, we must improve the Londoner.

Throughout the work, both in the description of parts of London, especially of six bad patches in the West End which mere statistics tend to merge in the wealth around them, and in the elaborate study of the child-world of London in its huge school system, the moral results of which, especially in the "worst" quarters, show the unique ethical force of leadership and *esprit de corps*, the same care has been taken to preserve a due relation between statistics and description. And Mr. Booth, whether by selection or by influence, has secured in his helpers the same shrewd yet sympathetic spirit for which his own writing is conspicuous.

Thus the book is thoroughly good reading, and of the highest interest throughout; except that I find some difficulty in caring for the street descriptions of places which are not named, and of which, therefore, the local influences and conditions are unascertainable to me. Here and there the writing is even brilliant. I know hardly anything in social literature more striking and suggestive than the juxtaposition (p. 299) of the two lives of Central London,—the gilded and the squalid,—with reference to their dependence on one another.

Has the whole work a practical moral? Booth himself has not yet found one, though he is confirmed in his view that the elimination of Class B is the problem, and evidently still cherishes the germs of a designer upon the Poor Law. We shall all await with the deepest interest his examination of the immense system—or chaos—of multiform agencies now employed in "doing good," which he proposes to undertake before suggesting a remedy of his own.

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He promises to "compare the condition" of districts left to themselves with that of others in which religious or philanthropic enthusiasm is active. This will be an inquiry of the highest value. Mr. Booth fully appreciates the immense variety of the evils to be encountered, and I could wish that he gave not so much tacit encouragement to the idea that there can be "a plan" for doing away with them. And I trust that before throwing in his lot with Poor-Law Reform he will devote ample attention and analysis to poor-law administration and to medical charities. Side-lights on unreasoning philanthropy are already to be found. I quote one passage (p. 300) partly to illustrate the enjoyable quietness of the author's style.

"Nor is the struggle of different sects over these poor souls conducive to anything but evil. Those who are hunted up in their homes on a Sunday morning by the emissaries of five or six religious bodies are not likely to be spiritually impressed by any. Religious services cannot be expected to do much good to those who attend them only to qualify for charitable assistance, or even—though this is less objectionable—if their simple motive is to enjoy the meal of tea and buns which often follows. The competition of organized societies is further aggravated in evil effect by the efforts of many West End philanthropists, who choose St. Giles' as a field of independent charitable work."

Mr. Booth, then, has as yet no "moral" in the sense of a formulated plan. Perhaps, as he pursues his invaluable inquiries, he may lean more and more to the view that no one plan is needed so much as a gradual drawing together of the multiform agencies now at work, with a reasonable division of labor between them, so that nothing may be wasted, nothing done as on mere impulse, that the source of demoralization may be dried up, and the power of organization evoked in those classes whose life is now disorganized. However this may be, I will venture, at my own risk, to suggest a moral of a more general and theoretical kind. It is, that, from a work like this we learn the real meaning of that phrase which we are almost tired of hearing, "the social organism."

Why, as we study a really careful and persevering inquiry by skilled workers, are our common opinions constantly being upset and turned into their opposites by our finding that to go straight at an element A of the social whole, and do for it that which on a *prima facie* view it urgently needs, almost invariably produces the opposite result to that which we desire, even for A, not to speak of B, C, and D? The reason is simple. Common opinion accepts things in isolation; but social elements are much less isolated than anything else except the elements of thought, and that is what we mean when we speak of them as parts in an organism. The mere carefulness and extent of this inquiry must show us, if we have eyes to see, how hard it is to master the intricate and delicate relations of causality which make up the life of our neighbors. These considerations are not negative nor deterrent from action. They demand that we should treat our poorer neighbors as we treat ourselves, our friends and family; that we should consider what they are, how they live, what they expect of us, and how these expectations affect their action; that we should be humble, and keep open minds for every hint of the consequences of what we do, and that, so far as possible, we should avoid meddling with social matters on which we have not the time or the inclination to inform ourselves fully.

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What a lesson in the study of the social organism is the short and modest conclusion written by the conductor of this immense investigation, and chiefly pointing forward to the need of further research!

BERNARD BOSANQUET.

NEIGHBORHOOD GUILDS AN INSTRUMENT OF SOCIAL REFORM. By Stanton Coit, Ph.D., Lecturer of the South Place Ethical Society, London. Swan, Sonnenschein & Co., London. Pp. 150.

Those of us who are doubtful with regard to the efficacy of General Booth's social scheme, are naturally eager to discover some other and more practical method of dealing with those terrible problems of modern life which are now engaging a large share of the attention of every thoughtful man. It would be a very high praise to any social reformer to say that he has succeeded in bringing forward a scheme which will accomplish all the objects that General Booth has at heart, and which will be free from all the drawbacks that are incident to his own proposal. I will not be so rash as to say that Dr. Coit has succeeded in doing this, but I will venture to say that this little book of his seems to me to indicate very clearly the direction in which such a scheme is to be sought. In writing it, Dr. Coit has evidently had General Booth's scheme constantly in view, and has also had constantly in view the criticisms that have been passed on that scheme, especially the very weighty criticisms by Mr. Loch and Mr. Bosanquet. To give an account of its contents would be superfluous. It is very easily accessible, and every one who is interested in social questions will, no doubt, procure a copy. It will be sufficient, therefore, to indicate the general character of the book. Dr. Coit intends to suggest by the term "Neighborhood Guild" that, "irrespective of religious belief or non-belief, all the people, men, women, and children, in any one street, or any small number of streets, in every working-class district in London, shall be organized into a set of clubs, which are by themselves, or in alliance with those of other neighborhoods, to carry out, or induce others to carry out, all the reforms—domestic, industrial, educational, provident, or recreative—which the social ideal demands." This may seem somewhat general and vague, but any one who will read through Dr. Coit's very clear and interesting exposition will soon find that the idea which he has in his mind is a quite definite and practical one. Perhaps the best way of indicating shortly its nature will be to note its relations to several other schemes which it naturally suggests,—viz., the Mediæval Guilds, Fourier's *phalanstères*, Toynbee Hall, the Charity Organization Society, and General Booth's Social Scheme.

It reminds us of the Mediæval Guilds, as being a fraternity banded together for social advancement; but it differs from them by its comprehensiveness, and by the immeasurably greater width of its aims. It would comprehend men of all trades, of all creeds, of all political parties, of all ages and sexes, as if in a single family group; and would seek to assist these not merely in their economic development, but also in their moral and intellectual culture. By its comprehensiveness it reminds us more of Fourier's *phalanstères* than of a mediæval guild; but from the former also it is differentiated by the fact that its organization does not require any social revolution. It does not aim at an artificial comprehen-

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siveness, nor does it seek, as Fourier did, to make each group self-sufficing. It is simply an organization of the inhabitants of particular districts, as they are actually found existing, for mutual aid and improvement. Hence it may be compared rather to such an institution as Toynbee Hall. But it differs again from this also, inasmuch as it is of the essence of the scheme that each neighborhood should have a guild of its own, and that within each guild the social work should be systematically organized. It would aim also, as I understand, at being rather more democratic than Toynbee Hall, insisting more on self-improvement rather than on improvement from above; but I am not sure that in this respect the difference would be great. From a Charity Organization Society, again, the scheme is, of course, distinguished by the greater breadth of its aims; but it is its object, among other things, that each neighborhood should be its own charity organization society. Dr. Coit considers (I think rightly) that by such an arrangement the work of inspection, which a charity organization has to conduct, would be rendered both easier and less offensive. Finally, as already remarked, the scheme bears an obvious resemblance to that of General Booth, inasmuch as it seeks to combine in one great organization all kinds of work for the social elevation of the people. It differs from General Booth's scheme chiefly (1) by its strongly educational character and by its insistence on self-help; (2) by its religious neutrality; (3) by its democratic spirit and decentralization, each guild being on an independent basis and governed by its own members; (4) by its co-operation with already existing institutions; (5) by the fact that it does not merely seek to deal with the "submerged tenth," but with the elevation of all social grades, and consequently may be hoped to be not merely a palliative measure but a real remedy for social ills.

That such a scheme should be free from defects it would be too much to hope. In the first place, the organization of it would, no doubt, be slow. It presupposes the existence not of one General Booth but of many social enthusiasts. This Dr. Coit clearly recognizes. "Nothing but personality," he says, "can organize the social chaos of the masses into rational and moral co-operation." But he says that "it is a mistake to imagine that suitable personalities are so rare that, if one goes, no one else would be forthcoming to take his place." "Experience, a generous interest in the work, and the consciousness of personal responsibility develop the type of personality required." The work, in short, would develop the worker. But this evidently would require some time. Such a scheme, therefore, cannot undertake, like General Booth's, to rescue the degraded classes of the population in a mass and at once. In the second place, it may be urged that, without central control, the work of the guilds would be apt to become, at least at first, somewhat chaotic. I am not sure, however, that there would be much force in such an objection. I think new guilds might be expected to follow to a great extent in the lines of those already at work, and to co-operate with one another in their subsequent development. In the third place, it might be said, that while such Neighborhood Guilds as these would be very suitable for certain districts, there are others in which they could not be expected to flourish, or, at least, to produce good results. In districts in which a single type of industry is predominant, there might not be sufficient diversity of character to give interest to such a guild. It might degenerate into an organ for the promotion of

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particular interests; and the small minority of those who did not belong to the dominant section, or who did not wish to promote its special interests, might find themselves unable to co-operate in a friendly way with the majority. But I suppose this difficulty would be to a considerable extent removed by the co-operation of the various guilds with one another, and by the personality of their leaders. In the fourth place, some may be disposed to think that the absence of religious enthusiasm would prevent the work from being carried on with the same fervor as that which we may expect from the members of the Salvation Army. But Dr. Coit is probably right in thinking that the enthusiasm for social improvement is of itself quite sufficient, when rightly appealed to, to supply all the motive force that is required. And certainly, at least, the religious neutrality of the scheme would render it acceptable to a much greater variety of people than it could otherwise hope to reach.

But whatever weight there may be in these difficulties, and in many more that might easily be suggested, it can, at least, not be denied that the scheme is a practicable one, and one that will produce beneficial results. It has already been tried and found useful. There have for some years been more than one such guild in America, and there are now at least two in London, and those who know anything of the working of them cannot doubt that they are rendering a most valuable service.

Dr. Coit's book is one of the most interesting additions that have yet been made to the admirable series to which it belongs. It is full of practical insight and wise suggestiveness. No student of social questions can afford to neglect it; and few will rise from the perusal of it without feeling that they have derived from it, in a very high degree, encouragement and help.

J. S. MACKENZIE.

LUXURY. By Emile de Laveleye. Swan, Sonnenschein & Co. Pp. 179 and 9.

This translation appears as the twenty-fourth volume of the "Social Science Series." The last third of the volume is chiefly occupied by a short treatise on "Law and Morals in Political Economy," and the book ends with a bibliography of M. de Laveleye's works. In this notice we are concerned only with the treatise on luxury.

The question which it aims at determining is stated at the outset to be this, Is luxury useful? And the author goes on to consider, in eleven short chapters, what luxury is, whether or not it is justifiable, and what are its causes, concomitants, and effects. Although the definitions given are neither very precise nor quite consistent, we may, perhaps, say that, on the whole, M. de Laveleye regards as luxury whatever is expensive and out of reach of the majority. Luxury is "the use of those things that are rare and costly" (p. 35); "it consists in what is very costly" (p. 55). The main point, and the one which is most often forgotten, is this: "Every article of luxury costs much labor; could not this labor be utilized in a more rational fashion?" (p. 29). Compare also p. 3: "Luxury is anything which does not answer to our primary needs, and which, since it costs much money to buy, and consequently [?] much labor to produce, is only within reach of the few. The extreme of luxury is that which destroys the

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product of many days' labor without bringing any rational satisfaction to the owner. The queen of the ball-room destroys in the mazes of the waltz a lace skirt worth ten thousand francs: there you have the equivalent of fifty thousand hours of labor, and labor of the most tedious kind and fatal to the eyes, destroyed in a moment. And what advantage has any one derived from it?" Compare, again, p. 26: "Luxury consists . . . in the consumption of what has cost great labor to produce for the satisfaction of spurious needs." We find in the latter definitions, in addition to the characteristics of *cost* and *rarity*, the further points that it is for the satisfaction not of "primary" or "rational," but of "spurious" needs, that luxuries cost more than they are worth, that a liability to speedy destruction is one of their most signal characteristics, that luxuries are superfluities.

But if we take the tests of mere expensiveness and rarity, it seems both that some things which are not commonly considered luxuries are very expensive; for instance, certain drugs and minerals, valuable in medicine or for scientific or artistic purposes; and also that some things which are not expensive, and certainly are very widely used, are generally regarded as coming under that head; for example, tobacco, alcoholic drinks, perfumes, light literature, cheap ornaments. Again, speedy destruction is the condition of the utility of all such commodities as food and fuel. And taking the question asked with reference to the lace skirt, what advantage has any one derived from it? It is obvious that quite possibly various advantages may have been derived. It may have been in itself so lovely, and may have so enhanced the beauty of the wearer, that the satisfaction of the æsthetic sense afforded by it may have been very considerable; and the sense of beauty is, in a later page, declared to be worthy of cultivation and satisfaction. Also the wearer herself may have derived keen and lasting satisfaction from this one night of triumph. If it is objected that the satisfaction was not "rational," the question occurs, What is meant by *rational?* To this M. de Laveleye replies: "That which is prescribed by reason and hygiene" (p. 54). If it is said that the satisfaction was not "worth" the cost, everything turns upon the force of *worth*. Of this we receive, I think, no explicit determination. The force of "primary" and "spurious" also remains vague. And certainly the intellectual and moral needs and satisfactions, which are set forth in chapters v. and viii. as the noblest, are very far from being "primary." What, again, are "superfluities"? The idea, as M. de Laveleye admits, is "relative. . . . What is superfluous to-day will be no longer so to-morrow." Indeed, he seems to admit that many things that *were* luxuries and bad, now are necessaries, and therefore not bad (cf. p. 38, etc.). He thinks that "the distinction [between luxuries or superfluities and necessaries] is always easy to make: is an object worth the pain it would require and the time it would take for me to make it myself? If so, it is not a luxury, and I am right in securing it," etc. A more ridiculous test could hardly be suggested. The author seems to be carried away here by his comparison between "humanity and Robinson Crusoe on his island."

It will be seen from the above that in defining luxury, M. de Laveleye gives, by implication, his answer to the question, Is luxury justifiable? He also, however, condemns it explicitly enough in various passages. It is declared to be "pernicious to the individual and fatal to society;" to be "immoral, unjust, and

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inhuman"—"inhumanly perverse;" and he devotes chapter iv. to showing expressly that "luxury is unjustifiable." The point insisted upon in this chapter is, that luxury means spending part of the available forces of capital and labor in producing superfluities, when there are so many people in want of bare necessaries. The argument here, of course, supposes that every retrenchment of luxury would mean an addition to the supply of necessaries. But necessaries will not be produced unless people are ready to buy them, and persons who are in destitution have not the wherewithal to purchase ample supplies of "necessaries." The only possible reply to this must be to recommend an improved distribution, and this, in fact, is what M. de Laveleye does, though only in a few unobtrusive passages. For instance, on p. 18, we have the assertion that "the race is ruined by *inequality of conditions.*" To banish luxury, therefore, we must introduce socialism.

It is easy to show that M. de Laveleye's definition and estimate of luxury are not satisfactory, but not so easy to replace them by something better. Courcelle-Seneuil remarks that luxury is a word "qui échappe à toute définition exacte et scientifique." According to Auspitz and Lieben ("Theorie der Preisen"), if the increase in the price of a commodity does not increase the total amount spent on it, it is a luxury; while if an increase of price does increase the total amount expended, it is a necessary. If one could be sure of people's laying out their money in a truly reasonable fashion, this definition would, perhaps, be satisfactory; but, as it is, I should prefer to suggest that luxurious expenditure means uneconomic expenditure in matters of comfort, convenience, or amusement. By an uneconomic expenditure of wealth, I mean expenditure which, comprehensively considered, produces *less* than the greatest amount of return (in human well-being and well-doing) which is possible under the circumstances,—that is (taking the utilitarian interpretation of good), which produces less human happiness than might have been produced by spending the wealth in some other way. And it may very well happen that expenditure which, considered with reference merely to individuals, would have to be condemned as uneconomic, may, when considered with reference to a whole community, appear not to be so. For is not a certain degree of luxury an inseparable concomitant (in the present stage of human development), even of a state of things in which the greatest *fruitful* expenditure on individual comfort is possible, much more of a state of great wealth?

It seems of the last importance to the community that in some cases, at least, the utmost limit of fruitful expenditure should be reached; it is this which makes possible the very best products of some kinds, and in some cases an advance upon the highest existing degrees of excellence. And as far as experience has gone hitherto, it is only in a wealthy community that great refinement, intellectual and moral, great development of science and art, general good education, and a general high standard of decency and respectability are found; not to mention that a community with a good deal of superfluous wealth is able to make costly experiments, to hold its own in times of difficulty, and to recover without serious injury from sudden or great disaster. What the world is and will be, what it thinks and feels and does on the whole, seems to depend on what the best men think and feel and do; therefore it seems as though a large expenditure on luxury were not too high a prize to pay for the sake of making the best as

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good as possible,—by providing both, as it were, a medium in which it can come into existence and flourish, and also the special means necessary in particular cases. And this seems so even when we take into account the harm which may result to individuals and the community (in other ways than individual enervation and deprivation) from such an expenditure. Where there is great wealth, making possible a high degree of general cultivation and refinement, it seems that a certain amount of waste (and worse than waste) expenditure is inevitable, and perhaps a certain amount of admiration for mere luxury. If, when the loss of happiness produced by luxury is weighed against the gain, the former is found to preponderate, luxury of such kind and degree is to be condemned. But if the luxury of individuals brings on the whole a gain to the community, such luxury is not to be condemned. In fact, to put the matter paradoxically, luxury is only desirable when it is not luxury.

E. E. C. JONES.

NEWS FROM NOWHERE; OR, AN EPOCH OF REST, being some chapters from a Utopian Romance, by William Morris. London, Reeves and Turner, 1891.

There is a very prevalent feeling, though it may not often be formulated, that if there were no deliberate wickedness, no grinding poverty, no grim struggle for existence in the world, life would not be worth living. This is a profoundly pessimistic creed if held with philosophical self-consciousness, for it introduces into every attempt to ameliorate the conditions of life a silent reserve to the effect that real and complete sucesses would be an unparalleled disaster. "Sin and misery will last my time, so I need not fear to strike at them with all my force" must be the motto of the reformer who believes that together with sin and misery the zest of life would depart; and it need not be shown how such a mental reservation reduces the most earnest forms of human activity to a mere game in which, while ever struggling to win, we never wish to have conclusively won.

Any man, therefore, who succeeds in showing us a life in and for itself worth living, as the ideal result and outcome of all our toil and strife, is conferring a real and practical benefit not only of high, but perhaps of the very highest order, upon his fellows. It is a blind instinct, rather than a true self-direction, that determines our efforts to "raise" ourselves and others, if we have no clear conception of a supremely worthy life to which we are to be raised. Now the great defect of Bellamy's "Looking Backward"—speaking of it merely as a vision, and apart from the weakness of its economic basis—was that his life of the future seemed pedantic, stilted, and uninteresting. It was in vain for the author to assure us that it was not so, but was in fact the precise opposite of all this. He had not the power of making us feel with him. So at least many of his readers found. But Morris has succeeded where Bellamy failed.

We see nothing of the machinery of industry in "Nowhere," and we gather that there is no government. The perfect and delightful order that reigns appears to be the order of anarchy rather than of socialism. Everything is spontaneous and unregulated, but everything is harmonious. There is a perfectly delicious absence of affectation and pedantry about the idyllic figures that cover Mr. Morris's canvas. Some of them are commonplace enough. One at least—Ellen—is a creation. But in their degree they all love the earth, love their art,

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love each other, find life supremely interesting,—in a word, *live*. Actions are judged right or wrong, but on their own merits, not by convention. Love, like everything else, is "free." But Mr. Morris on the whole, though here he is not very explicit, presents a Teutonic rather than a Hellenic ideal of the relations of the sexes. Rivalry in love is nearly the only source of violent disturbance left in the society of "Nowhere." It is the chief source of disappointment and sorrow too; but no one thinks it his duty to nurse his unhappiness or pretend to himself that he is unhappier than he is.

A passionate love of nature is the keynote of "Nowhere," and many readers may be partly convinced by it that life would be more than endurable without misery, without smoke, without competition, without drudgery, without enterprise, without pedantry, and without conventions. Can we reach such a state by Trafalgar Square meetings, and could we preserve it without stern self-discipline? Morris seems almost inclined to say, yes, to both these questions. "O sancta simplicitas!" we cry. He himself has said elsewhere—I quote from memory—

> "And into stern resolve this longing chill
> If thou would'st be God-loved and conquering still."

But he who has waked a longing for beauty and for true rest has already done well, even if he does no more.

P. H. WICKSTEED.

DE L'IDEAL. Etude Philosophique par A. Ricardou, Professeur au Lycée Charlemagne, etc.

This book is an able and careful attempt to characterize and vindicate the reality of the perfection realizable by a human being. The presuppositions of the author are evidently the following: 1. A form of Platonic Idealism consisting in a belief in certain ideal forms, such as the Beautiful, the Good, Essence, etc. 2. The reality of personality as testified by consciousness, and this in spite of the objections raised by the sceptic or the materialist. 3. A recognition of the facts of natural science with a critical mistrust of its generalizations. The aim of the book is not to "erect a notion of the spirit as a sort of transcendental reality," but simply to compare "the different characteristics of which the human individual is a synthesis," in order to show that some of these are "proper and essential" to it.

The Ideal is the progressive conception under a determinate form of the best possible for man. Although conceding that the best possible is for us only an idea, M. Ricardou seeks to show by an analysis of reality that it is not only a reality for the moral man but actually the highest form of reality. He sets forth then the characteristics, the formation, and the objective validity of the moral ideal as he understands it; and his treatment, it seems to me, evinces philosophical grasp and knowledge guided by a high and sure moral insight. His starting from the ideal as a basis of conduct is only part of his conviction that, notwithstanding what satirists, sceptics, and men of the world say, ideas are really motive forces to men, and in the last resort, to men as rational beings, really the supreme motive forces; and that an idealism is the only possible basis

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for ethical conduct which consists not in the life of naturalism and sense, but in a rational or deeper and voluntary striving after the better or the best. ("La vie c'est toujours quelque philosophie en action.") Metaphysically he defines the Ideal as Moral Perfection, and in the concrete speaks of it as Love. In two ways does he seek to show that the ideal is objectively valid, by proving, firstly, that the principle of the better is implied in all conduct and in all science; and secondly, that the natural or moral or free activity of man is the highest form of reality. In all this M. Ricardou's critical exposition is eminently clear and instructive.

The book is of course a "philosophical study," but has still a practical aspect, on which a word below. To many the interest of the book might lie in its vindication of the moral ideal in face of positive science. Really, as the author notices, Science paves the way for Morality by breaking down and idealizing the merely external character of the world, and reducing it to the spiritual fact of Law. The evolutionist who pleads naturalism as the truth about man and man's conduct, M. Ricardou meets with the teleological argument that what appears in the end (rationality, say,) is implied in the beginning: this position, strengthened by the one that the so-called objective implies the so-called subjective, I am inclined to accept. His stress upon human personality and the immediate consciousness of personality, recalling as it does Maine de Biran and the Scottish philosophers, constitutes, if properly understood, really a stronger argument than it is commonly supposed to be. In our moral consciousness we have a perception of a rational and spiritual life which, construe it as one may, always remains a fact of the world as much as any other fact attested to by consciousness. This consciousness cannot be so easily pronounced an illusion, so long as by an act of will any person may enter upon the rational life of which it speaks. I want to emphasize the author's position about Will. In the end the moral life is an affair of choice; we may or may not assert by an act of rational faith our spiritual nature; the *élan de foi metaphysique* of which the book speaks is really, as has often been pointed out, simply faith in reason, which faith is implied in every action and every application of the scientific method. While admitting that psychologically the moral ideal is a highly reflex synthetic construction of the mind, M. Ricardou insists on having this mental tendency explained by causes qualitatively adequate to its production; physical conditions do not settle everything: it is "absurd to dissect a corpse to find the soul." Utilitarianism, too, only systematizes a certain stage in the evolution of the moral ideal.

A difficulty of the book is that, what the writer finds to be a higher form of reality, he tends (in consequence, I believe, of a metaphysical theory) to speak of as the essence of reality, as the most real thing, and this in such way as if the other forms of reality only imperfectly existed, if at all. Accepting the sceptical position that we only know what is inside our consciousness, he yet attains, as he puts it, to a dogmatism in proclaiming what we do find in our consciousness (the rational or moral ideal) to be *the* reality, in fact the only reality. Without discussing the questionable philosophy of M. Ricardou here, I merely point out that it might logically lead him into the Monism or Pantheism to which he objects as a basis for Morality. Instead of reducing one plane of reality into another, it might be enough to show how one plane presumably higher determines a lower, to wit, here, the moral idea the natural basis of man's life,

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or the idea of God the moral idea. The book closes with suggesting that the real danger of the present time of critical reconstruction is moral indifferentism. With this I agree. Coupling it with the earlier position about Will, I get to the ethical principle, as old as Aristotle, that only the truly good man has the perfect moral insight, and consequently the evidence and certainty proper to a spiritualistic philosophy of which the last chapter speaks. Though M. Ricardou is largely indebted to older philosophers like Leibnitz and Cousin, he is an independent thinker throughout. Many fine moral sayings might be culled out of his book, and these not irrelevant to its main theme. I regard the book as of distinct value.

WILLIAM CALDWELL.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

RIDDLES OF THE SPHINX; A STUDY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF EVOLUTION. By a Troglodyte. London: Swan, Sonnenschein & Co., 1891.

DIE SOCIALE FRAGE EINE SITTLICHE FRAGE. Von Dr. Theobald Ziegler. Zweite Auflage. Stuttgart: G. J. Göschen'sche Verlagshandlung, 1891.

BROWNING AS A PHILOSOPHICAL AND RELIGIOUS TEACHER. By Henry Jones, M.A. Glasgow: MacLelose & Sons, 1891.

PROBLEMS OF POVERTY. By John A. Hobson, M.A. London: Methuen & Co., 1891.

FINAL CAUSES: A Refutation. By Walthen Mark Wilkes Call, M.A. London: Kegan Paul & Co.

MODERN HUMORISTS. By John M. Robertson. London: Swan, Sonnenschein & Co., 1891.

A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT. By Jeremy Bentham. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Notices of the above books will be inserted in a future number.

JUSTICE. Part IV. of Ethics. By Herbert Spencer. London: Williams & Norgate.

ELEMENTS OF POLITICS. By Professor Henry Sidgwick. London: MacMillan.

FREEDOM AS ETHICAL POSTULATE. By Professor James Seth. Edinburgh: Blackwood.

EDUCATION AND HEREDITY. By Mons. Guyan. Translated from the French.

SYNOPSIS OF THE LIVES OF VICTORIA C. WOODHULL AND TENNESSEE CLAFLIN. By G. S. Darewin. London: Corthesy.

Periodicals received:

REVUE LIBÉRALE; organe des progressistes des deux mondes. Vol. III. No 32.

This journal is devoted chiefly to the question of international peace, and ought to be of considerable interest to students of practical ethics.

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VIERTELJAHRSSCHRIFT FÜR WISSENSCHAFTLICHE PHILOSOPHIE. XV Jahrgang, Erstes Heft und Zweites Heft.

These numbers of this weighty journal do not contain any articles that bear directly on ethics; but the article in the *Zweites Heft* on "Der Hypnotismus in der neuesten 'Psychologie'" may interest many readers of the INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS as containing a criticism of Professor James's recent work.

THE LADDER. Vol. I., No. 6.

Contains articles on Free Education, the Lapsed Masses, etc., and continues to sustain its standard of interest.

THE ANNUAL INDEX OF THE REVIEW OF REVIEWS. 1891.

A useful aid to readers of the Review.

NOTE.—*Books to be reviewed ought to be sent to one or the other of the following addresses:*

Professor Josiah Royce, Harvard University, 103 Irving Street, Cambridge, Mass., U. S. A.;

J. S. Mackenzie, 3 Grosvenor Terrace, Withington, Manchester, England;

Professor G. von Gizycki, Nettelbeckstrasse 24, Berlin, W. Germany;

Professor P. Boirac, 108 Rue de Rome, Paris.

ERRATA.

Volume I., page 452, second line from bottom, paragraph begins with "But."

Volume I., page 456, sixteenth line from bottom, for "theological" read "ethological."

Volume I., page 457, first line, for "cries" read "cones."

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INTERNATIONAL

JOURNAL OF ETHICS.

JANUARY, 1892.

ETHICAL ASPECTS OF THE PAPAL ENCYCLICAL.

I PROPOSE in these pages simply to place in relief the ethical principles underlying the Encyclical of the Holy Father, Pope Leo XIII., on the burning question of labor in its relations with capital, making such comments and giving such illustrations as may occur. The document is one that has been received with a due sense of appreciation by thinking men of all classes and all creeds throughout the civilized world. Perhaps, never in the history of the Church did papal utterance receive more profound consideration than did this magnificent Encyclical. A short study of the document will enable us to understand its wide-spread influence and its deep impression.

I.

Speaking with all the authority of the Church, the Holy Father bears to the workingman, the poor, and the indigent a message of hope and comfort and prudent counsel as regards their temporal welfare. He holds that while the mission of the Church is primarily that of saving souls, her solicitude none the less extends with sincere concern to the well-being of the body:

"Neither must it be supposed that the solicitude of the Church is so occupied with the spiritual concerns of its children as to neglect their interests temporal and earthly. Its desire is that the poor, for example, should rise above poverty

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and wretchedness, and should better their condition in life; and for this it strives." *

In pointing out the way by which men may seek first the kingdom of God and His justice, the Church is also leading towards the further promise that all things else shall be added thereto. Certainly, the experience of all time is that virtuous living is the only road to real personal happiness, and not infrequently the safest road to material prosperity. And the prosperity so attained is the most abiding. The wealth that is accumulated rapidly by forcing the weaker competitor to ruin and starvation, the wealth that is made at the expense of the widow and the orphan, the wealth that is coined out of the sweat and the blood, the pains and the aches and the groans of the ill-paid and ill-fed workman, or mayhap of the poor girl, whose starving life is ground into it,—that wealth can bring with it neither happiness nor the prosperity that is a blessing to the land. Such injustice carries with it its own curse.

The vital problem of the day is twofold: the amelioration of the condition of the poor and the workingman, and the proper adjustment of labor and capital. To the solution of this problem does the Pope address himself in the present timely and thought-suggesting Encyclical. His Holiness begins by surveying the ground:

"All agree, and there can be no question whatever, that some remedy must be found, and quickly found, for the misery and wretchedness which press so heavily at this moment on the large majority of the very poor. . . . By degrees it has come to pass that workingmen have been given over, isolated and defenceless, to the callousness of employers and the greed of unrestrained competition. The evil has been increased by rapacious usury. . . . And to this must be added the custom of working by contract, and the concentration of so many branches of trade in the hands of a few individuals, so that a small number of very rich men have been able to lay upon the masses of the poor a yoke little better than slavery itself." †

The picture is not overdrawn, especially as regards the poor and the workingman of Europe.

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* Encyclical Letter, § 30.

† Encycl., § 3.

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True it is that with us in the United States there is not the festering and hopeless misery that is to be found among the very poor in the Old World; but poverty is none the less rampant; men and women there are who are overworked and underpaid, and living is high-priced, and in New York City, as well as in the heart of London, what is called "the sweating system" prematurely extinguishes the lives of women and children. Misery there is among us, and to spare.* There are cancer-spots on our social body. Neither science, nor the education of the people, nor the progress of industry can heal these spots. We may diminish the evil by a sympathizing activity exercised in a spirit of Christ-like charity towards the suffering; to attempt to eradicate it were utopian.

The Holy Father indulges in no such dream. He takes a practical view of things. He finds in the antagonism between labor and capital the source of many evils. The remedy he conceives to lie in the proper adjustment of labor and capital. Labor is necessary for capital; capital is necessary for labor. Each is in itself a good. It has been truly written, "Capital is not the begetter of misery, and the right and lawfulness of its participation cannot be gainsaid."† Owing to the rapid progress of science, the substitution of machinery for tools has broken up the harmony between many of the industries, and has imperceptibly placed the relations of labor and capital upon a footing for which men were not prepared, and in which the laborer, in consequence, suffered. A man's tools were part of his personality; the vast and perfect machinery of a large manufactory is something impersonal. What the skilled tradesman formerly accomplished is now the work of so many hands,—frequently the hands of feeble women and children. Life in the mean time continues to be conducted on the old social lines. Both capitalist and workingman have been unable to keep pace with the rapid changes brought about by the new order of things and

* See "How the Other Half Live," by Jacob A. Riis; see, also, "Chicago's Dark Places."

† E. Feno, "Della Carità Preventiva," Milano, 1868, p. 554.

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to accommodate themselves to the new environment. Hence the strain and the clashings.

But there enter into the adjustments of labor and capital many elements arising from the relative responsibilities assumed by the employer and the employed upon entering into a contract. These elements are dealt with in the Encyclical. It is with no faltering voice that Leo XIII. approaches the great issue. He speaks as one possessing authority and knowing whereof he speaks.*

II.

To begin with: The Holy Father is outspoken with the workingman, and cautions him against the delusory arguments of demagogues—"crafty agitators"—who "constantly make use of these disputes to pervert men's judgments, and to stir up the people to sedition."† He impresses upon the workingman a sense of obligation and responsibility towards the employer. He tells him that he should furnish wholly and faithfully the work stipulated for; that he should carry out honestly and well all equitable agreements freely entered into; that he should never injure capital or outrage the person of an employer; that he should never make use of violence in representing his own cause, or engage in riot or disorder; finally, that he should have nothing to do with men of evil principles, "who work upon the people with artful promises, and raise foolish hopes which usually end in disaster and repentance when too late."‡ There is always danger in reaction. Mr. Herbert Spencer says, "If it is true that a generation ago land-owners and capitalists so adjusted public arrangements as to ease themselves and to press unduly upon others, it is no less true that now artisans and laborers, through representatives who are obliged to do their bidding, are fast remoulding our social system in ways which achieve their own gain through others' loss."§ It is to prevent the evil of this reaction, it is in order that injustice may not be met by injustice, that the Holy Father gives such

* See *Dublin Review*, July, 1891, p. 154.
† Encycl., § 2.
‡ Ibid., § 21.
§ "Justice," p. 192.

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prudent counsel. The laborer may have grievances, but he does not better his position by leaving his work in an unfinished state, or by damaging or destroying property. Two wrongs cannot make a right. This were a violation of all justice; so the Pope regards it, and as such he rebukes it. While weighed down by consciousness of his grievances, it is the tendency of the workman to be reckless as regards the efficiency of his work and as regards the care of his employer's property. It is only his conscience, aroused and guided by religion, that can dictate to him the suppression of his personal spites and the doing of honest work under heavy provocation. It is only Christianity that can restrain men galled by a yoke that they would fain cast off. Christianity has been from the beginning the safeguard and guiding principle of society in its progress upward and onward.

The reformation of the workingman does not and can not come from without; it must come from within himself. "I tell you candidly," says Cobden, "that no people were ever yet elevated except through their own advancing wealth, morality, intelligence; and any one who tells the workingmen of this country that they may be raised in the social scale by any other process than that of reformation in themselves, is interested either in flattering or deceiving them." * It is this kind of reformation that the Holy Father seeks to bring about in the present Encyclical. Therefore it is that he appeals so strongly to the workman's sense of duty.

III.

While appealing to the workman's sense of duty, the Pope no less forcibly recognizes his rights.

1. He has the right to live; therefore is he entitled to food and shelter.

"Man's needs do not die out, but recur; satisfied to-day, they demand new supplies to-morrow. Nature therefore owes to man a storehouse that shall never fail, the daily supply of his daily wants." †

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* "Speeches of Richard Cobden, M.P.," delivered during 1849, p. 171.

† Encycl., § 7.

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This right is paramount to all other earthly and temporal rights. It is this right that justifies homicide in self-defence. It is this right that entitles a man to sufficient bodily sustenance, all human laws to the contrary notwithstanding. It need scarcely be said that the idle and slothful, or the burglar and footpad can find no sheltering cover beneath this right.

2. He has the right to remuneration for his labor.

"If one man hires out to another his strength or his industry, he does this for the purpose of receiving in return what is necessary for food and living; he thereby expressly proposes to acquire a full and real right not only to the remuneration, but also to the disposal of that remuneration as he pleases." *

His wages are the equivalent he receives for that part of himself which is wholly and exclusively his as a human being, his skill and his strength, and as such they enter the domain of his personal rights. He expends such portion of his earnings as is necessary for the support of himself and of those depending upon him. The remainder he holds or invests as seems best to him. And this leads to another recognized right.

3. He has the right to hold property. This right has grown with the growth of civilization. "Modern peoples," says Le Play, "who are most distinguished for their success and their superior influence, tend daily to give every species of property more and more a character exclusively personal. Under this form they consider it as the natural reward of labor and economy,—that is, of the two virtues on which chiefly rest the independence of individuals and the power of societies." † Therefore, the Holy Father tells us:

"Every man has by nature the right to possess property as his own. This is one of the chief points of distinction between man and the animal creation. . . . It is the mind, or the reason, which is the chief thing in us who are human beings; it is this which makes a human being human, and distinguishes him essentially and completely from the brute. And on this account—viz., that man alone among animals possesses reason—it must be within his right to have things not merely for temporary and momentary use, as other living beings

* Encycl., § 5.

† "La Reforme Sociale en France," t. i. p. 230.

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have them, but in stable and permanent possession; he must have not only things which perish in the using, but also those which, though used, remain for use in the future."*

This is what is meant by property. It is something that remains one's own to use and dispose of through all changes of place, time, and circumstance.

This ownership extends to the land that man tills. The soil is the source whence man derives the sustenance of life. "Land," says Cunningham, "is the property which of all others most calls out the virtues of prudence; the desire to realize it increases the will to work, and augments the endeavors of every workman in every trade, even in that of farming another's land."† Therefore we may rightly say that upon land and by land does man live directly or indirectly. Especially does man find in ownership of land the great incentive to exertion. "Give a man," says Arthur Young, "the secure possession of a bleak rock, and he will turn it into a garden; give him a nine years' lease of a garden, and he will convert it into a desert."‡ And Leo XIII. thus discourses upon the character of this right of private ownership:

"Here again we have another proof that private ownership is according to Nature's law. For that which is required for the preservation of life, and for life's well-being, is produced in great abundance by the earth, but not until man has brought it into cultivation and lavished upon it his care and skill. Now, when man thus spends the industry of his mind and the strength of his body in procuring the fruits of Nature, by that act he makes his own that portion of Nature's field which he cultivates,—that portion in which he leaves, as it were, the impress of his own personality; and it cannot but be just that he should possess that portion as his own, and should have a right to keep it without molestation." ‖

It is not disputed that there are limitations to that right in land determined by the interests of the common weal and the dictates of justice and equity that may not here be entered into.

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* Encycl., ‖ 6.

† "Conditions of Social Well-Being," London, 1878, p. 123.

‡ "Travels in France," vol. i. p. 51. ‖ Encycl., ‖ 9.

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But clearly defined limitations are one thing; the breaking down of all limitations is quite another thing. And so the Holy Father condemns all proposals for communism in land or any other form of property as "emphatically unjust, because they would rob the lawful possessor, bring the state into a sphere that is not its own, and cause complete confusion in the community."* Mr. Herbert Spencer stands at the opposite pole of thought from the point of view of the Pope. He would ignore the supernatural; he believes in the evolution of society from the lower forms of life; the moral sense he evolves from experience, environment, and heredity. Now, in 1850, Mr. Herbert Spencer argued that as the land could not be equitably alienated from the community, it should, after compensating its existing holders, be re-appropriated by the community. But as the result of an additional forty years' study of social institutions, within which he has accumulated the experiences of all times and of every degree of civilization, he is led to retract his former position, and he now holds that the present system is the one entailing the least evil.† He has practically reached the same conclusion with the Holy Father.‡

Moreover, the mission of the Church has ever been to infuse into existing social institutions the principles of justice and charity, and to reform those institutions so far as they would be reformed, but not to overthrow them by any sudden revolution. Men must not grow impatient because she does not change her uniform line of action and become a medium of propagandism of their untried and impracticable theories. These theories are not new to her. Some of her own children in the early days of Christianity lived a life in which property was held in common. Her religious orders, from the days of St. Benedict up to the present day, have practised this community life. We see them now, as they have been seen in the past, men and women, renouncing name and fame

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* Encycl., § 4. † "Justice," p. 270.

‡ See "Justice," on land-value, p. 92; on the injustice of communism, p. 200. Space will not permit us to quote these important conclusions.

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and riches, consecrating themselves to the service of their neighbor, nursing the sick in hospitals, caring for the foundling and the orphan in asylums, teaching the children of the poor in parish schools, attending to the dead and the dying when occasion calls for their services on the battle-field or in the plague-stricken district, ministering to the spiritual wants of the people the world over, and in return each requiring only the food to sustain him and the clothing necessary to protect him against the inclemency of the weather. This community life is built upon a supernatural basis, and is followed only by those who have a special calling, known in the Church as a religious vocation.

The theory of community life upon a natural basis has been frequently revived with the revival of the writings of Plato. From the time of the Renaissance men are to be found from age to age advocating the holding of lands and goods in common. We need only mention the names of blessed Thomas More and the Dominican Campanella. Communism is not a new factor with which the Church has had to deal.

No doubt, were modern society established on another basis, as in Russia, for instance, in which "the communal principle, with its periodical re-allotment of the land, still remains intact," *—did this relation of joint ownership exist throughout Christendom, the Pope would have recognized the situation, and addressed laborer and employer accordingly. But another order of things exists. Civilized communities everywhere recognize the principle of "individual ownership subject to state suzerainty." † Nor was the policy of the Church otherwise in the days of feudalism. Social relations were then established upon a different basis; the Church recognized them accordingly, and sought to counsel and guide men for the best. And so we may here continue the enumeration of the rights of the workman as contained in the Encyclical.

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* Wallace, "Russia," vol. ii. p. 92.

† Herbert Spencer, "Justice," p. 270.

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4. He has the right to live in the state of celibacy or to marry. Dealing with the workingman in his normal social and domestic relations, the Pope touches upon the state of celibacy only to recognize it. Men who formerly sneered at the Gospel counsel have now come to regard virginity as a natural right. Indeed, Schopenhauer goes to the other extreme, and considers it the kernel of Christianity. "Protestantism," he says, "since it has eliminated asceticism and its central point, the meritoriousness of celibacy, has already given up the inmost kernel of Christianity, and so far is to be regarded as a falling away from it. This has become apparent in our own day by the gradual transition of Protestantism into shallow rationalism." * The Church always recognized the place and the right of virginity. And so Leo XIII. tells us,—

"In choosing a state of life, it is indisputable that all are at full liberty either to follow the counsel of Jesus Christ as to virginity, or to enter into the bonds of marriage. No human law can abolish the natural and primitive right of marriage, or in any way limit the chief and principal purpose of marriage ordained by God's authority from the beginning—*Increase and multiply.* † Thus we have the family, the society of man's own household; a society limited indeed in numbers, but a true society anterior to any kind of state or nation, with rights and duties of its own, totally independent of the commonwealth." ‡

Here the Holy Father puts the axe to the root of that Malthusian tree of political doctrine which has misled so many writers on political economy. To stunt or cut off the growth of population is a crime against the natural law. It traverses God's design in creating the human race. Any theory of life that would limit the number of children in a family would be in its very nature unjust and immoral. Doctrinaires are at sea in determining the number of people that a country can support. A slender population living in waste, unthrift, lack of forethought, will thrive less prosperously than many times the same population upon the same territory, living in self-restraint, decency, economy, and prudent calculation of the future. Malthusianism, in its accepted sense,

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* "The World as Will and Idea," vol. iii. pp. 447, 448.

† Genesis i. 28. ‡ Encycl., § 13.

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is false in its premises, immoral in its application, and misleading in its conclusions.

From parental rights and responsibilities the Holy Father deduces strongly and clearly, as an additional argument, the right of private ownership in property. He says,—

"That right of property, therefore, which has been proved to belong naturally to individual persons, must also belong to a man in his capacity of head of a family; nay, such a person must possess this right so much the more clearly in proportion as his position multiplies his duties. For it is a most sacred law of nature that a father must provide food and all necessaries for those whom he has begotten; and similarly, nature dictates that a man's children, who carry on, as it were, and continue his own personality, should be provided by him with all that is needful to enable them honorably to keep themselves from want and misery in the uncertainties of this mortal life. Now, in no other way can a father effect this except by the ownership of profitable property, which he can transmit to his children by inheritance." *

The rights of the family are primary and anterior to all other social and state rights:

"Since the domestic household is anterior both in idea and in fact to the gathering of men into a commonwealth, the former must necessarily have rights and duties which are prior to those of the latter, and which rest more immediately on nature." †

Mr. Herbert Spencer lays down the same principle when he tells us, "Fatherhood habitually implies ownership of the means by which children and dependents are supported." ‡

5. Therefore the workingman possesses the right to support his family becomingly and decently. Mere existence, however much it may suit the brute creation, does not fulfil the whole meaning of man's presence on earth. He and his are here for a higher purpose, and that purpose can, at least in a civilized community, be efficiently attained only by a becoming living. Therefore, speaking of the duties of the rich towards the poor, and defining the limits of those duties according to the teachings of St. Thomas Aquinas, the Holy Father says,—

"True, no one is commanded to distribute to others that which is required for his own necessities and those of his household; not even to give away what is

* Encycl., § 14. † Ibid., § 15. ‡ "Justice," p. 216.

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reasonably required to keep up becomingly his position in life; 'for no one ought to live unbecomingly.'" *

Therefore, any system, be it social or be it of the state, that would hinder, or would render impossible, the exercise of this right on the part of the head of the family to provide a becoming and decent living for those dependent on him, according to custom and locality, would in itself be radically wrong, and would require reform.

6. The workman has the right to guard and preserve his soul intact, and cultivate in it the virtues of his station, and look after its spiritual wants even as he looks after his bodily wants. When he gives his skill, his strength of muscle, the fruit of his intellectual labors for remuneration, he does not barter his soul. That is not in the market. Indeed, it is not man's to dispose of.

"Life on earth, however good and desirable in itself, is not the final purpose for which man is created; it is only the way and the means to that attainment of truth and that practice of goodness in which the full life of the soul consists. It is the soul which is made after the image and likeness of God; it is in the soul that sovereignty resides, in virtue of which man is commanded to rule the creatures below him, and to use all the earth and the ocean for his profit and advantage. . . . No man may outrage with impunity that human dignity which God Himself treats with reverence, nor stand in the way of the higher life which is the preparation for the eternal life of heaven. Nay, more; a man has no power over himself. To consent to any treatment which is calculated to defeat the end and purpose of his being is beyond his right; he cannot give up his soul to servitude, for it is not man's own rights which are here in question, but the rights of God, most sacred and inviolable." †

Noble words these, worthy of the great Pontiff and befitting the dignity of man. They are words that should be engraved on every human heart. The workman who embarks in any species of labor in which his soul is utterly neglected or ignored is doing himself a great injustice. He is overlooking one of his most imperative duties.

7. The workingman has the right to combine. It is a right that he holds in fee-simple. The state, in interfering with this right, when the object of combining is good, just, and in

* Encycl., § 24. † Ibid., § 43.

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no wise a danger to the public weal, is transgressing its natural bounds. "All-embracing state functions," says Mr. Herbert Spencer, "characterize a low social type, and progress to a higher social type is marked by relinquishments of functions." * Man's rights—the rights of all society—"do not," in the words of the same author, "exist by authority of the state; but the state exists as a means of preserving them." † And therefore the Holy Father, reasoning on this very principle, says with no less force than aptness,—

"Particular societies, although they exist within the state, and are each a part of the state, nevertheless cannot be prohibited by the state absolutely as such. For to enter into 'society' of this kind is the natural right of man, and the state must protect natural rights, not destroy them; and if it forbids its citizens to form associations, it contradicts the very principle of its own existence; for both they and it exist in virtue of the same principle,—viz., the natural propensity of man to live in society." ‡

And yet, plain as the principle is, the history of all associations is one of struggle for proper recognition by the state. Look at the trades' unions in England. It was only in 1824 that they obtained release from state trammels and liberty to combine for mutual protection and advancement.§

IV.

These rights determine the relations of capital to labor. They imply certain claims on the part of the employed and certain duties and responsibilities on the part of the employer. The underlying principle determining these relations—the principle on the lines of which the whole Encyclical is planned—is this: That the workingman gives not only the skill and industry of his hands, for which he receives wages, but he gives a definite portion of his life as well, for which there is no stipulated compensation. And yet, this strain upon life is an essential factor, without which there can be no proper adjustment of the relations of labor and capital. It is a factor

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* "Justice," p. 230. † Ibid., p. 222. ‡ Encycl., § 55.

§ 5 Geo. iv. 95. See George Howell: "The Conflicts of Labor and Capital," p. 126.

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that is of vital importance to society and the race. A certain portion of the wage-earner's life goes with the energy he throws into his work; a certain portion, also, of that life is renewed in his children. Upon the employer rests the responsibility of compensating for the life-strain in the only manner in which it can be done,—namely, by taking cognizance of the family and imparting to the home the proper degree of comfort. There is not simply question of the man whose life is being coined into capital; there is question of the whole rising generation; there is question of the well-being of society and the future of the human race. Children who become stunted through unwholesome and insufficient food and lack of proper clothing are not likely to become the progenitors of a robust generation.

1. The employer, therefore, in the interests of society, is bound in duty to so compensate the wage-earner as to enable him to bring up his family in comfort and decency. Here state interference is at times permissible, and even at times urgent as an act of self-preservation. A father rears children not for himself, but for the social body. It is a matter intimately concerning the common weal that these children be well cared for, morally and intellectually as well as physically.

"Justice demands that the interests of the poorer population be carefully watched over by the administration, so that they who contribute so largely to the advantage of the community may themselves share in the benefits they create, —that being housed, clothed, and enabled to support life, they may find their existence less hard and more endurable. It follows that whatever shall appear to be conducive to the well-being of those who work should receive favorable consideration. Let it not be feared that solicitude of this kind will injure any interest; on the contrary, it will be to the advantage of all; for it cannot but be good for the commonwealth to secure from misery those on whom it so largely depends." *

Far into the future, at least for many years to come, there will continue a struggle on the part of the workingman to secure the highest possible wages, and on the part of the

* Encycl., § 37.

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employer to get his work done at the lowest possible cost. Times and seasons and circumstances regulate the price of labor. Other things being equal, it may be said that with increasing skill and expertness there must needs follow an increase in wages. But other things are seldom equal; they are a variable quantity, and among them may be mentioned the condition of the market, the relations of supply and demand, the competition of capital and the competition of labor. A constant quantity entering into the problem is the principle that every want which is satisfied creates other wants which remain to be satisfied. However, let wages vary as they may, it is no less important that there be a minimum beyond which the price of labor should not sink. And though the state cannot determine what that minimum should be, the state can see to it that, in all arbitrations between workingmen and employers, the weaker is protected against unjust encroachments upon his rights by the stronger.

2. There are other responsibilities which the Encyclical would not have the employers ignore. The workman is not a slave; still less is he a mere animal. He has a will ever craving for the good, an intellect ever thirsting for knowledge, a soul with spiritual aspirations. He is religious as well as rational. He has a spiritual life to be sustained, a spiritual sense to be cultivated, vices to be eradicated, virtues to be fostered, evil inclinations to be overcome, a God to worship, and religious duties to practise. "The right to profess beliefs of the religious class," says Mr. Herbert Spencer, "has for its concomitant the right to manifest such beliefs in acts of worship."* This manifestation requires times and seasons at the disposal of the workman. It is a sacred right which God sanctions for all.

"Whence follows the obligation of the cessation of work and labor on Sundays and certain festivals. This rest from labor is not to be understood as mere idleness, much less must it be an occasion of spending money out of vicious excess, as many would desire it to be; but it should be rest from labor consecrated by religion. Repose united with religious observance disposes man to

* "Justice," p. 137.

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forget for a while the business of this daily life, and to turn his thoughts to heavenly things and to the worship which he so strictly owes to the Eternal Deity. It is this, above all, which is the reason and motive of the Sunday rest,—a rest sanctioned by God's great law of the ancient covenant, 'Remember thou keep holy the Sabbath Day,' and taught to the world by His own mysterious 'rest' after the creation of man: 'He rested on the seventh day from all His work which He had done.'" *

The renewal of strength of body and peace of soul that accompanies the Sunday rest, when that rest is taken in the proper religious spirit, is a great boon for the man who has been in a constant strain of mind and body during the other six days of the week. In pleading for the Sunday's rest the Holy Father is also pleading for the prolongation of life as well as the strengthening of soul and consequent development of character.

3. In the relations between the workman and his employer there enter other considerations that cannot be ignored. For instance, there is a limit to the workman's power of endurance. He should not any day exhaust more of his muscle, or brain, or bodily strength than the night's rest and the daily food he takes are capable of restoring. Here the Encyclical is forcible and to the point:

"It is neither justice nor humanity so to grind men down with excessive labor as to stupefy their minds and wear out their bodies. Man's powers, like his general nature, are limited, and beyond these limits he cannot go. His strength is developed and increased by use and exercise, but only on condition of due intermission and proper rest. Daily labor, therefore, must be so regulated that it may not be protracted during longer hours than strength admits." †

These words place at hand a primary principle that should be employed in determining the hours of labor. Any species of work that exhausts a man's energies beyond the power of recuperation is inhuman. It forces him to premature death as effectively as disease or accident. Here the venerable Pontiff enters into details that reveal a careful study of the question. He tells us:

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* Encycl., § 44. † Ibid., § 45.

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"How many and how long the intervals of rest should be, will depend on the nature of the work, on circumstances of time and place, and on the health and strength of the workman. Those who labor in mines and quarries, and in work within the bowels of the earth, should have shorter hours in proportion as their labor is more severe and more trying to health. Then, again, the season of the year must be taken into account; for not unfrequently a kind of labor is easy at one time which at another is intolerable or very difficult. Finally, work which is suitable for a strong man cannot reasonably be required from a woman or a child." *

And so, there can be no cast-iron rule determining the number of hours for work. The number that might be too exhausting for one kind of labor would scarcely suffice for another. Some trades and occupations might in justice call for an eight-hour law, while with others that measure of time would be inadequate for a day's work.

There are many reasons besides wear and tear of muscle that call for shorter hours. The horse and the ox claim food and rest on the same ground. Man is of social instincts, and there are many social duties which he should have time and opportunity to discharge. He should be in position to cultivate the social virtues. His family has a paramount claim on his time and attention. Look into the life of the ordinary workingman who leaves his home before sunrise, and returns late in the evening, fagged out, glad if he can take a hasty supper and retire to his much-needed rest for the night, having scarcely time to receive the greetings of his little ones, and far too fatigued to enjoy their company. Is this the life that a Christian father of family should lead? How can he thus become acquainted with his children, and learn their peculiarities of temper and character and the degree of their mental endowments? Moreover, the workingman owes it to himself to improve his condition not only in material and social concerns, but intellectually as well. This is a reading age, and in proportion as the workingman becomes better instructed does he require more enlightened direction. Undoubtedly a more perfect order of society will take into account his intellectual and moral wants as well as his physical wants. Even

* Encycl., § 45.

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at the present day, companies and corporations which have his well-being at heart have established reading-rooms and night-schools for his instruction and improvement. And the fact that man has so many other claims than the supplying of his purely physical wants, gives motive and meaning to the clamor for shorter hours and higher wages that goes forth from every quarter of the globe.

4. But if this progressive tendency which the workingman feels is to become a reality there must be co-operation on the part of his employers. The workingman cannot better his condition by his own unaided efforts. Wherever large manufactories exist, the whole social basis is changed. The nature of this change I can best express in the language of one who gave many years to the study of this question in all its bearings. M. Louis Reybaud has noticed a twofold result of large factories: "On the one hand, the domestic hearth becomes deserted and the family spirit weakened; and on the other hand, a whole class becomes enrolled under a new condition of things, which industry has created and which it develops unceasingly; the head of the family becomes in a measure supplanted by the head of the establishment, and by degrees and by the very nature and force of things authority and responsibility shift. This is a grave situation." * It is a situation that capitalists dare shirk, only at the risk of their very existence as capitalists. The instinct of self-preservation, if no higher motive, should impel them to assume the responsibility.

V.

And now we come to the means by which the Pope would ameliorate the condition of the workingman. Acting in accord with the uniform policy of the Church, he is far from proposing any radical measures that would tend to revolutionize society, or for which this age is not prepared. In the future other ideas may prevail, other social conditions may exist, other grievances may be rampant, and these things

* "Études sur la Régime des Manufactures," Paris, 1859. Condition des Ouvriers en Soie. Introd. iv.

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may call for other kinds of remedies. Should such conditions exist, the Church will be prepared to meet them. The Holy Father takes the existing state of things as it is, and shows how that state may be bettered to the advantage of both rich and poor. He cannot do away with poverty; he cannot destroy all difference and distinction between the rich and the poor, the strong and the weak, the energetic and the indolent; he cannot suppress crime and injustice. He can only show the manner in which poverty may be diminished, and the poor may become more content and happy; the manner in which injustice may be lessened, and charity may the more abound.

1. First, and above all other means, the Holy Father places the religious influence of the Church.

"The Church does its utmost to teach and train men, and to educate them; and by means of its bishops and clergy it diffuses its salutary teachings far and wide. It strives to influence the mind and heart so that all may willingly yield themselves to be formed and guided by the commandments of God." *

To the rich the Church counsels sympathy and charity and abundant almsgiving towards the poor.

"Whoever has received from the Divine bounty a large share of blessings, whether they be external and corporeal or gifts of the mind, has received them for the purpose of using them for the perfecting of his own nature, and at the same time that he may employ them, as the minister of God's providence, for the benefit of others. 'He that hath a talent,' says St. Gregory the Great, 'let him see that he hide it not; he that hath abundance, let him arouse himself to mercy and generosity; he that hath art and skill, let him do his best to share the use and utility thereof with his neighbor.'" †

Upon the poor and the destitute the Encyclical would impress the dignity of labor; that virtue and not riches constitutes worth; and that through patience and resignation under the trials and difficulties of life runs the road to happiness. Says the Holy Father:

"Christian morality, when it is adequately and completely practised, conduces of itself to temporal prosperity, for it merits the blessing of that God who is the

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* Encycl., § 28. † Ibid., § 24.

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source of all blessings; it powerfully restrains the lust of possession and the lust of pleasure,—twin plagues, which too often make a man without self-restraint miserable in the midst of abundance; it makes men supply, by economy, for the want of means, teaching them to be content with frugal living, and keeping them out of the reach of those vices which eat up not merely small incomes, but large fortunes, and dissipate many a goodly inheritance." *

This is not dogmatism; it is simply the assertion of fact, based upon the experience of ages. "During those epochs," says Le Play, "that marked the prosperity of our race, the moral law as formulated in the Decalogue, and interpreted by the Gospel, gave well-being to the individual and peace to society." †

Therefore does the Encyclical encourage the exercise of charity towards the poor, and discriminate in favor of true Christian charity as against organized state aid:

"No human methods will ever supply for the devotion and self-sacrifice of Christian charity. Charity as a virtue belongs to the Church; for it is no virtue unless it is drawn from the sacred heart of Jesus Christ; and he who turns his back on the Church cannot be near to Christ." ‡

It is this charity that has inspired men and women to abandon home and kin that they might devote themselves under the guidance of the Church, among every people, embracing all in a bond of universal brotherhood. The state, like Sir Launfal in the morning of life, may toss that "gruesome thing," poor, ragged, leprous humanity, a piece of gold in scorn, but it is not the charity that brings God's blessing with it. True religious charity is the same Sir Launfal, his heart touched with pity, beholding, in the beggar who has endured the world's buffets and scorns, the image of Him who was poor in life and died on a cross in His love for man, sharing with that beggar his single crust, and breaking for him the ice on the streamlet's brink.

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* Encycl., § 30.

† "La Reforme Sociale en France," 1878, t. iv. p. 3.

‡ Encycl., § 32.

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"Not what we give, but what we share—
For the gift without the giver is bare;
Who gives himself with his alms feeds three—
Himself, his hungering neighbor, and Me."

2. But the Holy Father, in his desire to make the world better, also recognizes the necessity of employing human agencies. He next proposes that the state step in and protect the interests of the laboring classes against any condition of things by which life, health, or morals were imperilled.

"It is only by the labor of the workingman that states grow rich. Justice, therefore, demands that the interests of the poorer population be carefully watched over by the administration, so that they who contribute so largely to the advantage of the community may themselves share in the benefits they create—that being housed, clothed, and enabled to support life, they may find their existence less hard and more endurable." *

Farther on, he enters into details concerning those things in which state interference may be well taken:

"If by a strike, or other combination of workmen, there should be imminent danger of disturbance to the public peace, or if circumstances were such that among the laboring population the ties of family were relaxed; if religion were found to suffer through the workmen not having time and opportunity to practise it; if in workshops and factories there were danger to morals through the mixing of the sexes or from any occasion of evil; or if employers laid burdens upon the workmen which were unjust, or degraded them with conditions that were repugnant to their dignity as human beings; finally, if health were endangered by excessive labor or by work unsuited to sex or age,—in these cases there can be no question that, within certain limits, it would be right to call in the help and authority of the law. The limits must be determined by the nature of the occasion which calls for the law's interference,—the principle being this, that the law must not undertake more, or go further, than is required for the remedy of the evil, or the removal of the danger." †

These are all cases calling for state legislation. Without legislation, individual capitalists, in their efforts to reform the communities they control, might be seriously placing themselves at a disadvantage with their competitors. Placing all competitors on the same plane, legislation at the same time protects the individual against monopolies; and in so far as

* Encycl., § 37. † Ibid., § 39.

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it achieves this is it a good. The cautiousness with which the Holy Father limits and hedges in state interference is noteworthy. Personal rights are not to be infringed. Men are to retain liberty of action.

On the other hand, the trades' unions and the labor associations can aid the state considerably by advising the kind of legislation required as regards the manifold relations of capital and labor. It is thus that the Trade Union Congress of England has its Parliamentary Committee to watch over the interests of labor in Parliament. That committee represents over two millions of workmen. It has been of great assistance in producing legislative measures that were practical and easy of application for the reason that they were drawn up or recommended by men who knew where lay the real seat of the evil that was to be remedied. Heretofore the rich man has been the sole legislator, and as a rule he has legislated in his own behalf.

3. Another remedy the Holy Father suggests is organizing into associations. But His Holiness distinguishes between associations that are bound by secret oaths and led by invisible leaders and associations that are based upon Christian principles, accompanied by Christian practices, and as solicitous for the well-being of the soul as for the well-being of the body.

"Speaking summarily, we may lay it down as a general and perpetual law that workmen's associations should be so organized and governed as to furnish the best and most suitable means for attaining what is aimed at,—that is to say, for helping each individual member to better his condition to the utmost in body, mind, and property. It is clear that they must pay special and principal attention to piety and morality, and that their internal discipline must be directed precisely by these considerations; otherwise they entirely lose their special character, and come to be very little better than those societies which take no account of religion at all." *

Having laid the foundation of all organization in religion, the Holy Father next counsels the formation of Catholic societies for the benefit and protection of the Catholic work-

* Encycl., § 61.

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ingman. In France, Austria, Germany, and Belgium there are such Catholic organizations, powerful and wide-spread in their influence, in which the mutual support of the members extends to their spiritual concerns. In the United States labor has been organized upon lines independent of creed or nationality.

These counsels of the Holy Father may be called socialism. Be the name what it may, certain it is that His Holiness is commending only the legitimate use of a natural right. The workmen's associations can become a great power for evil as well as for good. Organized labor is the only means of protection of the poor against the organized capital of the rich. It gives the inferior workman a chance to live. Looking the subject full in the face, we are forced to admit that it involves many issues which are apparently contradictory. Organized labor, for instance, destroys competition, and in destroying competition it depreciates the value of skilled labor. Again, organized labor coerces, and anything like coercion easily becomes injustice. Now, the man who remains outside the association is liable to persecution. It is natural that the non-union workingman should receive but slight consideration at the hands of his union brother, for he is practically reaping the benefits of the union without contributing to its support. He indirectly and to a certain extent enjoys its protection. Furthermore, not infrequently do labor associations become despotic and interfere to the extent of attempting to direct as regards ways and means, and even the very course of industry, to the ruin of respectable firms. Such acts terminate in grave injustice. And though associations, like individuals, may discriminate in a spirit of self-protection, they must always be prepared to give others the liberty of action that they claim for themselves.

Thus does a delicate system of action and interaction run through the principle of combination. It is a system that calls for forethought and moderation. It is not in itself a complete remedy for the evils under which the workingman suffers, nor is it a solution of all the issues of industrialism. "It is not contended," says Mr. George Howell, "that trade-

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unions are capable of solving the great industrial questions which agitate the public mind. Their work is at best only a temporary expedient for dealing with labor questions as they arise."* And Le Play assures us that in the midst of its various transformations, the problem that organized labor has to solve is always the same,—namely, "to establish the security of the workingman upon the permanence of labor."† This is why the Holy Father, in asserting the new methods of reform and social regeneration, does not lose sight of the old methods by which communities have grown and strengthened in the ways of civilization.

"If society is to be cured now, in no other way can it be cured but by a return to the Christian life and Christian institutions. When a society is perishing, the true advice to give to those who would restore it is, to recall it to the principles from which it sprung; for the purpose and perfection of an association is to aim at and to attain that for which it was formed, and its operation should be put in motion and inspired by the end and object which originally gave it its being. So that to fall away from its primal constitution is disease; to go back to it is recovery." ‡

4. While recognizing the fact that, under the present strained relations between organized capital and organized labor, strikes must needs occur, the Holy Father does not counsel them. And yet strikes have been hitherto considered the right arm of workingmen's associations. But the world has had ample demonstration that the tendency of strikes is invariably towards destruction. They entail untold misery and suffering and loss of property. Their paralyzing effects are far-reaching. It is always a matter of deep public concern to see that they are speedily ended. Instead of strikes the Holy Father would substitute arbitration and co-operation:

"If it should happen that either a master or a workman deemed himself injured, nothing would be more desirable than that there should be a committee composed of honest and capable men of the association itself, whose duty it should be, by the laws of the association, to decide the dispute." §

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* See Mr. Howell's recent work, "Trade-Unionism, New and Old."

† "La Reforme Sociale en France," t. iii. p. 15.

‡ Encycl., § 29. § Ibid., § 62.

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He would have amicable settlement, conducted in a Christian spirit. He would have every association self-supporting, self-protecting, and promotive of the general good.

"Among the purposes of a society should be to try to arrange for a continuous supply of work at all times and seasons; and to create a fund from which the members may be helped in their necessities, not only in cases of accident, but also in sickness, old age, and misfortune." *

Associations have no meaning, no definite reason for their existence, unless they be such as are here described. There is here no place for exorbitant demands, or clamor for the destruction of some industries that others may flourish, or of what Mr. Herbert Spencer calls "encouragement of the delusion that it only requires union for workers to get what terms they please, prompting suicidal demands." † Undoubtedly that were a more perfect state of affairs in which the workman needed no associations, and in which all was harmony between the employer and the employed. But such is not the state now existing. And so, as Mr. Thornton has well shown in his ably-written book, the workingman's associations have come to stay, and are to be reckoned with in the immediate future. ‡ Greed for gain may be modified and injustice may be diminished, but while human nature remains human nature neither greed nor injustice can be wholly crushed out. Only the associations organized on principles of equity and Christian charity will be of lasting benefit to the workman. Such are the associations recommended and encouraged in the Encyclical.

BROTHER AZARIAS.

NEW YORK.

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* Encycl., § 62. † "Justice," p. 245.

‡ See "On Labor," by William T. Thornton, Book iii. pp. 187–362.

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THE THREE RELIGIONS.*

I AM afraid the title of this lecture is not so ethical in some respects as it ought to be. The first principle of ethics, I suppose, with regard to human speech, is that what we say (it being presupposed that what we say is worth saying at all), should be expressed in plain and intelligible language. Now, it is certainly not very clear what is to be understood by "the three religions." You will naturally ask, *Which* three? For indeed there have been almost as many religions in the world as there have been men. Perhaps in one sense there have been precisely as many. Perhaps every one of us has his own peculiar idea of what is most precious and most worthy to be pursued—his own standard of worship or worthship. What we worship is the counterpart of what we are; and hence, instead of saying that there have been three religions, there may be a sense in which it would be truer to say that there have been several millions of millions. And even if we set aside the vagaries of individual caprice, and consider only those objects of devotion by the thought of which large bodies of men have been inspired, the gods of the nations instead of the gods of individual fancy—those gods whom, as Goethe tells us, the poets have brought down among men, and to whose image the poets have, in some degree, helped mankind to rise—even if, I say, we confine our attention to such gods as these, who, in contrast with the more perishable ideals of individual minds, may not untruly be described as *immortal* gods; still, we cannot but be struck with the multiplicity of the deities whom men have worshipped, and the multiplicity of the forms in which men have worshipped them. Diversities of religion

* A lecture delivered under the auspices of the London Ethical Society, in Essex Hall, in February, 1891. After this lecture was written, I discovered that an article with a very similar title ("The Two Religions"), by Miss Frances Power Cobbe, had appeared in the *Contemporary Review* for December, 1890. The principle of division adopted in that article is the same as mine; but otherwise there is very little resemblance between the article and the lecture.

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have separated race from race by a more impassable gulf than that of language or of color; they have deluged the world with blood, and roused more bitter passions than the lust of gain or glory or power, or perhaps even the thirst for liberty, could excite. Not three religions, therefore, we are inclined to say, but three thousand or three millions rather.

That is one way of looking at the matter; and it is often a profitable way. Bacon has taught us that we are always in danger of imagining more unity in the world than there is. Such a word as "Religion" satisfies our minds, and we forget that it is used to cover things as far apart as Fetichism, the Salvation Army, and the Worship of Humanity. It is right that we should recognize this danger of resting content with a label. If no two leaves in a forest are quite alike, we can hardly expect that two human heads or two human hearts will perfectly harmonize in their ideals and aspirations. Yet, after all, we are all very much alike; or, at any rate, like the leaves in the forest, our thoughts can be brought under a few main varieties. And indeed it may help us even to understand our differences more clearly if we consider for a little what are the main principles of unity that underlie them.

In dealing with this subject during the few minutes that we have at our disposal, I shall make no pretence of discovering the mode of treatment which is ultimately right or best. It will be enough if we can find some point of view from which the matter may be instructively regarded, and which shall not be altogether untrue. An attempt to do more than this would be sure to be more tedious, and would not be sure to bring us any nearer to the truth. You are to understand, then, distinctly, that what I am about to say is merely given as expressing a point of view which I trust may prove suggestive, but for which I claim no particular merit or final validity.

There is a passage in Kant which has been often quoted,—almost the only passage that ever is quoted from the works of this writer, commonly supposed to be almost supernaturally obscure,—in which he says:*

* "Critique of Practical Reason" (conclusion).

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Two things fill our minds with increasing wonder and reverence, the oftener and the more closely we study them: *the starry heavens above and the moral law within*. . . . The former begins from the spot I occupy in the outer world of sense, and gives to my environment in that world an unbounded expanse, bringing me into relation with worlds upon worlds and systems of systems, revolving periodically throughout an infinity of time. The latter (the moral law), on the other hand, begins from my inner self, my personality, and places me in relation to a world which is in a deeper sense infinite, but which is discoverable only by thought, and with which I perceive that my connection is not merely contingent, but universal and necessary. . . . The former view of a countless multitude of worlds annihilates, as it were, my importance as an *animal creature*, which, after life has been for a short time breathed into it, one knows not how, has to give back the matter of which it was made to the planet it inhabits (itself a mere speck in the universe of being). The second view, on the contrary, elevates my worth as an intelligence in an infinite degree, by means of my personality, wherein the moral law sets before me a life that is not dependent on my animal nature, or indeed on the sensible world at all; since that law imposes on me a mission which is not conditioned by the limits of this life, but is in a true sense infinite.

These, then, are the two things that seemed to Kant most worthy of reverence—the infinity of nature and the infinity of the moral ideal. Now, it seems to me that there is a true and instructive sense in which it may be maintained that these are also the two things that mankind in general have found worthy of reverence—these two separately, or else some combination of the two. The worship of these two separately, therefore, and the worship of them in combination, may be said to be the three great religions of the world. At any rate, rightly or wrongly, it is this view of religion that (for lack of a better) I wish to illustrate to-night.

Perhaps the contrast between these three forms of worship could not be better brought out than by a comparison of what we may call the two cultured or sophisticated religions with the one popular religion which we find among ourselves at the present moment. The popular religion is, of course, Christianity; while by the cultured or sophisticated religions I mean Agnosticism and the Worship of Humanity. The juxtaposition of these three may seem strange. Agnostics and Humanitarians are very superior people, who may perhaps resent being classed along with mere Christians. Some Christians, again, may think that if Agnostics and Humanitarians are to be called religious, they would prefer to stand out of the list.

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Agnostics and Humanitarians, too, have sometimes a way of denying each other's right to be regarded as having a religion at all. And certainly it seems to me that, in these latter cases, the two elements of worship have been so completely severed from each other that reverence has become almost an impossibility. Neither "cosmic emotion" nor "enthusiasm of humanity" seems to be of itself sufficient for a religion. But it is just this abstract character, which these two religions possess, that makes them so instructive for our present purpose. What the Agnostic reverences, or thinks he ought to try to reverence, is the unknown power that is at work in all the processes of nature. What the Humanitarian reverences is the moral power that is at work in the history of human development. The Christian, on the other hand, reverences a power that is at work both in nature and in the moral life, a power that is at once known and unknown—known by its revelation in nature and in man, unknown in the fulness of its possibilities. His worship may thus be said to be a combination of the other two. Popular Christianity, indeed, does not present such a clear-cut outline as either Agnosticism or the Religion of Humanity. For while the agnostic religion is nothing else than the worship of the Unknown, and the religion of humanity is in its essence nothing else than the worship of the moral power in man (though it adds, on account of the hardness of men's hearts, an artificially fostered reverence for the earth, for space, and the like); popular Christianity, on the other hand, in combining these two elements, seems to combine along with them a great deal of what has been called "extra belief." Nevertheless, I am inclined to think that, if you omit from popular Christianity the merely dogmatic elements, on which the churches are divided, the merely sensational elements, which are differently apprehended by men of different temperaments, and the merely traditional elements, which have apparently no religious significance whatever; and if you consider only those great inspiring ideas on which the power of Christianity for so many centuries has rested, you will find that it is at bottom little, if anything, more than a combination of those two elements

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which Agnosticism and Humanitarianism have taken apart. That it is so, indeed, is perhaps sufficiently apparent from the ease with which both agnostic and humanitarian writers—when they wish to commend themselves to men's minds by their relations to the broad movements of history—can represent themselves as simply carrying out with perfect clearness what is dimly contained in the teachings of Christianity. The Agnostics are able to appeal to the fact that what the Christian religion sets up for our reverence is the inexplicable power behind the world that we perceive, "of whom and through whom and to whom are all things;" and they may claim, and frequently do claim, that what they have done is simply to strip this inscrutable power of those anthropomorphic attributes with which the fears and hopes of men had clothed it. The Humanitarians, in like manner, may—and sometimes do—point out that the Christian religion has been essentially a moral force for the amelioration of mankind, that its strength has all along lain in a certain enthusiasm of philanthropy, which breaks down the barriers of class and race, and gives rise to new ideals of life and society; and they may hold that what Humanitarianism does is simply to make these ideals clearer, and to rest them on a more scientific basis. And it certainly seems to me that there is much truth in these contentions both of the Agnostics and of the Humanitarians—though perhaps they are not quite so scientific in their reconstructions of religion as they like to think themselves. But what is apt to be overlooked by each side is the fact that Christianity has from the first contained *both* these elements at once; and that it is largely by the combination of them that it has been able to achieve so far-reaching a success.

It is not, however, on Christianity in particular that I wish at present to speak, though I intend to return by and by to that subject. I desire rather, in the mean time, to point out that these two elements to which I have referred belong to the essence of all true religion. I am inclined to think—and I intend to recur to this point shortly—that they are brought out more clearly in Christianity than in any other form of religion that has ever been widely influential; and I think it is to that fact

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very largely—though, I admit, partly also to more accidental circumstances—that Christianity has owed its remarkable prevalence and persistence throughout the history of the most cultured of modern nations. But in all religions worthy of the name I believe you will find that there is a more or less clear presence, though often hidden under strange disguises, of these two fundamental elements of which I have spoken—reverence for the power (or powers) from which all things flow, and reverence for the moral ideal.

Perhaps some of you may think that two of the expressions that I have just used,—"all true religions" and "all religions worthy of the name,"—are "question-begging phrases." You may think that they afford me a convenient method of making my theory fit, by simply affirming that those religions to which it will not apply are not "true religions," or are not "worthy of the name." And I must confess that I cannot undertake to tell you beforehand what I mean by a true religion or by one worthy of the name, or indeed what I mean by religion at all. The very definition of the term is a vexed question, upon which I have no intention of entering. You must remember that in what I say to-night I am not on my oath, and that I do not pretend to enter into minute distinctions or subtle definitions. I must content myself with saying, broadly and roughly, that I endeavor to use the term "religion" in the sense in which it is commonly current, to denote certain beliefs, feelings, and ceremonials connected with those objects which are regarded as the highest and deepest with which it is possible for mankind to deal; and that, when I speak of a "true religion" or one "worthy of the name," I mean a religion which is not simply founded on superstitious terror (for I think a religion must be a *reverence* and not merely a *fear*); I mean also a religion which is not simply a piece of poetic fancy or of philosophical theorizing, but one which large masses of men have carried with them into the ordinary affairs of life, which they have felt, in their soberest hours, to be as real as the sternest of life's realities, which has served, at least in some considerable degree, to furnish them with strength in labor, ardor in progress, courage in difficulty, consolation in trouble,

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or hope in death. Using the term with this large and somewhat vague interpretation, I intend to glance very cursorily* at some of the leading religions that have been current in the world, and to try to show in what sense the two elements to which I have referred have been present in them.

Let us begin, for instance, with the religion of the Greeks. The Greeks—*i.e.*, the Athenians, who are for us the typical Greeks—were not on the whole a nation of intensely earnest men, at least not in the sense of having strenuous moral convictions. Their life was, indeed, in its best days too free and happy for the intrusion of any such subduing presence. They had not that absorbing sense of the supreme importance of righteousness or justice, which is the key-note in the life of the Hebrews, nor had they even that stern recognition of law and order, to which at all costs the will of the individual must be subjected, which is so characteristic of the attitude of the Romans. The central element in the Greek consciousness was rather æsthetical than ethical. Artistic beauty stood with them on the whole for the highest that they knew. Even in their moral life, indeed, they were not conscious of any higher motive than that of the performance of what is right, as they said, "for the beauty of it,"—τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα,—which is, no doubt, in a sense, the highest motive that is possible; but it is the highest motive expressed rather in an æsthetical than in an ethical form. Every Greek would have been ready to follow Mr. Ruskin in his identification of morality and taste; only, while Mr. Ruskin tends on the whole to regard taste as a particular exemplification of the moral law, a Greek might rather have regarded the moral law as a particular application of the principles of good taste. The worship of the Greeks also was the worship of beauty. It might seem, therefore, as if our very first instance went against the view that I am seeking to maintain. The reverence of the Greeks can hardly be said to have been directly a reverence either for natural power

* As here printed, this "glance" has become still more cursory than it was in the lecture as originally given. On the other hand, some slight additions have been made in other portions of the treatment.

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or for the moral ideal;* it was rather the reverence for what is beautiful, whether in nature or in human life. Such an exception as this, however, is, I think, only of that kind which is said to confirm the general rule. For, in a sense, as I have already indicated, beauty *was* the moral ideal of the Greeks; it was the highest perception that they had; it was that for the sake of which, in its noblest forms, they conceived that everything else ought to be sacrificed. In a sense, also, they tended to identify beauty or harmony—as we see in most of their great philosophers—with the principle that is deepest and most powerful in nature. In their most developed thought it was nearly always supposed that it was some principle of order or harmony that ruled the world. Still, it must be allowed that, in its more popular forms at least, their worship was not primarily a reverence either for morality or for natural law. But observe further, that just for this reason the Greek religion betrayed its imperfection, and had to be supplemented from other sources. The gods of the Greeks were beautiful symbols of natural and moral forces; but they were not a complete expression either of that which is deepest or of that which is purest in life or in existence. Above the power of the gods, there was the power of Fate;† and above the beauty of the gods, there was the beauty of Justice and of Truth. It was necessary in the end that these deeper realities also should find recognition and reverence. And they did find recognition; though the recognition of them was at the same time the destruction of Greek religion, by bringing out its inherent incompleteness. In Greek tragedy—which is, I suppose, the highest expression of Greek religious feeling—the gods are overborne by Fate; and Plato, who was perhaps the most deeply religious of Greek philosophers, is forced to reject the stories of the gods in the interests of morality. And so it comes about that in the best religious thought of the Greek decline—that thought in which Greece seems to stretch out its hands towards Judæa—a moral power has distinctly taken

* *Cf.*, on this point, Ziegler's "Ethik der Griechen und Römer," pp. 16, *et seq.*

† See Wescott's "Religious Thought in the West," p. 106.

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the place of the ideal of beauty; and that power is recognized also as the strongest, or indeed as the only ultimate, force in nature.*

The Scandinavian divinities seem, so far as I can judge, to be mainly confined to the forces of nature rather than to the powers and ideals of the moral life. It was from this mythology that Carlyle selected his "Hero as God;" but as far as one can gather, even from the statements of Carlyle himself, it does not appear that hero-worship was the most prominent element in their religion. Their deities seem rather to be, for the most part, embodiments of those natural forces which, in a rough climate, and in the midst of wild scenery and modes of life, could not but impress themselves forcibly on the attention of the people. They seem also, to a large extent, to embody metaphysical principles of a rude and simple kind,—the idea of eternity, the continuity and organic nature of life, and so forth. On the whole, therefore, we must say that this religion is mainly concerned with the first of the two elements that I am trying to bring out. Nevertheless, it can hardly be denied that there is a distinct element of hero-worship contained in it in a subordinate way—indeed, in such gods as Woden, in a sufficiently prominent way—and that thus a certain moral ideal is also represented.

In most of the Eastern religions, on the other hand, as became a quieter and more meditative race, the moral qualities tend on the whole to predominate. At the same time, such moral qualities are frequently, if not even usually, thought of as lying at the very foundation of the natural order. The conflict of Ormuzd and Ahriman, for instance, in the Persian mythology, typifying evidently the battle of good with evil, is at the same time understood to sum up the whole struggle of light with darkness, of order with chaos, throughout the field of nature. In Buddhism, too, the ideal consists in the attainment of a certain peace which raises man alike

* Here followed, in the lecture as originally given, two paragraphs—one on Roman religion, and one on the general character of Greek and Roman religion as compared with that of most other peoples—which are now omitted for want of space.

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above the warfare of the passions and the disturbance of the elements. It is primarily the worship of the moral ideal; but it is an ideal which is conceived as being victorious over the troubles of the natural world, as elevating him who attains it above the confusions of the forces of nature, whether displayed without him or within him, "to where beyond these voices there is peace." It is thus a moral religion, but at the same time one which regards morality as strength, as a power which can give man the victory over nature, and raise him to a position of triumphant serenity.

Mohammedanism,* again, seems to start rather from the opposite side. It is primarily a worship of natural power. Its creed may almost be said to be distinctly that might is right, provided we understand by might the power which is ultimately deepest in nature,—which is identified with the will of Allah. At the same time, the will of Allah is, no doubt, usually regarded—implicitly or explicitly—as having a certain intrinsic rightness in itself, and thus as being a moral as well as a natural power.

But I suppose it must be granted that the religious people *par excellence* was the Jewish people; and it is to their religion, accordingly, that we ought to turn with most hope of enlightenment. In this case, we may perceive from the first an intimate combination of the worship of the natural with that of the moral. No people, I suppose, ever had a firmer conviction than the Jews had, that right is might. This faith gives confidence and emphasis to the utterances of nearly all their prophets, among whom one feels almost tempted to include our modern Hebrew, Carlyle. Among the Jews, however,—and in this respect also the modern prophet must be, to some extent, included,—there was frequently a tendency to invert the relation between right and might. There was a tendency at least to regard obvious success as a proof of rightness, and misfortune as an evidence of sin.† For,

* *Cf.* Miss Cobbe's article on "The Two Religions," *Contemporary Review* for December, 1890, p. 844.

† I mean that there was this tendency among the people generally. I do not know that this charge can be brought home to their prophets. In the case of our

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indeed, the Hebrew god, like the gods of many primitive nationalities, seems to have been primarily the god of battle, "the Lord of Hosts," and secondarily, perhaps, the god of thunder and of all other natural might. But in the deeper expressions of the Hebrew genius, in the finest passages of the prophets and the most poetic utterances of the Psalms, morality has the first place,—the moral law being sometimes set forth in its naked purity, with a directness and sublimity which has never been surpassed,—though there is a constant faith also that what is morally right is bound ultimately to become triumphant, together with a frequent sense of disappointment that it is not always obviously so.

It is, however, in the teaching of Christ that the religion of the Jews seems to receive its most perfect consummation. The exact nature of that teaching is, indeed, somewhat difficult to decipher, partly on account of the fragmentary nature of the statements in which it is expressed, partly on account of the questionable authenticity of the documents in which it is recorded, and partly because the early Christians came so early in contact with the thought of Greece and the organization of Rome, by which at last their own peculiar ideas were almost overwhelmed. Perhaps it has never been fully realized how much our modern Christianity is indebted to the Greeks and Romans. We usually think of it as essentially a Hebrew product, and this is, no doubt, fundamentally true. Yet perhaps if we inquired more fully into it we should find that in its more external aspects, at least,—by which also its inner spirit is very considerably modified,—it is almost as much a Greek product or a Roman one. With regard to the influence of Greek thought on Christianity, I may content myself here with a reference to the recently published "Hibbert Lectures" by the late Dr. Hatch, in which the whole subject is worked out in a very interesting and suggestive way. The influence of Roman organization is partly discussed in the same volume, and was wittily summed up long ago by

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modern prophet, I think there is some evidence of an undue worship of effectiveness.

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Hobbes, when he said * that the Church of the Middle Ages was essentially "the ghost of the deceased Roman Empire, sitting crowned upon the grave thereof." And, of course, we must recognize also—especially in Protestant Christianity—the far-reaching influences of the Teutonic genius as well. How much, for instance, of the Christianity which long dominated the better mind of England is summed up in the sublime verse of Milton! And how much of that is but the perfect fruit of ideas which were fostered indeed in the sun of Greece and Rome, but which first blossomed in the Saxon imagination of Caedmon, and which were ripened in the gloom of puritanic struggles! And in countless other ways the Christianity of the modern world has been very strangely transformed indeed from the spirit that breathed in those winged words that were uttered on the hill-sides of Judæa, and that fired the hearts of that primitive ethical society that met in an upper room at Jerusalem. But so far as we can abstract from such transforming influences, and consider Christianity simply as it was in itself when it was first promulgated, I think it is not difficult to see that the essence of it lies in its being a complete carrying out of the Hebrew idea that right is might, and that this right and this might is that which ought alone to be worshipped.

Christ developed, in the first place, both by his doctrine and by his example, the Jewish conception of righteousness itself. He substituted love and self-devotion for the idea of a hard, external law, and thus placed morality at once on the highest basis. I am not, indeed, prepared to say that he gave the final expression of the moral ideal either in his teaching or in his life. His teaching seems to me, as I shall explain in a little, to be in some points too negative and individualistic; and his life also had perhaps, as Hegel put it, "the guilt of innocence" †,—*i.e.*, of withdrawal from the particular concerns of mankind. Still, it cannot be denied that it was at least a great advance on the moral conceptions that were current

* "Leviathan," iv. 47.

† See Caird's "Hegel." (Blackwood's "Philosophical Classics.")

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among the Jews; and that both by his teaching and by his example (so far as we can judge of it from very imperfect evidence) he is likely to stand out pre-eminent to all time as by far the noblest and most characteristic of all "beautiful souls," the sublimest pattern of all the passive virtues, the eternal example of those who strive to keep themselves "unspotted from the world," and to remain faithful to the highest monitions of the "inner life." Whatever further we may *add* to the conception of the perfect life, that at least must be retained. By summing up in that short, intense life of self-devotion to the common good all that was highest in the fervor of Hebrew morality; by raising that morality to a white heat, till all that was narrow and intolerant and provincial in it was melted away in the fire of a universal philanthropy, he made the greatest contribution to *practical religion* —to religion as an ethical force—that perhaps any one man has ever made.

Again, Christ seems to have held with full conviction—what the Jews in general had at most only tried to persuade themselves—that the moral ideal is that which is alone ultimately victorious. It has, indeed, been often said, and not entirely without reason, that Christianity was at bottom pessimistic. Certainly, on the common interpretation of it at least, it does not hold out a very hopeful view with regard to the destiny of the great majority of mankind. And even with regard to the select few, it is only by pain and struggle that any good is to be achieved. Indeed, even pain and struggle may not always avail; for "many shall seek to enter in, and shall not be able." It is not without reason, therefore, that Christianity has been called by Goethe the Religion of Sorrow.* But yet at bottom there was a hopefulness in it

* Miss Cobbe, in her article in the *Contemporary Review* to which reference has already been made (p. 845), points out also that the worship of Christendom has tended to concentrate itself on that moment in the life of Christ (the crucifixion) in which his weakness is most apparent. Christianity might thus be thought to be in no sense a worship of might. But it must be remembered that this moment of supreme weakness has usually been regarded by the religious thought of Christendom as a moment of supreme triumph as well.

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also. There was always a faith in it,—a faith which the founder of it himself seems to have confidently held,—that he who persisted to the end was secure of victory; and that, indeed, the sorrows and difficulties by the way were but the means of securing a more complete success. Bacon had ground, therefore, for saying * that, while "prosperity is the blessing of the Old Testament, adversity is the blessing of the New." Indeed, as Dr. Hatch points out,† there is often an almost offensive obtrusion—due largely to an individualistic point of view—of the trust that for all labor undertaken and suffering endured here, there are abundant "wages" in Heaven. But this is on the whole only a metaphorical way of expressing confidence in the final victory of right—a confidence which is expressed in the same way at the close of Goethe's Masonic Hymn:

> "Here shall all fulness,
> Ye valiant! reward you;
> We bid you be hopeful."‡

I may sum up, then, by saying that Christianity seems to me to embody most clearly the two elements of religion to which I have referred; but that in all true religions they are more or less distinctly present. Religion, in fact, might almost be defined as the refuge of human feeling from the incompleteness of life. We demand poetic justice: we demand that the world of our experience should be a rounded whole, with reason as its ruler and love as its principle. We ask for a system, and we are disappointed and shocked because in our ordinary life we are presented only with a fragment. We ask for an intelligible world, and we are presented with a puzzle. Now, the central problem in the puzzle of life is the separation of power from goodness. As Shelley puts it in "Prometheus Unbound"—

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* *Essays*, "Of Adversity."

† "Hibbert Lectures," p. 224. Cf., also Bosanquet's "Essays and Addresses," p. 109.

‡ On the Optimism of Christianity, I may refer here to "Lux Mundi," p. 479.

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"The good want power, but to shed idle tears;
The powerful goodness want—worse need for them."

The devil is the prince of this world, and the gods are crucified. That, we sometimes feel, is the summing up of the appearances of history. Wrong is might. Religion, then, is the faith that this appearance is not the ultimate truth; that the two great wants—the want of power on the part of goodness, and the want of goodness on the part of power—will prove in the end to be better abundantly supplied: the faith, in short, that the universe has a heart, or that the heart will find for itself a universe.* This faith has, I think, been the soul of all religions, or, at least, of the religions of all thoughtful peoples; but, most of all, it has been the soul of Christianity.

J. S. MACKENZIE.

(To be concluded in the next number.)

THE ETHICS OF HEGEL

A PLUNGE *in medias res* is not the current way in philosophical discussions. The introductory *orientation* is too often a porch out of all proportion to the building. The start is made with giving a *résumé* of Greek thought. Then an easy hop, skip, and jump brings us through early Christian thought and scholasticism to modern philosophy. From Descartes to Kant brings us to what has been considered the heart of modern philosophy. But we go on farther to see that the heart is greatly changed; that the centre has become an all-animating organic life; that subjectivism has become objectivism again, and that we are in a modernized Greek phase of thought. Kant, like Socrates, no longer represents any more than a phase of the larger concrete thought of the world. Seven-league boots would be needed to traverse the distance between

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* *Cf.* Browning's "Epistle from Karshish:

"So, the All-Great were the All-Loving, too——
So, through the thunder comes a human voice
Saying, 'O heart I made, a heart beats here.'"

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Kant and Hegel in ethical conceptions. At first sight there seems rather to be a gulf than a bridge for us to cross. But gulfs and seas, instead of dividing, now serve to unite thoughts as well as countries. Continuity in and through diversity is a regnant conception of Hegelian philosophy. Hegel is said to have burned his bridges behind him. But bridges of thought are incombustible, and it is not difficult to trace the continuity through diversity of Hegel's ethical conceptions with those of Kant. The subject-matter itself will also reveal continuity with Greek conceptions. We must make the transition from Kant to Hegel as brief as it is great and definite. Formulas are as useful as they are inadequate,—often useful because of their inadequateness. The starting-point of both Kant and Hegel is man. But Kant considers the *subjective* Ego, while Hegel considers the *objective* Ego. The categorical imperative upon both was the eternal command, *Γνῶθι σεαυτόν*. They differed chiefly in their conception of the *σεαυτόν*, whose exegesis they attempted. With Kant it was the abstract, subjective self; with Hegel it was the concrete, objective, the completely ethicized or socialized self. Kant lived and labored under the conceptions of the eighteenth century rationalism, which held that reason was innate in every man as a sum total of clear, fixed notions, while Hegel considered reason as an immanent impulse of rationality that was continuously realizing itself in human experience. They both had a metaphysic of ethics. But with Kant this was forever unutterable, with Hegel it had been continually uttering itself in the institutions of man. With one it was formless, with the other it was the continuously self-realizing *Word* that from the beginning was formative of the moral organism of humanity. The one looked solely within, the other looked outward for the self to be studied. With Kant the *res interna* was absolutely supersensible. With Hegel it was expressed in definite and increasingly adequate forms in the *res publica* of the external world of man's activity. Hence he makes his "Philosophy of History" an illustrative exposition of his science of ethics. The State in the most concrete sense of this term is the *σεαυτόν* manifesting itself in temporal condi-

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tions. The history of the world is the tribunal through which man utters the forms of the categorical imperative heard in the supersensible world. Let us say in brief, then, that the difference between Kant and Hegel may be formulated as the difference between an abstract and a concrete σεαυτόν

Hegel never ceased to inveigh against the vice of abstractness. His whole work consists in starting from, criticising, and passing beyond various abstract conceptions to a real concrete in which alone they find their place as organic phases or members. That which is true relatively to its correlate is false when abstracted from its correlate. And both correlates are true only when they pass through this category of reciprocity to the organism which they both imply and demonstrate. The empirical and the noumenal self; the pure reason and the practical reason; subjective freedom and conditioning environment; duty and the good,—these are some of the elements of ethical man that Kant abstracted from their organic process, wherewith to build his airy castle of morality. Abstractions, every one of them, says Hegel, who endeavors to lead through them to the more concrete view. We may, however, select two terms which will illustrate the difference between Kant and Hegel in ethics,—*i.e.*, *Moralität* and *Sittlichkeit*, both of which are used by the Germans for what we call morality. The first denotes the morality of the heart or of the conscience. The latter denotes conventional morality, or the objective customs that are recognized as moral (ἠθικά, *mores*, *Sitten*). The first is the individual conscience, the second is the social conscience. Hegel would say that there would be no *Moralität* without *Sittlichkeit*, while Kant, with his categorical imperative, would make each individual an *Athanasius contra mundum*. Hegel would say that there could be no duty without some objective good as content for the formal good-will. That is, there can be no abstract self-realization by the conscientious man, no good-will without good manners. To realize himself the individual must do it in the forms of social man, must go beyond himself to be himself. He must erect himself above himself and expand himself beyond himself in his actualizing of his good-

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will. Only in the objective forms of his station can he find his duties. Otherwise his morality is sure to be peevish, cranky, and tyrannical, though, as a Simon Stylites, he may write the title of saint before his name. Hegel makes most trenchant criticisms * of Kant's formal law, showing that as an abstract universal it can neither suggest any particular duties nor test the rightness of rules otherwise suggested. It can only be a voice thundering in the inner Sinai, "thou shalt," without power to proceed to decalogic or monologic specification of what to do. Only an objective standard of right can afford the ground of private judgment and render it other than mere wilfulness. Pythagoras had this in view when he said that the best education one could desire for his son would be to have him be a citizen of a people with good institutions. On the other hand, such good institutions are impossible without the element of *Moralität*. Society does not exist apart from the individual. It is rather an organism of organisms, whose *Sittlichkeit* expresses the immanent *Moralität* of its people. It exists in and through the life of its members. Hegel's conception combated both an abstract individualism and an abstract societarianism. His ethics are the result of the organically related elements of *Moralität* and *Sittlichkeit*, as the very life of the most concrete form of the self or man,—*i.e.*, the State. It is the science of this body politic in its movement of self-realization, in which also the individual realizes himself, because its realization is what he must enter into in order to be what he ought to be. Further contrasts, however, would be better exhibited in the course of an exposition and criticism of Hegel's own ethical theory. We propose a brief expository statement of Hegel's doctrine.

Hegel's doctrine is found chiefly in his "Philosophie des Rechts," which is an enlarged exposition of the second part of his "Philosophie des Geistes." With this goes as an interpreting sequel his "Philosophy of History." We shall also find additional exposition of various points in his "Phænomenologie des Geistes."

* Hegel's *Werke*, i. 313, referred to by Professor Caird, "The Philosophy of Kant," ii. 186.

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I may take it for granted that enough readers of this Journal are not familiar with Hegel's own work to warrant a restatement of his doctrine.

Hegel terms the second part of his "Philosophie des Geistes" *der objective Geist*, which exhibits the *free spirit* as it actually stands or lives as *thinking will* in the world. It is an exhibition of spirit as objectified in the institutions of law, the family, and the state, set between *subjective spirit* and the *absolute spirit*. Thus his ethics start from the natural condition of man and lead on to man in his highest relations, exhibiting the perfection of his spiritual character in the realms of art, religion, and philosophy,—the three media of perfect self-realization or of comprehension of his relations with the Absolute Spirit of whom and through whom and to whom are all things. We shall note in our criticism Hegel's *apparent* failure to carry ethics up into this sphere of the absolute spirit.

Hegel's method is always that of beginning with the most abstract phase of his topic and following through the immanent self-criticism of one abstract phase to another until the organic idea (*Begriff*) is reached, which is then seen to be the real presupposition throughout instead of being an inductive result. His true first principle, his most concrete statement, is scarcely perceptible in his first advances, but it comes more and more clearly to light as the immanent and organic principle that lives in, through, and above all the abstractions that strut dogmatically, aping the real. His order, moreover, is always the logical one from the abstract universal through the particular to the universalized individual.

Hegel's "Philosophie des Rechts" may be called the doctrine of the will. The will is the man, and ethical man is will realized in his social institutions. To reach this conception, however, he starts with the most abstract conception of will, which he takes as ready to hand. He divides the whole work, as usual, into triadic form:*

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* "Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts," Berlin, 1821, § 33. All the references in this paper are to this earlier edition.

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I. The will as immediate, undeveloped potentiality, which gives the sphere of abstract or formal right.

II. The will self-reflected, or subjective individuality, opposed to objective will. This gives the sphere of *Moralität*, or of conscience *contra mundum*.

III. The will as the unity and truth of these two abstract phases, the realm of formal freedom and objective right realized in the world. This gives the realm of *Sittlichkeit*, or the ethical world, as the concrete realization of man as will. This includes the sphere of (*a*) the family, (*b*) civil society, (*c*) the state in the most concerete sense of the term, such as Dr. Mulford construes "the Nation." Under this last he embraces (*a*) internal polity, (*β*) external polity, (*γ*) international polity, or the history of the world, as the realization of man in the most cosmopolitan sense of the term.

I. *The Sphere of Abstract Right.*—Formal free will is the abstract universal, which demands full sway for itself without any conscientious motive or conviction. Beginning is made with this formal will as a mere potentiality of entering into manifold relations. The one possessing such freedom is a "person." As such a person I have the right to cast my will over everything and make it mine. It is my right to do so. But other persons exist. Hence the formula of abstract right is, "Be a person, and respect others as persons." Hegel warns us against putting into this formula all that it would imply in an ethical, social, or civil state. He is using "person" here only in its most abstract and formal sense of an individual will, as yet undeveloped in civil and social relations ("Philosophie des Rechts," § 35). Such a person is nowhere to be found. But the conception results from the abstract conception of will. It represents the first phase of self-consciousness in which "Ich ist alles," the will sovereign and the whole "world its oyster." The rights of the abstract person are absolute and universal, but utterly unlike the personal rights dependent upon and guaranteed by organized society. Abstract will asserts itself against its limiting environment and lays its hand upon its rights. It thus acquires objective existence and takes the first step towards actualization.

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Things are soulless, will-less, and "the person has the right to subject all things to his will, thus making them his" (§ 44). First, the body and its life is taken possession of, then other things. I place my will over a thing and make it an attribute or property of me. Thus "*property*" appears as objectified will. But will involves the further right of using or consuming things and of relinquishment. But other wills do the same. Hence limitation which leads to "contract," which is the first form of a "common will." But this will is yet far from being that of the universal will of society. Its elements are accidental and particular, and can give no guarantee of fulfilment. Fraud, violence, and crime are inevitable. In "crime" will violates itself, and thus creates its own "punishment." The person gives an eye for an eye, thus negating his crime. The punishment is but the reaction upon the person of his own act. It is equally the act of his will and his own right. But in this as yet unorganized and unethical condition, where there is no universal will of society to mediate between crime and punishment, "vengeance" takes the place of ethical retribution, and the state of nature becomes an aggregate of not even semi-domesticated Ishmaelites, or a war of all against all. Property, contract, and punishment are seen to be impossible without the presence and mediation of a universalized or ethical will. Death or slavery can be the only logical issue to abstract will seeking its abstract rights. With no other elements at work such a state of nature could never give rise to the institution of the State. Some judge more just and universal must be found. The demand is for a particular will which can at the same time will the universal or the "infinite subjectivity of freedom" (§§ 103 and 104). Such a will must reflect upon itself, retire from mere objectivity to the internal forum. This forum is that of Conscience, or

II. *Moralität*, or *Abstract Duty* (§ 105).—This is the sphere of "subjective right," for the will, reflecting upon itself, changes the merely objective "person" into a subject (§ 104). Thus freedom reaches a higher ground and person becomes more personal. The stand-point now is the right of the sub-

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jective will (§ 107). Hegel shows the process from the most abstract form of this subjectivity through the phases of (*a*) purpose and responsibility, (*b*) intention and welfare to (*c*) the good and conscience, where abstract right is translated into duty and virtue or good-will.

First, it is held that responsibility is only commensurate with knowledge. Next, the quality of the will depends upon the "intention" and its objective results, which are never restricted to particular selfish ends. They must (thirdly) be judged according to their universal worth. Hence "the good" as the reconciliation of the particular subjective will with the universal will, or with the rational. The ideal here is that of duty for duty's sake. The duty, however, is yet abstract. No content can be furnished by itself. The universal element is merely formal, unspecified as to content, giving no answer as to what one's duty is in any situation, except the grandiloquent one of "do right though the heavens fall." An objective system of principles and duties, and the union of the subjective knowledge with them, is plainly impossible on this stand-point (§ 137). Hegel, here and elsewhere, makes, as we have said, trenchant criticism of Kant's doctrine of duty. This formal law divorces duty from all interest or desire, a psychological impossibility. It takes no cognizance of the concrete situation and can suggest no present duty. It cannot discriminate between particular actions so as to call one of them a duty. Finally, it must equally universalize *all* particular actions, and thus bring about confusion and collisions. Only in view of the institution of property in the state can it say, "Thou shalt not steal." In the abstract form of Kant it must equally say, "Thou shalt steal." That is, if we abstract all social relations, which *ex hypothesi* Kant does, we can universalize any particular rule without contradiction. In the realm of the concrete morality of social life, however, we cannot do this. What will be the result of such an abstract subjective conception of duty? Plainly the individual must become the lawgiver and the judge of what is absolute good. He must trust to his own private judgment without the mediation of exist-

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ing codes of society. He must give a purely subjective individual determination of the content of the lofty but formal universal. The individual becomes the measure of the moral quality of objective actions. There is no public source and standard for the guidance of private judgment. Hegel does not neglect the important function of the duty of private judgment, but is here only showing its capriciousness when taken out of the concrete relations of an ethical world. Antinomianism is a logical and historical outcome of such abstract private judgment, which runs riot and plays the tyrant for lack of an objective concrete social system of duties. It is the making of self a statesman to represent a concrete state that *ex hypothesi* does not yet exist. This elevation of the individual subjective judgment to be the measure and definition of the universal finally results in *the evil.* "The highest summit of subjectivity asserting itself as the absolute is the bad." It is at this abstract stand-point of the natural (unethicized) will that we find the origin of moral evil (§§ 139, 140). Hence we see that conscience at this stage cannot be true or good conscience. This abstraction in turn demands as its correlate that which it was called out to correct,—*i.e.*, objective right. In fact, these two abstractions must be integrated into the concrete ethical substance from which they have really been abstracted. We are only advancing, prodigal-like, to the real home of morality, from which we have violently torn ourselves away. We thus reach *the ethical* (*sittliche*) *world.*

III. In this world of ethical (*sittliche*) relations of the family, civil society, the state, and humanity, the idea of freedom is realized as a "living good that is powerful enough to actualize itself" (§ 142). Here abstract rights become ethical and authorized rights, and abstract duty becomes specific and full of content. Private judgment becomes *relatively* universalized, and the lofty, cold, and colorless imperative becomes *relatively* incarnated in the hearts of a brotherhood of men. In his "Phænomenologie des Geistes" Hegel traces with a larger and freer hand the dialectic of previous stages under the rubrics of "self-consciousness" and "reason," and uses that of "spirit" to designate what he, in the "Philosophie des Geistes," calls realized

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morality (*Sittlichkeit*). He there uses the term "spirit" as equivalent to the corporate social "self-consciousness" and "reason," which has had the power to create the ethical world into various grades of which each individual is born, and through which he takes form and content in the work of self-realization, or of becoming a "person" in the truer sense of the term. The laws of this world are his own laws. He must fulfil them to realize himself. He finds them existing for him, as the reason and law of his own specific nature as man. In fact, man is by nature a social animal. He is only real as he is social. To be himself he must be more than his own abstract self; to live his own life he must live the life of the body corporate. On one hand, these laws of society appear with even more authority than the laws of nature. On the other hand, they are not foreign to him, but yield to him the testimony of the spirit that they are *his own* (§§ 146, 147). In accepting them he is not doing despite to his own individuality, but is accepting the essential conditions of its preservation and development. The individuality of a man who, from infancy, should sever all relations to his fellow-men and grow up "naturally" would be an idiot,—even lower than the animals with which he might consort. Society is really creative of individuality. The enlightenment and regulation of the subjective conscience by the laws and duties of one's station clothes its nakedness with the garments of truth and beauty. The largest altruism demanded by them is essentially the largest possible egoism. Through it the individual elevates himself from capricious lawlessness into substantial freedom and personality. Living for others is the highest form of living for self. Hegel also uses the term *substance* to characterize the ethical tissue into which man is born. The moral disposition of the individual consists in his recognition of this substance as *his own* ("Philosophie des Geistes," § 515). Virtue he defines as ethical personality (*sittliche persönlichkeit*), or the life of the individual permeated and transformed by the ethical substance. Here duties and rights first exist, and that only through reciprocal relation ("Philosophie des Rechts," § 155). Here the natural man is gradually converted into

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the ethical man. This ethical substance is an immanent and determining principle of action which permeates and transforms the natural man,—acts as a moulding power through the family, and the social, civil, religious, educational, and political organizations. These various institutions of society are the realized objective form of the ethical substance in the fruition of its own being.

Hegel notes three phases of this ethical world,—

(1) The family as the primitive form of this ethical spirit.

(2) Civil society, which results from the separation of the members of families and their being reunited again in more external form for the security of person and property, in a realm of merely formal universality.

(3) The State, or the invisible spirit of the nation, developed to an organic reality in the hearts and customs and genius of its people.

(1) The individual first *comes to himself* in the family, whose active principle is love, which transcends and includes its members in its unity. The family is the first or instinctive realization of the ethical spirit. It exists not by contract but by the grace of God. The union of love and trust in this circle forms its organizing and controlling principle, so that in it the individual members find a measurable fulfilment of their own capacities. The family, too, is a process involving,—

(*a*) Marriage.

(*b*) Family property.

(*c*) The education of children to maturity, and the separation of its members.

(*a*) Marriage is a transformed physical union of male and female. The animal phase is transfigured by love into a spiritual one. Marriage implies the free consent of the two persons to constitute henceforth one person, to submit to limitations in order to gain fuller self-realization. The husband is more of a man than the bachelor. Hence it is an ethical duty of mankind to enter into and maintain the marriage relation (§ 162). The marriage bond is essentially a spiritual relation in which individuals subjugate their private aims and wishes to the law of at least a dual life, love, and good.

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Hence marriage, too, is more than a contract. For contract implies that the parties still retain their external independence. Hegel says that Kant's subsumption of marriage under "contract" is scandalous (§ 75). In marriage the twain are to become one flesh, one heart, one mind, one person. Hence the marriage ceremony should be one of social and religious celebration. The cold formalism of mere civil contract before a justice of the peace is utterly inadequate to manifest and declare such a spiritual relation. Marriage is of both ethical and intellectual influence upon the parties. They have larger views of life and a common good as their aim. Marriage, too, is essentially monogamic. This is one of the absolute principles on which the ethical character of a social state rests (§ 167). Marriage between blood-relations is also unethical. The family, as a single personality, has its external reality in its family property.

(*b*) It is of the essence of family property that it be *common* property. This gives property an ethical value which we could not find for it under the category of "abstract right." The thought of a common good animates all in the acquisition and maintenance of family possessions, relatively overcoming the "miserable aims that end with self."

(*c*) The education of children to maturity.

Children complete the family circle. In and through them the unity of married love comes to external manifestation. In loving the offspring of their love the parents love each other anew. The rights and duties of parents and children spring out of the common good of the family. Confidence and obedience are educed in the children that they may grow up in love in the family *ethos*. The slave-like relation of children to parents among the Romans was of the most disastrous influence. The modern world recognizes that children are potentially free spiritual beings whom the family is to train for citizenship in a larger ethical sphere. Families multiply, parents die, and children grow up, and we have a multitude of separate persons again, though of more concrete and ethical content than under the category of "abstract right." Here the elements of individualism and independence appear again,

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with differing and conflicting interests. The first phase of a return to a higher ethical unity is in the form of

(2) Civil society, or the realm of armed peace among now semi-tutored Ishmaelites bound together, through their wants, by contract for defence against each other. Hegel declines to name this other than "the state on its *external* side," or government. In this realm of "particularity," or, as he elsewhere calls it, "system of atomism of self-interest" ("Philosophie des Geistes," § 523), each private atomistic person makes himself an end and uses everything else as a means. Law, the abstract universal element here is only a mechanical means to prevent internecine warfare. It is a task-master to be eluded by every means, and yet serves the pedagogic purpose of disciplining caprice into formal unity. Absolute individualism would be civil anarchy. The individual must contract to limit himself by some outward form of universality in order to exist. Through this he learns that his own good can only come through the good of all, and comes to recognize that the concrete state is the good and true for him on earth, without the immanent life of which in civil society government could not exist. But to reach this recognition of a common corporate good as each one's own good, civil society passes through three phases.

(*a*) The system of wants, including labor, wealth, and classes of society.

(*b*) The administration of justice, including legal rights, public laws, and courts of justice.

(*c*) The sphere of police regulation, in its broadest sense, and that of incorporated companies under legal sanction.

We cannot follow Hegel through his elaborate treatment of these phases, continuously demonstrating that each one presupposes and actually rests upon the larger ethical organization of man in the nation or the spiritual state. Through the maintenance of the sanctity of marriage, and of honor in corporations, civil society passes over into the Nation, in which all the previous abstract phases are taken up as organic elements.

(3) The Nation or the invisible State.

Hegel's lofty and profound conception of the State, as the

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highest realization of the will in its substantial freedom, is happily too well known to need lengthy exposition. Dr. Mulford thoroughly assimilated, appreciated, and Americanized this conception of "The Nation" as "a moral organism" and "a moral personality," rooted in human nature, which is rooted in the Divine nature, and of Divine origin and sanction; the sphere for the "institution" and "the realization of rights and of freedom;" "sovereign" and representative of the individual, the family, society, civil rights, and the commonwealth; immanent in and vitalizing all these spheres; "a temple whose building is of living stones," a body in and through which alone individuals can get the form and content of personality; "the work of God in history realizing the moral order of the world;" "fulfilling humanity in God;" "the beginning and the goal of history;" "having an immortal life" and "its consummation in the perfected kingdom of the Christ."

With Hegel the State is the ethical idea actualized in progressively more adequate form, the moral life of humanity throbbing through and integrating all the activity of its individuals.

"The State is the self-conscious ethical (*Sittliche*) substance, the union of the principle of the family and of civil society. In the family this principle exists as the feeling of love. This *immediate* but essential principle, however, receives the form of self-conscious universality through the second principle, which contains the elements of knowledge and will, or thinking will. Thus the state appears, having for its content and absolute aim intelligent subjectivity developed into rationality." ("Philosophie des Geistes," § 535). "The state is the actuality of the substantial will, the vital union of the particular interest of its members with the relatively universal aims of man as man. Neither the family nor civil society is commensurate with such realization of individuals, though in both of these spheres a beginning is made from single to universal aims. This larger—the largest earthly—sphere takes up and fulfils all narrower ones. The state is universal or public reason, existing unreflectingly in the genius or spirit of its

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people, and objectively in its customs and institutions. Membership in this moral organism is the highest duty. It is the ethical substance in which alone one can be himself. All that he says about the state can be questioned only by confounding it, as many modern theorists do, with "civil society" as the mechanical expedient for the security of private rights and liberty. Herbert Spencer's conception is essentially only a more developed form of that of "The Leviathan" of Hobbes. Rousseau's *volonté générale* also lacked corporate sovereignty, because it represented only an abstraction and contract of particular wills, as a means. The corporate will, however, is the primal essential element in Hegel's conception of the state. It is the true end of man on earth, an end that realizes itself in and through its self-conscious members. The idea of the state is itself a process having (*a*) immediate actuality in the particular state,—an independent organism, with its own constitution or *internal polity* (*Staatsrecht*); passing (*b*) into the relation of one state to other states,—*external* polity; and finally (*c*) appearing as the universal or generic idea as lord over particular states. It is thus the fullest earthly manifestation of man as spirit, actualizing itself in the process of universal history (§ 259).

(*a*) Internal polity.

The state, as actualized concrete freedom, not only permits but creates and contains as vital members individual personalities. "The prodigious strength and depth of modern states springs from their giving the principle of subjectivity or private personality the most extreme and independent development, while at the same time reducing this element into substantial unity with and making it a means for the realization of their own generic end" (§ 260).

The principle of the worth of the individual, he says, "marks the turning-point in the distinction of modern and ancient times. Christianity first emphasized this principle and made it the vital principle of a new form of the world" (§ 124). Hence he must never be understood as slighting this element in his larger doctrine of the state, though this appears to approach very nearly the ancient doctrine, which swamped

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the individual in the state. It is only the inane perversion of this Christian principle of subjectivity that he criticises. Though the state may appear as an external power, it is really but the rational expression of the corporate will of individuals. In the state rights and duties are in reciprocal relation. "This union of duty and right is one of the most important notes of the state and the inner ground of its strength. The individual in accomplishing his duty finds self-satisfaction. From his relation to the state there springs a right, so that the public affair becomes his own affair" (§ 261). Through the disposition and *ethos* of its people mere government is changed to ethical and substantial self-government, and is thus the actualization of concrete freedom. The universal element in the laws and institutions of the state are simply the reflective expression of the ethical spirit of its people. "They are the reason of the nation, developed and actualized in particular forms, and thus the steadfast basis of the state and of the genial confidence of its citizens" (§ 265).

"The *guarantee* of a constitution—*i.e.*, the necessity that the laws be reasonable and their realization secured—lies in the spirit of the people as a whole,—that is, in their definite self-consciousness of its reason (religion being this consciousness in its absolute substantiality), and also in the real organization conformable to it as a development of that principle. The constitution presupposes this consciousness of the national spirit, as this spirit presupposes the constitution. For the actual spirit has the definite consciousness of its principles only so far as they are present to it as existing" ("Philosophie des Geistes," § 540). The people make their own constitution.

But religion forms a most important factor in the spirit of a people. Hegel says frankly that religion is the foundation of the state, which "is the Divine will unfolding itself in the actual organization of a people." Religion has the absolute truth for its content, creating the most powerful and lofty temper of a people, and thus affording the highest approbation and sovereignty to the laws of the state. But when religion degenerates into fanaticism, and tries to make the

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state a church-state, it needs to be curbed. Thus church organizations, like other societies, are subordinate to the state. Still the religious sentiment of a people is so controlling that it is only "a folly of modern times to alter a system of corrupt morality and laws without a change in religion, to attempt a *political revolution* without a *religious reformation*" (§ 552). The religious faith should be left free, because the sphere of religion is higher than that of politics. But when religion takes the form of separate, dissenting organizations within the state, they must be subordinated to the ethical supervision of the state. They cannot be permitted to foster opinions absolutely alien or opposed to the constitution as expressing the corporate genius of its people, or to treat the state as a soulless, Godless mechanism, instead of an ethical expression of the freedom of God's children. Modern states base their constitutions on the principle of freedom. Want of freedom in religion, or an unethical conception of God, will be found hostile to such constitutions. Hence Hegel gave the political preference to Protestantism, because it inculcates freedom of thought and of conscience. The Roman Catholic conscience is priest-bound, while the Protestant conscience harmonizes with the principle of free political life.

"Patriotism is a subjective form of the political disposition of a people. The objective form is the external organism of the various public organs of the state, who think and will out loud for the whole social organism. The political constitution is this external organization of the state and the process of its organic life in relation first to itself, and secondly to other states" (§ 271).

It is not necessary, for our present purpose, to give even a *résumé* of Hegel's exposition of the *political* state, as the organized and publicly-expressed will of its people. Its articulate form follows from the distinction of the universal, the particular, and the individual, and their combination in a concrete and living unity. He declares that, as to form, that of a constitutional monarchy is the peculiar achievement of the modern world, emphasizing the constitutional and repre-

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sentative elements as well as the monarchical one. We have essentially the same articulation of the three elements in our monarchical democracy, and England the same in her democratic monarchy. He was specially favorable to the English form, in reference to which he uttered his well-known saying that the king was "but a dot upon the i." The King or the President may equally be the mouth-piece of the personality of the state, the crown,—or the necessary dot over the i,—of the whole moral organism of the state. What he says about laws as the express forms of the content of substantial freedom, of the constitution as the express will of the people, of the function and moral temper of the officers in the whole department of civil (public) service, of suffrage being restricted to representatives of definite interests organized under the commonwealth, of freedom and equality, and of the double form and worth of public opinion, is admirable. So, too, is what he says as to (*b*) international polity. He recognized that any one national spirit is a limited one, that no one state can be the "terrestrial god," or realize the full nature of man as a political animal. Hence he turns to (*c*) universal history to find the law of the development of man as man. Here he gives his interpretation of the autobiography of humanity, whose individuals are nations, progressively and consciously realizing the idea of freedom, and entering upon their rightful heritage. It is thus throughout an ethical consideration of universal history, an ethical estimation of the course of man's thoughts and deeds, under Divine guidance, to the largest and most rational form of self-realization.

Before noting the ethical principles in Hegel's "Philosophy of History," however, we may turn aside to reflect briefly upon the significance of Hegel's "Ethical World" (*Sittlichkeit*). It is not merely the customary but the vital union of *ethos* and *pathos*. The pathos as active emotion has externalized itself in customs and institutions, but does not therefore cease to act. It continues to be the active element in the observance of its own customs. This ethical world includes the national manners, customs, laws, and institutions in which the freedom and rationality of the communal spirit has embodied

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itself. Family, state, school, church, social, scientific, and literary circles are all manifestations of this free spirit of man in its struggle for self-realization. They are the forms of substantial freedom which exist in some degree in the lowest form of society. They are conventionally recognized forms of "the good" which alone enables one to specify the categorical imperative. They are more: they are the self-specifications of the communal spirit seeking to be good,—the outcome of the *Moralität* of the social soul,—the good or moral manners springing from its relative rationality and freedom. Conscience has had some might, and has, to some extent, formed and ruled the ethical world. It has had might enough to form decalogues in all the circles of social activity. The community has an insight or conviction, and organizes it into a law or an institution, and thus makes its free spirit substantial. The ethical will of any people is thus relatively self-realized. It thus enacts itself and specifies what its "common good" consists in. The individual asking what good he must do, finds here his first definite answer. He is not put to the impossible task of framing a morality for himself, but is born into the obligation of entering into, sustaining, and furthering the moral world into which he is born as a member. His private judgment must thus be based upon a public source and standard. Hence Hegel says, "The striving for a morality of one's own is futile, and by its very nature impossible of attainment; in regard to morality, the saying of the wisest man of antiquity is the only true one,—to be moral is to live in accordance with the moral traditions of one's country" (Hegel's "Werke," vol. i. p. 400). The Indian of any tribe is a more moral man for being a loyal tribal man than he would be if he ignored all tribal and domestic relations. No absolutely bad (*sittenlos*) man can exist. Such isolation would be instantaneous suicide. Homer thus ridiculed the idea of such a being or thing:

> "No tribe, nor state, nor home hath he."

Even the babe in his cradle and Simon on his pillar and Crusoe on his island have their substantial worth through past

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or present relation to a social tissue. No one any more than Hamlet creates his own duties. Every one is born into an objective ethical world. His only task is to realize himself by fulfilling these objective duties of his station. But does this not land us in a Chinese state of immobile conservatism? Does this not imply that the customary is the ultimate, that the existing status of our ethical circle is identical with the ideal, or the "is" with the "ought to be"? Certainly this is not the doctrine of Hegel as to the progressive consciousness and realization of freedom. Loyalty to conventional morality is only a prerequisite to reflective conscientiousness, which asks and strives after better forms of social self-realization. Hegel recognizes no finality in temporal institutions. He sets or sees the negative dialectic always and everywhere at work criticising, overturning, and reforming the ethical world in its progress into the absolute spirit,—the realm of art, religion, and philosophy, in which alone complete self-realization is possible to the human spirit. Here Hegel's doctrine of the development of "the moral Ideal" is in place. This has been thoroughly worked out for the individual in Green's "Prolegomena to Ethics," and for the race in Hegel's "Philosophy of History." For the individual, in the lowest stage of his social (and actual) life, there is a *common* good already realized, into whose inheritance he enters. Loyalty to this fosters conscientiousness which leads to reform. Progress, while an advance upon the customary morality, is not a product of mere private conscience, but is the outgrowth of the ideal embodied in the conventional forms, which come to be more and more fulfilled in higher forms and richer content. Finality means sterility in morals as well as in all other spheres. Hegel gives ample recognition of this element of conscientiousness, or principle of subjective freedom, announced first by Socrates and given its infinite worth by Christ, so as to be really creative of the modern ethical world in distinction from that of the ancient, which mechanically subjugated the individual to the tyranny of his social environment ("Philosophie des Rechts," § 124). His ethical world absorbs and demands the constant activity of this element of

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conscientiousness, as the necessary dynamic in the progress of social man into the consciousness and realization of freedom. In the course of its activity it passes through many phases, rational and irrational. He shows the course of its own dialectic in his "Phænomenologie des Geistes," of which Dr. Harris has given an excellent expository *résumé* in his "Hegel's Logic." *

In his "Philosophische Propædeutic" (Werke, vol. xviii.) he defines ethics as "the science of the human will in relation of particular will to the universal or rational will" (§ 1). The individual acts or determines itself from within to actualize itself in some of the soliciting forms of action, and hence has *responsibility* (§ 8). Duty demands both elements,—the right deed and the right intention or disposition. Morality is concerned directly with *intention*, and demands that the specific deeds be done out of simple regard for duty (§ 33). This moral disposition is thus essential to his fulfilling his duties to himself, his family, the state, and society (§ 40). It is this subjective element of intention in the performance of these duties that constitutes "*virtue*." Hegel wrote his "Rechts Philosophie" when this doctrine of subjective freedom was being pushed to the limits of anarchy in all realms of thought and practice. This doubtless made him emphasize more strongly the side of the objective content of all duty. The abstract freedom of the "Age of Reason" was producing revolt against all external authorities as a phase of "private judgment." He recognized the *Aufklaerung* as a subjective reaction in the realm of ethical institutions. In his "Phænomenologie" he traces the course of the individual obeying implicitly prescribed forms till blind obedience becomes open-eyed insight into their rationality. But these laws being found to be rational and self-imposed, the individual claims that his

* Professor F. H. Bradley has also, I believe, given a thoroughly unique exposition of this in his "Ethical Studies," which, however, is unfortunately of avail only to the few who happen to possess a copy of this "out of print" book. Many would gladly buy, borrow, or even steal this desirable volume. I never succeeded in more than stealing a hasty reading of it some years ago. It ought to be reprinted.

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reason is competent to criticise all laws and to formulate new ones. This leads rapidly to a revolt against established institutions and codes and culminates in a reign of distrust and terror. This is more fully brought out in the latter part of his "Philosophy of History." Hence Hegel emphasized the suicidal nature of this revolt, and proclaimed anew the living way of self-realization through the established ethical institution of state and church. He still maintained the subjective element in his conservative emphasis upon the established moral order. There must be a consciousness that the common good is one's own good and a cordial recognition of the customary as the relatively rational to which one voluntarily conforms. To know and do those things which the social community of which he is a member demands must be done from insight into their value as self-realizing activities. He must transmute the customary into the personal, making out of this raw material the elements of his own formed will or character. He must interpret his social environment so as to create his imperative ideal. This reflective appreciation of objective forms of morality is necessary to make them a moral person's own duties. They really become his duties, in the highest sense, through this personal recognition and adoption of them as forms of self-realization. Absolute inwardness, making the merely objective subjective and personal, is the very essence of the Reformation principle, the proclamation of which was the unfurling of the final banner of free spirit. Hegel insists upon this with utmost emphasis in his "Philosophy of History" (p. 433). In social, political, and religious relations this private conscience is ultimate. The acquiescence in any established order must be *ex animo* and intelligent in order to be moral. The disposition or moral temper can alone maintain the sovereignty of any ethical institution ("Philosophy of History," p. 468). Conscious effort to realize one's own conception of good he held to be a higher stage of moral temper than blind conformity to any customs, however good. Only one's own conceptions must be rooted and grounded in and formed out of the social conceptions about him. That is, private judgment is ultimate, but its content is of worth only

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as it has been universalized beyond all merely subjective conceits. The individual's moral ideal is to be developed out of existing moral realities.

In his "Philosophy of History" he shows how the successive ethical institutions and ideals are developed for man universal, through nations as individuals. In the progress of man into the consciousness and realization of substantial freedom, the drama of self-education under divine teaching proceeds by fixed steps. The Oriental nations knew that *one*—the despot—was free. In Greece and Rome individualities are developed, and *some* become conscious of their freedom. Finally, with the Germanic world, under the inspiration of a reformed Christianity, maturity is reached, and it is known that all men (man as man) are free. Throughout this drama of history there is, however, the guiding hand of Providence. Nations may fret and toil and advance, rise, ripen, and rot, but the drama continues its teleological progress towards the attainment of the spiritual freedom of man in conscious Godsonship, because of the immanent Providence who always rules and transcends all the acts of the drama. Hegel sees one increasing purpose run through the ages because he sees God in history. Man proposes and God disposes, making even the wrath of man to praise him. His guidance is not arbitrary or artificial, but remains the unchanging condition of all human endeavor at self-realization.

The visible result, the progressive realization of freedom by man, affords the "true theodicy, the justification of God in history." Such is the triumphant conclusion of his "Philosophy of History." And this affords us an answer to a question that forces itself upon us in studying Hegel's ethics. Does he carry ethics up into the sphere of absolute spirit as he does art, religion, and philosophy; or does he leave them below in the objective world? Are they merely "secular ethics," or does he give a metaphysic of ethics which enswathes, permeates, and elevates them to the sphere of absolute spirit? We answer no and yes. *No!* He did not formally treat of the science of absolute ethics (*Sittlichkeit*). He did not formally develop the science of the metaphysic of ethics. He

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did not formally carry it over into the realm of absolute spirit along with art, religion, and philosophy. But neither did he ever proclaim any form of ethical life as ultimate. No state ever exhausted the ethical capacity of man. Universal history, too, is seen to be an ever-tending and never-ending process towards the perfection of man. To know and to be himself is the constant endeavor of man that Hegel traces in his "Philosophy of History." But note that it is never man apart from God that makes any progress. The all-animating cause of progress is the immanent divine spirit, and every step forward is really possible only through this Divine metaphysic of all knowing and doing. *Yes!* Hegel throughout all his works is laboring to bring this Divine metaphysics to men's conscious recognition, in which alone, he maintains, can men and states find their proper realization ("Philosophie des Rechts," § 360).

In his "Phænomenologie," Hegel makes the transition from ethics to religion through the act of forgiveness of the wicked. This negation of a negation is the mind's majestic act in ascending from the sphere of the finite and relative to its native home with absolute spirit. This is the sphere of religion, where all the discords and failures of the ethical sphere are transcended and transmuted by the spirit's union with God. Thus the ethical consciousness rests upon and is possible only through its relation of dependence upon religion as its own higher form. Ethical man, in his most comprehensive and ripest earthly relations is not a little god by himself. Self-realization is impossible even in the widest ethical (*Sittliche*) institutions. Personality can only approximate realization in conscious relation with the Absolute Personality. Thus ethics, as the science of man, reaches its highest form in Christian ethics,—that is, in that form and spirit of life congruous with the Christian conception of man. "The measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ" is the norm of man's self-realization. The Christian "secularization of morals" means the realization of the kingdom of God on earth. Any lower view really dehumanizes man in abstracting him from all that is most essential and substantial. The new birth into Christ and his

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kingdom is the absolutely essential condition of a normal ethical life on earth. To live aright one must love aright, for what one loves he lives. Hence Christian *love* is the all-comprehensive activity, which is the condition of ethical life in the individual and society. In all ethical (*Sittliche*) spheres man is *relatively* realizing himself under the "disposing" of God, however, he himself may "propose." Thus we see Hegel finding a *relative* self-realization of man in the family, which is organic to a larger life in society. In the state the same process goes on, and transition is made to the larger life of self-realization in "universal history." But universal history again is seen to manifest the inadequateness of attainment, and becomes organic to the perfect consummation of man in the discovery and adoption of the revealed will of God as the absolute standard of an ethical life, so that man becomes consciously a child of God and a co-worker with Him. This insight attained, the process begins of living anew and aright in all the established ethical institutions, of imbuing the secular with the divine, of secularizing the divine, of the maintenance of the kingdom of God on earth through domestic, social, civil, political, and religious institutions. The Christian banner is the final banner of free spirit, recognizing its own work in the so-called secular institutions which it creates and animates. All these Hegel declares to be "nothing else than religion manifesting itself in the relations of the actual world." "The Gospel in the Secular life" expresses in brief Hegel's ultimate conception of ethics. "The spirit finds the goal of its struggle, and its harmonization in that very sphere which it (as mediæval ecclesiasticism) made the object of its resistance; it finds that *secular pursuits are a spiritual occupation*" ("Philosophy of History," p. 369).

That which vitalizes and moralizes each one of these secular spheres, that which is their constant presupposition and life—their metaphysic—is the life of God in the mind and heart of social man, guiding, luring, and impelling him on to self-realization in the sustaining environment of spiritual, substantial freedom,—the republic of God. Thus Hegel finds *ethics* to be not an abstract decalogue falling straight from heaven,

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but rather a slowly-worked-out process of the heavenly in the earthly sphere. Limit of space precludes the giving of even a faint picture of the magnificent drama of this world-process as presented in Hegel's "Philosophy of History." Fortunately this work is well translated in "Bohn's Philosophical Library," and may be commended to the reader who desires to see these dry bones of his ethical system clad with all the beauty and vigor of incarnate, thinking will.

J. MACBRIDE STERRETT.

A PALM OF PEACE FROM GERMAN SOIL.

"And they shall beat their swords into ploughshares, and their spears into pruning-hooks: nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more."

FORTY years ago the pen of a woman played a considerable part in bringing about the abolition of slavery in America. If, as many of us to-day fervently wish, as some of us are sanguine enough to hope, the substitution of international courts of arbitration for the arbitrament of bloodshed be destined to form a main line of Western progress in the twentieth century, a woman's pen will again be entitled to count among the forces that have wrought the change. "The hour and the book" bids fair to apply to "Die Waffen nieder!"* as it applied to "Uncle Tom's Cabin."

Thinkers, moralists, reconstructers of the social fabric, science, industry, commerce, the irresistible logic of the salient facts of modern life, have all been hard at work on the task of weakening in "civilized" man the ingrained fighting impulses inherited from his rough-hewn forefathers. "Sappers and miners" of this kind may ply their mattocks long before the strokes begin perceptibly to tell. Of a sudden there are signs that the old order is tottering. Its founda-

* "Die Waffen nieder! Eine Lebensgeschichte" ("Lay down your Arms! The Story of a Life"), von Bertha von Suttner. 2 vols. E. Pierson, Dresden and Leipzig. 1891.

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tions have been loosened and are giving way. The time is ripe for a fresh departure. Then, if the consecrated apostle be at hand to preach a new gospel with the compelling power of earnest conviction, many an ear will be strained to listen, many a hearer will be stirred to act. Mighty is the magic of glowing words from heart-depths aflame for a cause which has truth and reason on its side.

It is somewhat *bizarre* that a woman writing in the tongue of Moltke and Bismarck should have drawn up what is perhaps the most forcible protest ever uttered against the stupendous evils, the egregious madness, of war.

The appeal comes at the right moment. Never before has that eternal problem of our race, the betterment of the human lot, seized hold of men with the strong grasp by which it holds them now. Never before has its solution stood out to their vision so distinctly as the true goal for the highest effort of every successive generation. Never have the conditions of human life been so complicated, so perplexing, so urgent in their demands upon the abstract thinker and the practical reformer as in this day; never has there been such pressing need for the cultivation of the sympathetic, the repression of the anti-social tendencies of our nature.

The opinion of women on public matters is held of small account by Germans and but little encouraged to make itself heard. She who oversteps the limits assigned to the *Hausfrau* may expect to encounter a contemptuousness, a harsh censoriousness, that savor of the same *ancien régime* to which belongs the national partiality for soldiering and Martinet rule. When, therefore, as in the case of the author under consideration, a woman manages to obtain a respectful hearing from German men, it can be only by the grace of genius that the marvel is accomplished. The speedy and ungrudging recognition Frau von Suttner has received is striking. During the debate on the budget in the Austrian Chamber of Deputies on the 18th of April, 1890, the Minister of Finance, Herr von Dunajewski, felt impelled to say, "It is not a professional politician, it is a German lady, Bertha von Suttner, who in a recent work of fiction has drawn such a picture of

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war as must send a shudder through every reader. I pray you to devote a few hours to that book. If any one, after having done so, still retains a passion for war, I can only sincerely pity him."

"This is not a mere book, it is an event," writes Herr Heinrich Hart in the daily *Rundschau*. The dictum of *Blätter für literarische Unterhaltung*, a leading German literary review, runs: "No literature and no language can point to any presentation of this subject so comprehensive, so exhaustive, and at the same time so enthralling. We are here dealing—and in this judgment many men of eminence concur—with the most important work of fiction treating of war that has ever appeared, and with one of the very highest achievements, moreover, in the range of contemporary *belles-lettres*." That distinguished authority, Friedrich von Bodenstedt, is "convinced the glorious book will become a standard work. Since Madame de Staël, no woman has wielded so potent a pen." Pages and pages might be filled with extracts from the numerous articles called forth by "Die Waffen nieder!" Many of them assume the proportions of treatises; nearly all sound the note of enthusiastic, unstinted praise, and even the few dissentients, for whom militarism still constitutes a sacred object of worship, do not conceal that the foe who seeks to destroy their idol is formidable.

People are accustomed, not without ground, to fight shy of novels with a purpose. The artist and the missionary do not make a good team. But the book, of which I am attempting to give a rough sketch to those who cannot read it in the original, forms one of several notable exceptions to the general rule.

Frau von Suttner has felt and written at a white heat. She was far too intent on making converts, on "crushing the infamous," to be thinking much of literary artifices, or of success from the literary point of view. This entire absence of self-consciousness lends to her fiction so illusive a semblance of fact that, regarded simply as a story, the work must rank high. The imagination of the authoress has been kindled at the fire of intensest feeling, guided by a virile faculty of reason-

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ing closely and logically. She pierces to the marrow of the thing that has taken hold of her. By that thing she is verily possessed; it has made of her a seer. Assuredly she has lived through all the sickening, gruesome, hideous, awful incidents and details of war, as Dante had actually trodden the circles of hell and tasted the beatitudes of heaven; as Bunyan had been beset by the temptations and gnawed by the remorse of Christian; as Defoe had known the horrible solitude of Crusoe's Island, the anguish of the castaway's yearning for companionship, the intoxicating joy of discovering the footprints in the sand. Minds of this particular and rare complexion are capable of a degree of self-detachment the rest of us can hardly understand. They lose themselves in the contemplation of a subject in which they have no personal stake whatever. Their vision does not get blurred by the disturbing action of egotism and vanity, and they look down into depths that to other eyes are obscure. Their imaginings have a verisimilitude, a living reality all their own, and the artistic value which their self-effacement stamps upon their creations is as distinctive as it is unpremeditated. No deliberate striving after effect could possibly have achieved the same result or have generated the spiritual force that emanates from such selfless, sincere service of an idea. To the possessors—they are few and far between, however—of minds of this peculiar order is vouchsafed the secret of preaching an evangel in the accents of a poet. They are the elect who may, if they like, embark on the risky enterprise of writing novels with a purpose, and nevertheless gather literary laurels by the way, probably the last thing they care for.

The form Frau von Suttner has chosen as a garment for her gospel is that of an autobiography. Martha von Althaus, afterwards Martha von Dotzky, finally Martha von Tilling, is the narrator. Her experiences as maiden, wife, mother, widow, and wife a second time serve for a thread whereon to string a chaplet of great, far-reaching events comprised within the period from 1859 to 1871. The historical panorama unrolled before us includes Solferino, Sadowa, Sedan. Martha is the daughter of a retired Austrian general, much given to

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chewing the cud of an Italian campaign of his younger days under Radetzky; he adores his profession, and has brought up his brood in the cult of military glory. Martha's childish aspirations soar towards the *rôle* of a Joan of Arc. The famous captains of antiquity and Napoleon are the heroes of her girlhood. At her first ball, during the whirl of a waltz, a youthful lieutenant of hussars, Count Arno von Dotzky, makes her an offer of marriage, which she accepts on the spot. On both sides it is an extreme case of love at first sight. They are married on her eighteenth birthday, boy-husband and child-wife, with little or no thought for the seriousness of life. A brief year of undimmed joy is allotted them, and a son is born by whose cradle they build many castles in the air, all based on the wee Rudolph's future career as a soldier. Before the little "Corporal"—to that grade his fond parents have already advanced him—is three months old a small speck appears in the blue heaven of the young couple, which quickly and irresistibly grows into a black, tragedy-laden thunder-cloud. Trouble is brewing in Italy. Martha does not at once gauge the import of the threatening symptoms. The relations of Sardinia and Austria, Cavour's object in standing by the French emperor in the Crimea, Louis Napoleon's attitude to the house of Savoy,—how can these things affect *her?* But soon she beholds writ large in all its grimness the real meaning of those catchwords, "The privilege of dying the death of a patriot," "Glory and fame earned on the battle-field the prize of prizes," "Victory and the banners of Austria march side by side," "The Lord of hosts is with us," etc., to which she and the people of her world have been so glibly giving currency. Doubts spring up in her mind, and she begins to ask herself whether the traditional opinions concerning militarism and war are as valid as she had hitherto assumed. Gradually, both from without and within, her questionings are nourished to such a vigor of anti-military conviction that it thenceforth becomes the main purpose, the master-passion of the rest of her life, to open men's eyes to the folly, the blasphemy, the futility of war. The further she pursues the subject the more vividly does she

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realize the incompatibility of the martial spirit with all that is most nobly characteristic of our time: the conquest of the forces of nature by science, the free development of peaceful industry, the systematic nurture of the altruistic and sympathetic instincts in man, on whose growth moral advance depends. But this is somewhat of a forestalling. To go back to the moment at which we left her with her future views yet in the germ. Martha's father and husband are impatient for the declaration of war. As the peace-barometer falls, their spirits rise. Neither the idolized wife nor the cherished baby "Corporal" has power to counterbalance the soldier's craving for an opportunity of winning renown and promotion. A feverish period of wearing anxiety, of nights sleepless, or haunted by torturing dreams of evil presentiments fed on the calamities that are daily darkening the homes of her neighbors, ensues for Martha. Then the tidings reach her that Arno has fallen, and a week or two later the crushed young widow learns from her father how Solferino has shattered all the brilliant expectations on which she and her nation had placed such heavy stakes. It is about this time, while Louis Napoleon and Cavour are busy settling the terms of the peace of Villafranca, that Martha, who with her boy is living in seclusion at her father's country-house, receives a parcel of books from Vienna. "See," she says to the general, "the bookseller sends us these on approval. He specially recommends a newly-published work by an English naturalist named Darwin, entitled 'The Origin of Species.' He says it is of high interest and likely to be epoch-making." "Tell the good man, my dear, to leave me out of his reckoning. Who on earth can have thought to spare for such trivialities at a critical moment like this? What can there be epoch-making for us human beings in a book about the species of animals and plants? The federation of the Italian States, the predominance of Austria in the German Union,—these, if you will, are matters of a wide bearing; they will figure in history long after any creature remembers so much as the mere name of this book. Mark my words." "I did mark them!"

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In the foregoing passage is discernible an undercurrent which throughout pervades "Die Waffen nieder!" Frau von Suttner prostrates herself before the achievements of modern science; she is penetrated with the conceptions of modern philosophy; above all, with the conception of a social organism ever increasing in complexity, ever tending at the same time to absorb more and more completely each one of the component human atoms, whose active and conscious efforts towards collective, as well as individual, amelioration are the very essence of progress and, in the true sense, of religion. The shrill disharmony between such an ideal and the actual condition of our soldier-ridden Europe revolts her reason as it shocks her feeling. She sees in militarism the negation of the cardinal doctrines of nineteenth-century science and philosophy; a senseless obstruction to the healthy evolution of civilized life; an influence so baneful to the finer elements of man's nature that it must be reckoned a moral poison.

Two years of widowhood have toned down Martha's poignant sorrow for her lieutenant of hussars into gentle regret. She is conscious of a change in herself in which he never could have shared. Had he lived, they must inevitably have drifted further and further apart. She now meets in Baron von Tilling the man fitted to be a mate to her in the fullest sense. He, too, is an officer in the Austrian army, but, unlike Arno von Dotzky, he has come to recognize with pain that his calling is an anachronism; that the aims, objects, and desires of the soldier run directly counter to the true interests of mankind; that the whole constitution of military life teems with evil. The promptings of his heart, reinforced by Martha's growing abhorrence of war, urge him to throw up his profession. But he is poor and proud, and for a time circumstances thwart his eager wish. The Schleswig-Holstein difficulty comes to a head, and he receives orders to join his regiment at the very moment when his wife is in the throes of giving birth to his first child. Agonized with grief, he is forced to leave her alone in her hour of trial, and to hurry to the scene of action, without knowing how it has gone with her. This harrowing episode is preceded by a masterly historical expo-

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sition. In a vein of pungent sarcasm the writer sets herself to unravel the bewildering tangle of events and genealogies accountable for the collision between Denmark and the German powers. With scathing irony does she lay bare the emptiness of the far-fetched, absurd pretexts for the quarrel, so dexterously made instrumental to Prussia's schemes of aggrandizement. Frau von Suttner's dissection of an *imbroglio* whose baffling twists and turns run the "Eastern question" hard, is a brilliant performance.

The Schleswig-Holstein affair is over. Friedrich von Tilling has gathered fresh experiences—many of them told in his letters to Martha—which throw into stronger prominence than ever the monstrousness of war. After his return to his adoring wife, they are both perpetually occupied with the problem: how to bring an altered state of feeling; how to form an altered public opinion in regard to international relations and the adjustment of international disputes. The sinister influences to be combated, as Friedrich and Martha know full well, are formidable; but those influences move against, not with the current of two great forces of our time: the thought of the foremost thinkers, the rapidly-growing sense of an identity of interests among the workers of the West. Therein lies the hope of the "wild dreamer," the "idealist," the "Don Quixote," as it is usual to label him, who believes in the possibility of extirpating from the social organism a devouring cancer.

It is the deliberate policy of the governing class in every military state to neglect no expedient, to leave untried no blandishment that can serve to foster a martial spirit. The babe in the cradle is not deemed too young, the nonagenarian on the edge of the tomb not too old, to be wrought upon. Tin soldiers and a drum for the one, crosses and stars for the other, are effectually seductive. The schoolmaster and the professor are utilized as recruiting sergeants. The so-called teaching of history concerns itself chiefly with battles and dates of battles, and with the exploits of successful conquerors. The noble word "patriotism" is seldom uttered save in connection with bloodshed, with injury or insult inflicted on

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another people; and it is rare for any stress to be laid on the numberless ways, apart from fighting, wherein the citizen, to whom the land of his birth is dear, may, by personal sacrifices for its welfare, prove himself a patriot. Everything is done that can be done to manufacture from the masculine raw material of the country an abundant supply of willing targets for the latest development in rifles. The girls—shut out from the cannon- and bayonet-hedged avenue which leads to fame—are taught to covet inordinately the reflected glory of becoming the wives and mothers of soldiers. And for the "children of a larger growth" than those caught with the bait of Nuremberg toys, there are the real, living, breathing prototypes of the tin infantry and cavalry, the military bands, the parades, the reviews, the *Kriegspiel*, the camps, the mock-battles, the eagles red and black of the first, second, and third class, and all the rest of the paraphernalia. Not least efficacious in bolstering up the system are the sophistries to which its guardians have recourse. On this point let us hear Frau von Suttner.

"To nothing does the legend of the Hydra so fittingly apply as to that monstrous entity: stereotyped opinion. You chop off one of its argument-heads, and are proceeding to send the next one after, when lo! up starts the first again, set on as firmly as ever.

"My father had a few stock justifications of war which defied destruction:

"'1. Wars are made by God, the Lord of Hosts, instituted by Himself. Witness the Holy Scriptures.

"'2. Wars have in all times been, and will therefore always be.

"'3. But for such occasional decimation, the peoples would multiply too fast.

"'4. Unbroken peace is relaxing, enervating; like the stagnant water of a marsh, it breeds putrefaction,—namely, corruption of manners.

"'5. Wars are the main generators of self-sacrifice, of heroism; in short, they are moral tonics.

"'6. To all time will there be dissension among men. Never can complete agreement be possible as to what is each man's due. Opposing interests must constantly clash; eternal peace, then, is inconceivable.'

"None of these propositions, and certainly not a single inference deducible from them, can hold its ground against a well-aimed thrust. But each in turn will serve its defender as an intrenchment when he has been made to surrender the others; and as the new intrenchment topples over, the old one rears itself up again.

"For instance, if, driven into a corner, the war-champion finds himself unable to maintain point four, and is brought to admit that peace beseems human dig-

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nity better than war, brings more happiness, is more conducive to culture, he forthwith shifts his position and answers, 'Well, yes; war may have its evil sides, but on grounds one and two it is unavoidable.'

"If you thereupon show that it might be avoided by means of state-federation, courts of arbitration and the like, there comes the rejoinder: 'Well, yes; it might, but *should* not for reason five.'

"The advocate of peace now upsets objection five, and urges that, on the contrary, war renders man coarse and brutal.

"'Well, yes; there is something in that, but point three——' You may not exactly in so many words formulate the whole train of reasoning here set forth, but you instinctively feel that the famous point three has a flaw, and is anyhow being used against you disingenuously. You content yourself with quoting the old proverb, 'There's no fear the trees will grow up to the sky,' and besides 'tis not the bogie of over-population our rulers have in their mind's eye.

"'Agreed; but then point one——' And thus the controversy moves round and round in a circle from which there is no outlet."

The war of 1864 soon proved disastrously reproductive. 1866 opened amidst ominous signs. Austria and Prussia were gnarling over the bone wrested from Denmark, and Louis Napoleon stood by calculating what might be got for his own ends out of the mutual jealousies of the Hohenzollern and the Hapsburger. There is the usual preliminary exchange of diplomatic notes, the usual asseveration on both sides that each is arming purely with a view to self-defence, the usual fanning of the flame by the press. At last comes the ultimatum, its rejection, the declaration of war, and by the month of June the ghastly carnage is in full swing. Once more Friedrich von Tilling is torn from his wife and ordered into the thick of the fight. After awhile Martha's terror for his safety, the misery of her suspense as to his fate, rise to such a pitch that, unknown to any one, she steals away from her father's house and makes for Bohemia, It is in this part of the book that the power of the authoress is most fully revealed. One would swear that the descriptions—some in the form of extracts from Tilling's letters, before Martha has gone in search of him, others in that of entries in her diary after she has started on her adventurous journey—must be the records of an eye-witness, so instinct are they with living reality. Such pictures of the atrocities and horrors of war have probably never before been produced by either pen or pencil. Yet

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they are wholly free from vulgar sensationalism, They bear the unmistakable stamp of sober and therefore appalling truth. Here are a few samples. Some reflections of Friedrich's at the outset of the campaign, suggested by the efforts of his good friend, Dr. Bresser, to mitigate the sufferings of the wounded, may serve as prelude.

"When one comes to think of it, is not *humanity* in warfare a self-contradictory notion, an incongruity? It is much of a muchness with 'enlightened faith.' One or the other; but love of one's fellow-creatures and war, reason and dogma, do not go together. Downright red-hot hatred of our enemies, coupled with absolute disregard for human life,—there you have the very marrow of warfare, just as the unquestioning suppression of reason constitutes the fundamental condition of faith. But we live in an age of compromise. Old institutions and new ideas are both alike potent influences."

Another passage from a letter of Friedrich's:

"A detachment of artillery is crowded together on a steep, rain-sodden roadway. The cannon sink over their wheels in mud. By stress only of terrible exertion, dripping with perspiration and urged on by merciless blows, do the horses succeed in extricating themselves. But one of them, already tired to death, can do no more. Flogging will not avail; it wished to work—it cannot, it *cannot*. The man who is raining down blows on the unhappy beast, does he not see that the case is hopeless? Had the brutal fellow been the driver of a cart carrying blocks of stone for building purposes, the first policeman at hand, nay, I myself, would have arrested him. But this cannoneer in charge of the cruelly-weighted wagon was doing only his duty. Of that the horse could know nothing; the tortured, willing, noble creature that had struggled to the extreme verge of its strength, what must it have thought of such pitilessness, such senselessness?—thought,—that is, as animals think, not in words or with a definite conception, but through the medium of sensations all the more intense that they are inarticulate. One only utterance is there for such suffering—a cry of pain. And what a cry it was, that of the poor horse as it dropped down at last, a cry so long drawn out, so plaintive, that it still rings in my ears, that it haunted me the following night in a dream,—a horrible dream. How shall I tell it to you? Dreams are so incoherent that language devised for the purposes of coherent thought is ill qualified to reproduce them. Methought I was the dumb consciousness of misery of such an overtasked artillery horse,—nay, not of one horse, but of a hundred thousand horses, for in my dream I rapidly worked out the total number of horses that perish in a campaign, and the sum of misery likewise seemed to multiply itself a hundred thousand-fold."

The reflections of the dream-horses (left to the reader's imagination) are supposed to wind up thus:

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"For to men it is made clear why their lives are exposed to danger; they know the whither, the wherefore. But we unfortunate wretches know nothing: around us all is horror and darkness. Men, anywise, go forth against the enemy side by side with trusty friends; enemies alone surround us on every side. Our own masters, whom we would serve with such loving devotion, for whom we would toil with our utmost strength, they fell us down with blows and leave us helplessly lying. And oh! what agony that means; we tremble till a cold sweat runs off our bodies; we thirst,—for we too suffer fever,—oh! that thirst, that unspeakable thirst of a hundred thousand of us bleeding, ill-treated horses! Here I awoke."

So far Friedrich has been spokesman. Martha must have her turn. She is waiting at a road-side station on her way to Bohemia.

"Here too the Sisters were already busy performing their offices of mercy. Such food and drink as were by hook or by crook obtainable they handed round to the wounded; but in many instances nothing was to be had; the resources of the refreshment-rooms were mostly exhausted. The hurly-burly at the railway stations, especially the more important ones, was maddening. It was like a nightmare. The running to and fro; the wild confusion; troops in readiness for starting; fugitives; bearers of the sick and disabled; groups of bleeding, moaning soldiers; women sobbing and wringing their hands; screaming voices; harsh shouts of command; crowds in every direction; nowhere a clear passage to tread along; mountains of heaped-up luggage; implements of war, cannon; horses and bellowing cattle close beside the platform;—in the midst of it all, the continuous tinkle of the telegraph;—trains rushing through filled, or rather crammed, with the reserve forces sent on from Vienna,—all these impressions, intermixed in a crazy jumble, stamped themselves on my bewildered brain. Those soldiers from Vienna were packed into third- and fourth-class compartments, or even into cattle and goods trucks just like beasts on their way to the shambles. And, in fact,—the thought would not be repressed,—what else could they be called? Were they not being dragged to a butchery in the great political market, where bargains are driven in flesh-food for cannon ('*chair à canon*')? There they whirl past! A mad roar—was it a war-song?—sounds across, drowning the rattle of the wheels; a minute, and the train has disappeared. Swift as the wind it bears a portion of its freight to certain death,—yes, *certain* death. Though no individual among them can say of himself that he is sure to fall, a fixed percentage of the whole number is doomed. Armies setting out for the battle-field, moving—mounted or on foot—along the road-way,—well! about them there may yet linger something of the poetry of a remote past. But the modern railway, that symbol of the culture which binds the peoples of the earth together, turned to the uses of barbarism let loose: that is too incongruous, too abominable a combination! Again the telegraphic bell,—how even *it* can be made to jar upon the ear!—that glorious trophy of the conquering intellect, which found a way to flash the thoughts of men from land to land! All these miracles of the new era, meant to stimulate intercourse among nations, to make life easier, to

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beautify, to enrich it, are now misused by the Old-World institution that strives to cleave nations asunder, to cheapen human life. 'Behold our railways and our telegraphs! We are a civilized people!' Such is our boastful attitude towards savage tribes, the while we are applying these precious acquisitions to a hundred fresh developments of our own savagery."

The pestilential seeds contained in the miasma of the battle-grounds, the camp-hospitals, the hastily-dug and overcrowded graves of the fallen, ripen apace to a harvest of terror—cholera. The fell disease follows close in the track of the war, mowing down its victims by hundreds and thousands. Within a few brief days it carries off Martha's father, her brother, and her two younger sisters, a pair of gracious and graceful maidens, who, with their betrothed husbands, Conrad von Althaus and Prince Heinrich of Reuss, have flitted brightly through the story. Martha is now the sole representative of the family, and sole heiress of the general's fortune. Every chord of her being is unstrung; her Friedrich's love alone sustains her. But the curse that has blasted her house spurs her to fresh efforts in the great cause of peace. Thenceforth it shall be the supreme task of her life to assail more energetically than ever the opinions still prevalent in regard to war. Maybe she can help to hasten the day when the monster will no longer have power to pierce other women's hearts as he has pierced hers. The affluence unexpectedly cast in her lap by the bony fingers of Death sets her and Tilling free to give themselves up unhampered to their self-imposed mission. On All-Souls' Day (November 2), 1866, as a sort of consecration of their resolve, husband and wife make a pilgrimage to the graves of Königgrätz. Martha describes the impressive scene:

"We had now reached the spot where most of the combatants lay buried,—friend and foe side by side. The place had been railed off as a graveyard, and hither streamed the greater number of the mourners, for in all likelihood it was here that their dead had been laid to rest. In this enclosure the bereaved ones knelt and gave vent to their sobs; here they hung up their wreaths and their votive lights.

"A tall, slender man, youthful and of distinguished aspect, wrapped in a general's mantle, approached the mound. The others fell back respectfully, and I heard voices whispering,—

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"'The Emperor' . . .

"Yes, it was Francis Joseph, the head of the State, the commander-in-chief, himself, who had come this All-Souls' Day to offer up a silent prayer for the dead children of the land, for its fallen warriors. He too stood with bowed, uncovered head, paying mournful tribute to the majesty of death. Long did he stand there motionless. I could not cease to gaze upon him. What were the thoughts that crowded through his mind, what feelings stirred his heart? It seemed to me as though I followed in the wake of his own sensations, as though it were given me to think the very thoughts passing athwart his low-bent head.

. . . "'You, my poor brave fellows . . . dead . . . and wherefore? We have not even conquered. . . . My Venice! lost! . . . So much, so much is lost! . . . your young lives, too. And you gave them with such generous sacrifice . . . for me. . . . Oh, that I could give them back again! Not for myself did I ask the sacrifice,—for your own, for your country's good, O sons of my empire, were you led into this war . . . and not through me, although at my word of command . . . was I not *forced* to utter that command? My subjects do not exist for my sake; it is for theirs I occupy the throne. . . . And at any moment would I be ready to die for my people's welfare. . . . Ah, had I but followed the impulse of my heart, refusing my assent when all those around me clamored for "War, war!" Yet . . . could I have withstood? God is my witness I could not. . . . What urged me, what compelled me. . . . I can no longer clearly define; but this much I do know: it was an irresistible pressure from without,—from yourselves, ye dead soldiers. . . . Oh, how sad, sad, sad! What unspeakable sufferings have been yours, and now you lie here and on other battle-fields, swept away by cartridges and sword-thrusts, by cholera and typhoid fever! . . . Oh, if I could but have said my "Nay;" you wanted it, Elizabeth. . . . Oh, that I had done so! The thought is unbearable that . . . Ah, it is a wretched, a blemished world . . . too much, too much of misery!'

"And still, while his thoughts went surging through me, my eyes were fixed upon him, and now it was, 'too much, too much of misery.' With both his hands he covered up his face and broke forth into bitter tears.

"Thus it came to pass that All-Souls' Day of 1866 upon the battle-field of Sadowa."

In 1868 and 1869, Friedrich and Martha visit Italy and Paris. They wish to learn how their question of questions is looked upon in other countries, and how they can themselves most effectually work into the hands of the scattered friends of arbitration and peace. Paris proves so stimulating and congenial, so promising a centre of action, that they determine to spend a portion of each year there in a home of their own. In the early spring of 1870 they return to the gay and brilliant city, which, as yet, is blissfully unaware of its impending fate. A suitable house, in process of erection, is in

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the market; the Tillings buy it, and their building operations detain them in town after the rest of the fashionable world has dispersed for the summer *villeggiatura*. In this way it comes about that the outbreak of war finds them in the midst of the excited *boulevardiers*, who are shouting themselves hoarse with cries of "À Berlin! À Berlin!" Nothing foreshadows the vast proportions the conflict is to assume, least of all that it will be fought out to the bitter end on French soil; so the pair of married lovers remain. And when day by day and hour by hour the situation grows more critical, and they at last prepare to leave, Martha, whose nervous system has been fearfully overwrought by continuous agitation, breaks down, and is threatened with brain fever. To remove her is no longer possible; shut up, consequently, in Paris, she and her husband have no choice but to go through all the experiences of the siege. Thus does a sequence of accidental circumstances lead to their becoming bystanders, while the whole series of tremendous events of the Franco-German war is enacted, from the hour when Prim offers Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern the crown of Spain to that dark day when the unchained, seething passions of the Commune hold Paris in their cruel grip. A dark day truly for Martha! A letter found upon Friedrich, bearing the postmark of Berlin, suffices to inflame the thirst for vengeance of a fanatical and infuriated mob. A wild cry goes up: "*À mort—à mort le Prussien!*" On the 1st of February, 1871, Tilling is dragged before a tribunal of "Patriots" . . . and shot as a spy!

The bare, bald outline of "Die Waffen nieder!" which is all I have been able to attempt, can give but a faint, feeble idea of its power and pathos, and none at all of the many light and humorous touches, the well-drawn minor characters, the thrilling episodes, the piquant glimpses of the great world of Austria and France, which relieve the gloom of the tragic story. Like a stream whose course we follow from source to ocean, the narrative flows on, embanked by events that form part of history, and carries us past a succession of ever-changing scenes. The two eminent qualities of the writer are her unsurpassed faculty for painting pictures that live, and

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her equal capacity for perceiving and turning to fullest account every resource that logical reasoning can furnish, wherewith to point the moral of those pictures.

The distinguished French critic, M. Francisque Sarcey, has been nicknamed by the wits of Paris "*Monsieur la scène à faire*," because of his persistency in exacting of the playwright that, from a given situation, he shall extract every moment of dramatic interest latent within it. Frau von Suttner sets to work on Monsieur Sarcey's lines. She has not overlooked or neglected a single point that bears on her case or can strengthen it. The first impressions of the nursery, the bribery of the toy-shop, the pernicious lessons of the dame, the schoolmaster, and the professor, the seductions of the drawing-room and the ball-room, the sophistries of the would-be patriot, the self-delusions of chivalrous youth, the traditions of courts and aristocracies, the conservatism of statesmen, the tenacity of vested interests, the glaring discrepancies between the precepts of Christianity and the practice of militant Christians, the false and foolish standards, the distorted ideals whereby individuals and nations shape conduct,—all these threads, and more, her shuttle has skilfully thrown to and fro and woven into a close web of argument there is no destroying. With Herr von Dunajewski one is inclined to say, on closing the book, The reader who can put it down unshaken in his belief that war is a necessary factor in modern life must be harder of heart than of head.

This position does not, however, imply a denial of the truth that war has been one of the prime formative influences of the human race. To ignore its large share in the training of mankind were alike unphilosophic and ungrateful. War has bred noble virtues; it has formed precious habits,—physical courage, endurance, self-sacrifice, ardor for impersonal objects, subordination of private interests to the common weal. During long ages it was, next to religion, the strongest of the disciplinary forces so indispensable to man, and the one best adapted to his early state. By slow degrees and many transitions it moulded the savage into the citizen; and perhaps—as a renowned philosopher has claimed for it—military disci-

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pline will to all time typify the spirit in which each one of us should serve the community. Be it more than ever open to the "soldier of humanity" to fight bloodless battles against the manifold evils that oppress his fellow-creatures, and to gain triumphant victories over ignorance and wrong-doing! But let us henceforth relegate actual, literal militarism and warfare to their resting-place in the pages of history and the pious memories of men, where slumber in honor so many other institutions and creeds, now effete, that have done splendid service in their day. We will embody them with the sum total of beneficent influences of the past to which we owe a deep and lasting debt. That debt we can best endeavor to repay by substituting new moral convictions and new moral forces for those we hold to be worn out. The era of science and industry, the *régime* of human providence, must rest on another basis than war.

FANNY HERTZ.

AUTHORITY IN THE SPHERE OF CONDUCT AND INTELLECT.

MR. LESLIE STEPHEN, in an article on "Cardinal Newman's Scepticism," recently published in the *Nineteenth Century* (1891, p. 188), says that the word "authority" may mean two different things. "Authority, when I speak as a historian or a man of science, is a name for evidence. Authority, as used by a lawyer, is a name for coercion, whether physical or moral."

I propose to use the word "authority" in the sense of the power which, in the sphere of conduct, in the long run determines our practice, and in the sphere of intellect in the long run determines our assent; admitting, at the same time, that the two spheres are by no means always distinct in human life as we know it.

It is not necessary for me to say a word on the importance of this subject, either in itself or in reference to the present time. Every one who observes human life at all must ac-

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knowledge that the desire for authoritative guidance is one of the most universal desires which men experience and express; and that the feeling of loyalty or devotion to the persons or institutions to whom, or to which, a man owes anything of his better life is, of all feelings, one of the noblest and the most commanding. This is true at all times and in all places, but at the present time the desire is felt to be especially urgent, because it is in so many cases unsatisfied. We live in a time of widely-diffused intellectual activity,—widely-diffused, I say advisedly and with emphasis, rather than deep or penetrating. A main consequence of this fact is that there are as many claimants for authority as there are moral and intellectual aspirations demanding it.

The desire for authoritative guidance may be observed to exist in two different forms, and issue in two different results, according to the moral constitution of the persons anxious to satisfy it. In this relation, human beings may be roughly divided into two classes: those who are capable of forming convictions, and those who are not. This division does not, it need hardly be said, correspond with the line of mere intellectual cleavage; it is not a division into clever people and stupid people. The capacity of forming convictions is a sign of power, but not exactly of intellectual power. On the other hand, great intellectual capacity, great versatility of talent, and manifold insight into things, need not imply any faculty of forming a real conviction. These gifts may serve no purpose but that of intensifying a sceptical tendency.

The history of human thought and action varies as either of these types of mind has, at any given time, the predominance. To the former class are due, in large measure, the great and sincere and constructive movements which re-awaken the moral forces which inspire society and social life. The demand of those minds for authority is answered by the moral passion which moves them; the rule which they set up is the embodiment of their own love of truth. The latter class form their convictions, or what stands for their convictions, upon scepticism, and thus tend to look for and find their authority, or governing principle, in mere force. Nothing is

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true, they say or think; the human intellect is impotent; therefore, let the majority of mankind with its traditional institutions, its received opinions and conventions, be our deity. Weary of reason, or disappointed at the results of its efforts, they fall back for guidance on the irrational elements in life.

It has long seemed to me that during the last quarter of a century we have been suffering under what I venture to call a disorder of this kind.* The intellectual tendency of this period has been towards laborious collection of facts in the special spheres of particular sciences, natural and historical. Little, if anything, however, of first-rate importance, even in effort and intention, has been produced in the way of comprehensive thinking. John Stuart Mill is dead; Lotze is dead; Herbert Spencer is an old man, and who is to succeed him? The tone of literature, where it is not merely dull or conventional or sentimental, is that of a moody pessimism, or, at best, a clever and impatient scepticism. The danger of a reaction against the true liberal spirit, by which I mean the spirit of free mental and moral effort, is a real one, In the highest of all spheres, that of morals and religion, we are now face to face with a tendency to rest in half-beliefs, to decry the effort of real thinking as a superannuated folly, to accept traditional opinions as if, because traditional, they represented accomplished facts; in short, to found a system of orthodoxy and conservatism upon scepticism and distrust.

Yet liberalism, or the movement in favor of mental and moral freedom, though not so powerfully represented in England as it was some thirty years ago, is no less vital in its essential characteristics. Its leading representatives at that time were John Stuart Mill and Thomas Carlyle. There were certain weaknesses or limitations in the teaching of both these great men which have tended to impair the permanency of its force. Neither, so far as I know, succeeded in giving a

* This sceptical tendency seems to have begun, in the nineteenth century, with Joseph de Maistre, who characteristically opens his defence of the principle of authority with an attack upon Locke. But it has assumed various forms, and is very differently represented, for instance, by de Maistre, by John Henry Newman, and by recent popular writers such as W. H. Mallock.

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thoroughly satisfactory answer to the question which I am endeavoring to discuss.

Mill's contribution to the movement which he represented seems to have been twofold, lying partly in the moral force and concentration of the man himself, partly in his protest against existing authority in those cases in which it appeared to him to embody injustice. His "Essay on Liberty," published in 1859, is a masterly exposition of his principles. It is a noble protest against the tyranny of society and legislation, but, as it stands, will seem incomplete to minds which require the statement of some positive principle which, whatever its embodiment, is to take the place of society and legislation.

Carlyle, who felt more strongly than Mill did where the weak side of contemporary liberalism lay, made a real attempt to set up a positive authority in the shape of the great men of history. Perhaps, if Mill had been asked the question, he would have answered that men ought to be content with the simple "love of loving-kindness," and to ask for no further light. This would probably have appeared to Carlyle an inadequate, if not a sentimental, answer. However this may be, there seems to be no doubt that Carlyle set himself seriously to inquire what had been the ruling force in human history, and to have found the answer in the characters and actions, much more the characters than the actions, of great men. But he executed his task in too crude and hasty a manner, and though, as I believe, he struck upon the right path, he did not succeed in satisfying his age. His action was too much confined to asserting the greatness of great men; in what that greatness consisted, and where its permanent influence lay, he does not seem to me to have asked with sufficient seriousness.

In this brief and fragmentary article I shall make no pretence of treating the subject exhaustively, or even thoroughly. I shall attempt only so much as is possible to one who lives outside the serious study of philosophy, and who can do nothing but record his observations on the facts of modern civilized society as they have presented themselves to him.

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Starting from the point of view of liberalism, and speaking in complete sympathy with its principle and tendency, I would ask whether it is not possible, after all, for its representatives to take up a more positive ground than was occupied by the liberal philosopher of thirty years ago. I shall first ask what are the chief existing seats of authority recognized by modern society in the spheres of conduct and intellect; and then inquire whether any common and permanent principle can be discovered which underlies them all.

Roughly speaking, one may distinguish four different kinds of authority, which, although mutually connected, and indeed inseparable, in fact, suggest convenient landmarks to guide us in the discussion. These are (1) the authority of law, (2) the authority of religious bodies, (3) the authority of society or public opinion, (4) the authority of great men.

Do these various authorities rest upon any permanent principle? If so, on what? and why is the principle permanent?

I shall try to show, in answer, that the permanent element of authority, in all of them, is the moral feeling or conviction of the society which they affect; that where they are imperfect, or transitory, there they fall short of, or imperfectly represent, this moral feeling; that the authority of no one set of laws, of no one religious body, of no one society, of no one man, can be permanent; that at any given time the only absolute authority for the individual is his conscience, or his free moral conviction; that where this gives an uncertain answer, which it seldom does, recourse must be had to the moral feeling of mankind; or, failing that, to the moral feeling of the society to which he feels himself morally most nearly attached; that the cases of conflict, so arising, are inevitable, owing to the fact that the moral vision of every individual and every society is limited; but that the conflict is the means by which the moral force is asserting itself, and struggling for harmonious expression; that the conflict tends to a balance of moral forces and an ultimate agreement.

In all this I am obliged, for the mere sake of making way, to assume the liberty of using the words *morality*, *conscience*, and *freedom*, in their ordinary and popular sense; and I shall

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also assume the truth of a theory, which is, of course, disputed, that the moral sense and moral action, whatever their ultimate origin, are, as they now exist, *sui generis*, and cannot be included in any other class of feeling or action, such as the desire for pleasure in any form, or the exercise of the reason.*

(1) The authority of law is that with which we are all most immediately familiar. It may be said generally that law represents such part of social enactment and social demand as society allows to be carried openly into effect by physical force. You commit a robbery or forgery; if detected, you are imprisoned; you wrong your wife or your husband; the law takes it out of your power to wrong them further; you commit a murder, if detected, you are hanged. The court, the judge, the prison, the policeman, the scaffold, represent the power of law.

The spirit of liberalism has been generally adverse to the extension of the power of law into spheres where it is other than restrictive or preventive, and, on the whole, the spirit of liberalism may be said to have prevailed in modern states. Even in cases which appear to contradict this statement, in such cases as those of the English Factory Acts, Poor Law, Education Acts, Criminal Law Amendment Acts, and the like, enlightened legislators would probably argue that their aim was mainly if not entirely protective. The Factory and Vaccination Acts fairly admit of being represented as protective of life; the Criminal Law Amendment Act as protective of freedom. Legislation, such as that of which we have examples in the Poor Law and Compulsory Education Acts, does not, it is true, admit so easily of being viewed in this light; the wrong persons probably regard it as a preservative against barbarism and against revolution.

What is the permanent element in the authority of law?

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* I might perhaps have used the word *social* for *moral*, but I prefer the older term, though the moral character of an act seems to me to consist entirely in its unselfishness. This is fully recognized in ordinary thought and language. An unselfish act is regarded as good or moral in the doer, though its consequences may be disastrous; a selfish act may have excellent consequences, but no one calls it good or moral in the doer.

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As regards conduct, its strength may be said generally to lie in its antiquity. I do not mean, of course, that a new law is not in many cases as binding as an old one. But I mean that society does not, as a rule, appeal to law—that is, to the employment of open force—unless the social demand for the employment of open force is, in the particular case, of long standing; and that the effectiveness of the law when thus appealed to is in direct proportion to the length of its standing. If a law is passed in satisfaction of a sudden or temporary demand, it soon ceases to be effective.

Those laws, the authority of which is most readily taken for granted in modern society, such laws, for instance, as secure the possession of private property and protect the institution of marriage, represent the social institutions, arrangements, and customs which can claim the highest antiquity. And they can claim the highest antiquity only because they represent the oldest moral feeling of the community, or, in other words, because they are the earliest creations of the moral force.

Still, confining ourselves to the sphere of conduct, we shall easily see that the very antiquity which gives law its strength may also be its weakest point. When the law is found to be at variance with the moral sense of the community, it will usually be found to be behind it. The law, for instance, has in times past imposed restrictions, as in the case of the exclusion of the Jews from Parliament, or the limitation of the right of voting for members of Parliament; the moral sense of the community demands and obtains their abolition. Or immoral institutions or customs, institutions or customs which in the long run are found to be injurious to society, have been allowed to exist in security—the slave-trade, for instance, or the traffic in young girls. The moral sense of the community demands that the law should turn its arm against them. Or unjust institutions have been protected; for instance, the husband's rights over the wife's property. The moral sense of the community demands and obtains the abolition of these rights. Thus law is continually being brought abreast of moral feeling, without the support of which the constable is powerless.

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It is then the general moral sense of society which gives to law its permanent authority. No prudent government will either try to resist a demand supported by this general moral sense, or force on legislation which, though in itself beneficial, is obviously in advance of it.

There is little to be said upon the influence of law in the sphere of intellect. In civilized states there are but few instances in which the law attempts to prescribe how men are to think. The tendency of civilization is to allow the law to meddle less and less with the intellectual life of society.

(2) At this point we pass, by an easy transition, to consider what elements of permanence there are in the authority of *religious bodies*. A religious body or a church is, so far as it can be, a theocracy. There are few, if any, churches which, if they had the power, would not extend their authority over the whole of human life. In modern times, the main difference between the secular authority and any religious authority is this, that while the law only imposes restrictions on conduct, the religious authority claims supremacy in the intellectual sphere as well. It says not only "This thou shalt do, and this thou shalt not do," but also, "This thou shalt believe, and this thou shalt not believe,"—and this, from the very nature of the case, in the highest spheres attainable by human thought.

In matters of conduct, the churches generally represent a higher moral standard than that of the law, and this fact is one of the reasons, perhaps the most solid and respectable reason, of the perpetual conflict between church and state. The contest is, in Europe, as old as Christianity; for, outside of the pale of Judaism, it was in Christianity that religion first embodied itself as a social force. Leaving on one side all debatable points, we may confidently assert that the success of Christianity in its earlier stages was due to the fact that the Christians opposed an organized society, based upon ethical principles, to an imperfectly instructed government. The intellect of the Græco-Roman world had not penetrated far enough to understand the necessity, or to attempt in practice the organization of social life. Add to this the facts

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that the principles of political economy were not understood at all, that taxation was based upon wrong principles, and that scientific knowledge was not, to any great extent, applied to beneficent inventions, and it will be easily seen that the lot of the poor and of the slaves throughout the Roman empire was likely to be a hard one. The Roman aristocracy had the genius for deciding cases of dispute between individuals, and their law is one of the greatest monuments of human intellectual effort. They were masters of the machinery of organization, and their roads united into a whole the distant parts of their empire. But they did not know how to improve life or bring it forward, and they were unequal to the problem of dealing with the poor and miserable. It was to these first that Christianity, with its binding ordinances, based upon the ancient and indestructible laws of the moral nature, gave new life and new hopes. Had its basis been any other, nothing could have saved it from perishing amid its errors and its dissensions. It is hardly necessary to mention any among the thousand instances in which religious bodies in Europe, since the appearance of Christianity, have used their influence in destroying or modifying immoral customs and institutions.

It is the other pretension, the pretension to dictate to the intellect, which weakens the authority of religious bodies, and will, so long as it is effectively put forward, destroy the permanence of that authority. A constant struggle, one of the most tragical of all struggles, has long gone on between the churches and the progressive intellect of mankind. The conscience—I will not limit the term by saying the intellectual conscience—of the leading men imposes on them the duty of practising intellectual honesty, a virtue at all times rare, and in a democratic society perhaps the rarest of all. The conscience of the religious community has been taught that its practice is strictly dependent on certain beliefs. Hence the churches are continually tending to lapse into what is neither more nor less than an immoral position. They find themselves under the necessity either of expelling from their midst the men who have, so far as is possible to man, attained the truth, or are conscientiously trying to attain it, or of carrying

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on a hypocritical coquetry with error. Now, it is much easier for a society to make unavowed alterations in its theories than to change the form of its practice; and the religious bodies accordingly, in view of their corporate interest, adopt, if they can, the former alternative. Thus the outward coherence of the society is maintained; but at what a price! At the price of keeping alive the rivalries and animosities of the various churches, and preventing the co-operation of good men, as though the forces of evil could be met with a divided front; at the price, also, of attempting impossible compromise, debauching the reason, and helping on the ruin of the thinking power, the noblest gift, as its exercise is the noblest prerogative of mankind.

The religious life, to be of any value, must spring from the centre of a man's moral being, and absorb the whole of it. "Mine own with usury;" "mine own" includes the entirety of the loan. The religion which represents only a part of the man will die off, and perhaps corrupt the other part.

The conclusion to which these considerations seem to point is that, in the case of these moral questions, the importance of which can be immediately seen and generally grasped, the authority of the church is likely to be permanent; but that in the sphere of speculation it will almost certainly be transitory. A strong and united organization may be necessary for moral as for political purposes; but the wise course is to break it up when it has done the work for which it was called into existence. Even now a tendency may be observed towards a union in practical moral effort on the part of churches widely divided on points of doctrine.

(3) *The authority of society or of public opinion.* In modern Europe this is, or is tending to be, stronger than that of law and of the religious bodies. Society, on the whole, supports the open force which is the arm of the law, and adds to it a more formidable power, that of public opinion. Public opinion is dominant from end to end of human life, from the region of mere fashion to that of moral action, and even of intellectual belief. Its force can hardly be exaggerated. Say of an action, "Cela ne se fait pas" ("we do not do that"), and

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it is doomed. This tremendous engine will become stronger as social conditions are more equalized, and what is called the democratic type of government develops itself. Let us inquire where the authority of public opinion is permanent, and where it is not, or should not be.

In the whole sphere of feeling, and of action which depends upon feeling, it is nearly irresistible; I had almost said absolutely irresistible, but for the fact that great men have at all times been found who could dare to stand up and face it. If public feeling allow it, you can put a man to lingering torture or a painful death. If public feeling forbid this, the man will probably be rescued by the mob, or vengeance will be taken upon his judges and executioners. In our own days we have seen that boycotting and its cruel sanctions may command, or seems to command, the respectful admiration of literary men.

The *vox populi* is at the same time the present dread of the saint and the philosopher, and their hope for the future. If they dare, in the interest of moral and rational progress, to defy it, they become heroes and martyrs; but in the hour of their martyrdom, they are sustained by the knowledge that at some distant day the power which now seems to be their conqueror will bow before their prophetic insight.

Public opinion is then the strongest available force which can be invoked in the cause of humanity, and of all the graces, charities, and sanctities of life. It is permanently powerful when enlisted on the moral side; but only then. Its weakness lies in the fact that it represents not only the deep moral feelings of the community, but its superficial notions. Its dictates are nearly as imperative in the one sphere as in the other. It crushes the weak; it worships success, strength, and riches, the symbol of strength; its golden calves are conspicuous in every market-place. It affects to set up its laws in the higher regions of speculation, with the result that the great pioneers of progress are generally its enemies. It attempts to make every question a social question; to render its notions fashionable, to get them represented in high places, and adopted by the powerful. It says to the philosopher,

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"Think as we do;" to the artist, "Give up your high aspirations, and paint or sing as we like."

(4) There is, however, a power, which in the long run proves itself stronger even than that of public opinion, and which public opinion is constantly, though in vain, endeavoring to crush,—that of great men, the leaders of moral feeling and intellectual activity. It is curious to observe what concessions it is at all times tacitly making to their direction. The history of religious opinion in England during the last thirty years affords some striking examples. English society as a whole professes to be Christian in the sense of orthodox Protestantism, but it does not like the alteration of any of its formulæ. The influence of many leading moralists and religious teachers has, however, done much during the last century to create a hatred of cruelty; and accordingly many religious persons dislike the damnatory clauses of the Athanasian Creed. If they do not openly revolt against them they say to themselves that the framers of those clauses, whatever they said, could not have meant it. Leading men of science, again, have succeeded in making public opinion uneasy on the subject of miracles, or at least unwilling to think about them. Habits of intellectual compromise have thus grown up with regard to this question, which are probably spreading, and occasionally find expression in remarkable theories; such, for instance, as that the Almighty has throughout history taught mankind by "illusions," and that while particular events, which two thousand years ago were regarded as miraculous, may really have occurred, they need not be regarded as miraculous any longer.

It seems at first impossible to indicate any element of permanence in the influence of great men. And yet no fact in every-day life is commoner than devotion to some leader, than hero-worship of some kind or other.

Great or leading men are always distinguished by general power and insight, by a force which in the mind seems analogous to physical force in the body, a force which imposes itself at once, the faculty of command. This superiority may be manifested in an exceptional group of facts, or in an ex-

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ceptional insight into human action, the human heart, and human motives; or in an exceptional tenderness and power of sympathy; or in all these combined.

Difficult as the subject is, it seems possible to distinguish a permanent and a transitory element in the influence or authority of great men.

The influence of a great man is permanent in direct proportion to the extent of its beneficence; or, in other words, it is the more or less lasting according as it tends more or less to improve and consolidate society. Frederick II. made Prussia a nation and a power in Europe. Napoleon Bonaparte, if we may believe M. Taine and others, founded the modern French polity; modern Italy owes its existence to Cavour and Garibaldi. The private weaknesses or vices of these men are forgotten in the memory of their public services. The names of great scientific men are remembered in virtue of the permanent effect produced by their discoveries upon the life of mankind. The foibles and littlenesses of Voltaire we pass over, remembering his great services to the cause of mercy and truth.

It may safely be said that, however unjust posterity may be (and unjust it very often is) to the memory of good men, the name of no great man will live as a centre of authority whose efforts have been anti-social, or in so far as they have been anti-social. It is not merely personal ascendency, or strong passions, or intellectual power which has assured the great men their permanent position. Their influence depends on the intensity of their unselfish effort, the greatness of their social achievement, the width of the social interests which their effort and achievement embraces. Hence it happens, as a rule, that intellectual greatness alone, even where it is not crippled by moral defects, obtains tardier recognition than the greatness of the statesman or the saint.

The progress of knowledge, and intellectual advance in general, seems at first sight to be the least moral of all great tendencies, and hence the jealousy of them so often shown by society at large. But it should be remembered that every new piece of knowledge gained, whether positive or negative,

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marks the starting-point of a new duty. "This is true; therefore this must be believed, or this must be done: this is false; therefore it must be disbelieved or avoided." In no case can the *savant* or scholar escape the moral relation. Sooner or later it becomes his duty to proclaim the truth that is in him, and no one can exaggerate the danger which he may have to incur, or the height of moral effort which may be implied in encountering it. The martyr's death may be necessary, but it is the birth-throe of a new life for the community, who give him his reward in their acknowledgment that it is for them and for their higher humanity that he dares and suffers.

Indeed, in the constitution of authority, the services of great men are by far the most important element. We are apt to think of great things as done by the consent of the masses; and no doubt the *momentum* of this consent is of enormous weight. But there is seldom any permanent unanimity among men without a leader to embody and emphasize their aspirations. Seldom, too, does it happen that these aspirations are not first anticipated and expressed by a great man. The most fatal error which any community can commit is to crush its men of genius. It is in their insight and anticipations that the future of society lies in the germ.

The position and authority of a great man is the absolute reverse of that which belongs to law and to general opinion. The man goes forward, and represents the future; law, and to a great extent social opinion, represent the past. The man is in peril; law and society are, or think themselves, safe. The man seems to die and to be forgotten, but lives; law and social opinion seem to be alive, though they may be dead.

As I said at the beginning of this article, four kinds of existing authority may for the sake of convenience be distinguished, but they are, in fact, organically connected. I have tried to argue that every kind of authority, where permanent, rests on a moral or a social basis, and that where it rests on any other foundation, it sooner or later crumbles away. It is not necessary in this place to attempt a complete definition of a moral act, or to inquire what is the origin of moral ideas.

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One may fairly appeal to the acknowledged fact that mankind tends to recognize certain acts, or conditions, as absolutely desirable, and certain others as absolutely intolerable. The real aim of society, the goal of progress where progress is desired, is the development of the moral sense as the safeguard of humanity. It is not material prosperity, nor even freedom from pain. A particular movement in the history of mankind may appear to have material prosperity, or freedom from pain, as its object; but no one would admit that these are the absolute object of the general movement of human feeling. What men aim at in reality is not a merely negative freedom from restraint or from trouble, but the constitution of freedom for spontaneous moral action, or (in other words) for healthy social action.

Where, then, at any given time, is the seat of authority in conduct and intellect to be found?

For each individual the absolute guide can, in the long run, be no other than his own conscience. By conscience I mean moral feeling. The individual conscience generally, to a great extent, reflects the common conscience of society; but it is, of course, equally true that every individual has a peculiar conscience of his own, that moral feeling does not exist in every one to the same extent, and that, consequently, there is never a time when a conflict is not going on, both between good men individually, and between different bodies of men in the same society. It may be urged, on the other hand, that the conflict between one good man and another is due not to the better, but to the worse, part in each. In every man there is a dead and a living part, so to speak, of the moral self. The conflict between good men is a conflict of the worser elements in their being. Again, the conflict between great men—saints or philosophers—and society is due to the fact that the conscience of the saint or philosopher is far more alive than that of the society in which he lives, and is therefore in advance of it. The conflict between different bodies in the same society may be, and often is, in great measure a conflict of material interests, in which case it does not concern our inquiry. If it is anything better, the same may be said of it

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as of the conflicts between good men, that it is due to imperfect moral apprehension on one side or on both.

When the individual conscience is in doubt, recourse is generally had to some external authority. This ought to be the recorded moral experience of the past, as summed up by the great moral pioneers of all ages and countries. It should be looked for, not in the laws set up by any one body of men, but, so far as possible, in the actual moral tradition and practice of mankind, interpreted according to the circumstances of the inquirer.

In the sphere of intellect, on the other hand, authority is generally to be looked for in the utterances of the living leaders of intellectual life; I say the living leaders, because the conclusions and discoveries of the past are generally embodied in record and practice, and the demand for fresh light can only be met by the men who are actually engaged in the intellectual labors of the age.

New intellectual results are more readily accepted than new moral results, because a change in thought may easily take place without any serious social displacement, while a change in conduct, if hastily adopted, cannot possibly do so. And, in any case, the final moral consummation can only be realized by a series of conflicts, perhaps deadly and tragical. But these conflicts are, after all, healthy and natural, for the *odium morale*, like the *odium theologicum*, is only an evidence of the seriousness with which the combatants realize their object.

H. NETTLESHIP.

DISCUSSIONS.

THE THEORY OF PUNISHMENT.

IN the last number of this JOURNAL, two articles were devoted to the discussion of this question: "The Theory of Punishment," by the Rev. Hastings Rashdall, and "The Prevention of Crime," by Dr. Tönnies, of the University of Kiel. Both articles may be taken as representative of the protest against the older or retributive theory, and of the

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demand for the substitution for it of the "deterrent" and "reformative" theories. The change in our view of punishment, urged by these writers, is one which a growing number, not only of ethical thinkers, but also of practical philanthropists, hold to be necessary. The new "Science of Criminology," though not the International Criminological Association, is founded upon the theory that crime is "a pathological phenomenon," a "disease," a form of "insanity," an "inherited or acquired degeneracy." * The proper treatment of the criminal is, accordingly, that which seeks his cure rather than his punishment. Prisons must be superseded by hospitals, asylums, and reformatories.

Now, an advance in human feeling, as well as in intelligence, is to be seen in this movement, both in its theoretical and in its practical aspects; an advance from the hard, blind desire for justice and the unrelenting and unreasonable spirit of vindictiveness to a gentler and wiser humanity. *Summum jus summa injuria.* Besides, society is now so securely organized that it can afford to be not only just, but generous as well. The question which I wish to raise is, whether the newer and the older views of punishment are mutually exclusive, and, if not, what is their relation to one another. I wish to ask whether the *substitution* of the deterrent and reformative for the retributive view is ethically sound, or whether, in our recoil from the older view, we are not in danger of going to the opposite extreme, and losing the "seed of truth" in that "evil thing."

We must acknowledge, to begin with, that the new theory can point to many facts for its basis. The general principle of heredity is operative in the sphere of crime and vice no less than in that of virtue. We might almost say that the criminal "is born, not made," or, rather, that he is *more* born than made. Crime seems to be almost as "instinctive" in some natures as goodness is in others. This instinctive tendency to evil, developed by favorable circumstances or "environment,"

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* *Cf.* Dr. Donaldson, "Ethics as applied to Criminology," in the *Journal of Mental Science*, January, 1891.

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blooms in the criminal act and in the life of crime. There is a criminal class, a kind of caste, which propagates itself. Crime is a profession, with a "code of honor" and an etiquette of its own, almost a vocation, calling for a special aptitude, moral and intellectual. Have we not here a great "pathological phenomenon," a "disease" to be cured, not punished?

But we cannot carry out the "pathological" idea. It is only an analogy or metaphor after all, and, like all metaphors, may easily prove misleading, if taken as a literal description of the facts. We distinguish cases of "criminal insanity" from cases of "crime" proper. In the former, the man is treated as a patient, is confined or restrained, is "managed" by others. But he is, by acknowledgment, so much less a *man* because he may be treated in this way; he is excused for that which in another would have been punished as a crime; he is not held accountable for his actions. The kleptomaniac, for example, is not punished, but excused. Are we to say that the difference between these actions and crimes proper is only one of degree, and that the criminal is always a pathological or abnormal specimen of humanity? Do all criminals "border close on insanity"? Even if so, we must recognize, among bad as well as among good men, a border-line between the sane and the insane; to resolve all badness into insanity does not conduce to clear thinking. A point may indeed be reached in the life of crime as in the life of vice generally, after which a man shall cease to be himself, and may therefore be treated as a "thing" rather than as a "person;" a point after which, self-control being lost, external control must take its place. But normal crime, if it has anything to do with insanity, is rather its cause than its result.

To reduce crime to a "pathological phenomenon" is to sap the very foundations of our moral judgments; merit as well as demerit, reward as well as punishment, are thereby undermined. Such a view may be scientific; it is not ethical, for it refuses to recognize the commonest moral distinctions. After all these explanations have been given, there is always an unexplained residuum, the man himself. A man knows himself from the inside as it were; and a man does not excuse *himself*

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on such grounds. Nor would the majority of men, however "criminal," be willing to have their crimes put down to the account of "insanity"; most men would resent such a rehabilitation of their morals at the expense of their "intellects."

This leads us to remark a second impossibility in the theory, viz.,—that the ordinary criminal, whether he is a pathological specimen or not, will not submit to be treated as a "patient" or a "case." For he, like yourself, is a *person*, and insists on being respected as such; he is not a *thing* to be passively moulded by society according to *its* ideas, either of its own convenience or of his good. Even the criminal man will not give up his self-control, or put himself in your hands and *let* you cure him. His will is his own, and he alone can reform himself. He will not become the patient of society to be operated upon by it. The appeal, in all attempts at reformation, must be to the man himself; his sanction must be obtained, and his co-operation secured, before reformation can begin. He is not an automaton, to be regulated from without. The State cannot annex the individual; be he criminal or saint, his life is his own and its springs are deep within. It is a truism to say, but it has to be repeated in the present connection, that all moral control is ultimately self-control.

In virtue of his manhood or personality, then, the criminal must be convinced of the righteousness of the punishment. Possessing, as he does, the universal human right of private judgment, the right to question and criticise according to his own inner light, he must be made to see that the act of society *is* a punishment or retribution, and to accept it as such; he must see the *righteousness* of the punishment before it can work out in him its peaceable *fruits* of righteousness. Here, in the force of this inner appeal, in such an awakening of the man's slumbering conscience, lies the ethical value of punishment. Without this element, you have only a superficial view of it as an external force operating upon the man. Such a violent procedure may be necessary, especially in the earlier measures of society for its own protection. But it is not to be taken as the type of penal procedure, nor is it effective beyond a very narrow range. A man may be restrained in this

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way from a particular act of crime on a particular occasion; but the criminal nature in him is not touched, the criminal instincts are not extirpated,—they will bloom again in some other deed of crime. The deepest warrant for the effectiveness of punishment as a deterrent and reformative agent is found in its moral basis as an act of retribution. True reformation comes only with the acceptance of the punishment, by mind and heart, as the fruit of the act. For punishment thus becomes a kind of revelation to the man of the true significance of his character and life. A man may thus be *shocked* into a better life. For "accidental" calamity, or for suffering which he has not brought upon himself, a man does not condemn himself. Such self-condemnation comes only with insight into the retributive nature of the calamity. It is just this element of retribution that converts "calamity" or "misfortune" into "punishment." Mr. Rashdall virtually acknowledges this when he admits that the "conviction of the external strength of the moral law will not make a man morally better, unless the external judgment is ratified and confirmed by the appellate tribunal of his own conscience." That is to say, the judgment of society upon the man must become the judgment of the man upon himself, if it is to be effective as an agent in his reformation. This private re-enactment of the social judgment comes with the perception of retribution.

But apart from all argument, the fact and the truth of retribution lie too deep in the experience of mankind to be eradicated. The idea of retribution is the root-idea of tragedy, ancient and modern. By the Greeks as well as by the Hebrews any breach of the moral order, which was considered as divine, was regarded as fraught with inevitable disaster. "Fate," like "Jehovah," was "a Power which made for righteousness." Sin was conceived by the Hebrews as a "transgression" of divine law, by the Greeks as ὕβρις, or a going beyond the "measure" set by the gods to human life. By both punishment was regarded as the vindication or re-establishment of the broken order. On the Shakespearian stage we see again and again the same drama being played, the same inevitable sequence of suffering upon sin. Even Mill

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acknowledges that the idea is at the basis of the modern "sentiment of justice," and that "it is entitled to consideration in a world like ours in which punishment is really necessary." * Mill, it is true, calls the sentiment a mere "animal impulse;" but that is no real disparagement, for all our natural impulses may be so described,—they all need to be "moralized." However we may interpret it, the conception of retribution is "an inexpugnable element of the moral consciousness."

But even the Greeks saw that the divine punishments are not *merely* retributive, but purifying, and, in a sense, redemptive as well. "For Elektra and Antigone we feel that suffering has purified the character. Antigone dies, but for Elektra the curse of the race has spent itself in suffering; her spirit is moulded into sympathy with law and the government of the world." † Punishment is not a mere barren vindication of the divine order; it has an "effect on character," and moulds *that* to order. And now that Christianity has brought home to us this brighter side of punishment, this beneficent possibility in all suffering, it is still less philosophical to separate the retributive from the reformative purpose of punishment. The question is not, as Mr. Rashdall states it, "whether, *apart* from its effects, there would be any moral propriety in the mere infliction of pain for pain's sake." Why separate the act from its "effects" in this way? In reality they are inseparable. The punishment need not be "for the sake of punishment, and for no other reason;" it need not be "modified for utilitarian reasons." The total conception of punishment may contain various elements indissolubly united. The question is, Which is the fundamental; out of which do the others grow? The answer is contained in the articles of the International Criminological Association, as quoted by Dr. Tönnies: "Punishment is an act of justice, and the essence of punishment is retribution. From this stand-point, satisfaction is the primary object of punishment, and the other objects include reforma-

* "Examination of Hamilton's Philosophy," p. 594, note. *Cf.* "Utilitarianism," chap. v.

† Professor Fairbanks in *International Journal of Ethics*, October, 1891 p. 87.

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tion and deterrence." Nor do I see that such a theory of punishment is open to the charge of "syncretism." I should rather call it synthetic and concrete, as taking account of all the elements and exhibiting their correlation. Might we not sum up these elements in the word "discipline," meaning thereby that the end of punishment is so to bring home to a man such a sense of guilt as to work in him a deep repentance for the evil past, and a new obedience for the time to come?

Whether, or how far, such a conception of punishment can be carried out by the state is another question. Its realization would mean that the state should stand to the individual *in loco parentis*,—that the state is the great moral educator. Such a "paternal" function is, at any rate, no less practicable for the state than the curative function assigned to it by the theory we have been considering; for the latter function, to be effectively discharged, would imply an exhaustive "diagnosis" of each criminal "case." But we are coming once more to realize, what the Greeks realized so perfectly, that the state has a moral end, that its function is not the merely negative or "police" one of protection of individual from individual, but the moral education and development of the individual himself. It is, indeed, mainly to the external and inadequate modern conception of the state that we must trace the external and, I have sought to show, inadequate view of punishment as primarily deterrent, and (even when reformative) undertaken for the protection of society from the individual rather than in the interests of the individual himself. Civil punishment is, or ought to be, undertaken in the interests of the moral individual; it is one of the arrangements of the state, which is the individual's moral "sphere." Deepest of all, such punishment is a vindication of that moral order, of which the civil order is a part. And although the punishment by the state is at best but a clumsy imitation of the subtler and far more just punishment of nature or of God, clumsier and less just even than the undefined social penalties, it is yet an all-important factor in the moral development of the individual. In all punishment, domestic, social and even civil, justice should be tempered with mercy and compassion. Does not

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nature, if she punishes, also heal, and with a tenderness all her own? And has not Christianity taught us that forgiveness may do what punishment cannot? Yet we must remember that there is a moral order, of which the physical and the civil orders are parts, and that any breach of that order must be rectified. Such rectification *is* punishment.

The view of punishment which has been under discussion is one among other manifestations of the present tendency of ethical thought to "explain" the moral man by resolving him into certain forces or factors. But *a man's a man*, and is not to be "explained." Neither the intellectual nor the moral man, neither the saint nor the blackguard, is to be resolved into "factors of evolution." You shall never reduce immorality, any more than morality, to an "exact science." Human nature is not "exact." The new "Science of Criminology" is a part of Mill's "Science of Ethology," the impossibility of which was convincingly shown by Mr. Ward in the July number of this JOURNAL.

JAMES SETH.

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THE LABOR CHURCH IN MANCHESTER.

MR. JOHN TREVOR, formerly assistant to Mr. P. H. Wicksteed in London, and now in charge of the Upper Brook Street Free Church in Manchester, has recently started an institution of a somewhat novel character. He calls it "Labor Church." What he means by this may be best gathered from the following account, taken from a circular which he issued last July:

"The churches are making great efforts to bring religion into the lives of the people, and these efforts have in many directions met with considerable success. This has been especially the case where those leading the movement have recognized the fact that religion must affect not only the personal but also the social condition of those who are influenced by it. A new confidence in religious teachers has been awakened among the working classes, and a new hope is arising that the churches may be able to give them some practical help in improving their lives.

"While this is undoubtedly the case, those who have been most active in promoting popular services, and the various social enterprises now considered

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essential to active church life, appear to admit with sorrow that very few indeed of the workers themselves are attracted to any religious organization, or give practical assistance to the work done for their own class. Men and women everywhere are willing to come and listen to smart addresses and good music, and, undoubtedly, many are benefited by what they hear. But they are not organized, they do not work, they will accept no responsibility, they do not give financial support to the movement. Everything is done for them, and they are simply willing to be catered for.

"It is obvious that religious work of this kind, however valuable, is not thorough enough to satisfy those who sincerely desire to give to the people a religion at once personal and social,—a religion which shall both mould their character and improve the conditions of their lives. It must be obvious, too, to those who know what the working men are, that these popular services and other agencies have not taken hold of the best men of their class. There are hundreds and thousands of the workers who are in earnest about something, who are willing to organize themselves, to undertake responsibilities, and to give both money and time towards carrying forward the work in which they are engaged. These men are not found about our churches, save in the very smallest numbers. These are they who are fully awake to the adverse social conditions under which they have to toil for their livelihood, and who too often regard religion as having nothing to do with the improvement of their lot. The men, on the other hand, who are attracted by these popular services, and all the various attractive methods of the churches, are not those who are most awake to the problems which poverty and drunkenness and crime present.

"The next step forward in developing religious life, and improving social conditions in our land, must be to bring religion into practical harmony with the working men who are really alive and in earnest about the elevation of their class. If these men are manifesting little interest in the churches, and in the social work they are doing, it is because the preponderating bulk of religious influence in our country is still opposed to their advancement, and also because, even when religion does appear to take their part, it is usually in such a mild manner that it becomes questionable to them whether active opposition would not be preferable. The churches have not shown themselves strong enough, whether in character or in intelligence, to deal thoroughly with the social facts so painfully real to the enlightend artisan. The burden of prejudice rests too strongly upon them, and the best men among their leaders have too often to spend much of their strength in overcoming the opposition of their own supporters to the advanced position they hold.

"The question for us, then, is: Cannot religion be presented in such a form that it shall become a real power and inspiration in the lives of these earnest and clear-headed working men? Cannot a religious organization be formed which, while supporting them in their daily life and social work, shall in turn be cordially supported by them? Those who know the working men best will surely admit that such a presentation of religion, and such a religious organization, must be possible, otherwise we might as well give up our belief in religion altogether. For it is needless to point out that the character given to these men, by those who oppose their efforts for freedom, is a grossly false one."

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Mr. Trevor goes on to say that he is anxious to make an experiment on new lines:

"The problem is, not merely attraction, but organization; not merely to attract the semi-indifferent, but to organize those who are in real earnest about the problems of life; and further, to set them about arousing the semi-indifferent which at present wander from service to service, and the utterly indifferent who go nowhere. To this end I propose to organize a Labor Church, which shall include what, for want of a better name, may be called the Labor Program, with a distinct recognition of God's government of the world, and of the need, in every sphere of life, to obey the laws He has revealed to us. A church frankly founded upon such a basis as this, and conducted with a reasonable amount of intelligence, will, I am convinced, awaken a new enthusiasm for religion among those who, in the interest of society itself, most need it; and will provide these men with a higher conception of life, which they in their turn may impart to their fellow-workers."

The Church to which Mr. Trevor refers has now been started in one of the public halls in Manchester, and has met with a surprising degree of success. The following interesting remarks with regard to one of the first meetings of the Church are taken from an article by Mr. Trevor in the *Workman's Times* (London) for October 23d:

"At the close of our large and enthusiastic meeting last Sunday afternoon, a working man came on to the platform to offer his services in helping forward our work. After some talk I said to him that we seemed rather like boys who had set light to a pile of straw near a stack, and the whole stack had caught fire, He, with the swing of the service still vibrating through him, warmly replied. 'It's not straw, sir, it's powder; and you have just applied the match. This thing,' he continued, 'has been in the hearts of working men for years past, and you have given voice to it.'

"Nothing could better illustrate the central aims of the Labor Church. While we mean to develop a very practical program as we gather our forces together, the bottom purpose of this movement is to give free expression to the religious life which has been dumbly moving in the hearts of the toilers, to let some fresh air into the heart of the stifled, smouldering fire which shall cause it to burst forth into a flame.

"To me the Labor movement is the great religious movement of our times. It works for emancipation. It develops self-sacrifice. The man who once clearly sees and feels the lot of the wage-slave, who once clearly sees and feels the lot that all might share, cannot choose but give himself up to the service of man. The power which through countless ages has been evolving a free manhood and womanhood from the material conditions of life has seized upon that man, has taken possession of him, and has made of him a prophet with a word from God to man. Such were the old Hebrew prophets, who pleaded for justice and love,

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and denounced tyranny and lies. Such was Jesus, the joiner, who loved the poor and oppressed, and uttered his terrible woes against the self-seekers and hypocrites who held them in bondage. Such have been Lamennais and Mazzini in this century, prophets whose message has still to be heeded by a world which made their life a cruel martyrdom.

"The true Labor movement partakes of the character of its greatest prophets. It emancipates man from materialism; it launches him on a career of self-sacrifice. Self-seekers may hang around it, Judases may carry the bag, but these do not represent the movement any more than the petty thieves who mingle with a demonstration of the unemployed represent the "out-of-works." No, the true representative of the Labor movement is John Burns, standing in the prisoner's dock after the Trafalgar Square riots; Ben Tillett, preaching at the dock gates the glad tidings of the tanner; or the poor Socialist, standing on an old wooden chair in the rain, shouting himself hoarse to catch a few stragglers.

"These are the men who represent God's power in the world. There are thousands of them in our land, varying in their ability and worth. Many of them are called atheists, infidels, self-seeking agitators, agents of the evil-one, stirring up strife on which they may grow fat. And some of these brave men, denounced by the official representatives of God, deny the God in whose name they are denounced, and submit, without retort, to be called atheists, so baffled and perplexed are they at finding the cry for righteousness which tears their hearts stigmatized as godless. And yet it is these men who have the real life of the moral order of the universe dwelling in them, though they themselves make no claim to it.

"Now, here is the powder of which our friend spoke,—a dumb consciousness that right is right, though God be said to be against it; a glimmering perception that somehow things must be on the side of this right, though it be denounced from the pulpit; a determination, anyhow, to live and labor for that right, though there may be no recognition of the service beyond the gratitude of a few faithful hearts and the great world's pious scorn.

"The Labor Church stands to set a match to this powder,—to set free the tremendous power of religious enthusiasm and joy which is now pent up in the great Labor movement, to bring into living consciousness the godliness of this splendid service for the emancipation of man.

"To conclude with an illustration: There was a poor old woman who suffered many losses. She was assured by a friend that God had done it all. 'Ah,' she replied, 'I know as God has allus bin agin me, but there's Them above as 'll be down on he yet.' And so the Labor Church says to the parson and the squire, and all that they represent: 'We know that *your* God has always been against us; but there is a God above that is stronger than he.'"

Among those who are taking part in the work of the new Labor Church are Mr. Ben Tillett, Mr. Robert Blatchford, and other well-known leaders of the Labor movement. It is hoped that Dr. Felix Adler may be able to address the Church in the course of the spring.

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From such a movement as this much good is to be hoped, and readers of the *Journal of Ethics* will naturally wait with interest for records of its further development.

J. S. M.

BOOK REVIEWS.

EDUCATION AND HEREDITY. A Study in Sociology. By J. M. Guyau. Translated from the second edition by W. J. Greenstreet, M.A., with an introduction by G. F. Stout, M.A. A volume of the Contemporary Science Series. 8vo. Walter Scott, London. 1891. Pp. xxiv., 306.

This volume is a translation of one of the posthumous works of Jean-Marie Guyau, a young French philosopher and poet, who was born in 1854, and died at the age of thirty-three, after a brief career of brilliant and prolific industry. The dominant idea of his work on education is that man is a social organism, openly receptive to the influences or suggestions of his social environment, realizing his development or finding his good in social activity. Just as the student of heredity—*i.e*, the relation of organic continuity between generations—recognizes that the race is a reality more important than the individual, the tree being greater than its transient leaves, so Guyau has realized that education "should be orientated with reference to the maintenance and progress of the race." For education is more than the art of bringing up the individual,—it is a failure in proportion as it is individualistic,—"it is the search for means to bring the most intensive individual existence into harmony with the most extensive social life." To a certain extent "education is a prolongation of suckling,"—a development of inherited instincts,—but it is also the art of creating new instincts harmonious with or counteractive of those which are inherited, and these new instincts are created by a process of psychological, moral, and social "suggestion" comparable to that adopted in the treatment of hypnotized subjects. "Education is nothing but a totality of co-ordinated and reasoned-out suggestions." The most important end of education is to moralize, on the one hand recognizing the inherited imperatives, on the other hand creating new moral instincts by suggestion, impressing the child with a consciousness of his powers for good, utilizing the power ideas have to realize themselves, the tendency of sentiments to socialize themselves. "The child," Mr. Stout says, "must be led to understand that his own self-realization is possible only if and so far as he widens and deepens his social interests and sympathies." But the race must be vitalized as well as moralized, hence physical education is not less important; and as the other ideal is to socialize, those modes of intellectual education which tend most effectively towards this result should receive the preference, art and literature being more "useful" than concrete science or technical education, but all requiring organization with reference to social evolution.

In presenting a summary of this book, we may distinguish the more theoretical from the more practical studies, especially as many who may be far from agree-

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ing with the peculiarities of Guyau's psychological and ethical position, may find themselves in accordance with his practical suggestions.

Theoretical. (1) *Suggestion and Education.*—In the treatment of hypnotized subjects it is possible to suggest sensations and sentiments, ideas, volitions and actions, to originate new impulses and new feelings of obligation, to moralize and to demoralize. But this hypnotic suggestion has its normal analogue in every-day life, during which, by example, command, authority, and assertion, we receive psychological, moral, and social suggestions; for suggestion is the introduction into our being of a practical belief which realizes itself spontaneously. And as children are very readily hypnotizable, so they are peculiarly open to normal suggestions, which it is the educator's task to control. The moral art of suggestion is the art of modifying an individual by persuading him that he is or may be other than he is, by convincing him that he is capable of good and incapable of evil, in order to render him actually so, by creating a series of habits which strengthen or counteract hereditary impulses, by strengthening these habits by the consciousness and belief that they are rational.

From these sentences, which are almost quotations, we see that Guyau uses the term suggestion in a wide sense, as co-extensive with the influences of social environment, but when we read that "our instinctive conscience is a kind of hereditary suggestion," that "original sin is a kind of suggestion," that "our ego is a kind of permanent suggestion," that "society is a reciprocal suggestion," we feel that the ingenious author sometimes played with words. We think, too, that his insistence on the analogy between hypnotic suggestion and normal education is somewhat strained, for there is a wide difference between the passive receptivity of the hypnotic patient and the actively personal docility of the child. But we object only to an exaggeration of the analogy, being aware of the light which pathological processes sometimes cast on healthful life.

(2) *The Genesis of the Moral Instinct.*—"Partly to our inheritance and partly to our education we owe our powers or aptitudes, which are organized residua of past actions and reactions. The simple forms of life have the power of habituating themselves, they have organic memory which is manifested in reflex actions. When the reflex action is impeded, it tends to produce simultaneous pain and consciousness. Consciousness in its origin could only be due to the vague formulation of pain by a kind of inward cry. Little by little, after a series of impeded reflex actions,—*i.e.*, of interrupted adaptations,—is formed the power of constantly readapting one's self in conformity with the environment. It is this power of constantly rehabituating one's self which is at once the basis of the intellect and the volition and the mainspring of all education. In other words, intellectual and voluntary power reduces to a habit of acting in a certain general direction,—a habit continually transformed, following the particular transformations of the changing environment in which it is exercised. But habit gives us a feeling of order, which is an essential element beneath every moral and æsthetic concept. To be perfectly accustomed to a thing—that is, to perceive it without experiencing any resistance in any of our senses and in any of our intellectual or motor activities—is almost tantamount to feeling it to be beautiful and good. Thus and thus only do powers of moral action become incarnate, and are expressed in swift reflex actions not consciously moral, but also as inward prompting and persistent ten-

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sion." This Guyau calls "obsession." "The perception of the effort with which an impulse enters into the field of consciousness, maintains itself there by trying to subordinate to itself the other tendencies it encounters in that field, and seeks to prolong itself in action. Now, obsession may be due to habit and instinct, or to suggestion, whether conscious or unconscious, and it strives to develop into an obligation on its emergence into consciousness. But the germ of morality is volition,—the power of bringing into consciousness an almost simultaneous survey of all the possible effects of an act. An act is really voluntary only if with the strongest tendency that produced it co-exist weaker and duller tendencies which, under other circumstances, might have produced a contrary act. Liberty consists in deliberation, and deliberation consists simply in the determining influence of the best motive elicited by rational process. Any other free will is a delusion; reason and liberty are identical. And if a voluntary act presuppose the participation of the whole group of conscious or subconscious states which constitute the individual at a given moment, the very idea of such an act is the idea which will beset the consciousness with most force, is the 'idea-force' of most practical power. Every idea being the representation of a possibility of action or sensation, the group of conscious or subconscious states that constitute the ego is nothing but a shifting equilibrium of representations of action, to which corresponds an impulsive force, roughly proportional to the force of the representation itself. Our ego is but an approximation, a kind of permanent suggestion, an 'idea-force' which maintains our identity. In primitive man the beginnings of art, morality, and personal education are already displayed when premeditated and organized action begins, when an idea or sentiment is realized by a self-conscious effort. The will develops its own activity as it apprehends its own powers. Duty is the consciousness of a certain internal power, superior in character to all other powers; it is a superabundance of life requiring exercise and development. Power to act is duty to act. But the intellect has in itself a motive power in 'idea-forces,'—ideals of the normal human and of the normal social type. Once conceived, the type of possible normal man is more or less actualized. Moral obligation is the force inherent in the idea approaching most closely to the universal, in the idea of the normal to us and to all beings. Since in fact the conscious idea derives most of its power from its very generality, the idea-force would be *par excellence* that of the universal, if the generality were conceived in a concrete manner as representing a totality of social conditions. This idea we call the good, and in ultimate analysis it is the highest object of morality. Hence it appears to us obligatory. Though morality is more than the social instinct, the social basis of the organism is on the whole identical with its moral basis. The individual is a society of cells, a collective consciousness; every determination springing from the depths of our being is the result of the reciprocal action of the cells and elementary consciousnesses which constitute *us*. Morality is a social phenomenon. But ideas are not the sole motives in an action; feelings must be taken into account. Just as the idea of liberty determines us to act as if we were free, the idea of love invites us to act as if others loved us, and as if we really loved them. Education consists in favoring this expansion towards others. To be moral is, in the first place, to feel the force of our will, and the multiplicity of the powers inherent in our being; in the second place, to realize the superiority

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of those possibilities having for their object what is universal over those with merely private objects."

The above sentences are quotations or condensed quotations from Guyau's confident account of the genesis of the moral instincts. To sum up, "there are three stages in the development of the moral instinct:

"(1) Mechanical impulsion, only momentarily appearing in the consciousness to be there translated into blind propensities and unreasoned sentiments.

"(2) An impulse, checked but not destroyed, tending *ipso facto* to invade the consciousness, and to be there translated into a sentiment, and to produce a permanent obsession.

"(3) An idea-force,—the moral sense grouping around it an increasing number of sentiments and ideas, becomes not only a centre of emotion, but an object of self-conscious reflection. Then obligation springs into being; it is a kind of reasoned obsession,—an obsession strengthened and not dissolved by reflection. To gain consciousness of moral duties is to gain consciousness of inner and higher *powers* which are developing in us and urging us to action; of *ideas* tending by their own force to realize themselves; of *sentiments* which, by their very evolution, tend to socialize themselves, to impregnate themselves with all the sensibility present in humanity and in the universe.

"In a word, moral obligation is twofold consciousness: first, of the power and of the fecundity of higher idea-forces, unified by their common object, the universal; second, of the resistance of contrary and egoistic propensities."

In the preface, Guyau promises "to endeavor to exhibit the exact *rôle* belonging to hereditary or ancestral habit and individual habit,—the one incarnate in the organism and the other acquired,"—but he devotes only a few pages to this discussion, and these do not carry us far. "Morality is a second nature added to a primitively animal nature by the action and reaction of our faculties and environment. Man has made his own moral law by the higher powers he has little by little acquired in the process of evolution, by an education partly spontaneous, partly enforced, sometimes individual, sometimes collective." While Guyau is clear that true morality cannot be inherited, and differs from Ribot in maintaining that the genius has a high degree of educability, he confesses that in the majority of cases it is not possible to draw the line of demarcation between the influences of education and heredity. Perhaps we cannot safely say much more until experimentally ascertained data are more abundant.

Practical.—As the object of education is to develop all the powers of a being, physical education is fundamentally necessary. The uses and abuses of boarding-schools, the question of over-pressure, the value of manual work as an educational method and as a physical counteractive, are discussed in this connection. "After physical development, or even before, if required, we should place moral development, which is the supreme end of the individual, and the essential condition of social existence. . . . Arithmetic, physics, and chemistry have no power to 'form the heart.' . . . Further, we ought to place æsthetic before intellectual and scientific instruction, because the beautiful lies nearest to the good, and because æsthetics, art, literature, and what have been so well called the humanities, are the least indirect influences making for morality." Methods of teaching; the inadequacy and danger of purely intellectual education; the foun-

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dation of moral instruction on the "correlation between the intensity of life and its expansion towards others;" the dependence of school discipline partly on the "natural reactions" of the anarchic method, partly on "some sanction carrying with it its own motive and reason;" the necessity for the teaching of civic duties in all stages of instruction; the expansion of intellectual education from the geography of the district outward and inward,—these and similar subjects are discussed with vivid suggestiveness. As to higher education, "to unite, co-ordinate, and at the same time to simplify literary and scientific studies, a middle term is needed,—viz., the study of moral and social science, the philosophy of history, the philosophy of art, and the philosophy of science. . . . History derives its special value from its social and philosophical side. . . . The science of nature is especially valuable from the humanities contained in it. . . . Technical instruction exaggerated produces short-sighted and uneducated utilitarians. . . . The university should be an educational synthesis, but it is not." In regard to the education of women, Guyau recognizes the necessity of conciliating two opposing facts: "On the one hand, having at her disposal less strength than man, woman cannot afford the same expenditure of mental energy; on the other hand, being destined to be man's companion and the educator of his children, she ought not to be a stranger to any of his occupations or sentiments." Finally, "instruction should be of such a character as to usher and lead into real life. . . . It is essential to represent education as continuous, uninterrupted, and to be ended only with life. . . . But alike in the individual and in the race, there must be an intellectual 'rotation of crops,' and progressive education must be accompanied by progressive environment. . . . The aim of education is not an automatism of thought and sentiment, which could only be the perfect organization of past experience, but 'an increasing facility of readaptation to the changes of the environment.' . . . Not only by its most universal and impersonal ideas, but by the very curve of its evolution, by the ever-increasing power and duration of its inward fecundity, the human consciousness will tend more and more to bring in its train a wider immortality."

As the practical tendency of Guyau's book is undoubtedly healthful,—many of his ideas are implied or have been further developed in existing educational endeavors,—criticism of details may be dispensed with, while as for the peculiarities of his philosophy they raise old problems for the solution of which we need not wait in our recognition of the facts of heredity or in our development of the art of education. It remains to state that Mr. Greenstreet has made a pleasant translation, and has added a number of bibliographic references, while Mr. Stout furnishes a useful introduction, giving us the key to Guyau's position.

J. A. THOMSON.

L'ENSEIGNEMENT AU POINT DE VUE NATIONAL. Par Alfred Fouillée. Hachette: 1891. Pp. 18, 445.

The subject of educational values has yet to be exhaustively treated. From the sociological point of view it has been skilfully handled by the late M. Guyau,* who brought to his work a profound acquaintance with the different phases of

* *Education and Heredity* (Contemporary Science Series), Walter Scott, 1891.

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modern thought; but that lamented thinker was taken from us before his study of the question was completed. Fortunately, however, the fragments he has left behind are sufficient to indicate the general lines on which he conducted the inquiry.

Guyau threw into bold relief the two essential terms of the problem,—the individual and the race. "Given the hereditary good and bad points of a race, how can education modify existing heredity?" And he proceeds to show that what is best for the race is also best for the individual. For the solution of the problem the preliminary data are given by certain moral and physiological laws, which have been until recently neglected. As Spencer wrote long since: "While the raising of first-rate bullocks is an occupation on which educated men willingly bestow much time and thought, the bringing up of fine human beings is an occupation tacitly voted unworthy of their attention." Guyau re-states the old problem, generalizes from the individual to the race. M. Fouillée, who is at least as well equipped for his task as his younger relative, narrows the field of investigation in the volume before us, and discusses the problem from the ethnical stand-point. The doctrines of physiological and social selection are employed to exhibit: 1st, the real power and limits of education; 2d, the conditions under which we may insure such an *élite* as is necessary to the progress of a nation. Thus are laid down the general principles from which M. Fouillée deduces the reforms which are necessary in the systems of secondary and higher education at present obtaining in France. The reader will find that M. Fouillée's suggestions are almost literally applicable to the systems obtaining in this country. Roughly speaking, the volume is an eloquent defence of the classics as the basis of secondary and higher education. The quarrel between the advocates of a classical and of a scientific education is an old one. M. Fouillée has entered the lists and does not belie his reputation as a formidable opponent. His able and temperate re-statement of the old question, his masterly refutation of the pretensions of the new school of French reformers—the parents of the so-called *Enseignement classique Français*—alone make this volume worth a second reading. But as a compromise with his adversaries he proposes to introduce into the curriculum of the secondary school—at the expense of Greek and the memoriter work of the science-student—an elementary but complete syllabus of moral and social science. It is to M. Fouillée's powerful advocacy of the claims of the latter that I wish to draw the attention of the readers of this JOURNAL.

Such importance does M. Fouillée attach to this matter that he regards this inclusion of moral and social science as the "only solution of the educational problem." The reasons adduced for this are in part applicable to France alone, but the residue form such weighty impeachment of our present *immoral* and *unsocial* system of education as to justify an appeal to our readers for further discussion in that part of the JOURNAL reserved for such an object.

The following sketch of M. Fouillée's argument will suffice to indicate the nature of his attack upon the existing order.

Education is nowadays menaced by the following evils: an increasing realism, mental passivity, want of power of concentration, or dispersion of thought by over-analysis and by premature specialization. Moral and social science, the organization of which will be the crowning work of the next century, alone can

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stamp out these evils. Why? First, they alone are the form of instruction of maximum utility to each, and *at the same time* the most disinterested form of education. The scope of mental science is universal, and, therefore, its utility as instruction is equally universal. Psychology, logic, ethics, law, political economy are of use in the scientific as well as in the literary professions. Moreover, the moral and social sciences always view man in his relation to humanity—the main "practical" need of modern societies. Again, from the point of view of education, moral and social science is *par excellence* the subject best calculated to encourage reflection, for instead of encouraging the mind to dwell upon the outside, it accustoms it to search for the inner reality. Natural science and the industrial arts are making rapid progress; systems of positive theology are decaying; all the more necessary is it that psychological, moral, and social science should recall the mind: *ab exterioribus ad interiora, ab interioribus ad superiora.* At the same time these sciences develop the sense of the real, because alone of the sciences do they seize the realities themselves. And this sense of the real is not merely applied to the realities of the physical world, but also to those of the moral and social world, which by their complexity and number may escape us. These studies, then, are neither purely formal, nor material, and thus do they escape the pit-falls of all "modern" education,—the forgetting realities for forms, and the absorption of all realities into matter. Education is made simultaneously more liberal and more practical by a study of great economical principles and social laws; its environment is at once more positive and more moral. Just as philosophy is, so to speak, the morality of science, so political economy is the morality of industry, commerce, and agriculture; natural law is the morality of legislation; social science is the morality of history and politics.

With moral science there is no danger of passivity. The pupil must reflect in order to understand what is said to him. He is forced to have an opinion of his own, for he is furnished neither with ready-made judgments, nor with absolute dogmas. He must form his own opinions, he must weigh the pros and cons. The faculties of the subject and the knowledge of the object are equally exercised,—in fact, moral science affords us the only instance of this coincidence of these two terms. Philosophy also is the only study which obviates mental dispersion, and this is due to the nature of its object and to its method. The object is mind, what constitutes man, what makes our *Ego*, and what, while varying with the individual, is, nevertheless, at bottom identical. Moreover, the parts are only conceived in relation to the whole; philosophy is essentially systematization, and in default of a real co-ordination and subordination of things, it must supply one. Its end is unity, and, therefore, its method is unification. Of this method the two essential processes are processes of concentration,—*i.e.*, inner observation and speculation; the former seizing the facts, and the latter grasping the ideas that link them together; but whether we are dealing with facts or ideas, philosophy always proceeds by concentration. On the other hand, so indissolubly are the various moral sciences linked together that excessive specialization is impossible.

M. Fouillée then proceeds to show that the want of an ethical training is especially marked in a country like France, where theology is daily losing ground. Ethics have been left to the hap-hazard play of the suggestions of the child's

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environment, too often with spontaneous demoralization as the net result. Without a moral atmosphere we cannot create an organized series of suggestions, and it follows that the child knows not when to resist or when to yield to moral impressions, his will is fashioned but imperfectly, and he loses the stability of character which is the basis of morality. What are the masters doing? Why do they neglect their countless opportunities? Because they are generally specialists, and are as a rule without any philosophical training. For these doubtful chances of spontaneous moralization by the suggestions of the environment, by literature, by history, by the influence of a master here and there, M. Fouillée proposes to substitute a clear and definite view of life, a scientific training in morals. That morals are not scientific enough as a subject is a poor objection, for they have a perfectly positive and scientific, as well as a purely metaphysical side. The latter may be left till the boy reaches the higher classes, for it is of much less importance than the former. Guyau emphasizes the distinction. The scientific side comprises "the rules of the most intensive and extensive life, either for the individual or for the community." There are laws of individual, and no less certain laws of social conservation and progress. The necessary conditions of life in common may be rigidly determined; the subordination of the individual to the group is one of these conditions. An ample store of facts and laws can be furnished by the positivist, utilitarian, or evolutionary schools, as the material from which to construct the positive side of morals, the science of manners, and the science of society. In addition to this must be considered the æsthetics of manners,—*i.e.*, a treatment of the good from the point of view of beauty, and not merely from that of utility or social necessity. M. Fouillée then shows us that the most effective way of acting upon the morality of the young is to present morality to them from the civic and patriotic stand-point. An extreme instance will suffice. "Idleness is treason to one's country." A full syllabus of such a course of lessons will be found on pages 282–284.

This rapid summary, which is mainly in the words of M. Fouillée, will suffice to place the reader in possession of the salient features of his argument. As a whole, the volume is, to use the words of a head-master of one of the public schools, to me, "just what I have been waiting to see written."

As a master in English secondary schools, which are attended by children from homes in which all varieties of religious opinions are held, I have long felt the need of a text-book much on the lines laid down in M. Fouillée's syllabus. Our curriculum is practically laid down for us by the regulations of the Oxford and Cambridge Locals. In these examinations religious knowledge is a compulsory subject, and one difficulty annually facing us is to provide instruction in the catechism for members of the Church of England, and in the alternative subjects for the Dissenters. In the Senior Locals provision has been made for the elements of social science by the inclusion of political economy among the optional subjects. Why not make morals a substitute for the catechism or the alternative part of the section entitled Religious Knowledge? We could then, without interfering with the general school-work, easily supplement the scanty references to morals with which we have to content ourselves in the course of ordinary lessons as our opportunity arises. A small volume about the size of, say, Raleigh's "Elementary Politics" would be sufficient for the purpose. M. Paul Janet's

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"Morale théorique et Morale pratique" (Delagrave, 3 fr.) may be consulted with advantage by those who, like myself, have felt the need of definite guidance in this work. I need not remind readers of this JOURNAL that instruction in morals is given to every child in the French *primary* schools.

W. J. GREENSTREET.

MORALPHILOSOPHIE. Eine wissenschaftliche Darlegung der sittlichen, einschliesslich der rechtlichen Ordnung. Von Victor Cathrein, S. J. Erster Band: *Allgemeine Moralphilosophie.* Freiburg im Breisgau (St. Louis, Missouri). Herder'sche Verlagshandlung, 1890. (522 pp.)

This is a work replete with learning, and will, without doubt, find great favor in Roman Catholic circles. We would recommend it to a wider public because it introduces the reader, in a clear and logical manner, into a world of thought which to us moderns easily remains unknown. But nothing human should be alien to us, and Father Cathrein is right in saying that "he who earnestly searches after truth will not deny a hearing to his opponent."

The author, who opened his career as an ethical writer by publishing an interesting volume on "The Moral Teachings of Darwinism" (Freiburg, 1885), takes his stand "wholly on the basis of theism, which looks upon the universe as being the work of the personal, almighty, and all-wise Creator." He seeks to justify this view on purely scientific ground, and therefore does not adduce any arguments from revelation. He defines moral philosophy as "the science of ethical conduct derived, with the help of the natural light of the understanding, from the highest principles of reason." Father Cathrein is a champion of the *ecclesia militans*, and few contemporary defendants of an "independent morality" can be mentioned with whom he does not cross swords.

The work consists of eight books and an appendix. The first book treats of the nature of man and of the physical aspects of human action. In one of its chapters—which is among the weakest of the whole work—there is a dissertation on the freedom of the will, where arguments disproved long ago are confidently put forward. The second book deals with the destiny of man. According to Father Cathrein, man is created by God, to know him, to love him, to serve him, and thus to effect his own eternal salvation. The craving after perfect happiness, he thinks, is innate in man, from which it follows that perfect happiness is attainable. Now this craving cannot be satisfied here on earth, for no earthly good has the power to render a man perfectly happy. The craving, therefore, can be satisfied only in a life after death: "only in God can man find the complete happiness he seeks." "If a man had nothing to hope for but the misery of this life," reasons Father Cathrein, "his noblest attributes would turn into a curse. After all, of what use is to man the grandeur and the nobility of his understanding and his will, if he is condemned, like a brute, to make shift for a moment here on earth, and then to crumble irrevocably into dust?" The third book treats of the principle of what is morally good. The author holds that this is to be found in man's rational nature. "That is morally good which is conformable to man's rational nature in relation to itself and in relation to all other creatures." What is this but tautology?

The subject of the fourth book is "The nature and the sources of moral good."

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Father Cathrein here says that the assertion that the Jesuits defended the rule that the end justifies the means—so far as immoral means are implied—is a calumny that has been refuted a hundred times over. "Let anybody point out to us," he declares, "a single passage from the thirty thousand authors of the Society of Jesus in which it is maintained that it is permitted to do or to will something bad in itself for the purpose of attaining a moral end." The fifth book discusses the natural moral law, which is defined as "the knowledge communicated to us by our Creator through the channels of nature, that we should follow in our conduct the order conformable to our being." The sixth book treats of the conscience; the seventh, of guilt and merit; and the eighth, of "Jurisprudence." Father Cathrein rejects the notion that morality and law must be separated, for the reason that the latter, in his opinion, is only a branch of the former. In an interesting appendix the author seeks to prove that moral precepts, in their roughest outlines, are alike in all peoples, and have everywhere supernatural sanctions.

What especially strikes the present writer in the work of this Christian author is the circumstance that in his book there is very little of the spirit of the thirteenth chapter to the Corinthians, of which Henry Drummond has given us such a touching paraphrase in "The Greatest Thing in the World." "Charity seeketh not her own," but the transcendent covetousness of some theologians never ceases to seek its own.

The second and closing volume of Father Cathrein's work is to appear before the close of the year.* The author has already published a part of it under the title,—

DER SOCIALISMUS. Eine Untersuchung seiner Grundlagen und Durchführbarkeit. Von Victor Cathrein, S. J. Separatabdruch aus des Verfassers "Moralphilosophie." Freiburg im Breisgau (St. Louis, Missouri). Herder'sche Verlagshandlung, 1890. (166 pp.)

After a definition of socialism and a few references to the history of this theory, Father Cathrein criticises its philosophical, religious, and economical basis. The socialistic doctrine of the equality of all men he tries to disprove, and he reproaches socialists with a one-sided exaltation of economics, and an atheistic-materialistic conception of the universe. Noteworthy is his criticism of the Marxian theory of value (though, of course, this theory does not form an essential part of socialism) and his discussion of the relation between socialism and liberalism. "The principles laid down by the liberals logically lead to socialism." The author seeks to prove this assertion in detail. His next point is that "a socialistic order of society is impossible in the long run, because such an order is at war with the indestructible tendencies and impulses of human nature." The author raises many strong objections, besides a number of weak ones, against the theories of some socialists; but his reasons, to a socialist, will hardly appear fatal to socialism itself. Many of his objections are satisfactorily disposed of in Bellamy's "Looking Backward," which book, however, Father Cathrein leaves unnoticed. Some of the arguments, again, that may be stumbling-blocks in the

* The volume has meanwhile appeared. Review will follow.

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way of intuitional socialism are easily overcome by utilitarian socialism. Archbishop Whateley's "fallacy of objections" is also applicable here. For even if it could be proved beyond a doubt that great evils are bound up with a socialistic order of society, this would yet by no means prove that socialism is unjustifiable. It would first have to be shown clearly that the evils of the present social system are less than those growing out of a socialistic order of society. The controversy between optimism and pessimism bears also on our subject, for the man, belonging to the propertied class, who has a pessimistic view of human nature, can hardly become a socialist. Father Cathrein, it seems, belongs to the ranks of those whom Kurt Falk, in his remarkable pamphlet, "Die Bestrebungen der Socialdemokratie" (Nürnberg, Woerlein & Co., 1891,), calls the choir of blasphemers of mankind.

We do not hesitate to recommend this generally concrete and interesting volume to the attention of Socialists and Nationalists. It is always useful to look carefully into the criticisms of an intelligent antagonist.

A book much talked about, and which is strongly attacked by Father Cathrein, has appeared in its ninth edition,—viz., "Die Frau und der Socialismus," (Stuttgart, Dietz, 1891.)

G. VON GIZYCKI.

BERLIN UNIVERSITY.

LA RELIGION BASÉE SUR LA MORALE. Choix de discours publiés par les Sociétés pour la culture morale. Traduits en français, avec l'auterisation des auteurs, et précédes d'un Aperçu de l'histoire du mouvement moral. Par P. Hoffmann, Professor à l'Université de Gand. Paris: Librairie Fischbacher, Rue de Seine, 33, 1891. (Pp. 357.)

Professor P. Hoffmann has done a great service to those who are unacquainted with the English or German languages by translating into French a series of brilliant and powerful lectures delivered before different Societies for Ethical Culture. The ethical movement, which will forever reflect credit on this century, will thus be able to appeal to a wider circle. The deep-felt want of a new faith built on firm scientific ground, the desire for a living moral *crêdo* at one with the whole range of modern ideas, finds valuable nourishment and a warm call to practical satisfaction in the lucid thought of the American and English societies for ethical culture. And the gist of this thought is represented accurately and attractively in the introduction (pp. 1–45) which the translator has prefixed to the volume. "A sketch of the ethical movement in America" is given there, largely based on W. L. Sheldon's "Sketch of the History of the Ethical Culture Movement." In it we have delineated with historical accuracy the gradual development of the conception of a purely moral religion, the modest beginnings towards the realization of this conception, and, lastly, the victorious and hopeful results as well as the methods which have until now constituted the practical power of this movement. The introduction acquaints the reader not only with the nature and main tendency of the new moral-religious convictions, but serves also as a guide to those who might care to found a society on a similar basis.

After enumerating the philanthropic undertakings of the ethical societies, the author of this useful introduction justly adds, "Undoubtedly, this achievement is considerable, if regard be had to the short space of time that has elapsed since

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the formation of these societies, and to the relatively small number of persons of which they are composed. It proves a moral enthusiasm quite uncommon, and gives the most promising hopes of progress. We are convinced that the practical undertakings will spread in every direction. New ways of doing good will be discovered, as some have been discovered already. Moral discovery has still a vast field open. Who can say beforehand what it may not succeed in bringing to light?" (p. 42.) And further, "All these things go to prove that the ethical societies are really above parties and creeds, and that they really represent a superior principle to that of the old religions. We shall, therefore, be singularly mistaken if their theory is not that of the future" (p. 43).

The lectures which M. Hoffmann has given to the public in a French garb are the following: "Need of a New Moral Movement in Religion" (Felix Adler), "The Basis of the Ethical Movement" (W. M. Salter), "The Success and Failure of Liberalism" (S. B. Weston), "Sketch of a Religion based on Ethics" (Felix Adler), "Ethical Religion" (W. M. Salter), "Ethical Culture as a Religion for the People" (Stanton Coit), "The Conscience" (Felix Adler), "What is a Moral Act?" (W. M. Salter), "The Four Forms of Suffering" (Felix Adler), "How to build up the Inner Life" (Stanton Coit).

I do not doubt that this translation, satisfying a general want as it does, will contribute much towards spreading the noble views of life which find a beautiful expression in these lectures.

J. F. Gavanescul.

Jassy University, Roumania.

The Elements of Politics. By Henry Sidgwick, author of "The Methods of Ethics" and "The Principles of Political Economy." London and New York: Macmillan & Co., 1891.

The term "Elements" is a little startling, applied to a volume of 632 rather closely-printed octavo pages. Professor Sidgwick cannot mean that his book is one for beginners. In the "Preface" he explains that his purpose is to "expound, within a convenient compass, and in as systematic a form as the subject-matter might admit, the chief general considerations that enter into the rational discussion of political questions in modern states." We must, therefore, understand "Elements" in the sense of "Principles." And yet such a title does not appear to describe the contents of the work quite correctly. On the one hand, the author avoids raising philosophical questions which might seem to lie at the basis of political discussions, such as, *e.g.*, What do we mean by the individual, and what is the ultimate relation between individual and social ends?—a question to which some sort of answer, unfortunately not always the same answer, is tacitly assumed in all ordinary discussions about the functions of government. On the other hand, the author does consider many questions of practical politics with a fulness of detail, only limited by the statement of them in abstract terms. In fact, many parts of the treatise remind one strongly of such a book as Mr. Sydney Buxton's *Hand-book to Political Questions of the Day, with the Arguments on either side*, the difference being that Professor Sidgwick states the arguments in a way that would apply to some other constitutions besides that of Great Britain, that the opposing arguments are not marked off to the eye but are interlaced with one

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another in Aristotelian fashion, and that we are generally told directly which opinion the author considers "the more probable." Perhaps one might safely characterize the "Elements of Politics" as a discussion of most political problems of present-day politics, with some hints towards their partial solution. The discussion is distinctly of to-day, not of yesterday, and with just a slight regard for to-morrow morning early. Although we are told that "the primary aim of the theory of politics as here expounded is to determine what the constitution and action of government *ought* to be," we must not expect to find a sketch of an ideal state. Professor Sidgwick argues deductively from "psychological propositions not universally and absolutely true, but approximately true of civilized men," and yet, somehow, the conclusion again and again turns out to be just what we have in the present British constitution. Thus our unpaid members of parliament, and our parliaments of five, six, or even seven years' duration, are exactly the results at which Professor Sidgwick arrives by deductive arguments about what ought to be. He nowhere arrives at any conclusion which would differ very widely from that of the average man of the professional and commercial middle-class at the present day. The method is Bentham's; but there is none of Bentham's strong critical antagonism to the institutions of his time, and the mode of thought is much more what we might expect from an end-of-the-nineteenth-century Blackstone, or from an English Hegel, showing the rationality of the existing order of things, with only a few modest proposals of reform. If this is Benthamism, it is Benthamism grown tame and sleek. And yet even those, whose conclusions as to what *ought* to be would differ considerably from Professor Sidgwick's, must admit the immense value of his calm discussion, carried on in the undogmatic spirit of a sane and sober, if rather old-fashioned, utilitarianism, free alike from the prejudices of a historical antiquarianism which cannot treat a modern political question without dragging in the Witenagemote, and from the assumptions of a would-be scientific sociology which dogmatically decides the "natural" functions of government by the help of biological metaphors, or by reviving metaphysical theories about "natural" rights. To the biological sociologist Professor Sidgwick implicitly bids defiance, by treating of the functions of government before he treats of its structure. If government be regarded as largely a contrivance which can be adopted or modified for certain purposes, it does seem reasonable to consider those purposes first. And yet even Professor Sidgwick has to admit that the work government can be set to do depends to a great extent on the nature of the government, so that the distinction between the two departments cannot be rigidly maintained.

It is worth noting that in his utilitarianism Professor Sidgwick takes account of posterity as well as of the existing sum of individuals (p. 35). This allows him to get some of the advantage that comes from regarding human society as organic. But to most students of politics and ethics at the present day, a discussion which takes no account whatever of the theory of natural selection as applied to society, must seem a little out of date.

Professor Sidgwick starts with the "individualistic principle" that "the efforts of government should be concentrated on the prevention of mutual interference among the governed." But his dialectic method leads him, as he goes on, to modify this principle, so that by degrees "indirectly individualistic," "paternal,"

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and, finally, "socialistic interference," come to be admitted to some extent within the scope of modern legislation.

No theoretical discussion can give much direct help to the practical politician; but to follow the intricacies of Professor Sidgwick's arguments is a discipline in caution and many-sidedness which will make it worth while for the thoughtful citizen, as well as for the professed student of politics, to undertake the effort of mastering this important treatise. Some effort, it must be confessed, is requisite: not that anything is obscure, but that everything is smooth and uniform. And the difficulty of keeping the attention fixed is due, in great measure, to the abstract and general form in which the discussion is carried on, the conspicuous scarcity of proper names, the deliberate refusal to adopt the historical and inductive method. Historical antiquarianism is rightly considered out of place in a treatise on practical politics; but, as Professor Sidgwick now and then admits, a vast number of political questions can only be properly treated in the light of the "varying historical traditions of different societies." And, apart even from this, is there any advantage to the author in saying, "If so and so were the case, certain results would follow," when, in the majority of instances, he could quite well say, "In such a country so and so is the case, and certain results do follow"? To the reader there is a decided disadvantage in the method adopted. He is constantly being asked to solve riddles. When he has correctly guessed in what particular country the institutions described exist, he can appreciate the value of the remarks (and Professor Sidgwick's readers will certainly admire the abundant store of detailed knowledge which he has so carefully concealed); but why in a treatise, dealing almost entirely with actual, and not with ideal or hypothetical politics, should it be necessary to move in this region of abstract hypothetical propositions? Even in Montesquieu, one is apt to be irritated by the hypothetical form in which, for instance, he describes the English constitution; but Montesquieu had reasons for saying things indirectly which do not apply to the modern writer. The reading of many such sentences as "Let us now assume that a single-chambered parliament is controlled by a rigid constitution, not capable of being altered except by consent of the electorate," tends to produce a state of mind which one may imagine to have constituted the usual nightmare of the Abbé Sieyès. The true method of political science would seem to require always a combination of facts and logic,—the method of Aristotle, of Vico, of Montesquieu, of Hegel, and (to name a man of talent and industry along with men of genius) the method of Bluntschli. And it is this method which we feel certain will in the long run be preferred, in all the political sciences, to the abstract deductive method of Bentham and Austin. Even the admirable skill with which Professor Sidgwick employs the deductive method, and the safety with which his suppressed learning enables him to use it, hardly persuade us that it could be wisely followed by others. To take an instance of the defects attendant on the method, even as used by Professor Sidgwick himself, in the chapter on Political Parties (a particularly good example of the author's moderation of tone) nothing is said about the historical origin of the two great English or of the two great American parties,—matters surely of essential importance in any discussion of party government. Again, in the discussion of the representative element in the legislature, why is nothing said about the very important question

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whether the electors should be limited in their choice to persons resident in the electoral district or not? This is a question which has affected in a very marked way the character of representative bodies. It could hardly have been omitted by any one using the historical and inductive method; and it is surely quite as important as the question of the age of representatives, which Professor Sidgwick does notice.

German and, I should imagine, also American readers will be struck by the absence of any distinction corresponding to that between *Staatsrecht* and *Politik*, —a distinction, indeed, that seems of slight importance to any one looking at political questions from a mainly English point of view. But in the chapter on Sovereignty the absence of a systematic use of this distinction seems to prevent Professor Sidgwick from escaping completely out of the confusions into which Austin's theory leads. Thus, *e.g.*, on p. 612, "the duration of parliament" and "the activity of the political consciousness of the electors" are put alongside of one another as considerations affecting the answer to the question, "where supreme political power resides." It is Bentham's and Austin's abiding service to have made the distinction clear between law and morality. Do we not also need to maintain a very clear distinction between law and politics? At least that seems the best way out of the difficulties about sovereignty.

To refer to some small matters, why does Professor Sidgwick give the title of Bluntschli's work as *Lehre des Modernen Staats*, instead of *Lehre vom modernen Stat?* "Demombyne" (p. vii.) is evidently a misprint for "Demombynes." Professor Munroe Smith's name has lost an "e" on p. 499. There is one pun, apparently intentional, on p. 216, where the author suggests that no serious opposition would be made in any West-European State to the collective expatriation of Collectivists.

To such objections as I have ventured to make Professor Sidgwick would doubtless reply that any other method than that adopted by him would have immensely increased the bulk of his treatise, and that the work is professedly and inevitably incomplete. It may even seem ungrateful to speak words other than words of welcome to the most comprehensive book on politics by any English writer since Bentham,—we might truthfully say by any English writer whatever. (By English I mean here "British," and not English in the wide sense of English-speaking, for America has produced several valuable works of a comprehensive scope.) But when a work is admirable in its kind, the critic who would do something more than analyze, quote, and praise, must needs fall foul of the kind, especially when the kind seems to him not altogether satisfactory.

DAVID G. RITCHIE.

A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT. By Jeremy Bentham. Edited, with an Introduction, by F. C. Montague, M.A., late fellow of Oriel College, Oxford, at the Clarendon Press, 1891.

After reprinting the "Principles of Morals and Legislation," the delegates of the Clarendon Press have done well to reprint the "Fragment on Government," the earliest and one of the best written of Bentham's works. It remains for them to make again accessible to the English public the "Fallacies" and the "Letters

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on Usury," and they will have deserved well of their country. They could not do better than secure the services of the editor of the volume now before us.

Mr. Montague's introduction aims (as he says) "at shewing the place of Bentham in the history of thought and the significance of the 'Fragment' as a contribution to political philosophy;" and the aim is attained with brilliant success. Mr. Montague, indeed, is uniformly the critic of Bentham and not in any degree a partisan of his doctrines. But there are no Benthamites now, or they are silent; and no more could be expected than is actually found in this introduction, —a description of the author's life and character, and a reproduction of the intellectual surroundings in which he wrote and the part he played in transforming them. The labors of Montesquieu and Beccaria are fully considered, and the comparison or contrast with Bentham is happily drawn out. Questions of jurisprudence have naturally the larger share of the discussion, for the "Fragment on Government" is a treatise on sovereignty, and not on morals. But, incidentally, the ethical principle (of Greatest Happiness), which can never be overlooked in any treatise concerning Bentham, comes in for its share of regard; and the judgments of Mr. Montague in this field have much weight and suggestiveness. We are told, for example, that "the endeavor to establish a moral calculus, an arithmetical computation of pleasures and pains, is far more characteristic of Bentham than any of his general statements about happiness as the end of action" (p. 36), and that "the profound sense of the need of security to some extent makes good the lack of historical insight" in Bentham's writings (p. 38); or again "the principle of utility is valuable not as a creative but as a critical principle; it is valuable as a test, not as a germ" (p. 43). Mr. Montague contrives to put much wisdom into few words. Sometimes, like other epigrammatic writers, he is perhaps led by sententiousness into undue severity. It may be true that "the disposition to hope from mechanical improvements a new heaven and a new earth is a sure sign of a somewhat contracted mind" (p. 18); but the sentence by itself contains no argument.

J. BONAR.

THE CO-OPERATIVE MOVEMENT IN GREAT BRITAIN. By Beatrice Potter. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1891.

THE CO-OPERATIVE MOVEMENT TO-DAY. By George Jacob Holyoake. London: Methuen & Co., 1891.

In these two books one of the most remarkable and successful movements of our time is regarded from different and even opposite stand-points. Both Miss Potter and Mr. Holyoake present a graphic picture of the present extent of the movement, and an interesting review of the successive stages of development in its past history. They show how in its inception in the mind of Robert Owen, as in its subsequent success, it has been largely influenced by ethical factors. It originated in a theory of the influence of circumstances upon character; and its success has been due to a combination of moral enthusiasm with sound business insight. Perhaps Mr. Holyoake is more inclined to emphasize the former element, and Miss Potter to remind us of the necessity of the latter; but neither writer entirely neglects these two conditions of success. And yet they form a very different estimate of the ultimate tendency, and a very different conception

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of the inner meaning, of the movement. Mr. Holyoake presents the ordinary recognized view of the matter, which regards co-operative production, as it is called, as the natural and proper sequel, if it be not the appropriate accompaniment, of co-operative distribution or consumption. In the midst of his narrative he returns again and again to this attractive theme; and, treating co-operation, as many of its adherents have doubtless done, as a scheme which will embrace the whole of society within the range of its regenerative influence, he is never tired of rebuking those, who are unwilling to push on at once to the distribution of the profits of industry between workmen and shareholders as well as between shareholders and customers, of departure from the orthodox co-operative faith. This is a well-worn theme, although Mr. Holyoake handles it with characteristic vigor and freshness; and it represents a common view. Miss Potter, however, meets it with a positive denial, and gives reasons for her position. She tries to penetrate to the kernel of the matter, and she is not content with the old and, as she thinks, superficial antithesis between co-operative production and co-operative distribution: she maintains that in its origin the co-operative idea was essentially democratic, and that it should not be asked to contradict itself. The democratic element consists in this, that any one may, by becoming a customer or a shareholder, share in the benefits and partake in the government of the co-operative store. Its limits are never closed; and to give a bonus on wages, or distribute the profits of an industrial undertaking among the workers, implies, on the contrary, the establishment of a privileged corporation, and the infringement of the democratical principle by the introduction of an aristocratical element, which must of necessity be so far close that its privileges and government are not open to all. This idea is worked out with great cogency; and Miss Potter has succeeded in throwing a new light upon a subject which was previously obscured by preconceived opinion or unreasoning enthusiasm. Her book certainly forms the most philosophical treatment which has yet been given to the co-operative movement; and the solid objections, which have been raised to co-operative production on the ground of economic theory or business experience, are here reinforced by an appeal to the philosophy of politics. At a critical moment, like the present, in the history of the movement, the co-operator, who stands at the parting of the ways listening to competing guides, and the student, who is watching the contest, may gather much from both of the volumes before us; but Miss Potter is, we think, the more likely to make them question their views and to inquire carefully into the reasons for them.

L. L. PRICE.

THE EIGHT HOURS' DAY. By Sidney Webb, LL.B., Lecturer on Economics, City of London College and Workingmen's College; and Harold Cox, late Scholar of Jesus College, Cambridge. London: Walter Scott, 1891.

Notwithstanding the apparent blow inflicted upon the eight hours' movement at the Trades Union Congress at Newcastle, through the adoption of a resolution in favor of permissive rather than compulsory legislation, the movement is by no means dead. On the contrary, it is not improbable that the next congress may witness a swing of the pendulum back to the position of the Liverpool Congress of 1890. The authors of this opportune little manual have rendered an

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immense service to those who wish adequately to understand the movement for the legislative reduction of the hours of labor. The history of the agitation is excellently given, the arguments for legislation from the economic point of view are extremely well put, and the bibliography of the subject at the end of the book is invaluable. So honest a piece of work might fairly be entitled to pass without criticism, yet it is well to point out that the discussion of the economics of the subject is scarcely complete enough. There is, on the whole, too much indulgence in the "vague hope" that since the successive reductions of the labor day have been accompanied by good results in the main, further reduction cannot be injurious. Detailed examination of the proposal from an economic point of view cannot, of course, be given here, but an indication of the shortcoming of Messrs. Webb and Cox's little volume may fittingly be offered. The statement that a reduction from twelve hours to ten is an essentially different affair from a reduction from ten to eight, though not wholly lost sight of, is treated to scant examination. It is quite obvious that the continuous employment of the average man for eighteen, for sixteen, for fourteen, for twelve, even perhaps for ten hours is injurious; but the statement loses force with each reduction until it reaches a point at which it must cease to possess any force. Indeed, a point would be reached when further limitation of the hours of labor must be regarded as both a social and an individual injury. Thus the previous experience of reductions only avails so far. Obvious overwork, as in the case of railway, omnibus, and other workers engaged for the most part in transport, justifies rather proposals to enable all workers to enjoy the same amount of leisure as is presently enjoyed only in the textile trades, than a proposal to reduce the working-day in even the most highly-favored industries. Again, Macaulay's "indignant protest against the ignorant assumption," that wages must fall if the working-day is shortened, is scarcely of sufficient authority to demolish a rather irresistible conclusion. For, other things being equal, wages must either remain stationary or fall with every reduction of the working-day. The reason is obvious. In the lower orders of labor, where wages are fixed rather by subsistence than by product, the sum of wages will tend to remain the same whatever the working-hours may be. A rise in the rate of wages per hour in such a case involves, within certain limits, no rise in the sum of wages. On the other hand, in the higher orders of labor, where wages are determined, at least partially, by the value of the product, reduction of hours of labor, prices and quantities remaining the same, must mean a fall in amount of wages earned, with consequent reduction in consumption. It is quite clear that other things never do remain the same, and that disturbing influences enter to upset calculations; yet that is no excuse for ignoring what we can see so far as we see it. Restriction of production followed by rise in prices might result through trade-union pressure in maintenance or advance in money wages; but if the restriction in production affected the staple articles of consumption, real wages would tend to fall.

Disregarding disturbing influences external to our subject, it may suffice to note that maintenance of quantity in production can be secured,—1, by increased strain on the part of the workers and their organizers; 2, by the employment of an additional number of workers; and, 3, by increased employment of machinery, and that in the order given. When the individual strain reached its

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maximum more men would be employed. When the employment of more men became more costly than the increased use of machinery, more machinery would be employed. Wages would thus be maintained in the first case only by increased severity of work during working-hours, and in the case of piece-work, the inducement to increase the strain would be very great; in the second case, the sum of wages paid by the employer would, other things being equal, remain the same, but they would be divided over a greater number of persons, giving a smaller share to each; in the third case, the sum of wages would tend to diminish, since a larger share of the value of the product would be appropriated as interest upon the increased amount of capital invested in machinery. Arbitrary action on the part of trade-unions or good-will on the part of the employers might prevent these effects; but, under normal conditions, it is clear that they must follow. Experience of the working of the Factory Acts shows amply that each of the three effects followed their adoption. The first effect—viz., increased strain—was very manifest, and has been quite permanent. The second effect, no doubt, also appeared, though it is so hard to disentangle the increase of employment due to extraneous causes that it is difficult to place a precise value upon the one in question. The third effect appeared very largely. In spite of the reduction in the rate of interest during the past few years, the absolute, if not also the relative, share in the value of the product appropriated by capital has very largely increased, with the result of the unexampled accumulations of the past couple of decades. If, then, the intention of the promoters of the eight hours' agitation is to benefit the workers, which is not to be questioned, it were well to inquire whether the adoption of an eight hours' day, whether compulsory and universal or only permissive,—that is, compulsory within a certain area or a certain industry,—would not, *by itself*, result in a depression rather than an elevation of the standard of comfort of the working-people, and in still further aggrandizement of the capitalist classes. It is, of course, quite possible that concurrent development on other lines and a wise use of the added leisure might not only prevent ill effects from following the adoption of an eight hours' day, but might even bring about other good results not visible to a strictly specialist view of the question, although not for that reason to be excluded from our desires or imagination.

JAMES MAVOR.

THE LONDON PROGRAMME. By Sidney Webb. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1891. Pp. viii., 218.

This adds another to the many signs that have lately been given of the excellent work that is being done by members of the Fabian Society in the advocacy of "practicable socialism." Socialists are to be congratulated on having abandoned the construction of mere abstract ideals or Utopias, and on having set themselves strenuously to the improvement of the actual world in which we live. There are few sensible men, even among those who are not prepared to describe themselves as socialists, who would not cordially agree with most of Mr. Webb's proposals. He confines himself almost entirely to those forms of action in which state or municipal control seems obviously desirable. At the same time, in congratulating socialism on becoming practical, we cannot but regret that it seems to be losing something of what was best in its more Utopian days. We think we

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observe in Mr. Webb's book frequent traces of a conviction that self-interest is the sole motive of human action. Thus, on page 114, referring to the proposal of Leasehold Enfranchisement, Mr. Webb remarks: "How this ever came to be considered a radical measure, or one deserving the support of the masses, *who are not property-owners*, will remain a mystery to future ages." It is probable that Socialism may find it necessary to make certain concessions to Individualism; but that it should concede the principle of universal selfishness cannot but be a matter for regret to a writer in an ethical journal. That there is at present a tendency to make this concession seems clear from the writings of several socialists, as well as Mr. Webb. It is to be wished that they could remember that in becoming practical it is not necessary to become cynical. J. S. M.

THE NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY. By Henry Rose. London: James Speirs, 1891. Pp. viii., 152.

Mr. Rose believes "that if there is one class more than another which needs preaching to in these days, it is the political economists." Whether they need it or not, they certainly get it. And probably Mr. Rose is right. If we may adapt the saying of Plato, society will never be regenerated until religious men become economists, or those who are economists become religious. Mr. Rose's little book is chiefly devoted to a study of the teaching of Carlyle and Ruskin on economic questions; but it also includes, somewhat oddly, a similar study of Mr. Henry George. The tone of the book is excellent and stimulating, and, though not containing anything very novel, it will no doubt interest a considerable circle of readers. Mr. Rose describes himself as a socialist, but he seems to use this term somewhat loosely. Speaking of his three heroes, he praises "the judicial way in which they recognize the respective and reciprocal provinces of Individualism on the one hand, and of State control on the other. . . . They have, indeed, in this matter struck the happy mean of sobriety and reason. What but the highest perfection of the individual—of every individual—do they seek? And who have more powerfully pleaded for that measure of liberty on which individual perfection depends? But to the conception of individual freedom to do right they add the individual obligation to co-operate with society for the general good." Mr. Rose seems to be a socialist only in the sense in which "we are all socialists." Might we venture to suggest to Mr. Rose that, in a future edition, he should omit the study of Mr. Henry George, and insert one of Arnold Toynbee instead? J. S. M.

THE PATH TOWARDS KNOWLEDGE; DISCOURSES ON SOME DIFFICULTIES OF THE DAY. By W. Cunningham, D.D. London: Methuen & Co., 1891. Pp. viii., 241.

These twelve discourses, coming from an eminent economist and historian, must command a considerable degree of attention. Their point of view is probably too distinctly Christian, and even too distinctly that of the English Church, to be entirely acceptable to a number of the readers of this JOURNAL. Dr. Cunningham indicates the main aim of the publication by stating the questions it is designed to answer: "'*What guidance has the Christian faith to give for actual nineteenth century social problems?*' Much, as I believe: and I

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have tried to illustrate this belief by showing how Christian morality deals with suggestions which are being discussed in quiet corners and with bated breath, as well as with the proposals of more vehement agitators.

"'*But, after all, is this guide to be trusted? Is the Christian faith tenable by thinking men to-day? Can it hold its ground firmly and not be forced to retreat as empirical science advances? Are not more spiritual faiths maintained in the East? Is there not a less debatable faith in humanity?*' I have tried to illustrate some of the reasons for believing that the Christian faith is trustworthy, by examining attacks which were made upon it long ago, as well as the claims of its latest rival.

"'*At least is it not discredited by the divisions among professing Christians and by the 'insubordination' of some of the clergy?*' To me at least it does not seem that these things justify us in neglecting its teaching, and I have exemplified my opinions by taking one or two prominent instances."

The following are the titles of some of the more interesting essays: "Marriage and Population," "Socialism," "The Ethics of Money Investment" (originally a lecture to the Ethical Society in London), "Positivism: its Truth and its Fallacies," and "The Unitarians." Dr. Cunningham nearly always succeeds in making his point of view perfectly clear, and his point of view is nearly always one for which there is a good deal to be said. Even those who are unable to accept his fundamental position can hardly fail to be interested and instructed by his remarks. J. S. M.

MODERN HUMANISTS. By John M. Robertson. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1891. Pp. vi., 275.

This book consists of an interesting series of lectures on Carlyle, Mill, Emerson, Matthew Arnold, Ruskin, and Herbert Spencer, regarded as humanists or critics of life. Mr. Robertson's own attitude might be pretty well summed up in Shelley's line Εἰμι φιλάνθρωπος, δημωκράτικός τ' ἄθεος τε. He writes from the point of view of a materialistic evolutionist. Hence his treatment of Mr. Herbert Spencer is naturally more sympathetic than that of most of the others. On all of them, however, he occasionally makes penetrating observations. To Carlyle he is perhaps least fair. In one passage he refers to him as "gnashing his teeth, this raucous prophet, hooting like a Yahoo, snarling like a beast of prey." Such language is evidently not a criticism of Carlyle, but rather of Mr. John M. Robertson. On Mill he has some keen criticisms to make, especially on his defence of Theism. The essay on Emerson seems to me specially appreciative and searching. He well says of him that "he is the very poet of optimism, which it is not an easy thing to be: prosperity is prosaic, and the poetic impulse turns most spontaneously to shadow. It is his glory, and a glory not easily won, to have convinced men that every age must find its highest inspiration in itself, if it is ever to be capable of giving inspiration to others." He is severe on Matthew Arnold. "Righteousness and truth!" he exclaims, "yes, in the name of humanity, let us have them: the world is perishing for lack of them. But what are righteousness and truth; and how are we to determine what deserves to be of good report? If 'whatsoever things are honest' is to include the Tarpeian Rock and the lash for men exasperated into transient riot by tyrannous

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denial of their ancient rights, what is the worth of the air of benignity and the sanctified intonation? If truth is to mean inspired mistranslation and the systematic falsifying of religious history in the interests of sentiment; and if righteousness is to mean the cold-blooded urging of iniquitous wars in the name of national prestige, what better is all this mellifluous morality than the tender mercies of the wicked?" Towards Ruskin, he is much more sympathetic. He says of him, in comparison with Carlyle, that "his preparation, in the close study of relations in the department of æsthetics, seems to give him an abnormal power of seeing and representing in groups and masses the connections of our industrial life, which Carlyle only saw under a few ethical headings, though he, too, had the pictorial eye. Carlyle at bottom is Puritan, is always running into ethical metaphor, where Ruskin, tingling under a primary æsthetic stimulus, gives us in a flash the actual facts. Thus he is in these matters by far the more 'inevitable' critic, to use Wordsworth's phrase." He has to add, however, that "Ruskin is, so far as my reading goes, the most self-contradictory writer who ever lived," and that "for want of patience and temper, and, alas! want of continuous sanity, he has set against him alike economists, artists, democrats, rationalists, scientists; and the luxury of all-round vituperation is dearly bought at that price by a man who wants to make proselytes." The concluding essay is on Mr. Herbert Spencer, whom Mr. Robertson apostrophizes as his "spiritual Father and honored Master." In the midst of his laudations, however, he admits that Mr. Spencer "is not a born metaphysician: he has not that alertness of insight into the intricacies of language which enables a thinker in general to avoid fallacy and carry forward the processes of mental analysis." And indeed he points out so many fallacies in Mr. Spencer's reasonings, that one wonders a little at his persistent admiration. In his view of society, he definitely throws off Mr. Spencer's guidance, and criticises him very much in the spirit of Mr. Ritchie's "Principles of State Interference." He has some pointed remarks also on Mr. Spencer's view of religion.

On the whole the volume, though not containing anything very original, is one of considerable interest. The style is somewhat slipshod, and perhaps sometimes a little stilted. Carlyle and Ruskin, it seems, have not "patience to *expiscate* a general truth." His materialism, too, comes out rather crudely at times; as when he says that "men's minds are the outcome of their bodies, which are more or less extensive modifications of the bodies of their parents or ancestors." And his "Epilogue," in which his own views on social reform are given, does not appear to the present reviewer to be a very enlightening contribution to the subject. But the critical notices may be commended to the attention of all who are interested in our modern humanists. They are always vigorous and stimulating, and sometimes penetrating and original.

J. S. MACKENZIE.

BROWNING AS A PHILOSOPHICAL AND RELIGIOUS TEACHER. By Henry Jones, M.A., Professor of Philosophy in the University College of North Wales. Glasgow: James MacLehose and Sons, 1891. Pp. xii., 367.

This book is not a series of disconnected studies; its object is rather to explain and enforce a very definite view regarding the position of Browning as a philo-

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sophical and religious teacher. Accordingly, it will be best to preface such criticism as can be offered here by a short statement of what appears to be most essential in this view, although any such attempt to reduce the substance of a book to a few propositions must do some injustice to the author.

In the first place, then, Professor Jones in this book examines Browning's poetry not from the literary, but from the philosophical, point of view. He does not profess to estimate the value of the poems as works of art; he considers them merely as the expression of certain ideas,—a certain way of looking at and representing the world. Poetry, as he explains in some interesting pages, often introduces to men's minds in its own imaginative fashion ideas which philosophy only later presents in the shape of a reasoned statement; and it may thus provide the spiritual food of a generation which could not justify philosophically the beliefs which actuate and inspire it. This, the author holds, is emphatically the case with Browning, whom he couples with Carlyle as one of the great teachers of the time,—a teacher, too, whose sanguine faith has supplied the deficiencies of his gloomier contemporary. It is Professor Jones's first object, therefore, to connect the supreme utterances of Browning into a philosophy of life.

But Browning himself was not content to express in a poetic form certain ideas and a certain faith. He went beyond the strict limits of his art, and attempted to supply, almost in the manner of a philosopher, a reasoned justification of this faith. The faith itself, Browning's poetic beliefs, may best be gathered from the earlier works, ending with and including "The Ring and the Book": the philosophy, though indicated here and there earlier, is fully developed only in the later poems (1870 to 1889). And, as Professor Jones holds, and, I think, truly holds: whereas the poet's beliefs or ideas have a high value, his explicit philosophy is inadequate to them, and has much less value. The former yield what may be called an optimistic idealism, and a doctrine of the unity of God and man. Man appears as a progressive being, realizing, though never fully attaining, a moral ideal; realizing it even where he appears to fail, and finding in evil not only an obstacle, but also the instrument or negative condition of his advance. And alike in the ideal which inspires man, the love to which it gives birth, and the struggle towards it, the divine spirit is present, and is the guarantee (if a dangerous word may be used) at once of the necessity and the impotence of evil. The profound significance of Browning's poetry Professor Jones finds in the boldness with which this faith is set forth, and in the light which it throws on the darkest places of the mind and the most menacing problems of life. But in Browning's later poems this faith is combined with, and even made to depend upon, a peculiar doctrine of nescience or scepticism. A unity with God underlies man's moral nature and effort; but his intellect is regarded as merely human, and even as purely individual. His love is a ray of the central sun; his knowledge is a private possession of his own, and therefore no knowledge at all. And Professor Jones's object is to show that this doctrine of nescience is both self-destructive and destructive of Browning's optimism, and to indicate a philosophical theory which, instead of destroying Browning's optimism, would justify it. In other words, he appeals from Browning the philosopher to Browning the poet, and by implication he appeals from Browning the philosopher to another philosophy. This he has, of course, no opportunity to develop fully; but the

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reader divines it (rightly or wrongly) to be in substance Hegelianism, modified by a hearty acceptance of the positive results of natural science.

Even so meagre a sketch as this will show the originality and interest of Professor Jones's design; and, the execution being worthy of the design, he has produced a really valuable book. To us his main contention seems just, and no reader who dissents from it will fail to recognize the vigor and suggestiveness of the argument. Professor Jones writes, too, with a freshness, and enforces his beliefs with a fervor, that win upon his reader; and it must not be thought that his rejection of Browning's theory of knowledge weakens his tone of sympathy and reverence towards the poet. His literary criticism, where it occurs, is so good that one only wishes there had been room for more of it; he has many striking sentences and passages (*e.g.*, that on Carlyle); and the only literary defect of the book, occasional diffuseness and repetition, seems to be due to the author's anxiety to make a difficult argument perfectly clear.

To examine this whole argument in a short review would be quite impossible, but two or three points may be indicated where re-consideration or re-statement seems to be desirable. Thus, one may value all that Professor Jones says of Browning without sharing his *comparative* estimate of Browning's position. To the present writer he seems to do much less than justice to Wordsworth, to Shelley, and (by implication) to Tennyson, and to understate the community of tendency which exists between these poets and Browning. Again, while the author prepares us to look on Browning as the prophet of truths not yet formulated by philosophy, his book suggests that Browning's ideas, so far as they are true, coincide on the whole with those of a philosophy complete before the poet began to write. This seems to be an inconsistency; but perhaps Professor Jones means that no purely *British* philosophy gives adequate expression to the substance of Browning's faith. In the third place, it is difficult not to regret that Professor Jones's main argument is set forth so copiously, that comparatively little space is left for the exhibition of the particular ways and concrete instances in which the poet gives an optimistic interpretation of life,—for some readers will think that the special value and originality of Browning's poetry lies here rather than in his general ideas. Lastly, while Professor Jones's statement of Browning's strange theory of knowledge is very full and clear, he seems not to give sufficient emphasis to certain elements in that poetic faith which he considers to be the imaginative expression of a true philosophy. For instance, the idea of immortality is continually recurring in Browning's poetry; he preaches immortality more persistently than any other English poet. Yet one would hardly gather this from Professor Jones's book. We do not mean that he ignores or misrepresents the poet's teaching on this subject or similar subjects. He clearly recognizes that, according to the philosophy that may be extracted from Browning, the unity of the divine and the human is by no means an absolute identity, and the ideal of humanity is never perfectly realized. But this side of the truth probably appears to him less important just now than the other side,—the idea that such a unity of the divine and human does exist, and that man does, in some sense, realize his ideal; and, therefore, he places this idea in relief. I sympathize with his preference, but I think it somewhat lessens the value of his book; for it is peculiarly characteristic of Browning that he feels the imperfection of man's

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achievement quite as keenly as the greatness and certainty of his victory. If Hegel had a positive dislike of the truth or half-truth that there is always an unattainable "beyond," Browning is for ever insisting on this "beyond." He is not only the poet of "immanence," he is not less the singer of that "something evermore about to be" of which Wordsworth wrote. His insistence on the idea of immortality is one of the ways in which this sense of imperfection shows itself, and perhaps no words of his have gone more piercingly home to his readers' hearts than those in which he gives a voice to the hope that a day will come when "the broken arcs" will be seen as a "perfect round." In writing of immortality he sometimes falls below the height of his "supreme utterances," and it may be that in his use of the idea he gave an imaginative rather than a philosophical expression to a spiritual truth. But however this may be, our point is that, in Browning's poetic faith, the sense of imperfection and of the difference between the divine and human is not less strong than the poet's optimism and his sense of a divine presence in humanity. These are, as Professor Jones would probably say, only two aspects of a single truth. He will make his exposition still more satisfactory, and will render a further service to his readers, if in a second edition he gives greater relief to the first of them, and shows more at length how it may philosophically be united with those ideas on which he has dealt with so sympathetic an understanding and so unforced an eloquence.

A. C. BRADLEY.

RIDDLES OF THE SPHINX: a Study in the Philosophy of Evolution. By a Troglodyte. London (Sonnenschein, 1891).

Systems of metaphysics are seldom written at all; but still more seldom does the philosophical reader meet with a system conceived with such freshness of mind and expounded with such vigor and buoyancy of style that it persuades and entertains him, even where he is disposed to question its conclusions. The Troglodyte writes from the Cave, to which, as in duty bound, he has returned; but he has been in the upper world, and describes what he has seen with a confidence which recalls some of the best days of metaphysics. The flippant may suggest that it is easy under the circumstances to mistake the moon for the sun. But it is something to have seen the moon; and the Troglodyte's luminary, whichever he has seen, is sufficiently dazzling. In a word, the book is of such ability and originality that no serious reader can help admiring it, and learning much from its happy combination of the constructive gift with sceptical insight into the difficulties of philosophical problems.

Though a work of metaphysics, it possesses ethical interest. The author regards the questions of philosophy as ultimately questions of practical life; and, according to the order which he follows in the exposition, it is the impossibility of squaring current philosophy with the requirements of practical life which leads him to attempt yet another solution. His system is offered as an alternative to pessimism, which, taken in its widest sense as the belief that the universe whether of action or of thought is not rational, he treats as the outcome of agnosticism. Agnosticism leads to scepticism, and this to pessimism. Agnosticism both in its Spencerian and its Kantian form he successfully attacks; but to the other two he is more tender, and he states their case with a generosity

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which is sometimes equivalent to overstatement. For instance, the argument derived from evolution against pessimism is presented in a form which makes it easy to overthrow; the real argument, that our standards of what is rational are themselves the outcome of the struggle for survival, is neglected. Even the theory propounded is offered only as an alternative and upon the assumption that the world is rational. In the end, only an act of philosophic faith can justify us in accepting as certain the hypothetical conclusions. Alas for the insecurity with which human convictions about God, the world, and immortality are founded.

The second of his three books, that in which the author expounds the method of metaphysics, appears to be, on the whole, the most useful portion of the work. He calls his metaphysics the metaphysics of evolution. He wants to get a philosophy which shall accord with the results of the natural and other sciences, and he lays down the important principle that metaphysics must be based upon the sciences and must contain the ultimate truths to which they lead. He has done good service by calling attention to Mr. Crookes's profound theory of *protyle*, which philosophers have left strangely unnoticed. He tries to find a comprehensive formula which shall replace Mr. Spencer's famous law. But his conception of a theory of evolution is different in many points from the predominant conception. First of all he treats the evolution as tending necessarily to some end (though of course not an end external to the process), and therefore finite; and, secondly, he holds that the lower forms are to be interpreted by the higher. Neither of these principles seems to be proved; each of them appears, to me at least, to be a dogma. The weak point of the method is, however, that the author neglects or fails to do justice to the characteristic feature of the process of evolution, which is not that there is evolution, but that the evolution takes place by natural selection. Yet the frank avowal by a metaphysician that metaphysics is but science at a higher power is valuable and important.

The staple questions of metaphysics, the soul, God, the world, are discussed in the last of the three books. Acute reasoning and trenchant criticism abound; the polemic against pantheism is specially convincing. The dominant note of the system is the finite. God, the world, space, and time have all been believed to be infinite. The author holds them to be finite, and his arguments are full of weight. Yet finite as all these are, the end of the evolution is described, something in the manner of Aristotle, as a state of perpetual activity of rest, a state of Being which is the goal of Becoming. It is difficult to see in what way this is different from infinity. The other feature of the system is its theory of monads. The author takes his stand upon the consciousness of self as something of which we cannot doubt. Yet he knows recent psychological work well enough to see that the self is not complete at any one time; and he regards the real self as the "I, with all its powers and talent capacities of development." God is a self which interacts with our human selves, and all our experience consists of this interaction. Where, then, is matter? The author seems to leave it an open question whether the atoms are themselves monads of an inferior order of consciousness, or merely the effect of the divine force. This latter alternative is not clear, and it is still less clear that the question which alternative is adopted is, as the author thinks, not of vital importance.

But into the details of all these discussions, and especially into the solution

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offered of the problem of immortality, the reader must be left to inquire. He will find the whole well worth reading. But I do not conceal my own distrust of this metaphysical construction. The author seems to have deserted his perception that metaphysics is really founded upon the conclusions of science, and to have joined the band of constructors of unverified hypotheses. Time may perhaps be the "corruption of eternity," "the impermanence of the eternal," but does this formula teach us anything? How are time and space related to the phenomena of consciousness by which we become aware of them? The theory of monads is worked out with great ingenuity, but it raises many questions. Is it true that the consciousness of self is something so sure, so peculiarly and individually sure, that it can fitly be made the starting-point of a philosophy? Am I better conscious of myself than of the things outside me? To raise this doubt is a very necessary heresy. But even if we overlook this, on what grounds can we assume that other persons besides myself are real selves? The author appears to evade this question, though he very ingeniously uses the analogy of identical illusions produced by the operator in several hypnotized persons at the same time, to illustrate how the same material world may be "suggested" by God to all selves. There seems, indeed, to be wanting throughout the book a proper appreciation of normal psychological data. As our minds are the sources of all that we know, we must surely make the connection clear between how we come to know all things and what things really are. And in conclusion, although the principle of interpreting the lower by the higher naturally leads us to think of matter as being in its real nature spiritual, or at least the effect of spirit (and the author has many suggestive remarks upon the fact that we are burdened with material bodies), what is gained by this if matter is still so entirely unlike spirit? But it is ungracious to dwell upon objections in a notice which has not been long enough to give even a bare outline of the contents of a book which every one who reads, even if he does not assent to the whole, will enjoy.

S. ALEXANDER.

FINAL CAUSES: A REFUTATION. By Walthen Mark Wilks Call, M.A. London: Kegan, Paul & Co., 1891.

This little posthumous volume may be safely commended to all thoughtful readers, as presenting a clear and convincing proof of the futility of applying Theistic conceptions to the Universe, with its mystery of good and evil. Probably no book has ever issued from the press that more completely and concisely sums up the process by which many thinkers in modern times have been led to reject such conceptions.

The author begins with a sketch of the historical development of the hypothesis of a Divine Intelligence transforming original chaos into a world of order. He then proceeds to give a careful examination of the design argument in all its phases. The order of nature is shown to be defective, involving waste and destruction; and it is argued that, if we assume the existence of a Divine Artificer, we must deny either His benevolence or His omnipotence.

Mr. Call, though an acute and original thinker, was not a professed metaphysician, and does not deal with all the more recent phases of thought on the subject of Final Causes. From a scientific point of view, therefore, the essay

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may seem incomplete, or may be, by some readers, overlooked or too hastily deemed an effort to slay the already slain. But when we consider the persistency of theistic sentiment and its unwholesome effects in obstructing progress and vitiating the very spring and source of moral action, we cannot but welcome this calm, unprejudiced, and admirably lucid demonstration of the untenableness of all the assumptions of theism.

A brief autobiography, which is prefixed to the essay, enhances the interest of the volume. Mr. Call relates with candor and simplicity the history of his own inward development,—how intellect and feeling at conflict became reconciled; how moral impulse, deliberately acted upon, adjusted the outward to the inward condition; how sacrifices entailed by the position were bravely met, the inevitable sorrow gradually assuaged, and mental repose at length attained to and enjoyed through twenty years of peaceful, though not inactive, retirement. The story is one of tender human interest, and bears a lesson which must be patent to all, and which it was never more important to learn than at the present moment; the lesson, namely, that the true happiness and dignity of human life is not to be gained in mental supineness, not by ignoring doubts and concealing conclusions, but rather in the free exercise of all intellectual faculties, in the facing of doubts and difficulties with manly courage, and, above all, in faithful devotion to the cause of Humanity.

JANE HUME CLAPPERTON.

PROBLEMS OF POVERTY. By John A. Hobson, M.A. London: Methuen. 1891.

A well-known publisher is said to have declared some ten years ago that the public who might be expected to buy or read any new book on economics consisted of fifty persons at most. A month or two after that remark was made the astonishing sale of Henry George's "Progress and Poverty" showed that hundreds of thousands of readers could be found for a writer who approached economic science with the hope of finding in it some cure for the social evils of his generation.

Among the many treatises on the same range of subject, which have been published since that time, Mr. J. A. Hobson's "Problems of Poverty" (Methuen's University Extension series, 1891) deserves to take a high place. Mr. Hobson originally collected his materials for a series of popular "extension lectures," and the book has the virtues, if also some of the limitations, which might be expected from its origin. Almost every question that has been raised of late years as to the relations of capital and labor, or of the less fortunate members of the community to their more fortunate neighbors or to the state, is clearly stated, and the solutions proposed by the best authorities of the day are given as far as possible in the words of the original propounders. The bold note of economic heresy which Mr. Hobson struck in his and Mr. Mummery's book on Industrial Physiology is here absent, but Mr. Hobson generally indicates his own opinions on all but a few of the most burning questions. With every opinion of any writer on so many points no reviewer is likely to agree, and therefore it will be sufficient, *e.g.*, simply to state that the arguments used by Mr. Hobson in discussing an Alien Bill, and again in estimating the probable effects of an Eight Hours' Day,

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seem to involve the actual as well as the hypothetical soundness of commercial protection, and that his sweeping condemnation of the "wage-earning proclivities of married women" (p. 66) would not find favor with those women who are most anxious for some measure of economic independence.

Mr. Hobson uses his sources with a certain catholicity which is at times dangerous. Mr. Arnold White's statements about the East End are quoted as if they were of equal weight with those of Mr. Charles Booth or Mr. Llewellyn Smith, and (on p. 100) Mr. Hobson says that "it has been calculated that one-tenth of the business of England is in the hands of joint-stock companies," while (on p. 204) he says that "it has been calculated" by another unnamed authority that one-third is in that condition, without indicating which calculation he prefers. Both here and in many other places the value of the book for serious students would be enormously increased by much fuller references.

But as a popular summary of current opinion and controversy Mr. Hobson's treatise is comprehensive, pleasantly written, and eminently provocative of thought.

GRAHAM WALLAS.

NOTE.—Several reviews of German books, by Professor G. von Gizycki, received too late for insertion in this number, will appear in the next. There will also be "A Report on Recent Literature in Theoretical Ethics and Related Topics in America," by Professor Josiah Royce.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

CONTEMPORARY SOCIALISM. By John Rae. Second Edition. London: Sonnenschein, 1891.

AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY. By John S. Mackenzie, M.A. Glasgow: MacLehose, 1890.

ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY. By Prof. Thorold Rogers. Second Edition. London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1891.

THE QUINTESSENCE OF IBSENISM. By Bernard Shaw. London: Walter Scott, 1891.

THE USE AND ABUSE OF MONEY. By Prof. Cunningham. London: John Murray, 1891.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE BEAUTIFUL. By Professor W. Knight. London: John Murray, 1891.

FACTORY ACT LEGISLATION. By Victorine Jeans. London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1891.

THE MODERN STATE. By Leroy-Beaulieu. Translated from the French. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1891.

ETHICA; OR, ETHICS OF REASON. By Scotus Novanticus. Second Edition. London: Williams & Norgate, 1891.

THE REVOLUTIONARY SPIRIT PRECEDING THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. By Félix Rocquain. Condensed and Translated by J. D. Hunting. With an Introductory Note by Professor Huxley. London: Sonnenschein & Co., 1891.

THE STUDENT'S MARX. By Edward Aveling, D.Sc. London: Sonnenschein & Co., 1891.

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VIERTELJAHRSCHRIFT FÜR WISSENSCHAFTLICHE PHILOSOPHIE, XV. Jahrgang. Viertes Heft, 1891.

THE ECONOMIC REVIEW, Vol. I. No. 4. London: Percival & Co., 1891.

ETHICAL ARTICLES IN ENGLISH MAGAZINES.

August, 1891.

"The Ethics of Gambling." W. Douglas Mackenzie. *Contemporary Review.*

"Morality in Fiction." Canon MacColl. *Contemporary Review.*

"Marriage and Free Thought." M. *Fortnightly Review.*

* "The Old Economy and the New." W. Smart. *Fortnightly Review.*

* "Our Dealings with the Poor." Miss Octavia Hill. *Nineteenth Century.*

September, 1891.

"Ferdinand Lassalle." Mrs. Arthur Kennard. *Nineteenth Century.*

"The Real Status of Women in Islam." The Hon. Mr. Justin Ameer Ali. *Nineteenth Century.*

"Henri Pestalozzi." C. J. Hamilton. *MacMillan's Magazine.*

"The Christian Ideal of Human Life." The late Archbishop of York. *Good Words.*

"Eve's Mission." *Westminster Review.*

* "Women and Work." 1. M. Jules Simon. *New Review.*

* "Women and Work." 2. Miss Clementina Black. *New Review.*

October, 1891.

"Encyclical Letter of Pope Leo XIII. on the Condition of Labor." Canon H. S. Holland. *Economic Review.*

* "What is Justice?" Rev. H. Rashdall. *Economic Review.*

"Carlyle's Message to his Age." W. E. H. Lecky. *Contemporary Review.*

* "The Emancipation of Women." Frederic Harrison. *Fortnightly Review.*

"The Buddhist Gospel." W. S. Lilly. *New Review.*

"Herbert Spencer on Justice." Dr. St. G. Mivart. *Dublin Review.*

"Christianity and Morals." *Church Quarterly Review.*

November, 1891.

"The Christian Hell." James Mew. *Nineteenth Century.*

* "The Emancipation of Women." Mrs. Fawcett. *Fortnightly Review.*

"Philanthropy and the Poor Law." *MacMillan's Magazine.*

"The Morality of Animals." C. Lloyd Morgan. *National Review.*

"The Woman's Labor Day." M. McMillan. *Westminster Review.*

Attention is specially invited to those that are marked with an asterisk.

ERRATA, VOL. II.

Page 77, for "Ferdinand Tonnies" read "Ferdinand Tönnies."

Foot of page 105, for "University" read "Polytechnical School."

Page 115, top line, for "D. S. Ritchie" read "D. G. Ritchie," and for "Swan, Sonnenschein" read "Swan Sonnenschein."

Page 132, twenty-first line from top, for "successes" read "success."

Page 135, eleventh line, under "Books Received," for "Humorists" read "Humanists." Eighth line from bottom, for "Guyan" read "Guyau."

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INTERNATIONAL

JOURNAL OF ETHICS.

APRIL, 1892.

ECONOMIC REFORM SHORT OF SOCIALISM.

EVERY careful reader of socialist literature must be impressed with the extremely *a priori* character of most socialist theorizing. One of the over-bold assumptions of the socialist school is that socialism is the only possible result of democratic evolution. Very few sensible people, of whatever tendency, accredit the late Sir Henry Maine's prophecy, that society is to return to aristocracy or to monarchy. The civil polity of the future will doubtless be more and more completely a government by the many. One can also easily believe, with Adolph Wagner, that, as civilization advances, the state is sure to widen rather than narrow its function. But it is very rash to proclaim socialism as absolutely the only way whereby society can advance out of its *laissez-faire* ills.

Another pet affirmation of socialists, which always strikes the present writer as excessively dogmatic, is that society may look for entire surcease of its woe, for a virtual paradise of economic equity and bliss, as sure to come by and by. To believe this is to go beyond the secular evidence—evidence properly so called—and to exercise faith. All history is against such an expectation; nor have any measures been propounded by any sect of social reformers, even the socialists themselves, whose execution, supposing this possible, would yield aught beyond relative felicity. A larger hope than this

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may be very pleasant, but it is the mark of zealots rather than of cool, scientific thinkers.

"Man's unhappiness, as I construe," is one of Carlyle's sayings, "comes of his greatness; it is because there is an Infinite in him, which with all his cunning he cannot quite bury under the Finite. Will the whole finance ministers and upholsterers and confectioners of modern Europe undertake, in joint-stock company, to make one shoeblack happy? They cannot accomplish it, above an hour or two; for the shoeblack also has a soul quite other than his stomach, and would require, if you consider it, for his permanent satisfaction and saturation, simply this allotment, no more and no less: *God's infinite universe altogether to himself*, therein to enjoy infinitely and fill every wish as fast as it rose. Oceans of Hochheimer, a throat like that of Ophiuchus: speak not of them; to the infinite shoeblack they are as nothing. No sooner is your ocean filled than he grumbles that it might have been of better vintage. Try him with half of a universe, of an Omnipotence, he sets to quarrelling with the proprietor of the other half, and declares himself the most maltreated of men. Always there is a black spot in our sunshine: it is even as I said, the *shadow of ourselves*." *

And is it not quite sure that such relative felicity as we may expect will not proceed from any one measure of policy? Many friends of man are in despair at this moment because, in analyzing one social remedy after another, they find no sufficing virtue in any by itself. But suppose we discover here a little and there a little, if we but search far, we shall have brought to view, not a millennium, probably, but sources of social amelioration plenty enough at least to lift us from pessimism. There are processes at work now, in conjunction with the system of free industry, and many of them growing out of this, which, taken together, are rich with hope.

Many of the social remedies that are so freely prescribed of course need to be examined with care. A most popular

* "Sartor Resartus," chap. ix.

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cry, so soon as an evil comes to be felt as such, is legislation. But there are unnumbered evils, some of them very pressing, which cannot be cured by legislation. Not a few would be rendered much worse by any effort to treat them in this way. Already painful disrespect for law has been engendered by its use for purposes to which it is little adapted. Excellent in its place, and not to be avoided out of any doctrinaire scruples, legislation is not a panacea.

The restriction of immigration, much good as it might do for the time being, cannot be of permanent avail. All apart from those who come to us from abroad, our population swells with incredible speed. A better homogeneity in it would no doubt be of some advantage, as rendering education and the dissemination of right ideas easier. Yet, unless the strife of classes and the deep-lying causes therefor can be radically mollified, though not a foreigner be permitted to land, we shall find our trouble perpetually with us. The restrictive policy would have as little effect in England, where it is preached to-day almost as loudly as here. For England, state colonization would certainly for a long time be of great service. The Earl of Meath recommends it strongly, and it is the main thought of Mr. Rees's inspiring book, "From Poverty to Plenty," recently published.

We see, also, no promise in Tolstoi's proposal. Tolstoi, as is well known, disgusted with a half-dozen plans of social reform which he had devised and vainly sought to launch, determined entirely to reverse his old mode of life, and to place himself absolutely upon a level with the poorest. Social betterment, he thinks, will come only when people submit to the first law of nature, as he calls it,—every one working with his hands and living by the sweat of his own brow.

So far as this is a hearty protest against the wrongs which the poor endure, and against the vicious social customs and fashions which help to render their suffering necessary, it is well; but it would not be well in general, and it would be a painful misfortune for the poor in particular, were men of Tolstoi's ability to betake themselves to lives of unskilled labor. Others can do that better than they, and they can do

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much else, quite as indispensable to the welfare of all, better than the poor.

With the Tolstoi plan may be mentioned "slumming," which is so fashionable at present. For well-bred and well-to-do young men who are to be clergymen, teachers, lawyers, merchants, or whatever else, to familiarize themselves with the slums of London, Paris, New York, and other great cities, and with the people who reside there, learning how they live, their discontent, the causes for it, how they view the great world, and the many other lessons which such a residence is calculated to teach, cannot but work considerable advantage. Were this custom to become truly general, the time would certainly arrive when active philanthropists would not be looked upon as cranks, and when more wisdom than now would be available for the execution of reforms among the poorest of the poor. Still, here, also, is no fundamental resource.

Infinitely less valuable is what many are still continually preaching, free charity. Charity is good. Of benevolence in heart and purpose we cannot have too much. But we can easily have too much of that easy-going charity in act and habit which was sedulously built up by centuries of bad religious teaching in the mediæval church. The evil of it is twofold: it squanders the wealth which might be supporting labor and swelling the general stock of weal in the earth, and it breeds shiftlessness, breaking down industrial and moral character. Witness the operation of England's old Poor Law, and the history of poor relief in the great cities of our own country. No modern city can boast, like early Athens, of having no citizen in want, or of freedom from the disgrace of begging. America is far freer of this curse than Europe, yet it is here too, and becoming so oppressive in most of our cities that it is past understanding how sensible people continue to give way to their sympathetic impulses when alms are demanded.

Mr. C. W. Smiley, in the *Popular Science Monthly* for November, 1888, tells of a boy, in the city of Washington, who, put up to it by his mother, herself in not at all needy circumstances, began increasing his profits as a paper-seller by hob-

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bling about on a crutch. Congressmen and others would pass him a quarter, sometimes more, for the morning paper, refusing change. At last it became clear that his crutch was more profitable than his trade, whereupon he sunk from the honorable calling into that of a mere beggar. Mr. Smiley prosecuted this lad in the police court, and succeeded, after considerable effort, in putting an end to his fraudulent gains; but until the cheat was clear, popular opinion was decidedly in favor of the boy as against the prosecutor. A hundred cases could be recited showing, like this, the danger to character from indiscriminate alms.

On the other hand, one of the most splendid reforms of our day is that of organized charity, which is accomplishing so noble a work in very many of our cities. It operates to minimize the evils just described, preventing the waste of charity funds, and making the too free recipients of these ashamed and willing to work instead. The immediate saving is as nothing compared with the character-building which accompanies this wise form of philanthropy. The people engaged therein have opened a distinct new source of general economic welfare. No longer can old-school economists denounce the spirit of philanthropy as antagonistic to the wealth-multiplying impulse, since here we behold philanthropy pure and simple, the freest possible from all taint of self-seeking, doing a work demonstrably and in an extraordinary degree advantageous to the amassing of wealth.

All rejoice in the movement, so popular among work-people, for shorter work-hours. Yet it raises a question with two sides. Shorter hours would certainly advantage the workman in the first instance, but the final welfare of working-people must depend on industrial prosperity at large. Now, in our age, so overwhelming a majority of the work of production is accomplished by capital in the form of machinery, that any policy looking to an increase of work-less hours must reckon with the waste arising from idle capital.

There is certainly at some point a golden mean where the higher efficiency of labor through shortened tasks will just balance this loss. What that is—whether eight hours, or ten,

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or six—we are not yet in a condition to decide, probable as it is that an eight-hour or even a six-hour day may finally prove best.

One argument against shorter hours is almost too contemptible to be named. It is that the laborers will misuse their leisure. A few may do so, but the majority will not. They will profit by it to the cultivation of their best manhood. It is good to know that many establishments are voluntarily introducing the eight-hour system, and find it to work well in every way.

George Gunton has advanced a paradoxical theory, to the effect that the general payment of present wages for shorter hours, or of higher for present hours, would not only advantage laborers, but actually force up the aggregate national wealth, profits and dividends rising with wages. His thought, allied to Rodbertus', is that, wage-earners being the chief consumers, increase in their ability to buy must immensely stimulate demand, to be met only by improved machinery, which, appearing, would cheapen production. The gain, it is argued, would thus perpetuate itself.

The reasoning is specious, but doctrinaire and inconclusive. No doubt, were such a thing possible, a firm, universal strike for somewhat higher wages would succeed. The wages-fund is more or less elastic, and capitalists would prefer smaller returns to none at all. Labor might thus win in the first instance. Permanent betterment, however, would require the new pressure on capital to be so adroitly tempered as to keep up the new economy, on the one hand, without, on the other, discouraging production. The same analysis would fit a voluntary addition to wages by employers. There can be no assurance of permanent rise in wages save through more copious production. Gunton, to be sure, expects just this in consequence of better machinery. But that is something which cannot be had on simple notification.

One of the most hopeful signs of our times is the increasing willingness of employers and employés to submit their difficulties to arbitration. We see the result of this in the recession of the "strike" wave which reached its height in

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1886. During the year 1888 only 211,000 employés were involved in strikes or lock-outs, against 345,000 the year before, and 448,000 the year before that. Sympathetic strikes have also fallen off, the number engaged in these in 1888 being but eight per cent. of the total number, against thirteen per cent. in 1887. The inference is that laborers are learning not to resort to the strike except in cases of genuine grievance. We consequently find that while in 1886 but twenty per cent. of the strikes completely succeeded, the next year the percentage rose to thirty-eight, and in 1888 to fifty. Later statistics are not at hand, but would probably re-enforce these inferences.

Co-operation, of which profit-sharing is one form, is to increase its scope. The writer does not expect, as some do, that it will become the main mode of production; but nothing hinders such a growth of it as greatly to alleviate the workingman's condition. Co-operative establishments endure crises better than others, which must do much, in time, to lessen the intensity of crises. Besides, there is prospect that co-operative wages, being taken, as they naturally will be, for standards in arbitration, will gradually have the effect of elevating all wages.

According to the new theory of wages and profits now usually taught by economists, the proportion of product passing into the form of profits is continually falling, that going to wages increasing. This principle, suppose it true,—it is not yet certainly so,—does not, by itself, mean that individual wages must necessarily rise, because increase of population may prevent this, however large the proportion of product ever destined to go as wages. But a force is inevitably operating, through the competition of employers, to insure that in no long time all competitive profits will be as low as they ought to be; in other words, that all such profits received will be profits *earned.* It is not rash to believe that in this way society is destined to get its economic oversight and planning—the work for which profits are given—done at length far cheaper and better than would be the case under socialism of any form.

Our lot is cast in a very peculiar age. Never again, prob-

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ably, so long as the world stands, will men pass through a century so abnormal as the present, in the possibility of winning extraordinary gains. Humanity is henceforth, in the main, to settle down to regular and permanent modes of getting its living. The world's best land has been taken up. It is hardly possible that labor-saving inventions, embodied and unembodied, should come into existence so rapidly for any similar period hereafter as they have since the beginning of the century whose last years are now passing. Going to sleep poor to awake a millionaire; great fortunes by the turn of a hand; revelling in wealth without contributing aught to the production of wealth,—these things must be henceforth less and less common as the decades roll by.

As capital is multiplied, interest will go down, so that idle wealth will be the possible possession of fewer and fewer persons, while not even the richest will be able whimsically to withhold capital from producing. When we learn, too, as we shall, to tax property highly in proportion as it is in no sense socially productive, useless riches may easily become quite as rare as they could be in a society organized in the socialist's manner.

Nothing but removable ignorance and apathy prevents the practical abolition of those fluctuations in money value which are now so grievously influential. The writer has, in another place,* set forth with some particularity how such monetary reform might be carried out. While the labor problem fills the public mind as at this moment, little attention can be expected to a matter so recondite and difficult as that of reform in the world's system of hard money. But the necessary study will come, followed by the required improvement, and the injustice which rich and poor have been suffering from this source since the beginning of history, almost, will pass away.

As to the wasteful clashing of interests in the great businesses, the yearly demand for any line of goods can be statistically forecast by public authority just as well now as under

* "An Honest Dollar," in Publications of American Economic Association.

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socialism; while the other part of the problem, determining how much product each mill shall put out every year, is in the way to be beautifully solved, entirely without cost to the state, by the system of trusts. Many trusts are abominable and dangerous, and will have to be regulated or crushed; but this co-ordinating part of their work is wholly excellent, though usually ignored. They should have the credit of it.

Indescribably benign and far-reaching reforms are to be wrought out in our slipshod and unjust methods of taxation, —taxation, that mighty enginery, usually so baneful hitherto, yet now offering itself as a benign means of distributing inordinate winnings gotten through rent or other monopoly. We shall speedily, I hope, revise our revenue system, now so distressingly burdensome to the country's industries as a whole, the most so to many which are supposed to be specially aided by it. We shall give up the vain effort to tax personalty, and rate more heavily the tangible and visible forms of property which no one can hide. The public power will get more and more out of the lucrative franchises and monopolies of its own creation, easing the great mass of us who toil without any aid from such special advantages. In cities we shall one day raise the entire tax from ground-rents and from these lucrative franchises.

Henry George is a sincere friend of humanity. He is also clear-headed, and many of the economic analyses in his books are very brilliant. Further, while the writer cannot at all accept the fundamental principles of George's philosophy, yet he is bound to express on two weighty points entire concurrence with that author. One is that the private ownership of land, which most of us, unlike George, do not see how we can after all set aside, at present involves distressing evils and injustice. The other is that the taxation of land proper is one of the fairest possible forms of raising revenue as well as one of the easiest and most convenient to administer.

We are far from thinking that all Mr. George's reasons for resorting to this species of taxation are sound. Nor can we believe that two-thirds or one-half of the good which he expects from its adoption will be realized. But we are convinced

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that to place a heavy, if not the main, tax on land, apart from improvements, is not only just and equitable, but extraordinarily politic: that it would increase the production of wealth, decrease the holding of land for purely speculative ends, and in many ways aid to better relations between the social classes.

Many of the objections raised against the George philosophy are in a way recommendations instead. Among these is that of William T. Harris, who has figured, as he thinks, that a land tax alone, though it were to extend to the entire confiscation of rent, would not be sufficient to defray public expenses. Were that so, a chief difficulty in George's scheme, as propounded by him,—the proposal, namely, to bestow rich largesses upon the unfortunate,—would be removed. But a stiff tax might be laid upon land without entirely destroying private income from rent, and involving no whit more confiscation than the forms of taxation now prevalent; in fact, much less.

One may easily be optimist enough to expect that, as knowledge of economic laws becomes general and as altruism deepens its hold upon the human heart, the needless expenditures of the rich as well as those of the poor will be given up. Mark what is said: *needless* applications of wealth, expenditures prompted solely by lust and vanity, doing good to no one whatever in any way whatever, but evil, pure evil, to all.

Riches are used inexcusably in certain other cases,—those, namely, in which the purchase is not worthless or vicious, but costly out of all proportion to the good it will ever do. Instance the thousands of dollars' worth of Raphael's paintings in the Torlonia palace at Rome, for months at a time visible to no one, and accessible to the public perhaps once in five years. In many a moderately rich man's house the mere furniture and plate cost fifty thousand dollars, sixty thousand dollars, or even one hundred thousand dollars. This should be different, not through legislation so much, which could healthily get at the evil, if at all, only in an indirect manner, but through the enlightenment of consciences.

That the poor, too, squander their substance is no excuse

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for the rich. The latter have had the better advantages, and ought, with firmer self-control, to set their less fortunate fellows a healthful example. Nor let any one make the mistake of supposing such waste justified by the fact that the mere processes by which the waste is brought about involve the employment of labor. Productive investment would equally have done this, and would then, beginning at the point where the actual outlay withdrew forever its sustenance to labor, have gone on in an endless career of furnishing such sustenance. New wealth would have resulted, bringing sharper competition of capital with capital, lowering the rate of interest, and making much industry possible which, owing to the loss, is now impossible. Waste, lavish spending, sowing money broadcast, are not of service to labor: they curse it instead.

Taxes will soon be laid on legacies, heavy in proportion to their unproductiveness. He who considers that all wealth is in a way a social product, and considers, too, that all abstraction of wealth from production has the positive and direct effect of increasing poverty and making all economic conditions harder for the multitude, will quickly conclude that a wealthy man has no moral right to turn capital into forms of truly idle wealth, or forms of wealth out of which only the owner himself, or an extremely limited circle of human beings, can derive good.

There will further be introduced a means of public saving which must greatly alleviate the burden of taxation,—the saving, namely, of that vast bulk of unearned increment which our present loose policy lets go to individuals. We might, without confiscation or injustice of any kind, inhibit all public persons from ever hereafter selling outright a single foot of land. Rise in land values would then become a source of public wealth instead of private, and one from which no possible danger could arise. I am of opinion that no man living has sounded in his thought the new weal which awaits human society from these small but obvious improvements in taxation.

There are also to come new measures of administration,

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which cannot but be almost equally helpful. There is not an evil of a temporal nature which society now suffers that does not either originate in poor administration or derive more or less aggravation therefrom. Civil Service reform is a prime necessity, and its success is well-nigh as important economically as politically. Many another imperative reform waits for prosperous beginning upon this. Our banking methods, though much improved since the war, are imperfect, causing losses indefinitely large. The same of insurance. Better surveillance over both these departments must be had. A huckstering life insurance business is carried on among the poor by a base lot of sharpers, the results of which are pauperism and the increase of poverty. I have never known attention to be called to this great evil. Abuses even greater in magnitude exist in the matter of marine insurance, which offers peculiar temptations to fraud, and facilities therefor, as pointed out by Samuel Plimsoll in the *Nineteenth Century* for March, 1889. Twelve thousand sterling per annum, he thinks, are thus wasted at sea.

Intemperance is a dreadful economic woe. It has been computed that this country consumes nine hundred and ninety-four million dollars' worth of intoxicating liquors annually,—money enough to pay for and keep up a ten-thousand-dollar life insurance policy for every head of a family in the land, thus practically abolishing poverty. There is hope that this dreadful inroad upon our material prosperity may in time cease to be made. Whether by high license, or by prohibition, or by licensing weak liquors and prohibiting strong, and at last prohibiting the public sale of all, we shall go far in time towards eradicating the liquor appetite as well as the liquor habit.

In Europe more than here suffering arises through another terrible curse,—viz., military expenses. It is computed that Europe's annual outgo in this direction is not less than a billion and three-fourths of dollars. This sum takes no account of the loss in productive labor occasioned by the withdrawal therefrom of the flower of the male population. Were this item to be added, the yearly expense would be

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considerably in excess of two billions. Unfortunately, the outlook for change in this particular is not satisfactory. Yet one can hardly believe that a system so infinitely wasteful and weakening will always continue. Self-interest alone must, it would seem, lead rulers to cultivate peaceful relations, and with the prevalence of international arbitration we may safely prophesy, if not universal disarming, yet a vast and beneficial reduction in military outgoes.

A great deal may be expected from increase of thrift in the poor. The waste of which they are at present guilty is incalculable. Could we prevent that which occurs in uneconomic housekeeping alone, a fund would result far more than enough to feed all the hungry. Mr. Atkinson, who has well urged this consideration, computes that a saving in comfort and force, from the food which each person in the United States consumes, of five cents' worth a day more than at present, would be the equivalent of a thousand millions of dollars a year. How much is lost through unintentional waste in ill choice of dress, food, modes of cooking and of tillage, and in the neglect of accounts and of little sums! These shiftless habits are very hard to reach, and will succumb to nothing but careful education. Therefore, in addition to the compulsory technical, industrial, agricultural, and physical training so wisely and warmly recommended by the Earl of Meath and others, let us speak up for positive and systematic instruction in thrift, as a necessity in all primary and secondary schools. The school savings-banks which have been introduced in many cities of our country deserve to be extended to all the public schools of the land. Instruction in economics is already considerably general, and rapidly becoming more so. Its primary intention is not, of course, to cultivate economy, but it will incidentally have this effect.

Striking are the figures which connect general thriftlessness and petty criminality with ignorance. The latest judicial statistics for England and Wales show that in the years 1886–87, twenty-seven and five-tenths per cent. of the people committed for crime could neither read nor write. Seventy per cent. could only read and write imperfectly, only two and

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eight-tenths per cent. well, and only one in a thousand was really educated. Ignorance and poverty are mutually cause and effect. Among the above, ten and five-tenths per cent. were of no occupation; laborers, needle-women, and the like formed fifty-two per cent.; factory hands six per cent.; skilled mechanics fourteen and one-half per cent. Of people in the professional employments only two in a thousand were represented.

Even the big corporation and the trust will not prove beyond society's reach. As we have seen, there is a good side to the trust. To the system of trusts, as to the general system of massed capital, there is confessedly a dangerous side. The danger is partly political, from the control of governmental action; and partly economic, that of inordinate income at the public expense. In respect to this latter,—the economic peril,—notice, what is commonly overlooked, that a great organization of this sort is not necessarily a leech simply because its profits are immense. There is always this happy check upon one of these Titan agencies, that unless competition is intrinsically impossible, if prices are too high competing concerns spring to life; and the more it improves its methods in order to produce cheaply the greater the danger, since the cheaper methods cannot be long concealed. Unless the power concerned is vast enough, either singly or in combination with others, to control a majority of the line of product, it cannot permanently rob. The socialist will say, I know, that even so, society loses by allowing colossal returns to go into private hands which might help to enrich the whole body of us. The reply is that, if socialistically administered, these businesses would not yield these colossal returns.

But an agency may possess monopoly power, and yet, under public regulation, or in fear of annihilation, not use it to our harm. For this reason the writer cannot concur in the dictum that "Government may be rightly asked to undertake those services for the efficient or economical performance of which a monopoly is either desirable or necessary." * The

* Osborne Howes, Jr., *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, vol. ii. p. 354.

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great trusts-industries, for instance, come under this rule; but they should not be assumed by "all of us" till every resource for the regulation of them has been tried in vain.

There remain, then, the incorrigible corporation or trust having and abusing a monopoly, and the incorrigible corporation or trust which is a troubler politically. All such can be, must be, will be placed under state surveillance, and, if necessary, under state ownership. Deep meaning is in the words of Paul, "The powers that be are ordained of God." Let us not use these powers wantonly, but where their action is truly necessary it will be found to be safe and benign. The present drift towards corporate action as against abstract individualism is at heart rational, and can hardly become morbid save by proceeding too fast. As the world ripens for it, as our Civil Service becomes purer, and as men come to look upon public office not merely in the light of a charge to keep, but as a heaven-sent opportunity to do good and bless their fellows, all refractory monopolies, and very likely a large number of others, will pass into public hands.

The services of all businesses so assumed will then be furnished to the public at cost, or, if above cost, will by so much lessen the taxes. And, with a Civil Service such as we must strive for, the cost of administering such works will be indefinitely less than now. For, even were conscience in no degree to take the place of greed as a motive to sharp surveillance, public management would still have great advantage, avoiding waste from useless competition, from cheating in the work of corporations, from gambling with stocks and bonds, from the impoverishment of stockholders, and from the double carriage of freight, while the tendency of public ownership would be so to place and operate railways, telegraphs, and other public plants as best to develop the country. In comparisons between public and private management of railways and telegraphs, items like these are nearly always overlooked.

This review has given the reader painfully little vision. It has shed upon society's future but a glimmer of light,—perhaps only that of Milton's hell, just enough to enable us to see

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the darkness. But let us not despair. Till yesterday no study worthy the name was ever devoted to Social Science. What if the best minds of another century—the Darwins, the Huxleys, the Tyndalls, the Faradays, the Helmholzes, the Siemenses—shall give themselves up to Social Science as those of the last have to physical? In such an event, of which there is no small probability, great progress cannot but come.

However, it will be noticed that very much of the advantage for the advent of which hope has been expressed, presupposes moral betterment in men. This is the sole ultimate resort. With the best insight which the writer can gain into the terrible social imbroglio of our age, he is able to foresee no truly tolerable—to say nothing of a satisfying or final—social state, save as men are led, much more than they now do, to love and work righteousness. Make men good, and you may even launch a system of socialism with some success. Make men good, and you will need no such system. Make men good, and with the helpful influences which we have traced, a very high pitch of rationality in living will be attained.

But how are men to be made good? There's the rub, the stubborn centre of the whole difficulty. Save by a miracle, the task will prove impossible unless we can somehow *purify the sources of population.* With any given set of individuals moral reform, if earnestly undertaken, nearly always succeeds. Promising effort of this kind is continually going on. But while we are successfully at work lifting one layer of human life, another is forming beneath, thicker, wider, and less tractable than the first. The worst members of society are commonly the most prolific. We can see that this is naturally so, because such people feel no responsibility for their offspring or for their kind. But is this order of things inevitable? Must it be permanent? So delicate a subject one would hesitate to discuss, even if one had a prescription. Plato is the only sociologist who has yet duly envisaged this awful problem, and whoso will may read, in the "Republic," how the grand Greek seer proposed to deal with it.

E. Benj. Andrews.

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PLEASURE AND PAIN IN EDUCATION.

BEFORE entering upon my subject proper, it will be necessary to say something about the place of pleasure in moral action generally.

It is, of course, at once evident that the importance we attach to pleasure and pain in education, together with our view of their right use,—whether as incitement or deterrent, reward or punishment,—must rest upon and flow from our view of the place and importance of pleasure in our ideal of life. The end of education is the production of a good and capable human being. Before, then, we can with advantage set ourselves to investigate the process of that production, we must have clear ideas as to the qualities of the product aimed at. With regard to that particular quality of a good and efficient life, with which we are here concerned, we want to know—

1. What place and importance do we desire that those we educate shall assign to pleasure in their ideal and conduct of life?

2. How shall we best use to that end those susceptibilities to pleasure and pain which all possess?

That pleasure is a good, and that pain is an evil, will, with certain reservations, be accepted by all. But that pleasure is *the* good, or pain necessarily or absolutely evil, it is my object and intention to deny. The point, as to the good of pleasure, upon which the widest agreement will be found, is its effect upon the vital energies of the individual as a whole.

1. Happiness, speaking generally, heightens life, and happiness is a state of well-being, or "feeling of general content with one's existence," * to which pleasurable activity is a necessary condition.

2. Pleasure, moreover, is the mark of healthy faculty in

* See Bradley's "Ethical Studies," p. 121.

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normal activity, and tends—speaking generally—to increase the activity and further the health.

3. Pleasure in what we do is, when the activity is good, its crowning grace. "A man is not a good man at all," says Aristotle, "unless he takes pleasure in noble deeds. No one would call a man just who did not take pleasure in doing justice, nor generous who took no pleasure in acts of generosity; and if this be so, then actions done in accordance with virtue must be in themselves pleasurable." *

4. Pleasure has also been defined as "the feeling of self-realizedness;" † and self-realization is one of the forms in which we express the end of living.

5. Further, it has become common of late among philosophical and psychological writers of the idealistic school to speak of pleasure as "the sense of value for consciousness," ‡ and though I think the term is open to criticism, it at least shows the immense importance that is being attached to pleasure by even those writers and thinkers who may be supposed to hold a brief against what is known as "the pleasure doctrine."

If, then, pleasure be so "fair a fruit"; if it hold so important a place in life; if it tend, on the whole, to heighten life in general and to increase function in particular; if it be the mark of the normal activity of healthy faculty; if it be the sense of value for the individual consciousness; if it be the feeling of self-realizedness; if it be the crowning grace in the good action of a good man's life, shall we not, above all things, aim at pleasure?

No: for to do so is to aim at an accompaniment,—a kind of by-product,—but is not to aim at the fundamental necessity of our humanity. It is to mistake the sense of value for value itself; it is to mistake the bloom of health upon the cheek for that right-ordered system of physical activities which is health itself.

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* Aristotle's "Ethics," bk. i. chap. vi.

† Bradley's "Ethical Studies," p. 234.

‡ See "An Introduction to Social Philosophy," J. S. Mackenzie, p. 217; Dewey's "Psychology," p. 16.

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What we really need is life, function, self-realization, nobility of character; and at these we must aim. That pleasure is normally connected with all of these is true, but we may not let the amount of pleasure excited in us, or promised to us by any of these ideas, or by any other idea, be the test of its value for us as human beings. To do so is to leave us without an argument for the drunkard or the voluptuary. Neither may we make the *higher* pleasures our aim, for this is to introduce a new standard, and at the same time to be guilty of the stupidity of failing to see that we have done so, and therefore of failing to use our real standard in our judgment of action. Neither may we say that though the greatest amount of pleasure *to the individual* cannot now, as things are, be the individual aim or the test of right conduct, yet the greatest amount of pleasure *to the whole* is even now the test of right conduct and the true aim of the individual, while, in a perfect society to come, when complete adaptation to environment shall have taken place, the greatest amount of pleasure to the individual and the greatest amount of pleasure to the whole will have become coincident. We may not say these things because, among other reasons, the question which of several possible courses of action will result in the greatest amount of pleasure to the whole is a wholly insoluble problem, and because the sort of perfect society indicated by this ideal is a wholly inhuman conception. Human life implies progress, progress implies readjustment, and readjustment implies pain.

The shortest and simplest way to treat my subject will be, perhaps, to state what I believe to be the proper place of pleasure in the ideal of a normal, healthy, good person, rather than to criticise existing theories on the subject.

The end of life I shall call self-realization. Self-realization is only possible through the various self-directed activities of the individual as a member of society. To make himself the most efficient possible member of his society is the same thing to a man as to realize himself to the greatest extent possible. All things which further these desirable activities, this desirable self-realization, are valuable to us; all things are finally judged as good or bad by their relation to this end.

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All pleasure is dependent upon activity, and is judged good or bad according to the nature of the activity with which it is connected. Pleasure can, therefore, never be desirable in itself, regardless of the *kind of pleasure* which it is, and the kind of pleasure depends upon the kind of activity with which it is connected. Pleasure in activity may be of three kinds: (1) it may express for us the sense of value which the object of desire excites in us; or (2) it may be the "feeling of self-realizedness,"* the sense of having affirmed or expressed the self, which accompanies the attainment of the object of desire. The existence of the pleasure in both these cases depends upon the relation between the object of desire, or of attainment, and the man's character. A glass of brandy excites an anticipatory thrill in the drunkard; the thought of a well-ordered community calls up a glow in the mind of a good citizen. The moral value of the pleasure, in both instances, depends upon the nature of the object or activity with which it is connected, the value of the object or activity being ultimately judged by its relation to the man's life as a whole, his life, that is, as an efficient member of society, as a good man. (3) Pleasure is also the mark of the normal activity of healthy faculty, and is to be prized as indicating such activity; but the desirability of the activity itself must depend, as in the former cases, upon its relation to the man's life as a whole. The pleasures of the activities of parenthood are doubtless good in the normal human life, but for the individual they may be evil. Their desirability must depend upon the relation of these activities to the man's chief end.

If intensity of interest, if devotion to ideal ends be equivalent to "pleasure in ideal ends" (which I do not think, but which seems to be largely contended), then it is eminently desirable that we should feel intensity of pleasure in ideal ends. But the desirability of the pleasure depends, not upon its intensity, nor upon its duration, but upon the nature of the end to which it attaches.

The pleasure of achievement is, obviously, most desirable.

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* See Bradley's "Ethical Studies," p. 234.

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Without it we should be but "frustrate ghosts." But here again the desirability depends, not upon the amount of the pleasure, nor upon mere achievement as such (though something may be said for that), but upon the nature of that which is achieved.

Pleasure, then, is to be prized as indicating healthy faculty, strong interest, achievement, as, moreover, "perfecting the working," to use Aristotle's words, as generally heightening life and increasing vitality; but it is to be prized because it indicates or furthers these good things, and it derives all its value from its relation, through these things, to the end of life.

There is one difficulty which must be met here before leaving this part of my subject: but I shall deal with it as shortly as possible.

This is the notion that "to have pleasure in doing what we do" is the same thing as "doing what we do for the sake of pleasure." No one who has not thought about it ever makes this mistake. It is only when we begin to think why we do "so" and "so" that we grow confused about it. No one would think, for instance, of calling the carpenter who is an artist in his craft, and who works therefore with zeal and enjoyment, a "pleasure seeker." No one would dream that the enthusiast for social reform, the man who spends the passion of his life in the service of his ideal, is, therefore, because of his passionate devotion, a voluptuary. Yet this confusion means just this. A pure voluptuary is hard to find; but we all know those who are prone to be moved to action by the thought, "this will give me pleasure," and also those who are moved by the pleasure or interest felt in the object or end served, and we never confuse these persons in real life. The man who, with self-forgetful ardor, serves the object of his devotion with joy is never mistaken by us for the person who reflects, upon each occasion of action, "Shall I enjoy doing this?" "shall I have pleasure resulting from this?" and who decides for or against according as the answer is, "yes" or "no." It is only when some one suggests to us, "But your enthusiast, your man of ardent devotion,

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does, after all, the thing he likes best to do: wherein, then, does he differ from your selfish person?" that we grow confused in our thoughts.

A little further thought is the only cure. We shall find, if we examine the subject carefully, that pleasure or interest excited in us by the idea of an object (as, for instance, the painting of a picture, or the sanitation of a town) is not only different from, but absolutely incompatible with, "my pleasure" as an object or end. If the pleasure which moves to action be pleasure felt in the idea of the picture or healthy town, it cannot, at the same moment, be pleasure felt in the idea of "my pleasure." Pleasure to be gained may at any moment become an object to me, but if so, it must excite present pleasure or interest in me before it can move me to action. That the pleasure which is aimed at cannot be the pleasure which is felt surely needs no proving. If it were so we should never need to act at all in order to gain pleasure. To desire a pleasure would be to have it. To think with pleasure of the pleasure of a good dinner would be to have the pleasure of the good dinner. A hungry man would make short work of such logic.

I hope, then, it will be taken as proved—it is certainly capable of the most absolute proof—that to find my pleasure in an end is a wholly different thing from making my end pleasure.

I said at the beginning of my paper that we wanted to know, first, What place do we desire that those whom we educate should assign to pleasure in their ideal of life? So far I have tried to answer that question. I then said our second question must be, How can we best use to that end the susceptibilities to pleasure and pain of which all are possessed? In other words, What is the place of pleasure and pain in education?

I think it desirable to take, first, intellectual education, and afterwards moral education, though, in point of fact, the two are so inter-related that we shall find it impossible in practice to take any step in the interest of either without finding the interests of the other involved in the most vital way. All

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education is ultimately moral education, inasmuch as all education is the development of rational interests or of desirable capacities. But we use the term moral education generally and properly in a more restricted sense,—in a sense in which it means the systematic development of character. In the education of children the term must be still more restricted: it must mean formation of those habits of conduct out of which grow moral judgment, and the will to be good, as contrasted with simply the will to do this or that good thing. I shall, then, for convenience' sake, treat first of intellectual and secondly of moral education, but I wish to emphasize my sense of the fatal mistake we make when we separate these two interests.

All intellectual interests are of moral interest, for the acquisition of truth is part of the moral ideal, while the training of the mind in its pursuit is also the training of the will, as, for instance, in attention. All moral interests, on the other hand, have their intellectual quality. They are *interests*, not merely habits. Education means the development of these interests and the exercise of the faculties involved. Disaster invariably follows in practice from the separation of either of these forms of education from the other. It is fatal to think that moral considerations are not involved in the acquisition of truth and the development of faculty, or in the mode in which these are furthered or the end in subordination to which they are pursued. It is equally fatal to think that moral interests can be intelligently furthered by those who are deficient in intelligence and poverty-stricken in intellectual interests. The immorality of "masses" of the "moral" teaching of our day is due to this fatal separation. Having lost touch with the best intellectual life of our time, it has lost moral life also.

Having, then, premised so much, I may, without fear of being misunderstood, treat, for purposes of convenience, first one and then the other of these aspects of all education.

First, then, intellectual education. In the earliest years of children there is but little trouble for intelligent teachers. The mental appetite of a healthy child is almost as keen and is certainly much more insatiable than his bodily appetite.

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His mind is as instantly and trustingly agape at every moment as are the mouths of the hedgerow fledglings at every rustle in the leaves about their nest. The development of that appetite and that child's pleasure in the process will depend for the most part on the quality of the food dropped in. Difficulty may be perhaps for the first time felt,—drudgery may seem probable, if not inevitable,—when first a systematic education is commenced.

Mr. Morris has abolished all systematic education in his most recent "Earthly Paradise."* But so far from agreeing with Mr. Morris that the best way to develop interest in knowledge is to leave education entirely unsystematic, I believe that the only true way is to make it much more systematic than it is at present. Of course by systematic I do not mean rigid, unelastic, of one pattern and one content for every mind, but I mean more organized, more unified towards the end of all education, more diversified within that unity to meet the need of individual cases, more illuminated in every direction by our growing knowledge of the human mind and our growing recognition of the human end.

Now, the first effect of systematic education upon children is apt to be the sense of restraint. They cannot any longer flit, like butterflies, from interest to interest, abandoning each the moment a new one catches the attention, governed only by the impulse of the moment. They are called upon for a fixed and directed attention, for a self-governing exercise of will. At once the teacher's position with regard to pleasure and pain must be decided, at once the question becomes of the acutest moral as well as of the acutest intellectual interest.

Shall a teacher permit a child to roam from object to object, on the theory that nothing can be properly learned without interest or pleasure in the learning? Or shall he, on the theory that obedience and self-control are of more importance still, coerce the child by fear or pain? No one, I suppose, of natural insight or moral force would dream of simply adopting either one of these extremes, though either would be justifiable on

* "News from Nowhere," by W. Morris.

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current theories as to the place of pleasure. The teacher's aim, at this particular point, is the development of a particular interest, the production in the child of that pleasure which will keep him at his work, and make him do it well. If the conditions were all they ought to be, this pleasure would be a natural result. If it is not, then it is the teacher's business to see wherein the conditions are wanting. The happy transformation that has taken place in our own time in the education of little children is an apt illustration of what may be done in this way, and, perhaps, no better answer could be given to any one who is troubled about these things than an introduction to any well-ordered kindergarten. The adaptation of the knowledge which it is desired to impart to the needs and capacities of the pupils has been there carried to an admirable point and with the happiest results. The relation of the new fact to some familiar interest; the presentation of each new object to as many different senses as possible; the rational adoption of a varied programme; the saving of this variety from chaos by the dominance of some idea which is presented again and again under many different forms; the happy, eager, interested, good children who generally result from this treatment lead one to hope that in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred, natural interests intelligently developed and the pleasure of doing work that is fitted to the capacities and character of the worker, will be all-sufficient spurs to the acquisition of knowledge and the performance of duty.

In intellectual education, then, we shall aim at developing the pleasure of natural interests and the pleasure of the activity of healthy faculty, and when pleasure is slow to show itself, we shall seek to develop it by linking the new subject on to an old interest, and thus securing for the new, also, a value which will express itself as pleasure. This is the aim and this will be the method. But this may not always succeed. In spite of the wisest selection of subject, in spite of its most skilful treatment on the part of the teacher, in spite of the brightest capacity on the part of the pupil, there will come times when interest is not roused, when attention is not caught, and all seems for the moment at a stand-still. What

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has now to be done becomes a question of what we distinguish as *moral* education. That is to say, at this point, the emphasis passes to the moral aspect. Both interests are present throughout, but here we distinctly feel that the incidence of emphasis has altered.

When a child fails to respond with pleasure to the object presented to him, whether that be the acquisition of a piece of knowledge or the performance of some duty, to what must his teacher appeal? First, I think, beyond all doubt, to the child's habit of obedience, a habit which may be well begun in any child before it is a month old. If parents were not too foolish or too careless to give themselves the trouble of insisting upon even an infant's obedience, they would spare much pain afterwards, both to themselves and to their children. But suppose the habit of obedience to have been formed, and the child to respond to his teacher's authoritative demand as promptly as a soldier responds to the "attention" of his officer; can we leave him there? When the teacher is all that he ought to be, the instinctive obedience is probably followed so closely by the notion of doing as the teacher wishes, with the motive of pleasing the teacher, that nothing further may be needed. But this motive may not exist, or it may not be sufficient. How, then, is the child's will to be buttressed? The point is to rouse his will so that he may control himself in the case in hand.

It will make the matter easier, I think, if we look first at the case of an adult who finds himself in a similar difficulty, and see what would be the ideal conduct for him. Our treatment of the child then will be that which is best calculated to produce the ideal attitude. What happens when we find ourselves face to face with a duty which is, for the moment, distasteful to us, or which, from its relation to our character or circumstances, must necessarily involve much pain to us in the doing of it? How do we help ourselves? What makes us do our duty?

To the ideally good man the one thing necessary is the clear apprehension of the thing as "his duty," as the right thing to be done. No other spur is necessary. He never

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stops to think what pleasure will accrue to him, or what pain from the doing of it. He does not need to strengthen his will by the thought of the pained disapproval of those whom he most honors and holds most dear; he does not need to remind himself of the public esteem which may follow on his faithfulness to duty, the public disgrace which may follow on his unfaithfulness. These things, if he think of them, may make it easier for him to do his duty. But he needs none of them. The value to him of that which has to be done as part of his ideal of a good man's life, even if for the moment it fail to arouse in him a sense of value for its own sake, will be wholly adequate to insure his fidelity to that ideal. His character, in other words, will be the sufficient fulcrum of his will. And in this faithfulness to his ideal he will find a stern joy, no matter what the contemporaneous pain involved may be. It seems, indeed, a misuse of words to call this joy "pleasure," yet it is beyond all doubt a desirable state of consciousness. It is what Carlyle called "blessedness"; what the Bible calls "peace." A good man will not be much given to reflect upon this. He will be too much interested at the time in what has to be done; he will be too ready afterwards to pass on to the next thing needed. But if he does reflect upon it he will know that it is of more value to him than any other state of consciousness whatsoever. The point, however, which it most concerns us to note here is that if he is a good man he will never be determined to his action by desire for this state of feeling. To do so, indeed, would be to fail to get the feeling. The feeling is the satisfaction of having been faithful to his ideal *for its own sake.* To make peace of conscience our motive is as selfish in its way as to make bodily ease our motive, and it has the additional disadvantage of being hopelessly illogical. The goodness of a good act depends, ultimately, upon the will to do it for its own sake, as part of the ideal of a good life in the mind of him who does it.

A man's sense of the value of a contemplated action may be greatly increased by the more vivid presentation to him of its relation to other parts of conduct, the value of which are felt by him more acutely. This, of course, is not sup-

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plying a new motive, but is merely rendering the conception of the present object at once fuller, more intelligent, and more powerful, by allying it at more points to the man's character.

Once outside the moral motive proper,—*i.e.*, the intrinsic value of the thing to be done,—we may present a multitude of motives varying in worthiness from the motive of winning the approval of the best people we know, down through the hope of public approval or fear of public disgrace to the lowest motives of all,—anticipation of private material gain or fear of private loss, whether physical pain or other. The worthiness of the motive with which we seek to strengthen the will of the morally weak will be less or greater, just in proportion as the object in which we try to arouse his interest appeals to a desire for mere personal pleasure, or to the pleasure of that higher self in which is involved the good of others and our own moral approval. For instance, the appeal to a man who wavers in willing what is right, calling upon him to think of what some friend would think,—some friend who is to him the highest embodiment he knows of his highest ideal,—is a noble appeal so long as it suggests to the man being worthy of his friend's approval. If the man be so far lost to right as to say, "Oh, my friend need never know," then the approval, so far as it remains an object, is an immoral one. That is to say, the man has really ceased to desire his friend's moral approval. He desires his friend's *favor*, and he is dishonorable enongh to be willing to accept that on false grounds. But when the man, though weak, is honest, then the suggestion of what his friend's judgment would be strengthens his conscience and his will, and helps him to realize his better self. Similarly the appeal to regard for public opinion is best when attention is directed to the public conscience rather than to possible public favor or disfavor; and this can be effectively done only when the public referred to is morally better than the man.

But supposing that all these appeals fail. Supposing that we cannot educate the man's conscience by suggesting what will be the judgment of his friend, that we cannot quicken his will through love of his friend and desire to be worthy of his

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approval; suppose he be defiant enough to disregard public opinion, and reckless enough to be unmoved by counsels of prudence, must we leave him there?

If the man does what he ought not to do, and if his fault is sufficiently serious, has society no duty to interfere in its corporate form and punish the offender against its life? Is dread of this punishment a wholly mean motive to present to the man? Mr. Morris, in the "News" he brings us from "Nowhere," seems to report that this is the state of opinion in that region. May "Nowhere" retain it long!

That incentives to wrong-doing might be immensely diminished in a more rationally and humanely ordered society than ours is indeed a thought that all will welcome, and probably most hold in some form or other, and we can but be grateful to Mr. Morris for the eloquence with which he has preached the doctrine, and for the sense of beauty he awakes in us by his latest presentation of it. But it has seemed to other thinkers as humane as Mr. Morris, and—if one may be pardoned saying so—more profound in their application of their humanity, that the ever-deepening complexity of life and the ever-widening range of human interests might involve the increase, both in range and value, of the sacrifices possibly demanded from the individual.* If this be so, we cannot get rid of the difficulty in point by simply illuminating it from our future ideal.

It is true that to be deterred simply by fear of pain is not to be moved by a moral motive at all. But repression of the evil nature by pain, or by the fear of pain, may be the condition of the better nature with the better motive having a chance to assert itself. Which of us has not at some time echoed the heart-wrung prayer, "Purge me with hyssop, and I shall be clean; wash me, and I shall be whiter than snow." Which of us has not looked back with gratitude on pain through which his judgment was enlightened or his will strengthened? It is well to believe that there is a better self in every one, and that by punishment we take the side of that better self as

* Green's "Prolegomena," pp. 296–299.

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against the worst self which we repress. Punishment by the state—*i.e.*, by society in its organized form—carries with it peculiar advantages, and has a peculiar dignity. It is, at least in idea, free from mere personal malice or private revenge. It is the pronouncement of unbiased persons upon the merits of the case; it is the assertion by society of the inviolability of its common life; it is the demand of society upon the individual to recognize his responsibility as a moral agent and member of society,* or rather it is the enforcement of that demand, strengthening it may be the individual to enforce that demand upon himself, or making him conscious of it where he was before unconscious. The society, therefore, that fails to punish its criminals, fails not only in its duty of protection to the rest of society, but fails in its duty towards the criminals themselves. It fails, moreover,—and this is the worst failure of all,—to recognize the common interest in goodness and the common duty therefore of punishment. It fails, in short, to recognize society as a spiritual unity.

The whole question of the nature and function of punishment is of the utmost importance, but it is too vast a subject to be more than touched upon here. It must suffice us to get sufficient notions about it to justify us in accepting it as an instrument in the moral education of the individual, and to guide us, in a general way, in its use.

First, then, punishment is due as vindicating the spiritual unity of society; as expressing a sense of public wrong; as emphasizing the responsibility of the individual.

Second, in punishment we should aim at bringing home to the individual that responsibility; at repressing certain evil tendencies or habits by visiting the acts to which they give rise with pain; at taking the side of his better self as against the worse self which we repress.

Third, the form and extent of the punishment must be decided according to the merits of individual cases. Mere retaliation, as Aristotle long ago pointed out, may fail con-

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* Bradley's "Ethical Studies," p. 24 and foll. See *International Journal of Ethics*, vol. ii., No. 1, art. "The Theory of Punishment."

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spicuously in rendering that justice which is its primary justification. The blow with which a strong man might kill a child or a woman, might, if inflicted upon him in punishment, be productive of little or no effect. Moreover, though in some instances, "an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth" may, as some moderns contend, bring home to the offender, in the most pointed manner, the nature of his offence; such crude methods must become ever less and less necessary with the development of self-conscious intelligence. The form and extent, therefore, of punishment had best be regulated by the degree of responsibility of the offender, and by the way a particular punishment will affect him. A fifty-pound fine to a rich man would mean much less than one pound to a poor man; a week's imprisonment to a man who is responsible head of his own business would mean much more than a month to a loafer.

There is another powerful factor in what I may call education by pain. This is discipline. We think of punishment as pain inflicted for an offence committed. We think of discipline as pain submitted to by way of precaution or development.

One is one's own best disciplinarian, but many stand in need of external aid in the enforcement of this salutary pain. Sometimes, when the tendency to be fought against has become a mania,—as with a drunkard,—the only way may be complete starvation of the tyrannous appetite. But I am inclined to think that the best, perhaps the only, effective discipline is the exercise of the deficient qualities of character, exercise, that is, of those qualities, deficiency of which has made possible the excess of their opposite.* Thus the drunkard must, beyond doubt, deny continually his craving for strong drink, but he must also develop his interests in life, he must strengthen, in every possible way, his will. One may do this continually if one is on the watch. One may set one's self to endure pain just for the sake of developing one's endurance; one may deny one's self unimportant pleasures just for the sake of keeping one's self in hand, and one may

* Aristotle's "Ethics," bks. iii. and iv.

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also exercise one's self of set purpose where one is especially weak. The stingy person may seek for opportunities of giving; the spendthrift may take upon himself serious money responsibilities, with heavy penalties attached to failure; the physically lazy man may insist upon himself that he rise early in the morning, that he avoid a more than necessarily luxurious couch, that he take a certain amount of physical exercise every day; the woman whose fastidiousness causes a revolt from ugliness and dirt which threatens her human sympathy, may force herself to go, in the furtherance of some service of humanity, where ugliness and dirt abound; the strong-willed, vigorous, healthy person, who feels an unbrotherly contempt for the weak-willed, and has a barbarous want of insight into the woes of the physically feeble, might with advantage cultivate the acquaintance of at least one moral wreck, whom he might try to refit with some of his abounding energy, might with profit become a visitor in a hospital ward, if Fate have denied him the opportunity of such study and such sympathy nearer home. We shall persevere with this cultivation of the deficient qualities by the exercise of the faculties involved until that exercise is attended with pleasure. We shall look out for this pleasure as a sign of growth. We shall prize it, not simply as pleasure,—we might have gained more pleasure some other way,—but as marking development of desirable faculty.

This, then, is broadly the method of education by or through Pain. I would now speak of education by and through Pleasure.

I may pass perhaps lightly over the great educative force of public approval, because already our right attitude towards that has been indicated. I would just add that though not in itself or for its own sake a legitimate moral aim, it is yet one of the most powerful stimulants and auxiliaries to moral action. We should endeavor to utilize this social force, so powerfully educative when the public is noble, by allying ourselves and by trying to induce others to ally themselves with all those higher expressions of social opinion, those associations which exist for the purpose of furthering the

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realization of high aims. The enthusiasm of ten men banded together for a common end will be far more than ten times the enthusiasm of one man striving alone. Further, it will be our duty to try, each one of us, so to influence public opinion around us that social approval may be a help and not a hinderance to the moral life of the individual.

There is one great—perhaps pre-eminent—medium of education by means of pleasure of which I want chiefly to speak. It is less important than the medium of social approval in that the area of its influence is, so far at least, less extended; but it is more important in that it is the expression of the deepest insight brought to bear upon human life. I mean the great medium of art.

Art has for its function the relation of truth to us through the emotions. It must reveal beauty, it must make goodness dear, or it is not true art. All art is a comment upon life; all art is a selection, an emphasis; all noble art is the presentation in forms of beauty of the deepest and most permanent human interests.* It is the revelation of the meaning of life. The real artist is no mere imitator; he is a seer, a maker. Selecting, by his gift of insight, the permanent and the true, he embodies, by his creative imagination, these ideas in suitable forms, divested of extraneous or confusing adjuncts, so that they are apprehended by us and move us as they never did before. It is such a seer and such a maker, such a lover of the beautiful and the good, such a discerner of the permanent and the real, who, penetrating into the hidden heart and meaning of our life, dares to say to us,—

> "O world, as God has made it! All is beauty;
> And, knowing this is love, and love is duty,
> What further may be sought for or declared?"†

(Those of us who find it difficult to echo Browning's words may do well to consider whether the difficulty arises from our greater or from our lesser insight.)

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* Dewey's "Psychology," pp. 193, 200, 313–322.

† Browning's "Guardian Angel."

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This, I claim, is the function of all fine art; but the different arts are capable of it in different degrees. Those arts in which the appeal is more preponderatingly sensuous—as, for instance, music and painting—are necessarily less adequate to their high end than that greatest art of all, the art of Poetry. "Here for the first time," says Mr. Dewey, "art becomes thoroughly ideal."

I cannot better recommend the point of view I wish to put forward than by giving it in the words of one of the most lovable exponents of the loveliness of the art he so loved. In his exquisite "Defence of Poesie" Sir Philip Sidney says,—

"The ending end of all earthly learning being virtuous action, those skills that most serve to bring forth that have a most just title to be princes over all the rest; wherein, if we can show it rightly, the poet is worthy to have it before any other competitors."

Then, having compared the power of the Poet, as a teacher, with the power of the Historian and the moral Philosopher, whom he rightly considers his most formidable rivals, and having made some of the most penetrating and profound remarks upon their relation, he says,—

"For who will be taught, if he be not moved with desire to be taught? . . . Now, therein, of all sciences, is our poet the monarch. For he doth not only show the way but giveth so sweet a prospect into the way, as will entice any man to enter into it: nay, he doth as if your journey should lie through a fair vineyard, at the very first give you a cluster of grapes that, full of that taste, you may long to pass further. He beginneth not with obscure definitions, which must blur the margin with interpretations and load the memory with doubtfulness, but he cometh to you with words set in delightful proportions, either accompanied with or prepared for the well-enchanting skill of music; and with a tale, forsooth, he cometh unto you with a tale which holdeth children from play, and old men from the chimney-corner; and, pretending no more, doth intend the winning of the mind from wickedness to virtue. . . . For even those hard-hearted, evil men, who think virtue a school-name and know no other good but *indulgere genio*, and therefore despise the austere admonitions of the philosopher, and feel not the inward reason they stand upon, yet will be content to be delighted, which is all the good fellow-poet seems to promise; and so steal to see the form of goodness which, seen, they cannot but love, ere themselves be aware, as if they took a medicine of cherries. . . . And so a conclusion not unfitly ensues: that as virtue is the most excellent resting-place for all worldly learning to make his end of, so poetry, being the most familiar to teach it and most princely to move towards it, in the most excellent work, is the most excellent workman."

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It must not be inferred that I quote Sir Philip Sidney as supporting the unsupportable hypothesis that the justification or measure of art is to be found in its teaching of morality. The justification of art is the part it plays in the realization of the human spirit. I would but emphasize that aspect of art which is of especial interest from the point of view of the present inquiry.

After dwelling upon such high themes in such sweet words, and in company with so lovely a spirit, it is unwelcome to turn to the consideration of a far less lovely thought which is more current among us to-day, and about which, therefore, I must say one word before passing on. I mean that doctrine of which Mr. Spencer is the most distinguished exponent: that the natural pains and pleasures attaching to individual acts are the best, and, as sometimes seems implied, the wholly adequate means of moral education, desire for the pleasantness of those things found pleasant and fear of the pain of those things found painful being the ultimate and dominant motive.

I must not stop to criticise this theory as it deserves. I may only relate it to the view which I am advocating by pointing out, first, that the fundamental motive postulated—*i.e.*, desire for pleasure—puts it out of court in our present inquiry; and, second (which we may send as a parting shot after its retreating form), that it is but another instance of the tendency of Mr. Spencer to undervalue the importance of *consciousness* in human life. It is education we are talking of, and we mean by that the conscious application of means to an end not the elimination of "interference," not the handing over of our pupils to "nature." The idea, indeed, is incapable of logical application in a civilized community.

And now, having cleared our minds by a glance at the ideal attitude of the good man, in face of a painful duty; having tried to find out what are the pains to be inflicted, the pleasures to be encouraged in the moral education of adults who fail of this ideal attitude, let us go back again to the child we have left so long unattended to.

He has failed to control himself in the performance of a

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distasteful duty. The formed character and valued ideal of the good man are impossible to the child. But it is our object to develop these, and we shall do so best by appealing to the noblest of the motives which may be vital in him. This, as we saw, will be the motive whose value is felt by the highest part of the child's nature: the part that feels pleasure in the good of others, or in the approval of those whom he loves and respects. We may tell him he is disturbing his class, and preventing others from doing what they want to do and what he knows they ought to do. This will be a good motive. But if the child fails to value it, we may appeal to what is probably the earliest good motive a child has,—*i.e.*, his love of his mother and his desire for her approval. A good mother carries at all times the conscience of her child. He never dreams of doubting her wisdom; her approval means for him that he has done well. The sacred responsibility of being worthy of this faith, and of deepening this power by integrity and love is one of the deepest that life brings.

But the motive may be ineffective through lack of faith or love on the child's part, and it remains to appeal to his social sympathy, his fear of disgrace in the eyes of his class, fear of temporary banishment from his companions, fear of losing his place in his class, or, finally, to fear of some arbitrarily selected punishment, as, for instance, a whipping. The value of the appeal to his social sympathy will depend for the child, as for the adult, on the moral tone of the public appealed to. If the moral tone be high, public approval will emphasize and develop the child's conscience, and will be good. But if the tone be low the thought of public favor will either have the opposite effect from that intended, or it will move the child through his desire for its pleasantness merely, which is bad. Love of popularity is not love of the people any more than love of Love is love of a person. To be worthy of noble love is a high and powerful and worthy motive, but to do this or that merely that we may win love is pure selfishness, whether the love aimed at be love from God or love from man. Moreover, to threaten a child with loss of love, or to treat it with

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anger rather than with sorrow, is peculiarly wicked. We ruin his idea of the divinest thing he knows, the divinest thing, when it is at its best, that he can ever know. For we do not merely threaten him with the loss of the love that is a delight in, the love that is a response to, beauty or goodness, but we teach him to doubt the love that "suffereth long and is kind," the love that "never faileth," the love that is a belief and interest in his humanity, the love that we all owe one another, whether we are objects of beauty and joy or not.

I have spoken of the motive of competition. The worthiness of this motive is, of course, a burning question to-day. No one, I suppose, will deny that it has been not only a powerful but a valuable spur to effort in the past; no one, perhaps, contemplates as either possible or desirable its total obliteration in the future, but the need of careful thought as to the form and extent to which it is desirable is a commonplace to-day. Without presuming to attempt the answer to so difficult a problem, I may just point out some obvious reflections, most of which are already current among us.

1. It is evident that the competition of communities is less anti-social than the competition of individuals. It would be therefore better to urge the child not to ruin the record of his class among other classes than to urge him not to ruin his own record as compared with his companions.

2. It is finer to compete for excellence or for honor than for any prize beyond these. Therefore, it would be well, if prizes are offered at all, to let them be mere mementos of honor. The so-called prizes of bursaries and scholarships are, of course, of a wholly different order. They are not offered as a bait to zeal, and are competed for merely as a means of determining the greatest fitness of the candidates. Better days will, it is to be hoped, make these prizes unnecessary by putting such opportunities in the hands of all.

3. The exhilarating pleasure of social, as compared with solitary work, the stimulation of measuring one's self against others, may be kept largely free from the desire to surpass others, wholly free from the desire to gain what others must lose.

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I am reminded, at this point, of Aristotle's way of solving a difficulty which arose in his consideration of friendship.* The question had been started, whether a good man must most love and honor his friend or himself. A good man, Aristotle says, must be self-loving. But, then, his true self is the highest in him; that part in him which delights in giving all to his friend, in furthering his friend's good. To love this noble part of himself means to further its interests, and its interests imply the unlimited giving to his friend of all good things, even of the opportunity of doing noble actions. But in giving all these good things, even in giving away noble opportunities, the man yet necessarily retains what is best of all for himself,—that is, he retains the highest virtue and the noblest love. In other words, in these highest things in life, to give is to get, to get is to give. The highest we can do for ourselves is at all times the highest we can do for others.

Is it, then, too much to hope that a day will come when the competition that most absorbs us shall be the competition in the service of a common good, not, that is, a competition for the honor of public service, but a competition as to who shall further most the chance of each to render those services. This is a form of competition from which we have nothing to fear. The good thus attained is not attained at the cost of others; to thus surpass is to confer opportunities of a surpassing excellence, which will in turn confer upon others further like opportunities. The solution, as it seems to me, of our present difficulties in this matter must lie at least in this direction.

What I have already said as to punishment of adults holds with regard to children. Its object in the last resort is the enforcement on the mind of the child of the inviolability for the community of the laws he has broken, and of his responsibility as a moral agent. The certainty and justice of the punishment are the chief points of importance. With children the form of the punishment may, with more frequent

* Aristotle's "Ethics," bk. ix. chap. viii.

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advantage than with adults, indicate the nature of the offence, while the essential aims of education and penitence must receive preponderating consideration.

As to reward, I have already said something when speaking of prizes. It is best when this is given in the form of some advantage to the whole, of which the individual is a part (as a prize to the class rather than to any child), but is so arranged that it gains in value by every attainment of each individual child. Then each may feel that he can further, in however humble a way, the pleasure or good of all, while the prize, when gained, can never be a merely selfish pleasure. The best individual prize is that which confers upon an excellent individual the opportunity of performing further excellent acts. I remember being much amused by hearing once a Scotch mother say to her child, "Now, Jeanie, if you wash the kitchen floor really well, I shall allow you to wash down the stairs." That was an eminently noble kind of reward. "Faithfulness unto death" is rightly rewarded with "the crown of life," for "the crown of life" is just a perfected faithfulness.

For children, too, as for the adult, the joys of achievement, the enthusiam of interest, may be deepened by association. All who are accustomed to children know how they expand under praise, how their interests become intensified by the interest shown in them by those they love. This show of interest should be continual; this vivid appreciation should never be wanting. The love with which he should be surrounded should be brought home to the child every moment, his joy augmented by his mother's joy, his pain at wrong-doing rendered intolerable by sight of his mother's pain.

The great power of art, too, plays a mighty part in the lives of children. Up from the mother's lullaby, through the fairyland of picture-book and story, the path runs all the way unbroken. All the way the lovely forms of truth and goodness bear the child company; at every step they grow more familiar; at every step they are seen and learned anew, till, step by step, the child acquires and makes his own the most precious heritage of the man.

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To sum up, then, we shall seek to deepen, in every way in our power, pleasure in well doing, for, "to like and dislike what one ought is judged to be most important for the formation of good moral character."* We shall seek to deepen the pleasure or interest in good ends or objects; we shall seek to avoid the immorality of directing interest to the attainment of pleasure merely as such; we shall develop the pleasures of a noble self-realization by training ourselves and others in self-control, and the capacity of self-sacrifice, through a judicious abstinence and a healthy hardihood; above all, we shall cherish by example, and by precept, and by all the resources of art, those ideals of noble living for the love of which men can bear any pain or lose any lower pleasure; we shall try to make these interests, in the furthering of which our ideal consists, our very life, until, in our longing after that personal perfection which is to be found in the best possible furthering of that ideal, we shall be ready to cry,—

> Then welcome each rebuff
> That turns earth's smoothness rough,
> Each sting that bids, nor sit, nor stand, but go!
> Be our joys three parts pain,
> Strive, and hold cheap the strain;
> Learn, nor account the pang; dare never grudge the throe!

M. S. GILLILAND.

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* Aristotle's "Ethics," x. 1.

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THE ESSENTIALS OF BUDDHIST DOCTRINE AND ETHICS.

EVEN an elementary consideration of the Buddhist teachings is dependent upon an historical view of religious development in India, prior to the appearance of Buddha. The singular force of the great teacher's personality is unquestioned. The sweetness of his character and the majesty of his personality stand forth upon the background of India's religious history with a degree of vividness which is strongly enhanced by the absence of other religious figures of any great importance. Of religious thinkers before Buddha's time there was an abundance, and the philosophical thought of India was shaped by them very definitely. But they were rather famous schoolmen than teachers of the people; individually noted for a trick of abstruse thought, rather than a desire to render generally available the light of their respective systems.

The teachings ascribed to Buddha, on the other hand, are genuine products of the intellectual past of India. The leading conceptions are direct heritages from the great Brahmanical development which is accessible to us with remarkable completeness and continuity in the Vedic hymns; in the Brâhmanas, or the Vedic Talmud; in the Upanishads, the Vedic theosophy; and in the later orthodox Brahmanical systems of philosophy. Especially the freer thought of the Upanishads resembles, in its essential aspects, the doctrines of Buddhism to such an extent that a true conception of the latter is a very problematic undertaking without some knowledge of the former.

The religion which we find in India in earliest times, at the time when the Vedic hymns were composed, is a natural religion, in which the sacrifice forms the means of communication between men and the gods. It was a vigorous anthropomorphic polytheism, by the side of which ran an intensely animistic vein down among the lower strata of the people. The chief exponent of the polytheistic beliefs is the Rig-Veda;

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the repository of the animistic charms and incantations is the Atharva-Veda; the Brâhmanas describe and expound the sacrifice with great detail.

But by the side of polytheism, animism, and the sacrifice which was intended for the accomplishment of all desires, there flowed a smaller, quieter current of speculative thought, whose beginnings are found in the earliest documents of India. Even the Rig-Veda and the Atharva-Veda contain each a considerable number of hymns of a speculative, cosmogonic, and theosophic character. These present a strangely different tone from the body of the collections within which they are ensconced. From the present state of our knowledge of the chronology of the Vedic texts, we are in the position to say that there is no period of Indian history accessible to us which was entirely free from theosophic speculation. There is especially a class of hymns which present the higher theological insight of the earliest period in the form of charades,—*brahmodya* or *brahmavadya* they are designated in the texts,—which contain very valuable materials for the reconstruction of the more abstract speculations of the earliest times. The words *brahmodya* or *brahmavadya* mean "disputation in the knowledge of holy things." According to a recent investigation of the writer,* they are theological charades or "quizzes," which the priests asked one another and answered at the end of certain great sacrifices. They seem to have been intended for the display of theological learning, to impress him who instituted the sacrifice with the excellence and efficiency of the priests who had conducted the sacrifice. These *brahmodya* hymns, and others very kindred in character, contain the earliest Hindu theosophy, and a systematic presentation of their contents is still one of the desiderata in the history of Hindu thought.

But the earlier speculations did not shape themselves into a final philosophy until the period of the Upanishads. The Upanishads are short treatises which follow, nay frequently form a part of the Brâhmanas, and they are the first recorded

* See *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, vol. xv., pp. 172ff. and 184.

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attempts at a final philosophy. At that time thought had elevated itself to a height sufficient to recognize that the earlier religion, with its anthropomorphic nature-worship, its liturgies, and the religious technicalities of every-day life, were all of them products of the finite. They were produced, and whatever is produced is transient. To be sure, an orthodox Brahmanical life was necessary in order to obtain the fruits of life which the ordinary man desires. But all this begins to be regarded as preparatory and transitory. And the central doctrine of the Upanishads is the very same as that of Buddhism; the pivot of all speculation and all mental struggle is the same in both,—it is the desire after emancipation or salvation. Likewise, the means of salvation are the same in both. Now, in order to understand the Buddhist salvation and the accessory teachings, it is absolutely necessary to take notice step by step of the corresponding views of the Upanishads; there they appear more clearly, in more primitive shape, less far removed from the causes by which they were originated.

The name for the Buddhist salvation is *nirvâna.* Etymologically, the word seems to mean "blowing out." Every one who has tried his hand at the interpretation of this term has felt painfully the difficulty of the task, and the results presented by the several interpreters differ very considerably. This is not at all to be wondered at: a perfectly single interpretation of the word will never be found. The attempt might as easily be made to precipitate the uses of the Western word "salvation" into one single formula. The difference between the expression "to be saved," in the mouth of the servant woman, and the free theological thinker, is every bit as great as that which is to be found in the uses of the word *nirvâna.* The latter runs the entire gamut of values from a blissful half-conscious state of repose, a "peace that passeth all understanding,"—in the minds of the vulgar doubtless something very like a physical repose,—to the other extreme, absolute annihilation. There is a small treatise entitled the "Abhidhāna-ppadīpikā,"—a manual of synonyms of Buddhistical religious terms,—which presents forty-six words for *nirvâna.* Among them

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occur such terms as *mokkha* or *mutti*, "deliverance;" *tanhakkhaya*, "destruction of desire;" *nibutti*, "quietude;" *arūpa*, "bodilessness," and even *amata*, "immortality." The word *nirvâna* is not a very common one in the texts, and it occurs chiefly in connection with parable and symbolism. In this regard, again, it is closely parallel to our "salvation." One point seems certain, namely, that Buddha himself never gave expression to the doctrine that annihilation was the ultimate outcome of his teaching.

There is a very interesting legend in which, on the contrary, he is obviously represented as dodging the question when put to him point-blank by one of his disciples. The monk Malukya comes to Buddha and complains that the teacher's utterances leave in doubt this most important concern of the human mind: "Is the world eternal or limited? Does the perfected disciple continue to live after death or not? I am not pleased that such questions are left unanswered; hence I am come to the master. May Buddha answer if he can. When an upright man does not know, or is not conversant with a certain subject, he says: 'That I do not know; that I am not conversant with.'" The monk is captious, and will brook no equivocal answer.

Buddha replies that he never attempted to attract disciples by promising them any special information on this topic. "A man who has been wounded by a poisonous arrow does not tell the physician who has come to his aid, 'I shall not let you treat that wound ere I know whether you are a Brahman or a Kshatriya, or ere I know the family antecedents of the man who struck me.' Therefore Buddha did not inform his disciples whether the world is finite or infinite, or whether the holy ones continue to live beyond or not. Because the knowledge of those things does not strengthen holy life, does not lead to peace and illumination. The things that do lead to peace and enlightenment Buddha did teach, namely: the truth of suffering; the truth about the origin of suffering; the truth about the suspension of suffering; the truth about the way to bring about the suspension of suffering. Therefore, O Malukya, what has not been revealed by me, leave

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that unrevealed; and what has been revealed, that suffer to be revealed."

In attempting to present a definition of nirvâna, we must content ourselves with striking an average, or perhaps rather stating a few salient points on the infinitely fluctuating line of the conceptions of the word. The following seems to be a fair presentation: A condition of total cessation of changes; of perfect rest, of the absence of desire, illusion and sorrow; the complete resolution of the compounded physical man. But, above all, we are helped by taking the parallel speculations which preceded the Buddhist nirvâna in the schools of the Upanishads. We shall see that the nirvâna is the faded residuum of the belief that the human soul escapes the round of births, and is fused with the pantheistic all-soul, as soon as it is enabled by insight into the true nature of existence to break the rivets which fasten it to the visible, yet illusory world.

In the Upanishads the conception of an all-soul is of paramount importance. This is frequently designated as *sat*, a word which is etymologically identical with the Greek τὸ ὄν. But even more frequent, and destined to assume more permanent form, is the composite conception of the *âtman*, "the breath," and the *brahma*, "the essence of spiritual thought." In the view of the Hindus, the human body is pervaded by breaths, âtman (Gr. ἀϋτμήν): these vivify the body, and are the essential part, the Ego, of the individual existence. This âtman, after it has been adjusted to individual man, is transferred to the great universe outside of man. There arises a "breath of the universe," or "universal breath." The âtman, the lord of the breaths, is at the same time the lord of the gods, the creator of all beings: all the worlds are but an emanation of his great universal Ego; the âtman is the all.

The second all-embracing cosmic conception is that of the *brahma*. The sacred word, the constant companion of the sacrifice, contains again a kind of spiritual essence which elevates it above every profane word, and the entire profane world. That is the brahma used in the neuter gender, not as

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yet the personified god Brahma who stands later at the head of the so-called Hindu trinity,—Brahma, Vishnu, and Çiva. Thus we have in the âtman and the brahma two manifestations of the final universal power: the former representing the physical and the latter the spiritual side of universal life. As might be expected, the two ideas, in due time, merge into one, the conception of a great eternal existence, in which all the differences of visible phenomena are resolved: the universe, including all its physical, mental, and spiritual phases lives and moves through it. This product of early Hindu speculation came to stay in India; all the philosophies, including Buddhism, stand upon this ground, and they all accept the consequences, deduced from this fundamental thought, with modifications of comparatively secondary importance. When we find that the Buddhist longs for nirvâna, we have before us the longing of the philosopher of the Upanishad to be merged in the all-soul. The nirvâna is the pantheistic Brahma, with its personality and its attributes reduced to a mere blank—to zero.

The term which is employed in Buddhism to depict all states preceding nirvâna is *samsâra*, "the round of births." Here, also, we stand before an heir-loom from a distant past. The beginnings of metempsychosis—nay, even the first occurrence of the word samsâra—can still be traced in the Upanishads. The earliest Vedic time knows nothing of the wandering of the soul after death. There is, on the contrary, a simple, poetic belief in a future life which appeals thoroughly to the natural instincts of man. Whence came the first germ of metempsychosis it is impossible to say with any degree of certainty. It is possible that it had percolated from aboriginal non-Aryan beliefs into the musings of the philosophic schools. Like the Brahma, it is, too, a conception which works its way through misty, hesitating beginnings, to rigid doctrinary ends. But when it finally had assumed a definite shape we find the plain doctrine that every creature is again and again the prey of death, until in some life all desire and all activity, as the outcome of this desire, have been laid aside.

The doctrine of metempsychosis, from the first moment of

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its appearance in the literature, is closely associated with pessimism. In the Upanishads it is viewed with perfect consistency as a state of separation from the perfect all-soul, the Brahma. Human existence is not, as might have been the case, viewed as an emanation from the all-soul, but as a species of conflict with it. The Brahma is perfect, existence is imperfect. This is Buddha's "truth of suffering" in the controversy with the monk Malukya, quoted above. The cause of suffering is formulated in the Buddhistical writings under the twin terms *tanha*, Sanskrit *trshâ*, "thirst" or "desire," and *kamma*, Sanskrit *karma*, "deed." The tanha is the unsatisfied, and not to be satisfied, desire for things that belong to the state of personal existence in the physical world. In the Upanishads also occurs the statement: "When the mortal has freed himself from every desire of his heart, then does he enter immortal into Brahma." The unquenched desire is looked upon as a real force which has creative power, and it is itself sufficiently powerful to draw the being back into mundane existence, to produce the chain of existences which make up the samsâra. At this point the doctrine of the karma steps in. The successive births are affected by the nature of the unsatisfied desires, and by the merits or demerits of the individual. The broad rule is that a highly meritorious life is succeeded by a relatively happy existence; it accumulates, as it were, a good balance for the individual concerned. On the other hand, if there is an excess of demerit, the next birth is wretched and full of suffering. Edwin Arnold in his "Light of Asia" has exercised his great poetic gift in describing the karma as

> "All that total of a soul
> Which is the things it did, the thoughts it had,
> The 'self' it wove, with woof of viewless time,
> Crossed on the warp invisible of acts."

The chain of evils which fastens itself upon all individual existence is thus seen to be composed of various links. An illusory estimate of life and the world creates desire; desire leads to action; all action is by its very nature finite and doomed to produce fruit; it dooms the individual to end-

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less existence: again and again he is food for death. What then is the cure for desire, the thirst for life and its contents? The Upanishads answer, *knowledge*. Knowledge of the unity of the individual Ego with the great Brahmic principle, and the knowledge, ever present, of the divided condition of everything finite. "When a mortal has recognized Brahma, feeling 'he is myself,' how can he then desire and cling to bodily life?" Thus the ultimate attainment for man is this recognition; when it is attained all desire vanishes of its own accord. In the Buddhist system a somewhat secondary and schematic formula is known as "the way to the suspension of suffering." It is the so-called eightfold path: right belief, right resolution, right speech, right deeds, right life, right ideals, right thoughts, right memory, right meditation. All this is but the principle of "knowledge" brought down to every-day life; these terms embody the need of this highest knowledge in daily conduct, in order that it shall be finally fruitful.

The difference between early Brahmanic and Buddhist religion is chiefly this, that the Brahmans kept their theosophic knowledge to themselves without making propaganda for it. To the people, the Brahman philosophers gave nothing but a polytheistic worship, which kept changing the attractive early beliefs into an idolatry which grew more and more grotesque at every stage of its development. Buddha brought the philosophical beliefs of his time down to the people with modifications comparatively slight, and the chief interest which attaches itself to the treatment of this fundamentally theosophic system in the hands of the great teacher is this, that it opened the door for the gentle ethical system which has rendered Buddhism a great world-religion, and has always elicited the profound interest of Western minds. We must, however, not neglect to emphasize sufficiently that Buddhism could not have originated without the personal activity of Buddha. The conformation of its ethical system is doubtless due in a large measure to the personal character of the founder of the system. The legend of Buddha sets clearly before our eyes a truly admirable figure: a man of quiet majesty, of

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humor without acerbity, full of tenderness for all living things, of perfect balance and moral freedom, exempt from every prejudice. It does not matter much whether the picture is in a measure legendary or not; it stood at any rate very early before the members of the church, and affected them as only a living person could. Buddha, too, is loved for a great personal sacrifice: it was to save others that he was born as Gautama Çakyamuni, "the Prince Siddhartha," having disdained to enter nirvâna. He chose to develop up to Buddhahood at the cost of countless preliminary existences with their ceaseless round of sufferings. This is called the act of "great renunciation." The ideal of the Brahman is very similar to that of the Buddhist, but it is entirely for himself: he aspires to save himself; the great names of Brahman teachers are those of faded traditional personages, who had, so to speak, invented a new device, or exhibited an unusual amount of cleverness in accomplishing this end. Buddha made over the Hindu system of salvation, along with the finest flower of Hindu ethical feeling, to every person, high or low, gifted or ignorant, without stint and without exception.

One may ask with some degree of astonishment, "Where is the door which admits any system of ethics, as a part of a philosophy which broaches with such dangerous closeness on nihilism?" He who expects rigid logical consistency in the juncture of ethics with such a philosophy will be disappointed. But we are still in the position to show just where it slipped in—without desiring to indicate by this expression that there was ever a period in India devoid of good laws of conduct, and the practical application of the dictates of civilized humanity. What is meant is, that by the neglect of Brahmanical worship, Brahmanical sacrifice and dogma, and Brahmanical restrictions of caste, the ethical side of Indian thought found an opportunity to conquer for itself a place of high importance, from which it was previously shut out by other interests.

Buddhist ethics are joined directly to the doctrine of suffering, as we may call it. This is the very corner-stone of the edifice. It is designated with schematic regularity as the four-

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fold doctrine of suffering, being presented again and again in four statements which form a close sequence.

1. The truth of suffering: Birth is suffering, age is suffering, disease is suffering, death is suffering, union with what is not loved is suffering, separation from what is loved is suffering.

2. The origin of suffering: The thirst after existence which leads from birth to birth, and to the desire for lust and power.

3. Suspension of suffering: Giving up the thirst for existence by cutting out all desires.

4. The way to the suspension of suffering: Right belief, right resolution, right speech, right deeds, right life, right ideals, right thoughts, right memory, right meditation. This, as has been stated above, is the eightfold noble path.

The last of these clauses is the foundation of Buddhist ethics, and the presence of it as the final member of the group of four theses in the doctrine of suffering impresses upon it and the subsequent details a character which Buddhist laws of conduct can never quite strip off. Evidently ethical law here is not founded upon the dictates of a higher power, nor is there anywhere the suggestion of a law of universal harmony, or necessity, by which the single individual is led forcibly to follow a line of conduct which suits the universe. The difference between good and evil conduct, roughly stated, is the effect upon the individual himself. Good conduct in a small way produces relative happiness in life, and advance of station in the round of existences; in a large way it becomes the motive-power towards the highest aim, the resolution into the all, the nirvâna. This doctrine of suffering concentrates all serious attention upon the Ego, and for the Buddhist this metaphysical term steps out from the frame of an abstract system, and assumes a reality so strong that everything without fades at times into absolute insignificance. To find the Ego is praised as the best aim of all search; to be friends with the Ego is the truest and highest friendship. The Ego spurs to good; through the Ego one knows one's self, and the Ego watches and protects. The Ego is the ultimate refuge, therefore it shall be held in check as the dealer holds a noble steed.

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One's own Ego must first of all be securely founded on good; after that others may be instructed.

This may, perhaps, be regarded as the most characteristic point in Buddhist ethics, and its very prominence makes it important that it shall not be misunderstood. It is a spiritual egoism whose existence and development are hostile to and exclude practical selfishness by its very existence. The Buddhistic writings employ parable and story at every step. One of these we may not withhold, since it is perhaps more significant for the understanding of the very essence of Buddhist ethics than any other. It is the story of Prince Kunāla, the son of the great Buddhist Emperor Açoka, about 250 B.C.

Kunāla—his name was given him on account of his wonderfully beautiful eyes—lives away from the turmoil of the court, devoted to his introspective thoughts. One of the queens falls in love with him; but neither her seductions nor her threats, when she is rejected, move Kunāla. She thirsts for vengeance. Owing to her intrigues, he is sent to a distant province, and thither she sends an order of the king, signed with the royal ivory seal, which she has cunningly managed to get into her hands: Kunāla's eyes are to be torn out. When the order arrives no one has the heart to lay hand on the beautiful eyes of the prince. The prince himself announces a reward for the one who will execute the command of the king. At last an evil-looking individual is found ready to do the deed. The wails of the multitude accompany the tearing out of the first eye. Kunāla takes it into his hand and says, "Why do you not see the forms which you did see a moment ago, O you coarse ball of flesh? How do they deceive themselves who cling to you and say, 'This is I!'" And after his second eye is lost, he says, "The eye of flesh, difficult to obtain, I have lost; but I have gained the perfect, blameless eyes of wisdom. The king has abandoned me, but I am the son of the exalted king of truth: his child I am called." He is told that the queen and not the king had issued the order, and rejoins, "May she long enjoy fortune, life, and power—she who brought me such bliss." And he goes as a beggar to the city of his father, and sings before the palace to the accompani-

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ment of a lute. The king hears his voice, and, in the course of their interview, the truth comes to light. In his excessive grief and anger the king would have the queen tortured and killed; but Kunāla says, "It is not fit that you should slay her. Act according to honor and do not slay a woman. The highest reward comes to those who feel kindly: the perfect Buddha has praised patience;" and he kneels down before the king and says, "O king, I feel no pain, and no wrath on account of the cruelty from which I have suffered. My heart feels but kindness for my mother, who commanded that my eyes be torn out. As surely as these words are true, may my eyes again be as they were." Then his eyes shone in their former beauty.

Nowhere does Buddhist poetry exalt forgiveness and the love of enemies higher than in this charming story. And yet there is about this even a certain breath of coolness which we find in all Buddhist morality. It is less from the heart than from the head; it is from that *knowledge* which kills desire and leads to nirvâna. The Buddhist sage stands upon a height which cannot be reached by the doings of men. Wrong does not anger him, but he also does not suffer from it. His enemies have power over his body; his Ego they cannot touch.

The pervasiveness of this fundamental principle of Buddhist belief is such that even the more practical side, the side of every-day morality, constantly runs up against it. The Buddhists have no formal compendium of morals; they schematize as they go along—sometimes one way, sometimes another, according as one or another side of human life is prominent in the mind. Yet three categories turn up again and again, as though they were the headings of three chapters in a system of ethics. The first is righteousness, upright life. The conditions of righteousness are laid down in a definite pentalogue. 1. To kill no living being. 2. Not to touch the property of another. 3. Chastity. 4. Truthfulness. 5. Abstaining from intoxicating liquors. It is but just to say right here that no religious system was ever more in earnest with its own prescriptions than Buddhism was with the five points

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of this pentalogue. The first, the doctrine of *ahinsā*, "inviolability," that is, pity for living things, is insisted upon with rigid consistency in the Buddhist canonical writings, and many touching stories abound, which show with how much genuine feeling and cordiality of belief pity was practised. But the other two chapters turn the practical morality again into the channel of that single and singular interest, the destruction of desire and the escape from the bonds of existence, which has been, as it were, the text of our entire presentation. The second chapter is concentration; the third, wisdom. In the narration of Buddha's last sermons we find repeatedly what purports to be his own summary of his doctrine:

"This is righteousness. This is concentration. This is wisdom. He who is penetrated by righteousness, *his* concentration becomes fruitful and blissful. He who is strong in concentration, *his* wisdom becomes fruitful and blissful. The soul penetrated by wisdom is released entirely from evil—from the evil of desire, from the evil of coming into existence, from the evil of error, from the evil of ignorance."

The three domains are compared with the stations of a journey; the end is nirvâna. The foundation of all is righteousness; but righteousness obtains its value and its completion through wisdom. If it does not lead in that direction it leads nowhere. Buddhism is not for those who are poor in spirit, and we may regard it as certain that the spread of this religious system is not due to the philosophy at its foundation, but to the incidentally sterling dictates and the pure example of those who were far enough advanced in thought to strive for the fruits of the philosophy.

The essence of ancient Buddhism seems to have been concentrated into one good metrical tract called the Dhammapada, a collection of aphorisms which reminds us in many ways of biblical texts, especially the book of Proverbs. Thus especially such sentences as the following have the true Solomonic ring (see stanzas 63 and 64):

"The fool who knows his foolishness is wise at least so far. But a fool who thinks himself wise, he is called a fool indeed.

"If a fool be associated with a wise man even all his life, he will perceive the truth as little as a spoon perceives the taste of soup."

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The desire to be rid of earthly existence is expressed most intensely as follows (stanzas 60, 153, 154, 383):

"Long is the night to him who is awake; long is a mile to him who is tired; long is life to the foolish who do not know the true law.

"Looking for the builder of this house [the body], I have run through a course of many births in vain: painful is birth again and again. Now I have seen thee, O maker of the house; thou shalt not make up this house again. All thy rafters are broken, thy ridge-pole is sundered. The soul, approaching the eternal, has attained to the extinction of all desires.

"Stop the stream, sturdily drive away the desires, O Brahman! When you have understood the perishableness of all that was created, you will understand that which was not created."

The praises of him who has obtained by resignation the terrestrial nirvâna are sung ecstatically (stanzas 94, 197, 198):

"The gods even envy him whose senses, like horses well broken in by the driver, have been subdued, who is free from pride, and free from appetites.

"We live happily, then, not hating those who hate us; among men who hate us we dwell free from hatred.

"We live happily, then, free from ailments among the ailing; among men who are ailing we dwell free from greed."

A considerable domain of ethical life is sketched in stanzas 222, 223, 3–5; here the attitude of the ideal Buddhist towards wrath and revenge is stated forcefully:

"He who holds back rising anger like a rolling chariot, him I call a real driver; other people are but holding the reins.

"Let a man overcome anger by love; let him overcome evil by good; let him overcome the greedy by liberality, the liar by truth.

"He abused me, he beat me, he oppressed me, he robbed me"—in those who harbor such thoughts hatred will never cease.

"He abused me, he beat me, he oppressed me, he robbed me"—in those who do not harbor such thoughts hatred will cease.

"For hatred does not cease by hatred at any time; hatred ceases by love, this is an old rule."

The following two stanzas show the way to a pure life, and the blissful condition which ensues:

"One by one, little by little, moment by moment, a wise man frees himself from personal impurities as a refiner blows away the dross of silver.

"There is a treasure laid up in the heart, a treasure of charity, purity, temperance, soberness. A treasure secure, impregnable, that no thief can steal: a treasure that follows after death."

MAURICE BLOOMFIELD.

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THE THREE RELIGIONS.*

AND now we are led to ask a question. Every rightly-constituted sermon has an application, and it is to that that we have now come.† The remarks that I have been making to-night, whether they are well or ill founded, have certainly not been suggested by a mere idle curiosity with regard to the religions of the past. What I wish is, if possible, to draw a lesson for our guidance now; and with this view, I have to ask the question, Why is it that we have grown dissatisfied with Christianity? Why is it that we are hearing on all hands either of the necessity for a new religion or of the impossibility of any? I suppose most of us who are here to-night, for instance, are almost as little inclined to call ourselves by the name of Christ as by that of Buddha or of Zoroaster, were it not, indeed, that the first of these names is connected with a whole civilization, from which we cannot easily dissociate ourselves. Some of you, I dare say,—perhaps, in certain respects, all of you,—find yourselves even in some sort of revolt against that civilization itself. Many of you, at any rate, are probably inclined to regard the forms of Christian worship that still linger among us with a certain degree of hostility. You think, perhaps,—those of you who take a radical view of the matter,—that, in any really distinctive sense of the term, Christianity, properly speaking, expired in the seventeenth century; and that it is only the deceased spirit of it that still goes about mumming and muttering among us, burning candles and folding vestments, or crying out inarticulately in the streets. Others of you may regard it from a more sympathetic, or, at any rate, from a less impatient point of view, recognizing the greatness of its contribu-

* A lecture delivered before the London Ethical Society. Continued from the January number, page 176.

† It must be confessed that the "application" here is now in some danger of swallowing up the rest of the discourse.

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tion to human progress, and the purity and sweetness of life which—especially perhaps in its least developed and most unsophisticated forms—it still helps to maintain among us. But all of you, I imagine, whether you are sympathetic or unsympathetic towards it, regard it as, to a great extent, a thing of the past. Nor, I suppose, would most of you accept, as a sufficient explanation of this attitude, any such merely intellectual changes as that we have ceased to believe in miracles, in the inspiration of Scriptures, in the credibility of the doctrines of the Church. Of course, it is true that we have ceased to believe in such things now; but perhaps none of them belongs to the essence of Christianity. At any rate, while it is true that such changes as these are real, and that they have had a great and increasing effect, it yet seems to me that there is a deeper element in the phenomenon in question.* It is partly the result of a moral growth, or, perhaps, I should rather say, a moral expansion. Christianity, many of us seem to feel, has, in a sense, passed away from our ethical horizon, as Judaism has passed away, as Hellenism has passed away; and we are becoming conscious that, from a moral point of view, no less than from an intellectual, we stand in need of something altogether new and different. Why, I ask, should this be so? If Christianity, as I have been maintaining, comprises in itself, in a supreme way, the two essential elements of a true religion, why should we not be willing to retain it?

Perhaps some may be disposed to accept the answer which has been eloquently given by Dr. Hatch in his recent volume, to which I have already referred. He considers that Christianity has ceased to be a satisfactory religion merely, or, at least, mainly, on account of its accretion of Greek and Roman elements; and that, if only these encumbrances could be satisfactorily cleared away, the essence of the thing—the moral power of it—would still remain for us, with all the inspiration

* On this point I may refer to Coit's "Ethische Bewegung in der Religion," *passim*. In particular, I wish to call attention, in connection with this point, to his very suggestive essay on "Robert Elsmere."

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of its first deliverance. I, for one, am unable to believe this. In a sense, I even think that the reverse of this is true. I do not think we can go back. I grant, indeed, that Christianity lost something of its original purity by the intermixture of Greek philosophy and Roman discipline. But I am doubtful whether, without such an intermixture, it could ever have become the religion of the civilized world; and I suspect that if we were simply to withdraw these elements now—even if it be true that that would now be possible—it might be even more difficult to accept Christianity as our religion then than it is now, when we have it combined with these foreign elements. It is true, indeed, that the central spirit of Christianity is immortal, and that the more we return upon it the better it will be for us,—the spirit of self-sacrifice, of the effacement of personal ambition for the sake of general welfare. These ideas, as Goethe said, represent a definite advance of the human spirit from which it can never again recede. And perhaps we shall never have a nobler embodiment of the moral ideal than is to be found in the life of its founder. Perhaps even the effort to follow in his steps will always remain the highest inspiration of virtue. But, apart from that ideal, all that was distinctive of Christianity seems to have now forever passed away.

In the face of such a phenomenon as the "Salvation Army," indeed—which seems to many as if it might become one of the most powerful social and moral forces of our age—it may appear rash to affirm that the power of Christianity, even in its most modern and popular form, is finally extinct. In fact, it looks even as if in that shape it had returned to its original work, and had become again the gospel of the poor, though rejected by those who are wise according to the flesh. And certainly I do not wish to say anything against the noble aims with which the leaders of that movement seem to be inspired. I regard their philanthropic efforts with a considerable degree of hope. I think they have at least given a new interest to the problems with which they are endeavoring to deal. Still, I am not disposed to interpret the signs of the times as pointing to a revival of primitive Christianity. I suspect they admit of a very different interpretation. There is a profound differ-

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ence between a rising and a falling tide, though the height of the water may in both cases be the same. Christianity came from the humble, and conquered the intellect of the world. The intellect of the world has rejected it: the more characteristic parts of its teaching are scarcely to be found any more as genuine influences among the cultured classes:* it is sinking back to its origin in the heart of the unreflecting. The tide is falling; it is not coming in.

No: it seems to me that, in any special and distinctive sense of the term, Christianity has left us. For this there may be many reasons. One reason, I suppose, is to be found in its partially pessimistic character, from which the more hopeful modern spirit has recoiled. So far as this is the cause of the change, it would mean that Christianity has proved unsatisfactory, on account of its insufficient recognition of the might of morality. But on this point I do not wish to insist. I believe that an even more important reason is, that Christianity was an individualistic religion, which fact, indeed, was, I think, partly the source of its pessimism also.† It is sometimes said that Christianity was socialistic; and in a sense this is true enough. But it must be remembered that the communism of the early Christians was entirely voluntary; and, indeed, if we are to call them by any modern names at all, it would, on the whole, be more correct to say that they were anarchists than that they were socialists. When Camille Desmoulins spoke‡ of "the good Sansculotte Jesus," he was not altogether astray. But it is not this aspect of the subject to which I mean specially to refer. What I mean, in saying that Christianity was individualistic, is rather this. Its primary problem was that which is expressed in the question, What must I do to be saved? and that is a problem which the moral consciousness of the civilized world has now, in a

* This is perhaps an exaggeration; but I do not think it worth while to alter it. Such summary statements as I am here making cannot be expected to be quite accurate.

† On the connection between individualism and pessimism, I may refer to "Essays in Philosophical Criticism," p. 246, *et seq.*

‡ Carlyle's "French Revolution," III. vi. 2.

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sense, left behind. No generous spirit now has much desire that he in particular should be saved, or, indeed, that any person, simply as that particular person, should be saved. What the generous spirit wants now is to save England, to save Ireland, to save the "submerged tenth." Nay, I may say further,—if you will pardon the boldness of the expression,—that no generous spirit desires now that God may *save him;* but all generous spirits, some of them almost despairing of the possibility of it, *desire to save God.** That is a far different problem from the one that lay before early Christianity.

Let us not be unjust. I do not affirm that the problem to which I have referred was the one which the founder of Christianity had most at heart, or even the one that was most influential among his early followers. Still, it can hardly be denied, as it seems to me, that there was a fatal taint of individualism throughout a great part of their attitude towards the world. Christianity was, on its first presentation, essentially the religion of a man of genius; and it was, perhaps, for that very reason, not quite adapted to be the religion of a world. In the person of Christ himself, the religion may have been all that could be desired. The more one studies his character, so far as any authentic record of it is to be had, the more does one feel inclined to regard him as a kind of Shakespeare of the moral life,—the man of infinite moral depth, as Shakespeare was the man of unbounded human sympathy. But that moral depth was not communicable. In this respect, Christ was not unlike Socrates. In both these cases there was a noble life to which the key was lost; and nothing remained for their followers but to try to imitate the pattern that had been left.† This inevitably becomes individualism. The imitator of Socrates became a cynic: the imitator of Jesus became an ascetic. And, finally, in the case of Jesus, the effort to imitate degenerated at last into a mere worship without imitation.‡

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* This "dark saying" is explained below.

† Of course, this is only partly true of Socrates. He had, to some extent, a communicable doctrine, which certain of his disciples were able to develop.

‡ On the result of this in modern times, *cf.* Coit's "Ethische Bewegung in der Religion," p. 74, *et seq.*

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Or, at the best, what with him was the fine intuition of a noble character, became with his followers an empty dogma with regard to the salvation of the soul. It was thus in the main that Christianity became individualistic.

This being the case, then, it might be thought that all that is necessary now is to strip off the dogma and return to the original position, as Dr. Hatch, among others, has suggested. But this is not possible. Moral genius is as rare as intellectual,—if, indeed, they are not, as Carlyle held, fundamentally the same thing,—and a religion which rests simply on the intuition of a man of genius is not suited for the world in general. Nor is it possible for us now, as it was for the early Christians, to turn the intuitions of genius into dogmas. "The days of discipleship are past." * We demand something that we can understand, and, to some extent, prove. In order, therefore, that such a religion as that of Jesus may be adapted to the modern world, the rule by which the man of genius unconsciously went, must be expounded and proved as an intelligible principle of conduct; and when this is done with the character of Christ, the result which is left for us—the distilled essence of his inner life—ceases to be in any distinctive sense Christian, unless we choose to mean by Christianity simply all that is deepest in morals.

Further, I am not sure that the religion of Christ, even as he held it himself, can be altogether freed from the charge of individualism. I have compared Christ to Socrates and to Shakespeare; and, indeed, one can hardly help regarding these, as in their several ways, the unique men of the world.† But when one compares Christ with the other two, one feels, perhaps, a greater earnestness and depth, but, at the same time, a certain narrowness, which is quite foreign to the others. I have heard it alleged (by one who is not usually rash in his judgments), as an imperfection in the character of Jesus, that he never gave any evidence of the possession of humor. We read that he wept, though even this is recorded in a rather

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* Caird's "Hegel," *ad fin.*

† At least of the Western world.

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ill-authenticated narrative; but we are nowhere informed that he ever laughed. I do not know that such a criticism has much value. Some of the sayings that are attributed to him seem to show that he was not without a sense of the comic. And even if it were not so, there might be no real deficiency implied. Most laughter is "a fruit of unripe wisdom:" perhaps it is always somewhat akin to "the crackling of thorns under a pot." Shelley and Mrs. Browning may have been right in thinking that laughter is incompatible with the noblest human attitude. Nevertheless, when we think of the humor of Socrates or Shakespeare, it seems to reveal to us a certain element of character which we rather miss in Christ. I mean the element of breadth. There is no side of life which Shakespeare seems not to appreciate; there are few which Socrates did not. In comparison with them, Christ's interests appear to be limited to a single point,—individual morality. And in dealing with this point, he seems always to fall back for his highest authority upon his own inner light. I am well aware that it is rash to pass such criticisms upon one, of whose personal life, apart from mythology, almost as little is known as of that of Shakespeare; but at least we can see with some clearness what the effect of his teaching was on his early followers, and what the gradual outcome of it has been throughout the course of history. That these effects have been in the main noble and beneficial, I confidently believe; but it seems clear that they have been one-sided. And they could hardly have been otherwise. To fall back on our own subjectivity, as what is highest in our experience (though there is, no doubt, a sense in which it is true; nay, a sense in which it is a profound and all-important truth, for the discovery of which the world is infinitely the richer), is yet dangerously near to a most pernicious error. This is an error which the modern world has, on the whole, found out. We see into what abysses of sentimentalism and pessimism our introspective habits have led; and we have learned at least to sigh for the healthy objectivity of the Greeks, if not in any degree to realize it, for the power of seeing again that after all our own inner life is not in itself infinitely important; and of looking

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cheerfully at the world without us, the world of nature, the life of the state, the movements of history, as something that is quite as important as we are.* We are beginning to see, also, that a religion which tends to withdraw us from the world cannot be the religion that is to meet our modern needs. The Christian point of view is, I think, well illustrated by a passage from Sir Thomas Browne:† "For the world," he says, "I count it not an inn, but an hospital; and a place not to live but to die in. The world that I regard is myself; it is the microcosm of my own frame that I cast mine eye on: for the other, I use it, but like my globe, and turn it round sometimes for my recreation." Now, to reach such a point of view as this—a point of view from which the earth appears but as the "ante-room of heaven"—implies a great step in human advancement. But it is not a position to rest in, and it is not the step that has to be taken now; nor is a religion from which such a position follows, the religion that can satisfy us now. The modern religion must be able to give us inspiration in art, in science, in politics, in social reform. It must not throw us back upon our own souls. The problem of the present time, it becomes more and more apparent, is not the salvation of the soul, but the salvation of society; and whatever religion we are to have, it must be a religion that can lead us in that. Life must be wholesome before it can be holy; and it can be made wholesome only by bringing the individual into right relations to his society and to the world without. The moral life of the individual, when it is separated from these, loses its content, and becomes an empty abstraction.

I admit that there is a certain paradox—and indeed, I confess, a certain falsehood—in representing Christianity as

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* The contrast, in this respect, between the modern (*i.e.*, the Christian) spirit and that of the Greeks is finely brought out in a paper by Mr. J. B. Bury, entitled "Anima Naturaliter Pagana," in the *Fortnightly Review* for January, 1891. See also Professor E. Caird's article, on "Goethe and Philosophy," in the *Contemporary Review* for December, 1886, where both the merits and the defects of the Christian attitude are shown.

† "Religio Medici," Part II. § 11.

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purely individualistic. Whence, it may be asked, has come all that enthusiasm for social reconstruction which recent generations have witnessed, and which, we cannot but hope, is about to transform the world, if not from the Christian spirit? Were not the religious revivals of the last century the source of all our modern philanthropy? Nay, is not the whole idea of an organic unity of society, the idea that we are "members one of another," a product of the Christian faith, and, indeed, the very quintessence of its teaching? And if we speak of the breadth of such men as Shakespeare, was not Shakespeare himself (as Carlyle called him) a "blossom of Catholicism," who owed his depth of sympathy to that very introspective glance to which we have been referring? Certainly, I should reply, Christianity did recognize a certain unity—or at least a certain possible unity—in mankind; and it has, for that very reason, as I admitted before, done more than any other force—or, I suppose, than any combination of forces—to break down the barriers of class and race. It has taught, and to a considerable extent enforced, the essential equality and brotherhood of mankind. But this does not carry us beyond individualism. In all this, the Christian is still only showing himself as "the good Sansculotte." * For, the unity which Christianity recognizes is only a spiritual † unity—a unity which is not realizable on earth; and for that reason it has influenced the world, on the whole, only in a negative way. It is powerful in breaking down divisions; but it is not so powerful in reorganizing. It may, indeed, connect itself with an organization—as it did with the empire of Rome; but only at the cost of a certain sacrifice of its own purity. By itself it is, and must always remain, only an appeal to the conscience of the individual. It is for this

* It is interesting to find that even Mr. Oscar Wilde, in advocating what seems to the present writer an extreme individualism, yet recognizes the deficiency of the early Christian teaching from this point of view. See his article on "the Soul of Man under Socialism" in the *Fortnightly Review* for February, 1891, pp. 317–18.

† Spiritual, as opposed to, not as including, what is natural. Spiritual, in the latter sense, I should not describe as *only* spiritual.

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reason, I think, that Christian philanthropy has so often been rather sentimental and palliative than wise and thorough. It cannot get beyond the thought of the individual. The conception of a reconstruction of society on a more wholesome basis lies on the whole beyond its sphere. The idea which is beginning to be the inspiration of modern political life, the idea of the solidarity of mankind—the view of Burke, that a State or Society is something better than "a partnership agreement in a trade of pepper and coffee, calico or tobacco, or some such low concern, to be taken up for a little temporary interest, and to be dissolved by the fancy of the parties," but that it is, on the contrary, "a partnership in all science, a partnership in all art, a partnership in every virtue, and in all perfection,"—the view of Comte, that "the individual is an abstraction" and "Humanity the only reality,"—the view of German Idealism, that it is in the life of the state that the moral ideal of mankind must be realized—these views, which are the soul of modern social activity, however much they may seem to us to be an outcome of the Christian spirit (as, indeed, in one sense they are), are yet essentially alien to its direct teaching, as a religion of the individual conscience and of the other world. We may read them into Christianity; but they are at bottom something entirely new, something that carries us quite beyond it. It is Christianity, indeed, that has made this advance possible, and the advance proceeds along the Christian line; but it proceeds by the appropriation of much that to the early Christian would have seemed to belong to the heathen world. There are many signs that our modern Christian churches are on the way to appropriate much of this; but that means, I think, on the whole, that they are ceasing to be merely Christian, and are becoming more broadly human—as, indeed, they have been doing ever since they came in contact with Greece and Rome. And for the carrying on of this human movement, it seems to me that the purely Christian teaching will no longer suffice. It will no longer suffice to rest, as the Christian essentially did, within the abstract individual soul; and to lose sight, in comparison with that, of art and science, of politics and social union, even

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of domestic affection. It would be foolish, no doubt, to blame Christianity for this abstraction. Without the narrowness it could not have had the clearness and the force. It had to limit itself to accomplish its peculiar task. But that task is no longer ours. The problem of individualism has lost its interest. The new "Pilgrim's Progress" is not from this world to the Paradise of the individual soul; but rather from the individual soul, in its Paradise of false contentment, to the social ideal. There would, indeed, be little hope of our ever working towards such an ideal, if we had not first withdrawn into our own souls. It is from the purity of the Christian conception of individual morality that we must start in our efforts after social reconstruction. But, starting from that conception, we must work outwards; and our religion, therefore, if it is to be the inspiration of our highest activities, must not be a purely inward one.

I suppose it is partly for this reason that the need for such societies as ours, outside the Christian Churches, has begun to be felt. Partly, of course, what we aim at is to supply a certain study of moral ideals, apart from those theological motives which Mediæval Scholasticism associated with them, and which the Protestant Churches have not yet entirely abandoned.* But partly also, I suppose, it is our aim to bring ethical principles more directly into contact with the problems of the world. The very use of the word "ethical" rather than "moral" seems to imply that we aim rather at the elevation of society than at the mere salvation of the individual soul. And I imagine the use of this word is not entirely accidental. Our aim has throughout been a social one. We do not seek to cultivate cloisteral virtues, but rather to enlarge the sense of public duty. We do not seek to keep ourselves "spotless from the world," but rather to do our best to free the world from spot. We do not seek to come "out

* In a sense, I do not think that theological (*i.e.* metaphysical) motives ought to be, or indeed can be, dissociated from the highest moral ideal. But the sense in which this is true cannot be here discussed; and it may for the present be neglected.

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of the world," or even merely to "keep ourselves from the evil that is in it," but rather to exert ourselves that the world may be purged of evil. All this indicates, I think, a change that has come over our moral problem, since the time when Christianity was introduced. Christianity began at a time of social and political despair; and it did not hope to renovate the world, but only to rescue a few choice spirits from the world to be partakers in a better kingdom. This is not our attitude now. We have come to recognize that this world, as it stands before us here, is our problem; and that it must be our task to make of it, as far as possible, a home fit for the highest kind of life.*

It seems to me, then, that we are, in a certain sense at least, in want of a new religion, or, at any rate, of a restatement of the old one—unless, indeed, we can be content to go on without one at all. And that we cannot be so content, seems to me sufficiently evident. Without an earnest conviction, in some form, with regard to what is deepest and highest in life, there cannot, I think,, be any abiding enthusiasm for social progress; and how much such an enthusiasm is at present required—an enthusiasm not merely on the part of those who trust to feeling and rely on authority, but still more of those who think and know—must be obvious to every one. Hence, indeed, we find traces, all through our recent literature, of the consciousness of a need for such a new religion among us. Perhaps the clearest sense, for instance, of such a need, in recent English literature, is to be found in the writings of Carlyle and Browning,—the one serenely confident of its fulfilment, the other desperately struggling to reach its satisfaction.

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* In all that I have here said, I am perfectly aware of the inevitable one-sidedness of all such summary statements. I can only hope that this way of putting it may be found suggestive by some readers. Perhaps it may be well to add that in what I have said on the inadequacy of the mere "inner life," I do not by any means intend to deny the importance of that side of life as an element in a complete moral existence. On this point I may refer to the statements of Mr. Muirhead (*International Journal of Ethics*, vol. i., pp. 169–186) and Dr. Coit ("Ethische Bewegung in der Religion," pp. 56–73), with both of which I am on the whole heartily in sympathy.

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Browning, indeed, has even put the demand for such a religion in the very form in which I have been presenting it to-night; for the whole burden of his message on this subject is that the highest, the ultimate object of our reverence, must be recognized as at once power and love. "I who saw power, see now love perfect too," is the consummation of his faith. Carlyle, on the other hand, sums up his in the more Hebrew form, that "the soul of the world is just." Even these two great writers, however, belong to an older generation than we do, and hanker after methods of solution which probably most of us have already abandoned. The spirit of the time hastens forward and leaves even the greatest of its children behind.

Such being the state of our need, then, it does not appear to me that either agnosticism or the religion of humanity can adequately supply our want. The worship of an unknown power behind nature will not serve us. For such a power would be only the supreme might; and in the end it is not possible that we should reverence might, unless we believe that it is also right. Nor will the mere worship of the moral forces in humanity serve us. A right which is not might, could awaken in us only a kind of despairing sympathy: it could not claim our reverence or arouse a confident devotion. The faith that we require must be a combination of these two.

How, then, is such a faith to be secured? If Agnosticism fails us, if the Religion of Humanity fails us, if Christianity (which, in a manner, contains the two) fails us, where are we to turn for help? I do not think this is a question that can be lightly or summarily answered. I believe, with Carlyle, that no "Morrison's Pill" is possible in such a matter—no answer that can be stated off-hand; perhaps no answer that any one can yet, with perfect fulness, see. Part of its content, indeed, I have already indicated. I think the new religion must contain, as an essential element in it, the recognition of an organic unity of mankind. It must enable us to see, in the development of human society, the working out of that which is highest and best. It must, in short, be a

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more perfect combination of the two sides of worship than Christianity was—or at least than Christianity has yet shown itself to be. The very reason for the existence of Agnosticism and the Religion of Humanity is largely that Christianity did not fully represent the truths which they contain. The new religion, if it is to satisfy our minds, must represent them fully. But how exactly this is to be done, how these two elements are to be brought into combination, what are the other elements that are to make the combination of them possible—these are questions which it is not easy to answer, which it would be madness to attempt to answer here to-night. There are difficulties in the way of almost every answer. The world is still to a large extent a sphinx-riddle to us all.

> "While earnest thou gazest,
> Comes boding of terror,
> Comes phantasm and error,
> Perplexes the bravest
> With doubt and misgiving."

It was this that I meant a short time ago, when I said that the problem of our time is that of *saving God.* It is that of finding a point of view from which the world can still be seen, from which human life in the world can still be seen, as divine and worthy of reverence. To see this in any adequate degree will, I believe, still be the work of many generations. In the mean time, perhaps, we need not ourselves depart so very widely from the attitude of the early Christians with regard to it,—the attitude of a faith which had not yet become petrified into a creed. For, indeed, if we have broken away from the teaching of "the good Sansculotte," it is only, I believe, that we may follow him the better,—that we may apply his moral enthusiasm, his fearless confidence in right, to problems which in his time had not arisen, and with the help of ideals which in his time had not been ripened. To have a clear view of the right is, doubtless, the main thing; to understand what our moral ideal really is, and to follow that with all the ardor of devotion of which we are capable, endeavoring, at the same time, to keep alive the confidence that,

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in the long run, this right (if only we have clearly realized what it is) is bound to show itself as might also. That is, in some form, the faith that we must try to cultivate.

Such a faith as this is not, I think, unreasonable. The whole study of philosophy seems to force upon us the belief that in the intellectual and moral being of man is to be found the principle that is deepest in nature, and that furnishes the key to its interpretation. That any philosophy has quite adequately established this truth, or fully worked it out with clearness and consistency, is, on the whole, more than I can conscientiously affirm as my belief. But in such systems as those of Hegel and Green its basis is, at least, foreshadowed. Nor need it be entirely confined to students of philosophy. In such poetry as that of Goethe and Browning, in such prophecy as that of Carlyle and Emerson, it has, to some extent, received literary expression; and thus the best results of it, so far as it can be said to have results, have been, in some degree, rendered generally accessible; most perfectly, of course, in the works of Goethe. And I certainly see no ground to despair of its ultimate establishment. It is not, I suppose, the function of such a society as this to gather materials for its proof.* It is our business rather, as a society, to fix our eyes upon the moral ideal, to try to make the contents of it clear to ourselves, and to see that our devotion to it, in its various particular applications, does not in the mean time wax cold. "Work is worship." The effort to realize the highest that we know is the first foundation of religion. The other side of it —the proof, if there can be any final and conclusive proof, that the powers of nature are on the side of our ideal—does not particularly (or, at least, does not primarily) concern such

* To prevent misunderstanding, it may be well to say that I did not mean, at this point, to deny that an Ethical Society may profitably occupy itself with the discussion of such questions. But when one considers that a thorough answer to them must involve the working out of a long train of close and difficult reasoning, it seems clear that it can be accomplished only by a few men of rare speculative capacity, elaborating their ideas in solitude. Hegel's saying that "there is nothing in which one is so much alone as in philosophy," must, I suppose, always have a certain truth.

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a society as this, but must be left rather * to the solitary thinker and investigator. But, if we but faithfully fulfil this first part, I feel sure that we need not despair—nay, that we have the amplest grounds to hope—that at some time we may be able to see established, in a clear and consistent and cogent form, a religion in which both right and might shall be distinctly and fully combined, a religion in which all the best aspirations of our souls shall find satisfaction, and against which the gates of hell shall not prevail.

To say this, no doubt, does not amount to much, and it is very much easier to say it than to prove it; but this, at any rate, is all that I have to say at present.

J. S. MACKENZIE.

THE CONSCIENCE.

I. PRELIMINARY REMARKS.

To arrive at a series of statements, the validity of which no one in possession of his reasoning faculty can deny, is the aim of all science. In the abstract we may hold that the possibility of real scientific knowledge is by no means undeniable; the subjective element to be found in every perception has ever given rise to manifold doubts. What seems warm to me may seem cold to another; all the qualities we perceive in the object are nothing but its effects in the subject, and the belief that this perceiving subject is indefinitely variable is inconsistent with a rational belief in the possibility of science. If we assume the constancy of nature,—an assumption we

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* At least, must be left in the main. Perhaps we may say, with Goethe,—

"Zu erfinden, zu beschliessen,
Bleibe, Künstler, oft allein;
Deines Wirkens zu geniessen,
Eile freudig zum Verein!
Hier im Ganzen schau', erfahre
Deinen eignen Lebenslauf,
Und die Thaten mancher Jahre
Gehn dir in dem Nachbar auf."

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shall not here criticise,—the possibility of science depends upon such a substantial identity among the various perceiving and reasoning individuals as will render the undeniable differences between them practically insignificant. This substantial identity we believe exists; so great a uniformity prevails both in our senses and in the principles of our reason that individual differences may fairly be set aside. Not only can we say that when a given ray of light affects a normal eye, the man will have a sensation of something red; but we can also say that the great majority of men have normal eyes, and that, therefore, the thing reflecting such a ray of light may properly be called red. Our certainty is almost absolute that when a mentally sound man knows that A is B and B is C, he will conclude that A is C; and our belief is that almost all men are mentally sound, and that if any one will not acknowledge that A is C, his judgment has no weight. We hold it to be a fact that men cannot distinguish A from C, and at the same time regard A as identical with B, and B with C. The premises lead in the stream of our thoughts to the conclusion; and they lead to it in such a coercive manner that we cannot reject the conclusion without surrendering the premises. Whenever our minds yield to this coercion and we think out the implications of our premises, we feel a pleasure of a distinct kind, which we call logical satisfaction; otherwise we feel troubled, disconcerted, and logically unsatisfied. Our failure to think logically need not always be observed, or our attention may be drawn from it by other interests, in which case we shall not feel any logical uneasiness; but the nature of the process is not thereby altered. The specific quality of those logical feelings is due essentially to the way in which the propositions are related in our own mind; but it implies also the more or less distinct consciousness that in all minds they should be similarly related. In a contest about the correctness of a judgment, the parties do not appeal to the subjective fact that every man is supreme arbiter as to the quality of his ideas, and that it cannot be contested that he sees the thing as he sees it; on the contrary, each party will be eager to show that the others have overlooked something which by

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a more accurate investigation they might perceive, or that they have erred in their reasoning, and may discover their error by means of a little more patient and steady reflection. The weaker this expectation is, the weaker is our own assurance, or the stronger our belief that our opponent is mentally incompetent, and his opinions totally insignificant.

On its formal side, the possibility of science depends on the essential identity of the means by which men acquire knowledge. Yet it does not follow that the subjective differences, having turned out to have no importance in this relation, have none in other respects. These differences can themselves become the object of our reasoning. The physician not only treats different maladies in different ways; he must also take the individual factor into account, and apply a different treatment to different patients suffering from the same disease. This makes the medical art more difficult and uncertain, but it does not diminish the validity of the knowledge that a given disease requires a given treatment. We understand without difficulty that it is one thing to recognize a principle and another to apply it; and it may be a problem to ascertain how individual differences may modify a given process, although they may not have prevented our recognition of the general character of this process.

But in ethical discussions the case seems to be entirely different. The individual differences must here be regarded as realities, which affect the individual in the profoundest manner. Nevertheless, we maintain that they are of no more account in ethics than in natural science. We are not willing to let the principles of the moral life rest on the shifting foundation of personal temper; we are not satisfied with the discovery that a man with this or that character, desires, and faculties will do best to act in this or that manner, while a man of a different nature should follow other maxims. As we demand that all men whose opinions are to count should reason according to logical principles, so also we demand that they should act according to rules of universal validity if they are to be regarded as moral beings.

The individual factor plays nowhere so great a *rôle* as in our

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feelings and volitions. How far a certain impression shall please or displease an individual depends so much on all his concrete qualities, the permanent as well as the momentary, that it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to say whether a thing is pleasant or painful, and to what degree. Nevertheless, the feeling of pleasure or pain is a serious reality to him who feels it; and even if the whole world felt otherwise, the fact that he himself feels as he does would not be altered. It seems, therefore, altogether unreasonable to demand that a person under given circumstances shall feel in a certain manner, if we mean more by our demand than merely to say that a full inspection of the circumstance would produce in him the feeling we require. The fact that men can alter their character by self-culture, and thus learn to appreciate things they have hitherto disregarded, may justify a further extension of our demands; but even then it must be presupposed that motives can be aroused in these persons that will induce them to work for the improvement of their character. It is possible that the narrow-minded egoist, who has never experienced the pleasures of altruism, can by self-culture open his heart to these unknown emotions; but his motive in giving his life this new direction cannot be his appreciation of those unknown pleasures. Our simple demand that he acknowledge the higher pleasantness of unselfishness must remain to his mind entirely arbitrary. Repentance, the wish to have acted otherwise, or the determination to act otherwise in future, presupposes either that he has learned to judge his actions with fuller cognizance of their consequences, or that emotions which in the moment of action were not existent have taken possession of his mind.

The recognition of the great *rôle* which the subjective, variable element plays in the conduct of men, has given rise to the sceptical view of the moral life and of the problems of ethics,—a view which is strongly opposed to the eagerness with which every individual holds to his maxims and declares them to be valid, not only for himself at all times, but also for all other men. Moral life, it appears from this point of view, begins when a contrast arises between feelings of a durable,

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compound, and representative kind, and those which, even if more intense, are of shorter duration. If our passions lead us to do anything which runs counter to our permanent feelings, these will regain their authority and revenge themselves by causing that anxiety and regret which we call a bad conscience. A life conformable to our durable feelings will reward us by giving us a feeling of inner satisfaction called good conscience. Moral science, it is further said from this point of view, can build upon no other ground than the principle that every man shall act in conformity with his most durable and ruling feelings, and make it the aim of his life to carry out these feelings consistently, and to subordinate to them all other emotions and instincts. But what this ruling factor shall be cannot be declared universally; every man is in this matter his own supreme judge, and if he acts, or rather judges his acts, in a manner consistent with his guiding principles, he cannot be further criticised. The consistent egoist cannot be refuted by any logical argument; the contest between him and the consistent altruist can be decided only by force,—the logic of life. Every moral system must begin with a subjective choice: the principle by which the particular acts are to be judged cannot be itself criticised. We may hope that evolution may eventually make altruistic feelings and universal sympathy the ruling principle of most men, and thus make universal happiness the conscious aim of their moral life. But it must not be forgotten that this is a mere question of fact. If evolution had led mankind in the direction of egoism, egoism would be their moral code; the egoist, who may still be found here and there, has not lost his "right" to live after his principles. Evolution may render egoism the moral theory of only a small minority; it cannot thereby disprove its logical claims as a possible moral system,—possible exactly by reason of these few exceptions.

At the first glance, every one will see in this theory something which stands in direct opposition to his natural view of the moral precepts. These precepts seem to be something to which we should conform, not something which should conform to us. The conscience, we believe, is placed in the midst

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of our feelings and volitions,—not simply as their product, but as a power ruling over them, and claiming the exclusive right to pronounce whether they should be cultivated or suppressed. The most durable feeling is, of course, also a power ruling over the single momentary feelings; but it would seem that in ethics the starting-point can never be the fact that our most durable feelings rule, but rather the demand that some one feeling and no other shall become the most durable and powerful. At first sight, the proposition that every consistent system is unassailable seems to be the giving up of ethics altogether. Unless we can show that the consistent egoist can be convicted in the court of morals, we had better dismiss as a mere phantom all that men have hitherto called conscience. We believe that it is not alone in individuals in whose minds altruistic feelings are already developed that conscience points to benevolent and generous actions; we believe—at least such is the popular unscientific belief—that it can become the aim of conscience to lead the man whose heart by nature is cold and narrow to cultivate the germs of benevolence in his mind, until they grow up and become his ruling passion; and if no germs of this kind can be found in his mind at all, we do not believe that such a man, by virtue of his strong and unalterable egoism, can be a conscientious man. We believe, on the contrary, that the more uninfluenced by altruistic emotions he is able to live, the more conscienceless he is. We are ready to acknowledge that the totally conscienceless man cannot be influenced by conscience; but it would seem that the facts themselves forbid us to admit that it can be a matter of conscience to be selfish.

We stand here before the subject of this paper. On the one hand we see the possibility, be it real or merely theoretical possibility, that men may live as consistent egoists with untroubled inner satisfaction, and regard themselves as much wiser and more skilful than their neighbors whose hearts are moved by noble and generous feelings. On the other hand, we see the exquisite absurdity of admitting that any one's selfishness could be to him a matter of conscience,—a duty. The conscience is something which claims to be our ruling

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power; it is a particular kind of pleasure and pain felt in perceiving our own conformity or non-conformity to principle. But from this general statement, that the conscience must be the expression of something ruling in the mind, it does not at all follow that every passion that springs up and becomes the ruling power within us, becomes thereby the nucleus of our conscience.

It is around this point that the following reflections group themselves. The moral philosopher knows nothing *a priori*. If he arrives at conclusions directly opposed to ruling moral perceptions, we feel inclined to refuse our assent. We demand that the moral philosopher show us the legitimate basis of the principal moral precepts of daily life; he must not alter their contents, but only connect them with other unquestionable facts. The moral precepts must be made the conclusion in a syllogism, the premises of which are otherwise shown to be valid. If the validity of the premises depend on the validity of the moral precepts, the whole process is worthless; yet if other conclusions than the moral precepts should happen to follow from our premises, the conscientious man gives up not the moral precepts but the premises. Nothing can be good which is not true; but there are certain elementary moral intuitions or customs which belong so much to the essence of our daily life that we feel sure there must be something wrong in what goes against them. Nevertheless, we cannot take these moral perceptions as our starting-point; as objective commands they contain nothing from which the whole series of moral injunctions could be deduced. That murder is a crime cannot be the source of further deductions about things which are not included in the concept of murder.

There is but one thing which can be said of all moral precepts, fundamental or accidental: they cannot exist as moral precepts unless they can move the conscience. The conscience is a feeling of a particular kind: as hope, fear, love, hatred, joy, etc., are distinct feelings, so is conscience a feeling distinct from every other, and as such must have its own conditions under which it necessarily arises, and without which it never can arise. These conditions may be studied wherever con-

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science exists, in wild tribes as well as among civilized peoples of our own age. For this purpose it makes no difference whether the commands of conscience are mistaken or legitimate. When we say that it is right to act so and so, we mean to say that the conditions under which the feeling of good conscience (or moral satisfaction) arises are undeniably contained in the acts. Whether the action is really right may be disputed; but conscience never arises unless a man thinks he sees in the act something which, if it were actually to be found there, would justify that moral judgment. Beliefs held by individuals or by whole ages may seem wrong, upon a more accurate investigation or when the conditions are changed, and the dictates of conscience which spring from those beliefs will then seem wrong also. But the conditions necessary for the existence of conscience must be found in those cases also. Thus we may study as successfully the conditions of hope in cases where the individual hopes without reason, as in cases where he has good reasons for his confidence. Men have always thus discussed the reasonableness of their feelings, and we see no ground why the "right" of our moral perceptions should not be treated in the same manner. Whenever we say that we "ought" to act in a given way, we but declare that the conditions under which the conscience arises are actually to be found in this act.* So far as I can see, the sciences of logic and æsthetics have already taken this course; they study the conditions under which the particular feelings of logical and æsthetic pleasure arise, and then analyze the objective relations which really, and not by the mere fancy of the individual, contain these conditions. The science of ethics has but to follow the path indicated, and not to trouble itself with endless reflections concerning the possibility of a demonstration of the desirability of conscientious living.

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* Mr. Sidgwick, with his usual clearness, has pointed out the special ethical meaning of the term "right" or "ought." He describes it as a compound of reason (objectivity) and feeling (see especially pp. 27–35 of the third edition of his "Methods of Ethics"). But we believe, nevertheless, that he is in fault where he says the term is unanalyzable; some characteristic traits of Mr. Sidgwick's views may be explained by this definition.

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II. ANALYSIS OF CONSCIENCE.

The first question to be answered is, of course, whether the conscience (the feeling of moral satisfaction) is a particular feeling which can be described and distinguished from all other feelings. In our own mind we perceive a clear difference between the satisfaction called moral and all other feelings of satisfaction; but it may be questioned whether this feeling does not include a great variety of other more elementary feelings which are not the same in the individual at different times or in different individuals. Mr. Bain has given a picture of three stages in the evolution of the conscience,—a picture which most men cannot but find true.

"The infant conscience is the linking of terror with forbidden actions. A sentiment of love or respect towards the person of the superior infuses a different species of dread from that we have just supposed, the dread of giving pain to a beloved object. We call it a higher order of conscience to act from love than to act from fear. When the young mind is able to take notice of the use and meaning of the prohibitions imposed upon it, and to approve of the end intended by them, a new motive is added, and the conscience is then a triple compound and begirds the actions in question with a threefold fear, the last ingredient being paramount in the maturity of the sympathies and the reason. . . . If the conscience is moulded principally upon the fear of punishment, the agony of remorse means simply the apprehension of the penalty incurred. . . . If love, esteem, and reverence enter largely into the case, the remorse will correspond to the suffering endured from inflicting a wound on those we love, respect, or venerate. If the duty prescribed has been approved by the mind as protective of the general interests of persons engaging our sympathies, the violation of this on our part affects us with all the pain that we feel from inflicting an injury upon those interests." *

It seems, then, according to Mr. Bain, that the compound of feelings which constitutes the conscience differs widely at various stages of evolution and in different persons. But the more we accentuate the different forms of conscience the more difficult becomes the question, why we give the same name of conscience to all these different forms. By studying the conscience in its three main forms, as Mr. Bain has described them, we may hope to discover the traits they have in com-

* A. Bain, "The Emotions and the Will," Third edition, p. 286.

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mon, and ascertain whether these are merely accidental similarities, or unveil the very essence of conscience.

The bad conscience or remorse shows itself very often as mere fear. But the fact must not be overlooked that not every kind of fear is called bad conscience. We can follow Mr. Bain and say that the conscience implies a relation to authorities. In all cases where the fear consists in the apprehension of the natural consequences of our actions we do not speak of remorse. A savage who has murdered one of a neighboring tribe will fear to be murdered himself in retaliation; but he will not feel remorse. The penalties which he incurs in transgressing the laws of his own tribe awake a fear which sometimes may be regarded as mere fear, sometimes as remorse or bad conscience. The peculiarities, by virtue of which a penalty is capable of arousing the latter kind of fear, must not be sought in those traits which it has in common with all other pains which men may fear. Neither can it be sought in the circumstances that the threatened pains are inflicted by other men, since the fear of the revenge of embittered enemies is not bad conscience. The explanation is, of course, to be sought in that which distinguishes a mere pain inflicted upon us from a penalty. The pain is a penalty when it is the sign of the displeasure of an authority,—*i.e.*, of some one who stands to us not as an enemy, but as an arbiter or judge. There must be a desire to have good and peaceful relations with the man who punishes before the individual can regard him as a judge, and feel his conscience moved by his displeasure. The original type of such an arbiter is a group of our fellow-men.

In itself, penalty is a very relative idea. We can punish another by inflicting upon him every kind of physical pain; we can also punish him by mockery and ridicule, or by avoiding his society. In such case the punishment consists in very different kinds of pain; their character as pain depends on very different relations between the man who punishes and the man who is punished. Physical sensibility to bodily pain is very different in different individuals; the mental pain, supposed to be given to our neighbor by avoiding him, will in many cases prove a mere illusion, its sole vitality being our

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own belief that we have displeased him. If our neighbor does not at all desire to maintain good relations with us, he will not care about all this, which could affect him only by virtue of such an interest. The physical pain caused by blows, hunger, etc., is always pain, whatever its causes may be. But among civilized as among primitive nations, among adults as among children, experience shows us characters which are very heroic in enduring every kind of physical pain, and never desist from any purpose on account of the possibility of that kind of suffering, and yet tremble before the same pains when they are incurred as punishment of an offence committed. The only natural view must therefore be to explain this fear by the same causes as the fear of the mental pains above mentioned. In all cases the punishment may be defined as a pain inflicted by a natural manifestation of our fellow-men's displeasure,—*i.e.*, the inflicting of pain stands mainly as the sign or symbol of this displeasure. In a particular case it may be hard to determine the part which the apprehension of the pain and of the displeasure respectively play in the remorse felt by the guilty; but it may be set down as a ruling principle of our reasoning, that if equally disagreeable consequences, sprung from different causes, awake the same fear in our mind, this fear must be regarded as depending on the mere apprehension of these consequences. But if simple apprehension of suffering causes one feeling, and apprehension of the same suffering *due to other men's displeasure* causes a different feeling, this latter circumstance must be regarded as at least one of the principal causes of the particular character of the second feeling.

The bad conscience, as distinguished from fear of punishment, must, therefore, be defined as a feeling of uneasiness at having incurred the displeasure of other men. It follows that we cannot see any important difference between the first two stages of conscience pointed out by Mr. Bain. The second stage is distinguished by the exclusive supremacy of the feeling of annoyance at having displeased; it presupposes a greater mental evolution to perceive the displeasure of another man manifested merely as sorrow, distress, or avoidance of the

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guilty, than if the displeasure were manifested in the more active form of anger. It may be a sign of less tender relations if fear rather than injured love or reverence becomes the characteristic trait in the expression of remorse; but common to both is the essential point that the necessary condition for the existence of remorse lies in perceiving another's displeasure, and in being painfully affected by this perception. One might think that this regard to the manner in which other men look upon our actions is the distinguishing trait only of the lower degrees of conscience. Conscience in its highest form, described by Mr. Bain as the inner authority, approves or disapproves without any regard whatsoever to the judgments of others, and draws its whole authority from the reflections and emotions of the self-reliant individual. Mr. Sidgwick* has called it a crucial experiment, making against the theory that the conscience consists in sympathy with the feelings of others, that we in our conscience may hold to be right what is condemned by the whole world. If this were granted, it would apply also to our own theory; but we think Mr. Sidgwick has not carried his analysis to the bottom of the question. The inner authority as the highest independent form of conscience is a conscience which, whether rightly or wrongly, actually holds that regard for our fellow-beings, ought to be the mainspring of all our actions. The independence claimed by the individual cannot, therefore, be said to be indifference to the effect of our actions upon the interests of others,—it can only mean that in the valuation of our actions we do not care whether others are, in fact, pleased or displeased; we form our own subjectively uninfluenced and objectively impartial opinion, whether they have reason or not to be pleased or displeased with our conduct. The independence of the conscience, resting on inner authority, signifies only our logical independence of the opinions of the world. Whether the thinker's arguments gain general assent or not, he still holds to them; his failure to convince the world may incite him to a repeated and more diligent examination; he may doubt

* "Methods of Ethics," p. 29.

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about his skill as a writer, etc.; but if all his care cannot show him any fault in his premises or in his conclusions, and if at the same time he can see the reasons why the world has not been brought to understand him, then he will maintain his opinions against the whole world, and be convinced that the time will come when they will be universally admitted, or, if such a time should never come, he will point to some permanent cause of the universal delusion. This is also the case with the convictions of the conscience. Just as the ignorant can, without difficulty, be made to retract their opinions, if any one contradicts them, since their confidence in their maxims reposes mainly on the authority of the world and not on first-hand observation of the facts, so our conscience depends at first on the actual effects of our acts upon others. But gradually as our knowledge augments, and our mental firmness and experience increase, we may outgrow this dependence. No authority in the world can persuade us that we have done what we surely know we have not done, and the loudest disapproval becomes incapable by itself of convincing us that we have done anything which can be a legitimate reason for such an outburst of displeasure. In itself the inner authority does not signify more than this: that the man is guided by his own insight as to what constitutes a valid ground for the censures of his fellow-men. We do not think that sympathy is the source of our moral convictions, because we cannot see that sympathy is requisite to form an idea of the feelings of other men; but that sympathy is not the source of our moral convictions, because our ethics may be contrary to the opinions of the world,—this we cannot grant to Mr. Sidgwick until he has shown that the ideal to which our conscience refers has not been abstracted from the real world. We maintain that our conscience may become independent of the real existing opinions of the world by a mental representation of the ideal opinions of others; it is merely required that this representation shall be formed by a consistent construction according to principles, the validity of which may be pointed out in the same world to which the construction brings us in opposition.

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The whole difference between the lower and the higher degrees of conscience, accordingly, consists in the different degree of diligence and accuracy with which the person who acts conceives the sentiments of the persons affected by his action. That this is true of our existing conscience every one can see; but the question is whether this must always be the case. This is the cardinal point of our whole paper. Altruism is actually the content of our ethics to-day; but does the conscience command us so to act because the altruistic emotions have grown stronger within us, or have we gradually learned to cultivate these emotions because the conscience has declared them to be satisfying? Undoubtedly altruism is the form of conduct best calculated to be appreciated by others; every motive which invites us to take notice of our fellow-men must develop into altruism, either as a means or as an end. But the question is whether such motives are or are not in themselves altruistic feelings.

We must distinguish between the feeling of pleasure which accompanies every satisfied inclination and the pleasure we feel in perceiving that a given inclination has grown powerful in our soul. If our heart is moved by generous feelings, it is a pleasure to help our brother; and in many cases our pleasure in helping is but a sign of the existence of such feelings. But side by side with this emotion there may be also a lively pleasure at finding altruistic feelings ruling over us,—that is to say, not only may we live exclusively in our emotions, but we may also make them the object of a judgment, which approves them and our character on their account; and this judgment is also accompanied by a feeling. That the conscience is a feeling of the latter kind may be taken for granted; but the conscience is one thing if altruism, as our most permanent emotion, approves the single altruistic inclinations, and it is another thing if altruism itself must be judged by another powerful motive in our soul, the expression of which we find in our conscience. And here we repeat what we have already pointed out above: if it is but the most permanent instinct which, through the conscience, stands as the arbiter of all other motives and judges them according as they agree or

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disagree with it, every harmonized life must be regarded as a conscientious life. A person able to live a thoroughly selfish life should not only feel an undisturbed satisfaction, regarding his more generous neighbors as fools (about which there is no theoretical difference), but he should also be said to have a good conscience. But this can never be granted. Such a man is simply conscienceless. He can never regard his selfishness as a duty. And what shall we say if our soul stands wavering between conflicting inclinations? Whence comes it that it is just when selfishness is gaining the ascendency over our integrity and altruism that we feel our conscience troubled? Why can we never look at our integrity and altruism as the disturbers to be combated, and why can we never feel it a matter of conscience to cultivate our egoism? The argument that altruism is too deeply implanted in our hearts for us ever to become perfect egoists is of no value. For if it is true that all men at times are influenced by altruism, it is even truer that egoism is so deeply implanted in us that we can never eradicate it altogether or cease to feel pain when its claims are disregarded. Mr. Spencer explains the connection between conscience and altruism by the ascendency which the more far-seeing motives have gradually gained over those which correspond to immediate and extrinsic effects. As will appear hereafter, we agree in the essential points with Mr. Spencer; but this does not concern us as yet, because his theory does not explain the character of the conscience as a psychological fact, but only its emotional power. It is one thing to examine the causes which give to the conscience its ascendency in our soul, and another to search for the traits which distinguish it from all other mental facts; and here we are as yet exclusively occupied with the latter investigation.

If we compare moral satisfaction and dissatisfaction with satisfaction and dissatisfaction of any other kind, we shall find the difference to lie in this: that in the first case we are convinced that other men cannot help finding valid reasons to be pleased or displeased with our conduct, while in the other cases we have no such conviction. The egoist may feel himself happier with his ill-gotten riches for not sharing them

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with his friends; he is the sole competent judge of the value of his own feelings. But he cannot help admitting that other men have good reason to wish he were of a different disposition. This concession is purely logical, and springs from the very nature of our thinking. Whether the concession shall be more than a logical one, and gain power over our will, that is just the question whether we shall be conscientious or not. There can be no question that it is to the intellectual element that we must appeal for the explanation of the particular character of the conscience. The *dilettante*, without the faculty to become a great artist, the only thing he desires with all the energy of his mind, may take a dislike to living; but however painful a reality these broken illusions may be to him, he can never see more in them than the expression of his own subjective accidental constitution; and this not merely because he sees many who live well and happy without being artists, for such he might regard as prosaic natures, having no voice in the matter at all,—but because he can never convince himself that his being unable to become a great artist should give others any reason to be dissatisfied with him. On the contrary, if conscience speaks it will tell him that a ground for dissatisfaction would be found rather in that disheartened grief over the genius he misses, which hinders him from cultivating the useful faculties he may still possess. Individual peculiarities determine wherein a person shall seek his happiness; but what his fellows shall value does not depend on these peculiarities. And experience shows that in all cases where we speak of conscience, a judgment has been passed upon our value to others.

Two causes very often interfere with this analysis. One is, that the motive-pleasure (*i.e.*, the pleasure caused by satisfying our inclination) and the judgment which determines the moral worth of the motives do not always take place at different times, but often are mingled together in the most inextricable manner. The other cause is, that the moral worth of a motive may have been perceived so often that the past appreciation quite instinctively determines our present judgment. Therefore it may be hard in a particular case to

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determine the part the motive-pleasure plays in our whole mental situation, and what the pleasure of the appreciation may account for. We must eventually perceive that if mere fear keeps us from actions which injure others, this by itself will give them a good reason to be displeased with us; whereas every warm-hearted feeling which directly impels us to care for others' welfare, increases our worth in their eyes. Any sign that such a motive needs to be supported by the distinct consciousness of the approval of others, lowers our own estimate of ourselves, and shows us to be imperfectly developed; any sign that our sympathetic emotions have their full development becomes on the contrary a source of augmented pleasure. We are tempted, therefore, to ascribe to our benevolent emotions a motive power which probably they possess only by virtue of our consciousness of their value; and the pain which we directly feel in acting against them comes thus to stand for the whole content of remorse. We overlook the fact that behind this pain, behind its permanence and the complete submission with which we bend before it, there lies a judgment of its rightfulness, a judgment which can never be applied to our egoistic emotions, however bitterly we may repent having set them aside. Mr. Spencer's hypothesis * that the conscience, as the sense of duty, or moral obligation, may be regarded as transitory, and that it will diminish as fast as moralization increases, we regard as totally erroneous. What increasing morality will achieve is the diminution of the number of cases where remorse is reasonably felt; but never can an instinctive mechanism become so perfect as to render a distinct consciousness of its excellence superfluous. There must always remain at least a dim abstract idea of our inclinations being obeyed because they are right, and not because they are strong. If we will not reason against clear experience, which proves that it can never be a felt duty to extirpate benevolent emotions, we must agree that it cannot be their quality as ruling permanent inclinations which connects them with the conscience; for selfish inclinations may also gain ascendency over our

* "The Data of Ethics," 1881, p. 127.

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minds. The conscience does not announce how great a power these inclinations have already gained within us; it tells us, on the contrary, that they alone have a right to become powerful. The solid basis on which we wish to build the principles of our life can never be found by considering the number of individuals who are pleased as we are at having benevolent inclinations. In matters of scientific investigation a majority will not do. If there is not universality there is uncertainty. What mankind will feel happy in doing cannot be stated in any general, objectively valid way; but we may show with sufficient accuracy what rules of conduct men would be glad to see others follow towards them. Now, as all cases where the conscience appears have this trait in common, that the action commended is believed to be universally pleasing, and as this trait can never disappear without the character of conscience disappearing also, we must conclude that the conscience is always a state of feeling connected with the idea of what others should reasonably be pleased to see us do towards them.

The three stages in the evolution of conscience, which Mr. Bain has pointed out, are nothing but different ways in which we may gain the conviction that our character and behavior are reasonably satisfying or dissatisfying to others; these stages do not mark at all the essential points in the psychological mechanism by which the conscience arises. The conscience, as we have described this feeling, has but two forms,—good and bad conscience. The bad conscience is the painful consciousness of others' well-founded dissatisfaction. The good conscience may be merely the absence of bad conscience,—the peaceful slumber of a mind no enemy has as yet disturbed,—or it may be the conscious happiness of having no reason for remorse, or, finally, it may be the self-conscious noble feeling of pride in facing the ill-founded displeasure of others. It is worth noticing that language expresses positively the command that the wrong-doer shall repent; but restricts itself to telling the good man that he has no cause for repentance, and to directing his fellow-men to honor and to value him. As in almost all cases, so here language shows its fine

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tact; for if the good conscience transgressed the limits of its negative character it would run the risk of becoming a feeling of haughtiness, which is not at all laudable, but rather injurious to the community.

III. THE GROWTH OF THE CONSCIENCE.

Among the many opinions of men, some seem to us well founded and others absolutely absurd; and it is not always the latter that are the less powerful. But be that as it may, we feel assured that no one has ever been logically satisfied with an opinion unless it has presented itself to him as merely a statement of fact, or as a clear consequence from true propositions. The briefest experience compels us to acknowledge that the logical worth of an opinion is not the only thing which gives it value to the individual; a particular set of circumstances is required before the logical aspect of things can become a centre of interest for mankind. The motive-power behind all our science is the instinct of self-preservation; our instinct of curiosity is but a derivation from that more elementary instinct, and our logical interests are connected with this instinct to know. In other words, we distinguish between the conditions of logical satisfaction—*i.e.* the perfect harmony of our several opinions—and the conditions of its emotional strength,—*i.e.* its connection with the desire to know, and thereby with the struggle for life.

Similarly, it is necessary to distinguish between the conditions which give the conscience its specific character and the conditions which give this feeling its commanding influence over the soul. A great many feelings besides the conscience may determine the man, so that a particular set of circumstances is required to give the conscience the pre-eminence. The foregoing pages have shown that the idea of others having good reason to approve our actions is the necessary condition of the birth of conscience; but what are the causes that give it increasing strength? Before we go on to the examination of this subject, one remark will not be superfluous. The conscience may acquire a seemingly intrinsic worth, just as the logical interest has apparently lost its con-

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nection with the instinct of self-preservation. The thinker does not stand in the midst of the struggle for life. When this struggle is most bitter, free and far-reaching, thought may be impossible. But the first impulse to scientific investigation is, nevertheless, given by the instinct of self-preservation, and it is only its utility that has given, and still gives, thought its value. Since mankind has profited by the existence of thoughtful and intelligent men, institutions have been founded for the cultivation of logical interests; a living, and the possibility of honors and fame, are offered to the inquirer, and a conception has grown up of the ideal worth of scientific labors. In such an environment, formed by the evolution of society, the interest in scientific investigation may spring up in an individual mind as the mere disinterested pleasure in clearness and consistency, or as the love of discovery. But if this interest turned out to be useless for society as a whole, this *milieu*, this hot-house of thoughts, would disappear; and if the pursuit of science in the long run proved disadvantageous to the individual, scholars would become rare. We make this remark, so that it may be clear that what follows is not intended to describe the growth of conscience in every particular individual, but to point out the conditions which make its growth in the community at large comprehensible. We make no secret of our opinion that the direct correlation between the growth of the general and individual conscience is closer than is commonly believed; yet the ability to analyze one's own mind is so rare that we may fairly keep the distinction between the two things.

Language has the terms praiseworthy and shameful to designate the feeling of its being proper or not to please or displease other men. The isolated man stands in the midst of a world that operates without reference to his wishes; he may form ideas that describe this world accurately or inaccurately; he may distinguish between realizable and fanciful ideals; but he can never form any idea of the praiseworthiness or shamefulness of his actions. The isolated man may have permanent and changing passions; he may feel a vivid displeasure if he yields thoughtlessly to one of the transitory

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impulses, but he cannot feel remorse or shame. Life in common with other beings, our equals, may be of great value as a help in distinguishing true opinions from false; the collective labor of so many persons procures a larger sum of experiences, which form a more solid basis for the distinction between accidental subjective guesses and opinions conformable to the objective world. In principle, however, this life in society is not necessary to the distinction between realities and fancies, because the difference between them depends on that between imagination and perception. But life in society is the absolutely indispensable condition of the distinction between praiseworthy and blamable acts. Such terms have meaning only by virtue of a real or thought relation to other men. The idea is a comparison between essentially co-ordinate factors. The isolated man finds in all nature nothing to which he can compare himself, nothing he could feel pride to surpass or shame to be inferior to. The conscience is not absolutely coextensive with these feelings of pride or shame, but it is a case of such feeling. The conscience is always connected with sensitiveness to praise and blame. We have pointed out already what is required before this sensitiveness becomes conscience; it is the idea that our fellow-men have good reason to praise or blame us. Very often the shame we instinctively feel is far more powerful than the conscience; but in the end it will be the latter which will gain the supremacy in our minds because it acts through our intellectual powers, whereas the first is a mere impulse. The distinction between remorse and shame may therefore be practically admissible, but the psychological structure of the two emotions is, nevertheless, the same.* It is our aim to show that, as in former times, speculative truths were considered to be truths of a nobler and higher kind than empirical statements; so it is yet a secret but erroneous opinion that disinterested feelings possess a greater worth than interested feelings, and this opinion leads

* Mr. Stephens has not, so far as I am aware, been happy in his exposition of the relation between shame and conscience, because he has not perceived that the "rightful" is that which gives *others* good reason to be pleased with our actions. Stephens, "Science of Ethics," 1882, p. 319.

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us mistakenly to look for the conscience in the immanent pleasure of benevolence, or the immanent repulsion of cruelty or indecency. We are persuaded that these moral sentiments have acquired and still retain their emotional power as elements of the conscience through the associated idea of being praiseworthy or blamable, and that the only possible foundation of a solid moral theory must be sought in this circumstance.

We shall give only a short analysis of that sensibility to respect and contempt which may almost be said to be constitutional in the human mind.

Respect and contempt reveal themselves in our behavior, and may have useful or pernicious consequences for the object that inspires them. It is an obvious fact that men court respect and avoid contempt, as in everything else they pursue what is agreeable. Every sign of respect consequently pleases, and every sign of contempt irritates and alarms. But—and we believe this to be an important point—these emotions may have a very indefinite character, because the advantages of being respected and the discomforts of being held in contempt are themselves of a very indefinite and manifold kind. If respect or contempt was absolutely without consequences for its object, we should be totally indifferent to it: it affects the human mind by virtue only of its consequences. If the particular consequences of the emotions of others could be distinctly perceived in each case, their emotions would affect us merely with hope or fear for just those consequences. The vagueness of the consequences, the impossibility of forming a definite idea of them beforehand, makes it possible to think that our sensibility to respect and contempt has an immanent character, and is absolutely independent of their particular circumstances. This immanent sensibility, however, is nothing but sensibility to our abstract idea of the consequences which respect and contempt commonly have.

Every one who is the object of respect and reverence may feel a general security, and confidence that he will meet with no hinderance from his fellows; but he may follow his impulses and work for the accomplishment of his desires. The despised

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will have a general feeling of being isolated and obstructed in all his doings. Now, whenever our mental processes take a free course, we feel a pleasure of a very massive kind; and it is a pleasure of this kind that the respected man secures. If, on the contrary, all the powers of our soul are paralyzed, if we can never give ourselves up to the thought that fills us, but feel in every way oppressed, the most acute pain takes possession of the soul; and this is the case with the despised; their best-laid schemes go wrong. The opinions of our fellow-men are one of the means by which we judge the validity of our own opinions; respect and contempt manifest the judgments of others upon us; and, therefore, the thought of being respected or despised may affect us not only with hope or fear of the consequences, but directly, by modifying the feeling of security and confidence with which we pursue our several aims.

There are, however, various conditions which must be fulfilled before the feeling of confidence or of helplessness can take possession of the mind. The individual must feel impelled to work in the direction in which he finds the way open; otherwise the attitude of others is indifferent to him. But it may happen, on the other hand, that the discovery of our own ability to deal with a problem, hitherto lying out of our way, may suddenly produce a vivid interest in that problem. The vain endeavor to solve a problem has similarly a tendency to cool our interest; the pain of eventual defeat is prevented if we cease to strive; and we therefore easily give up willingly what we find to be impossible. It is pleasant to feel one's power, and, therefore, every free activity endures and increases. We believe that the interest in a profession, although it often springs from what we call an innate taste for its work, may in most cases be explained by the manifold forgotten experiences of success in dealing with its problems. In time, as the man goes deeper into his art or science, he may discover that he is incapable of mastering what is highest and most difficult in it; and this discovery often drives him into another profession. Circumstances may make such a change impossible, and if he is blessed with a happy disposition he

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resigns his ambition and ceases to aim at the unattainable. But often he will never lose the painful consciousness of inferiority; his attention will be fixed on what he cannot do rather than on what he can, and he will feel his life to be a failure. Satisfaction is all the harder to gain the more those professions to which our powers are suited lack all other attractions; and the more external advantages those have for which we are unfit, the more likely we are to make new and unhappy experiments, and to be tormented in consequence by the sense that we are good for nothing.

Respect and contempt, we say, are signs that we are secure from external hinderance or exposed to it. They may stand either as authoritative indications of our ability, in which case respect will increase our confidence in ourselves, or else as direct signs of our success or failure in winning the favor of others. We take no notice of the judgment of persons who in our eyes are incapable of judging our professional attainments, or with whom we do not care to maintain close relations. Every one has a circle of interests and an idea of the capacity of his various critics; and every one has a circle of persons with whom he wishes to keep on good terms. Yet we are all tempted to make intelligent judges of those who admire us, and to see desirable friends in those who honor us; we very quickly set down those who find fault with us as ignorant and worthless. Individual characters differ widely in this respect. One man yields willingly to the opinions of others; a second will fight by himself and follow his own ideas. These different characters may themselves be judged worthy of honor or contempt; but they have in other ways nothing to do with the structure of the conscience.

Respect and contempt, we have thus seen, may be produced by our abilities or by the relation in which they put us to our fellow-men. The conscience is exclusively bound up with this relation. The deepest foundation of society must be sought in the feeling of greater security and order which comes with social life; the isolated man can never concentrate the whole energy of his mind to a single end, he must at every moment be watching events; his attention is dispersed, and his life

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insecure. In time there will consequently arise a general instinctive comprehension of the value of a mutual understanding; and the man whose passions and appetites bring him into frequent conflict with others, who is indifferent to the pleasures of peace and thinks the sacrifice it involves too great,—such a man will not follow his conscience but his appetites. When the desire to live in peace and to sleep in security takes possession of the mind, the conscience arises and becomes the judge of all our particular inclinations. What we shall then ask of our emotions is whether they entitle us to the respect or contempt of other men. We explain the higher value which we attribute to the noble passions of benevolence and justice not to some immanent, undefinable prerogative, but to an undeniable worth in the eyes of others. When we cultivate them we gain a greater feeling of security, and, therefore, we are pleased at discovering their first faint apparition. We cultivate and foster them, not for their own sake, but for the sake of our conscience. The insight that the worth of these noble feelings increases, if they rule us without assistance from the distant consciousness of their moral value, has led to the mistaken notion that the conscience is not the judge of these feelings, but their expression, or the voice by which they themselves judge our other passions. But we think the distinction is very obvious between the moment of action, when we are moved by benevolence and the sense of justice, and the cooler moments of meditation when we judge of the value of these motives by deciding whether they deserve the respect or the contempt of the world.

From the earliest times man has felt himself bound to life in society. We shall not here discuss how men were originally driven to live together; we assume society as a fact, and the condition without which conscience could never have arisen. Every one acquainted with primitive forms of life will have remarked how the limits of the tribe are also the limits of the individual's hopes and fears. In the company of his tribesmen the savage will play and chatter in joyful ease; but as soon as he finds himself alone he is the prey of constant fear, and nothing is more dreadful to him than to be expelled from

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his tribe and left to face alone the vague dangers of the forest. The clan and its ideals are the absolute guide of the primitive man; they are the necessary support without which he loses all his ordinary good qualities. The same creature who in combat is courageous, and heroically endures the cruel tortures of revengeful enemies, becomes timid and trembles before the blame of his companions. The same is true of the child; the family circle is his world, and he cannot bear the loss of it. Praise and blame are probably the most effective instruments of education, and, in most families, it is a common experience that the first germs of sympathy and tender emotion which the child shows are cultivated by praise, and by signs of admiration and increased love. Just so primitive peoples educate their youth by praising the child's attempts to imitate the feats which are to be the work and glory of his manhood.

As the primitive man will fight against the whole world, if he has the respect and esteem of his own group; as the child feels safe and undisturbed, if he has the approval of his parents, so the religious man may set his whole mind to God, and with that support be enabled to bear the disappointments of life, and even the contempt and hatred of his fellow-men. It may be that the prosperity which God promises him makes him insensible to the short and insignificant chances of this earthly existence, or he may believe that all goods gained in opposition to God are turned into so many evils. Be this as it may, God is to him as a king above the kings of this world, and his society a society above that of men. Where our relations with God are not settled, no security at all is to be expected. We shall not here attempt to solve religious problems; we only urge that as primitive society is kept together by the manifold evidences which daily life affords, that only in society can the individual lead a life of relative security and count upon the fruits of his labors,—so religious feelings have gained and preserved their power because daily life, in a real or imaginary manner, shows that only the religious man truly prospers. Social life, and a regard to the wishes of others, becomes the centre of the individual's interests as a consequence of merely egoistic experiences, not kept distinct

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by memory, but moulded into the more abstract shape of sensitiveness to respect and contempt. And the case is the same with the religious feelings. What other men have good reason to respect or despise becomes the content of our conscience; what God sees reason to command or forbid we feel bound by the conscience to do or to forbear. The cultivation of our social instincts may be a command of God, but the culture of our religious feelings may also be a social duty. All that can be said of man and society can be said also of man and God, since man's relations to God are nothing but a new kind of society.

Religion, we believe, has been a most effective means of aiding the growth of the conscience, especially with regard to its capital point,—viz., independence of the real relations between the individual and his neighbors. It has done this by constituting a society by the side of, or rather above, the real human society. The most important question to which the moral philosopher has to give an answer is this: How it comes about that the conscientious man does not care about the actual respect or contempt he meets with, but either follows his own views as to what is right and wrong, without regard to the criticisms of others, or if he notices these, does so in a way which seems to make them a mere metaphor,—*i.e.* he reflects upon what their criticism "ought" to be. In the foregoing pages we have found the content of this metaphorical word "ought" to consist in our sensitiveness to the idea of what other people have good reason to think of us. This sensitiveness we think we have explained, by referring it to the fact that our sensitiveness to respect and contempt is the general, probably abstract, expression of the feeling with which others may regard us and our behavior. Respect and contempt may mingle with many other emotions, such as love and hatred; but they are in themselves more neutral, and, therefore, better suited to characterize the indefiniteness of the hopes and fears with which we look upon our relations to the surrounding society. Mental security, calmness, and confidence on the one hand, and mental restlessness, with want of security in the pursuit of our daily labors on the other, are, as

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we have seen, the fruits of good or bad relations with our fellow-men. It remains to show how this sensitiveness, very intelligible in itself, may become connected with an idea indispensable to the emergence of conscience, the idea of what our relation to society would actually be if the reality conformed to the ideal.

A mind indifferent to the respect and contempt of others, and a mind caring only for what the feelings of others actually are, are alike devoid of conscience. Characters cast in a robust mould may feel inclined to combat every one who comes in their way, and they easily become enemies of society; while weaker natures may yield to every outburst of the world's temper, and be unhappy unless they can conform to the ruling fashion. It is generally supposed that the latter persons possess a kind of conscience in their weak sensibility; but in fact they are nothing but timid creatures, and were it not for the faculty of suggestion—if we may use the phrase—by which they so easily persuade themselves that what they happen to hear at the moment is the eternal truth, we should never think we saw any analogy to conscience in their sensitiveness to public opinion. Some strength and firmness of mind may be required to become a conscientious man, because conscience must be independent of the actual and momentary judgments of the world. But there are other considerations, much more powerful than this, which lead men to disregard convictions which have not been firmly rooted in their minds.

We have already remarked that as men are naturally inclined to avoid what is disagreeable, they easily find their interest cooling towards any circle in which they are not esteemed, since thus the pain which such disregard causes is diminished. Everything has a great chance of becoming ultimately pleasant which increases the feeling of our mental worth, our mental calmness, and our unshaken security. In time, as the structure of society differentiates, there will be on the one hand greater scope for obtaining external signs of respect, and on the other greater experience of the precariousness and difficulty of such an undertaking. The respect and

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worldly happiness actually gained do not always go with inward worth. The flatterer and the sycophant may win success, blind fate may heap riches upon the ignorant, while proud genius consumes its energy in vain efforts. But these are chances which cannot be counted upon, and serious effort must build upon a more solid basis to succeed. Proverbs and myths suggest themselves, such as that man is master of his fate, that worth is measured not by success, but by desert; there arises a belief that the accidental separation of happiness and virtue cannot be ultimate; a thousand experiences support the hope in a future; life is not spent in a day, and its evening is often more just than its morning, and very frequently patient endurance in the time of misery is the condition of the happiness of the after-days. Sometimes men fill out the uncertainties of experience with the hope of a transcendent happiness. The experiences of life may possibly not teach that "honesty is the best policy," but we believe they do, and that men on the whole profit more by being independent characters than by conforming to a shifting public opinion; but we must acknowledge there are exceptions, and no one can be sure that his life will not be one of them. Therefore, men need some further sanction than the experience of the utility of duty; and this sanction has been sought in the belief in the eternal happiness of heaven. The human content of this belief, the sanction men need beyond the general experience of the utility of being independent of the accidental opinions of the day, may be found in the two following circumstances. At first it may seem doubtful whether an individual, in his particular circumstances, has not the best chance of prospering by flattery and sycophancy; but it is clear that persons who follow their own best convictions, and do not fluctuate like restless waves, are better friends and more trustworthy companions. Therefore our conscience must require us to be independent of the shifting opinions of the day, since only thus can we become fit objects of respect for our fellow-men. And our second remark must be, that when the average experience of life has been that such independence is the soundest basis on which to build our lives, it is implicitly

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made impossible to be confident of success in following other courses. The pleasure of felt harmony with the society about us consists mainly in the tendency it has to increase the volume and freedom of all our mental activities. But when we win respect without reason we can put but small reliance on its permanence, and can hardly keep away the anxiety for what the next moment will bring forth. But this anxiety diminishes the pleasure of being respected, if it does not totally abolish it. A harmony between ourselves and others which rests on a misunderstanding cannot produce in our mind the serene calmness we aspire to; but there is no impossibility of attaining this state of mind where we stand in real conflict with others, if only we are fully convinced that the conflict arises from their misconceptions. Therefore, man has no choice; if he wishes to attain that calmness of mind which is the condition of the undisturbed growth of all other pleasures and of happiness, he must be true to his own inmost convictions.

The terms we use have some ambiguity, but it is of a trifling kind. The conscience, we have said, is our sensibility to what others have good reason to think about us. A good reason, as we have meant it in this paper, is one founded upon the real, fully perceived character of our actions, and in our full apprehension of the laws according to which men are pleased or displeased. But if this is so, it is a mere tautology to say that experience must teach us that it is safer to build upon what gives others good reason to be satisfied with us than upon what makes them actually satisfied at the moment. Men may be kept in their illusion for a time, but it is the essence of an illusion to be a transient conviction. We cannot tell at what precise moment the illusion will be dispelled; but a perpetual illusion is a contradiction in terms. The moral code, we say, is the whole sum of our experience, accumulated and sifted through the ages, of what constitutes a good reason why our fellow-men should be satisfied or dissatisfied with us. Shifting circumstances, new conditions of life, may alter the code, and these changes may not go on without conflicts. The conscience is our consciousness of conformity to this code, or to that part of it which has impressed our intelligence; and

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this consciousness is but our nature's instinctive demand for a support, a firm foundation on which we may rely in the performance of the manifold particular undertakings which make up our individual lives.

C. N. STARCKE.

UNIVERSITY OF COPENHAGEN.

DISCUSSIONS.

DR. ADLER ON MORAL INSTRUCTION.

Dr. Adler's introductory lecture on "The Problem of Unsectarian Moral Instruction"* seems to me to beg a very large question, viz., whether school or any other children, or even grown-up persons, can be efficaciously instructed in morals. Perhaps, however, Dr. Adler meant to leave this big question on one side, and to set himself to the smaller problem: granted the efficacy of moral instruction, by what method is this instruction to be conveyed? The illustration he gives of his proposed method seems to me the reverse of happy. His enumeration of the degrees of the lie—the lie direct, the lie equivocal, the lie partial, the lie pantomimic, the *suggestio falsi*—is very ingenious, but as a lesson to a child is full of immoral suggestion. Unless we are to believe that the child is a very paragon of original sin, a perfect original sinner in Aristotelian phrase; unless we are to assume that its heart is deceitful above all things and desperately wicked, is it not a crime to suggest to the child the existence of a depravity which there is even a chance is not there?

In physical exercises, the right action is repeated again and again, until it becomes habitual; the wrong one is simply excluded. To attempt to exhaust all the possible varieties of wrong action would be worse than a waste of time; it would confuse the little brains and obscure the right action. Imagine a course of systematic lessons on Dr. Adler's plan in

* Published in the October number of this JOURNAL (vol. ii., No. 1, p. 11).

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walking, in which the child should be told that it *ought not* to walk on its head or its hands; that it *ought not* to roll on the ground or wriggle like a snake. So with the teaching of grammar. Apart from controversy about method, or the utility of instruction in grammar, which is open to question, it is the right phrase not the wrong one that should be spoken. Accuracy is only secured by training the mind in positive habits, so that the mind will spontaneously select the right expression. If it does so the wrong one will be rejected, if it ever occurs to the mind, which, in the normal case, occurs comparatively rarely. Right conduct seems to me to rest on the same basis. To contemplate sin is, to the normal man or child, to become sinful. To provide always influences stimulating towards positive right action; that surely is the end of moral education. It would perhaps be going too far to say that moral education and moral instruction are mutually exclusive; yet if no better method of instruction than Dr. Adler presents is available, they must be as nearly as possible as opposite as the poles.

The passage in which Dr. Adler speaks of the majesty of the *ought*, will, I think, be rejected by any one who observes children and the relations of grown-up people to them closely. *Ought*, pronounced in howsoever majestic a tone, and backed by unnumbered thongs or birches, is *felt* to be weak. The parent who answers the child's inevitable why? with "Just because you ought!" feels that his "moral instruction" has no ethical basis, and that he is a lazier and less honest creature than the child, with its boundless curiosity and insatiable appetite for reasons why. At least, as soon as a child begins to understand the meaning of language, it appears to me that its education (in a sense) should begin, its powers of observation quickened, its reasoning powers aided in development. The conventional training is destructive of these, and thus there arises the assumed need for moral instruction during school age, and the tendency no doubt is to set about this instruction in an empirical fashion, taking as a type the worst boy, whose uncultured imagination impels him to deceit. The opposite of this method is positive training (in respect of lying) of the imagination. Liars are incipient novelists, whose fault is that

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they tell the lie at the wrong moment. Given a child of healthy, physical, and moral parentage and upbringing, its normal disposition is truthfulness and uprightness. The suggestion of falsity by companion or by teacher is a moral shock, which the child feels deeply. The shocks the child will receive in the ordinary course of things are serious enough; they should not be thrust upon it in school. But it is said that the school ought to provide for the child by moral instruction, the training it does not get at home by observation of habitual right conduct. The school cannot compensate for bad heredity, although it may migitate the effects of it; and if the atmosphere of the house is unrefined or immoral, the proper antidote to that is surely another and healthier atmosphere. This brings me to the point I hinted at in starting, viz., that what the school should offer is a healthy, moral atmosphere, not a series of studies in morbid mental phrases. It is the moral poise that has to be cherished, and no "systematic moral lessons" or any "modern educational method" or moral tales of an old-fashioned sort can effect this. It must be remembered that in an elementary school we are not training moral philosophers, but, in a stumbling enough way, we are training children to act wisely and uprightly. In this sense moral education is the most important and necessary of all; but to be really edifying it must be pervasive, and not occasional, like a lesson in history or in geography.

In school, surely, truth, honor, uprightness, open-mindedness, open-heartedness should be evident in every action, every spoken word, every pantomimic gesture. I have not discussed the problem of the replacement of supernatural moral sanction by sanction of another kind, because Dr. Adler does not raise the point; but, necessarily, the gist of the whole matter lies here.

JAMES MAVOR.

A BRIEF REJOINDER.

The lecture on the "Problem of Unsectarian Moral Instruction" is the introductory one of a course of sixteen. It deals with various plans of moral education on a religious basis, which have been suggested or tried in public schools. The

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failure of these attempts leads to the recommendation of a scheme of unsectarian moral instruction. *All the remaining lectures of the course are designed to develop the scheme in detail.* The example of the method to be followed, given in the introduction, is very brief, and taken in an isolated way has proved to be misleading. I must, however, refer to the whole course for my answer to the criticism. The points that lying should be corrected by the positive training of the imagination, and that the school should offer a healthy moral atmosphere, which are mentioned above as objections, are really included in the proposed scheme, and receive considerable attention. The question how far moral evil should be discussed with the young also receives notice.

FELIX ADLER.

[The course of sixteen lectures referred to above, which was delivered before the School of Applied Ethics at Plymouth, Mass., in July and August, 1891, is now in press. The titles of the lectures are: (*a*) *Introductory:* The Problem of Unsectarian Moral Instruction; The Efficient Motives of Good Conduct; Opportunities for Moral Training in the Daily School; The Classification of Duties; The Moral Outfit of Children on Entering School. (*b*) *Primary Course:* The Use of Fairy Tales; The Use of Fables; Supplementary Remarks on Fables; Selected Stories from the Bible; The Odyssey and the Iliad. (*c*) *Grammar Course:* The Duties of Acquiring Knowledge; Duties which Relate to the Physical Life and the Feelings; Filial and Fraternal Duties; Justice and Charity; Elements of Civic Duty; The Use of Proverbs and Speeches; Individualization of Moral Teaching. Dr. Adler's article on The Influence of Manual Training on Character, published in the *Ethical Record* of January, 1889, will be reprinted as a supplement. D. Appleton & Co., New York, publishers.—MAN. ED.]

THE MANCHESTER LABOR CHURCH.

Since the time when the notice of the above movement was written for the January number of this JOURNAL, the Labor Church has made considerable progress. Mr. Trevor has

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given up the other work in which he was previously engaged, with the view of devoting his energies entirely to the service of the new Church; and a monthly paper, entitled *The Labor Prophet*, has been started to serve as its organ. The first number of this paper, which appeared in January, contains a brief statement of the ideas underlying the new movement, several items of news with regard to events in the world of labor, an unpublished letter by Mazzini, a New Year's Hymn, and three short articles by Mr. Trevor, Mr. P. H. Wicksteed, and Mr. Tom Mann. Mr. Mann's article is an interesting treatment of the question, Is the Labor Movement inspired with an ethical principle? He insists that this movement is altruistic, having for its basis the idea of the brotherhood of man. Mr. Wicksteed's article is an answer to the question, Is the Labor Church a Class Church? He replies that it is not so: for, though it is true that it concerns itself primarily with the betterment of the condition of a particular class of society, this betterment is, in reality, required in the interests of the whole society. No society, he urges, can be in a wholesome condition in which there is any class occupied exclusively with the *means* of living, rather than with life itself: and he holds that, under present conditions, this tends to be the case with the laboring-class as such. He says,—

"We claim a fair share of life for those who do a fair share of labor, and demand that the 'classes' shall no longer be content to take for themselves all that is important, all that matters, and leave nothing to society itself [*i.e.*, I suppose, to the *larger portion* of society] except the toil and labor necessary for this life, but insignificant without it."

What he means by this is more fully explained as follows,—

"We must distinguish, in all things, between that which is most *necessary* and that which is most *important*. What is most necessary to the life of every man is that he should have air to breathe, food and drink, clothes and shelter, for without these he cannot live at all. But what is most important is the exercise of his human faculties,—knowledge, enjoyment, fellowship, love, active interchange of thought and feeling with man, joyful communion with nature and with God. If he has none of these, and secures none of them to others, then it is of no importance for him to be alive. Therefore we have to pay attention, first, to necessary things which have no importance in themselves, and are only the *means* of life, and then to life itself. Now, if one set of men are producing the

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means of life, and another set of men are living, we have a state of slavery in which the worker has not his fair share of life, and the man who has a rich life does not do his fair share of work [*i.e.*, I suppose, his fair share of *toil*,—of work which is not in itself an end, as some work seems to be]. So, when we think of the world as it ought to be, when there shall be no more slavery, we begin by thinking of every one (except the weak, the miniature, and the ailing) as doing work enough to provide the *means* for his own living; and then we think of him as living a full life, in fellowship with his fellow-workers and his fellow-livers. To strive for this is not to fight for a class, but to fight against classes on behalf of society itself."

I confess there is in this on the whole admirably lucid statement one point which seems to me to require to be more fully cleared up. Mr. Wicksteed says that in an ideal society every normal person would "do work enough to provide the means for his own living." Does he mean by this simply that every one would do work enough to provide the means of supporting his actual physical existence? Or does he mean that every one would do work enough to support the kind of life which he actually lives? Also, does he mean to exclude from the conception of "work" all work which may be regarded as in itself an end, such as the work of an artist? Does he mean, for instance, that in an ideal society Shakespeare would have been required to provide, by some irksome toil, for the support of his own physical existence, in addition to the production of his plays,—which we may suppose to have been a pure enjoyment? Or does he also mean that Shakespeare would have been required to provide the means of carrying on the life which he actually lived,—*i.e.*, the means of getting his works printed, exhibited on the stage, etc.? Or does he merely mean that the writing of the plays might be regarded as an equivalent for the toil necessary to provide these things? Apart from this point, however, which seems to me to require some further elucidation, I think Mr. Wicksteed has made it apparent that the Labor movement, as conceived by him, is not a movement in the interests of one class as opposed to others, but in the interests of society as a whole. This point is further illustrated in Mr. Trevor's paper on "Commercial Slavery," in which he objects to the phrase "Wage Slavery," as not sufficiently covering

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the evils of our modern commercial life, and points out that in many respects the life of a worker for profit is often subject to conditions of slavery "almost as real and galling" as those of workers for wages. He urges, therefore, that the wage-earner ought "to welcome the 'bourgeois' as a comrade in arms." Evidently what the Labor Church aims at is the establishment of better conditions of social life generally; and the name "Labor Church" seems to be adopted merely because it is the condition of the laboring class that is specially in need of improvement. Mr. Trevor himself says explicitly that he sees no means of introducing the required improvement except by socialism. This appears, indeed, to be the view generally adopted by those who are taking an active part in the work of the Labor Church.

J. S. MACKENZIE.

BOOK REVIEWS.

REPORT ON THE RECENT LITERATURE OF ETHICS AND RELATED TOPICS IN AMERICA.

(To be continued in the July number.)

1. WHAT IS REALITY? An Inquiry as to the Reasonableness of Natural Religion, and the Naturalness of Revealed Religion. By Francis Howe Johnson. Boston: Riverside Press, 1891. Pp. xxvii., 510.
2. STUDIES IN HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION, with a chapter on Christian Unity in America. By J. Macbride Sterrett, D.D., Professor of Ethics and Apologetics in the Seabury Divinity School. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1890. Pp. xiii., 348.
3. THE CRISIS IN MORALS. An Examination of Rational Ethics in the Light of Modern Science. By James Thompson Bixby, Doctor of Philosophy of the University of Leipzig. Boston: Roberts Brothers, 1891. Pp. viii., 315.
4. CONDUCT AS A FINE ART. The Laws of Daily Conduct. By Nicholas Paine Gilman. Character Building. By Edward Payson Jackson. Boston: Riverside Press, 1891 (two vols. in one). Pp. vi., 149; viii., 230.
5. ETHICS FOR YOUNG PEOPLE. By C. C. Everett, Bussey Professor of Theology in Harvard University; author of "The Science of Thought," "Poetry, Comedy, and Duty," etc. Boston: Ginn & Co., 1892. Pp. iv., 185.
6. DUTY: A BOOK FOR SCHOOLS. By Julius H. Seelye, D.D., LL.D., late President of Amherst College. Boston: Ginn & Co., 1891. Pp. 71.

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7. A PRIMER OF ETHICS. Edited by Benjamin B. Comegys, author of "Talks with Boys and Girls," "Beginning Life," "How to get On," "Old Stories with New Lessons," "Addresses to the Pupils of Girard College," etc. Boston: Ginn & Co., 1891. Pp. vii., 127.

8. "MAKERS OF AMERICA." COTTON MATHER, THE PURITAN PRIEST. By Barrett Wendell. New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1891. Pp. vi., 321.

THE JOURNAL OF ETHICS is not responsible for any full report of the theological and metaphysical studies which appear of late in constantly-increasing numbers as factors in our American philosophical literature. But the trend of ethical thought is so largely determined by that of other forms of philosophical opinions that we cannot wholly ignore such works as those of Mr. Francis Howe Johnson, or of Dr. Macbride Sterrett.

1. Mr. Johnson's "What is Reality?" appeared in large part as a series of essays in the *Andover Review*. Without in the least lacking decided originality in statement, and especially in illustration, Mr. Johnson's general line of argument stands in obvious historical relationship to that of Lotze, to whom our author acknowledges indebtedness in his preface. Especially is his position towards Fichte, and the rest of the constructive German idealists, analogous to that which Lotze was accustomed to take in his academic lectures on metaphysics. The method of "subjective analysis," thinks Mr. Johnson, must be unfruitful in philosophy (p. 48). The "test of reality" lies after all in this, that "the necessity of living a proposition shows that this proposition expresses a reality" (p. 79). Neither in the inner life alone, nor in the bare observation of physical facts, can complete truth be grasped. A world of "real agencies that act and react upon us," and the human mind as a real originating cause, which to some extent modifies and directs itself and external agencies,"—these are, as it were, the data of philosophy, and Mr. Johnson, although quite willing both to analyze his data and to defend them against objection, never undertakes by any process of thorough-going self-criticism to face ultimate issues concerning their acceptability. Philosophical scepticism receives a certain treatment in Chapter V. on the "Thing in Itself," and, in particular, pp. 117–124, the question of the "relativity of knowledge" is well, but briefly, considered. Yet Mr. Johnson's *forte* lies rather in the synthesis of various suggestive lines of thought concerning concrete facts than in any facing of ultimate issues. Philosophy, as Lotze's own case shows, has owed much to thinkers of this type, and Mr. Johnson's syntheses form the really significant feature of this important book. These syntheses are upon the now so familiar lines of an organic Monism, with stress laid upon "conscious efficiency" and "personality," as characteristics of the Soul of the Universe. The methods used are largely those of analogy. The field run over in the course of the argument is of the widest, and the literature referred to is very varied. So many students in our day tread these paths of monistic philosophical synthesis, the same warm hopes of a coming clearer insight inspire so many minds, that the man who speaks in the terms of any form of this organic monism is useful to the cause of philosophy chiefly in so far as he has experienced widely in the realm of such inquiries, in so far as he can report freshly and with some originality of reflection his personal impressions, and in so far as he constantly feels his necessarily close relations to his many

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allies. Epoch-marking originality is here impossible. We can only work together. Mr. Johnson has all the advantages of such a wide outlook and experience; he shows great sensitiveness to the suggestions of current discussion; he states his case with a pleasant simplicity of style, and he adds his own reflections with a highly effective strength. It is a great regret to the present reviewer to have to pass him by here so hastily. There are many matters that one would desire to discuss with him more at length. The strongest single discussion in the book seems to me the fine Chapter IX. on "Immanency and Transcendency," where the analogical method of dealing with the problems of monism and of the world-consciousness receives an embodiment of almost classic skill, with a result which is, after all, strikingly similar to that reached on wholly different grounds by the idealists whose method Mr. Johnson declines to follow. The present reviewer is free to confess that he favors more ultimately critical methods in philosophy than are those here adopted by Mr. Johnson. Yet it is one thing to favor such methods, quite another thing to carry them out; whilst Mr. Johnson's execution of what he has planned is, within his own limits, admirable. Meanwhile Mr. Johnson's definition of the "efficiency" of "creative intelligence" in the world-process, as the matter now stands in his book, does not in the least satisfy the present reviewer; yet if any treatment based upon his form of the notion could disarm criticism, Mr. Johnson's version of the Lotzean doctrine would do so. Appendix A, on "The Evolution of Conscience," will be especially interesting to our own readers. The present writer cherishes the hope of coming to closer quarters with Mr. Johnson in the future, in the form of some more adequate discussion of his Teleology. In sum, then, this is a work of a man who looks over a very large field with a summary yet penetrating glance, who has strong intuitions, and who on the whole trusts them. The resulting book has some of the defects, but surely many of the merits, of this fashion of thinking.

2. Dr. Sterrett is now not unknown to our readers. His book, "Studies in Hegel's Philosophy of Religion," is the outpouring of a very learned and philosophical enthusiasm, which is not in the least wanting in clearness of expression, but which, after all, seems to the present reviewer somewhat deficient in self-critical freedom from the overshadowing influence of Hegel himself. It will not do to feel, for instance, that Hegel's classification of religions was so perfect that one may venture to say, as Dr. Sterrett does (p. 253), "The study of religions since Hegel's day undoubtedly compels considerable change to be made in the characterization that Hegel gives of some of them. But it does not change or invalidate the method, which can readily adapt itself to any amount of new information as to religious phenomena. The *idea* passes through these phases, and is indifferent as to just what religion shall represent any one phase." This seems to be taking our Hegel far too seriously. But in general Dr. Sterrett, although an expositor rather than anywhere a critic of Hegel's fundamental positions, preserves an excellent freedom of form. Chapter IV., on "The Vital Idea of Religion," and Chapter V., on "Theology, Anthropology, and Pantheism," show our author at his best. He is profoundly impressed by Hegel's conception of God as the complete and organic Personality, *in* whom all individuals have their fulfilment and their true being. In expounding this notion, however, Dr. Ster-

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rett is free from any slavish dependence upon the letter of the Hegelian text, and his work will surely serve to make the Hegelian point of view more comprehensible than any merely literal following of Hegel's language could do. The book is especially good in bringing together literary illustrations of the principal philosophical conceptions discussed. At one moment Green, or Principal Caird, at another Lotze; or, again, Carlyle, or St. Hildebert, or St. Gregory the Great, or Meister Eckhart, will be found contributing to the reader's interest and insight. Yet none of these other writers are expounded at any length. It is Hegelianism which they all alike in some fashion illustrate. Few studies from the hands of the relatively orthodox Hegelian school, meanwhile, show so much vitality, personal experience, and suggestiveness as are here found together. It is true that, from the present reviewer's point of view, the final significance of Hegel for the philosophy of religion, as for other regions of philosophical inquiry, will never be made out until we shall have at once understood Hegel himself with something of Dr. Sterrett's warmth of appreciation, and shall have learned also to view him more critically from without, and to regard him in his historical place as one only among many of the expositors of the idealistic doctrine. For the rest, Dr. Sterrett, in his eagerness to show us the significance of Hegel, seems in some places, as on p. 31, unjust to the genuine spirit of the Kantian doctrine; and in one passage, p. 139, he places Schopenhauer in what we take to be an incorrectly chosen context. If one may venture to express a hope as to the future of Dr. Sterrett's work as a student and expositor, I should look for fresh aid from him if he undertook, in a form somewhat similar to that of Pfleiderer's well-known work, a comparative historical sketch of modern religious philosophy. It is the comparative method which best tends to correct the imperfect perspective in which we must view our world so long as we study it from the outlook of a single systematic thinker. As things are, we have to thank Dr. Sterrett for a very warm and readable volume, full of temperament, of devotion to truth, and of a spirit of genuinely catholic liberality.

3. Temperament is also not lacking in Dr. James Thompson Bixby's "Crisis in Morals," a book in which perhaps the thing most open to objection is the title, although that is by no means wholly bad. There is namely a sense in which the world is indeed perpetually in the midst of a "Crisis in Morals," just because it is of the nature of our greater spiritual interests to be always in question, always dependent on the clearness of head and the strenuousness of will of erring and hesitant mortals. But, on the other hand, Dr. Bixby's frequent recognition of his numerous allies in ethical teaching shows what is the fact, that his book is in line with the wisest thinking of our time concerning these matters. We have mentioned above the prevalence of organic monism in the thought of the age. Now monism has many forms, but all of its more organic forms tend to the recognition of the truth that the real world is informed by a genuinely spiritual principle, and that whether or no the physical forces at work on our planet always favor the development of righteousness, still, at all events, whatever beings are rational enough to appreciate the truth of the universe in even a very dim way, are led by that very fact to prefer on the whole some approach to righteousness, just because they thereby get a genuine place in the organism of things, and conform to the deeper truth itself. This

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general statement is here made in an intentionally vague way, in order to leave plenty of room for the actual variety of method which obtains among those who try to give it a more precise formulation. Suffice it to say, however, in the first place, that Dr. Bixby is one of the large company whose general purpose is thus definable. He is in nowise alone, therefore, nor does he in fact feel himself to be alone. The bare title, however, and a few words in the first chapter, would suggest that the need for a defence of the objective validity of the moral law is more pressing, and Dr. Bixby's own fashion of defence more isolated in current discussion, than our author himself, in the body of his book, appears to think, or than is the case. In Mr. Spencer's own treatment of ethics, as Dr. Bixby shows (pp. 215–217), the more organic principle contends for mastery with the more hedonistic. The remarks in Mr. Van Buren Denslow's book, cited by Dr. Bixby on page 17, and the other examples of extreme or anarchical individualistic opinions concerning ethics which he here and there refers to, are, as a fact, symptomatic of currents wholly aside from the main stream of our time,—a time very generally devoted to the elaboration of social ideals, and to the defence of a theory of the universe which recognizes the world-principle as essentially organic, or else as at the very least productive of the Ideal through processes of evolution, even if it be not itself the embodiment of a genuinely conscious and spiritual Ideal.

Yet a defence of the moral order as such is never out of place, and Dr. Bixby's little volume is full of a noble spirit, is written in a clear, scholarly, and effective fashion, and is sure to do good. The negative portion, devoted to Mr. Spencer's ethics, is on the whole less serviceable, to my thinking, than the positive half, but Dr. Bixby's criticisms of Mr. Spencer usually carry the present reviewer with him. One might, indeed, lay more stress upon the Spencerian distinction of "Absolute and Relative Ethics" than does Dr. Bixby (p. 47, *sqq.*), and I myself should find the distinction, properly understood, less dangerous than the latter tries to make it out. There is no reason why strenuous devotion to the absolute good, in so far as it is in sight should not be joined with a readiness to remember that in case by reason of our ignorance it is *not* in sight, then the principles which we actually follow may, and in fact must, be such as would need correction from a higher point of view. But this assertion cannot here receive further justification; for it in fact introduces the whole discussion which, since the controversy between Kant and Herder over the limits of the historical justification of imperfect stages of life, has occupied a prominent place in ethical theory (*cf.* Julian Schmidt's remarks in his "Geschichte der Deutschen Literatur," last edition, vol. iii., p. 105, on the Kant-Herder controversy itself). As to the matter of the hereditary element in the development of conscience, Dr. Bixby is very suggestive. There is probably no portion of the Spencerian theory which, in the light of well-known recent investigations into the nature of heredity, is more vulnerable than this portion, and Dr. Bixby's criticisms on pages 178–181 fall well in line with the discussions of the final chapter of Professor James's larger "Psychology," where the possibility of the heredity of acquired habits as a source for the formation of instincts is considered from a more general point of view. Mr. Lloyd Morgan, in his "Animal Life and Intelligence," after a lengthy study of the recent inquiries concerning

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heredity, decides, indeed (*op. cit.*, p. 176), that while there is no certain proof of the fact, there is still no reason why, in view of the present state of our knowledge, the heredity of acquired variations "should not be assumed as a provisional hypothesis," and, accordingly, Mr. Morgan himself is also ready to accept, with some doubt, the view that certain instinctive tendencies have, as at least a part of their basis, the acquirement and consequent heredity of a habit. But the arguments of Dr. Bixby, and others of the same sort, seem to the present writer to show pretty conclusively that, however the matter may stand with other instincts, in case of the conscientious impulses at all events, this their supposed origin in the experiences and slowly-acquired habits of our ancestors is a peculiarly poor "working hypothesis." Were they derived in this way, they ought to have a very different content and psychological context from their present one. Yet strange to say, it is this weakest portion of the Spencerian doctrine which has won apparently the largest popular approval and the most general support.

The second and more positive portion of Dr. Bixby's study is full of brilliant brief statements of important insights. The total effect is, to be sure, a little unsystematic. To fundamental questions as to the nature of the moral consciousness, the author returns in several different places, and in a way to confuse somewhat our notion of the precise nature of his theory in its wholeness. On p. 191 moral obligation has as its source "the nature of things," in that "we are all parts of an infinite organism," and in particular have a share (p. 193) in "the common life of the social organism." This thought is further defined, though still somewhat vaguely, on p. 195, to the effect that "as soon as we see certain relations in existence, we see, as involved by them, certain corresponding feelings and acts, as the only ones befitting under the circumstances." On p. 210 we learn that the "ultimate standard of worth is personal worth," and that the end is the "realization of our true and higher self." On p. 221, *sqq.*, there is an insistence upon Dr. Martineau's notion of morality as "essentially a preferential choice between higher and lower alternatives." Further on an union of altruism and of the sense of "sacred obligation" figures as the instinctive element in morality. In Chapter VII. of Part II., p. 245, *sqq.*, we learn that the "reason" is the "faculty of human nature most directly concerned in moral development;" and man is a moral agent "because he is a thinking being." On p. 260 the "moral germ," with which conscience began in the course of evolution, "starts with only a dim fierce sense of personal rights;" and on p. 268 the transition from the conception of "rights" to that of "duties" occurs in this fashion: "When one sees a thing to be right and good, it is the most natural of impulses to do it. . . . Duty is thus logical consistency in conduct; the equation between our social demands and our personal deeds." Thereupon Dr. Bixby returns to "reason" as the power which developed out of the "germ" our own moral law. All these notions, as Dr. Bixby defines them to his own mind, are unquestionably meant to form one organic doctrine; but we could wish for a more technical definition of the entire process of synthesis by which they are united in his thought. So far as one can gather his drift, the present reviewer feels in decidedly close sympathy with his philosophical interpretation of the moral consciousness.

4 to 7. The publication, almost contemporaneously, of a number of text-books for the ethical instruction of the young, is a most interesting sign of the times.

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The two books by Mr. N. P. Gilman and by Mr. E. P. Jackson, were written in response to the call of the American Secular Union for a prize "essay, treatise, or manual adapted to aid and assist teachers in our free public schools," etc., "to thoroughly instruct children and youth in the purest principles of morality without inculcating religious doctrine." The prize offered was divided between these two works. The other works mentioned in our list appear independently.

The present reviewer feels distinctly disqualified, by his lack of experience in the actual teaching of children at the ages which the authors of these books have in mind, from giving any accurate estimate of their probable effectiveness for their particular purpose. It is to be hoped that an expert discussion of the practical problem here involved will ere long find a place in the pages of this JOURNAL. If a non-expert in the teaching of children and youth at this particular age may hazard an opinion, the present reviewer's would run thus: Of the various books on our list, Professor Everett's has the advantage of joining a great deal of picturesqueness and grace with suggestiveness and depth. The illustrations employed are often very attractive. The style is crystal clear. The volume ought surely to set a number of young people thinking; and in doing so it will also surely increase their sense of the dignity, not to say the true solemnity, of the general business of life. On the other hand, Mr. Jackson's book will reach perhaps a still wider range of minds than would be susceptible to Professor Everett's gentle and gracious thoughtfulness. It will stir them more immediately and vigorously. But, on the other hand, it *may*, for all that one can tell, raise more ghosts than it will lay. Mr. Jackson, to change the figure, descends before his class into a sort of ethical arena, and there, in each new discussion, grapples with some practical problem or some human failing in a fashion sure to excite a certain interest, such as any hand-to-hand fight arouses. The scene can, of course, have but one ending on any occasion. The moral law easily wins, the human failing is duly chastised, the practical problem is bravely throttled; only one fears lest the class should come to get, after all, a certain sympathy, as it were, with poor Satan, who fights so persistently, but every time gets worsted. Are they sure to hate him merely for having seen him, under such one-sided conditions, bite the dust so often? Still, a teacher of ethics to the young must take his risks, and Mr. Jackson seems sure, as has been said, to arouse a genuine and, as it were, a somewhat elemental stirring of inquiry in a class that has been well introduced to his book. Mr. Gilman, on the contrary, is less directly stirring in his appeal to youthful curiosity, and is rather more theoretical in his attitude. He aims at getting principles before his pupils, especially the principle that society is an organism, and that individuals are members of the social body. He thinks, apparently, a little too often of the teacher rather than of the pupil, and his book may herein find the limit of its serviceableness. Nevertheless, his study is only relatively theoretical in its character. He aims to avoid technicality as such, is more successful than Mr. Jackson in escaping the paths that may lead to an inconvenient sort of casuistry in the discussions of the schoolroom, and brings his pupils face to face with a wide range of moral fact.

Mr. Benjamin Comegys has printed an adaptation and abbreviation of the once noted "Rollo Code of Morals," with some new chapters added. Jacob Abbott and his "Rollo" formed a great part of the moral training of our American

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youth in a generation not yet wholly departed from the earth, and his work in its new dress will, at all events, be no wholly unwelcome visitor.

President Seelye's "Duty" is founded on the thought that "there can be no abiding basis of morality altogether separate from religion," but seeks to avoid altogether any sectarianism.

8. Professor Wendell's book on Cotton Mather cannot properly be estimated as an historical study, except by an expert in its own field. It is very highly interesting to the student of ethical facts as an exceptionally painstaking and, so far as a non-expert can judge it by internal evidence, a faithful portrait of the inner life of the "Puritan Priest," written with a full sense of the paradox involved in this very title, and in the assurance that, in the long run, "Protestantism can have no priesthood." Professor Wendell gives himself over with the utmost devotion to picturing his hero's moods and struggles. Their story is told, as largely as possible, in Cotton Mather's own words; and the whole book adds most valuable documents to the now so extensive history of mysticism, as well as to the tale of the inevitable struggle in a proud and self-willed soul, between this mysticism and the temperament which made other men call Mather a vain pretender. The tender sympathy, the delicate psychological skill, and the clear literary style of the biographer give the reader every aid in making Mather's acquaintance. The treatment of the witchcraft delusion, in Chapter IV., is introduced and much affected by a curious hypothesis of Professor Wendell's own, concerning the explanation of these phenomena,—an hypothesis as ingenious as it is, in the present state of our knowledge, unpersuasive. But it is at least worthy of consideration.

The foregoing brief notices form the beginning of a report on such current American literature as is of interest to students of ethics. It is the reviewer's intention to continue and extend the undertaking in the July number. The necessarily narrow limits of space and time at my disposal must excuse the curtness of speech which may here and there be manifest.

JOSIAH ROYCE.

LA PHILOSOPHIE PÉNALE. Par G. Tarde, Paris. G. Masson, 1890. Bibliothèque de Criminologie.

This book is the work of a philosophical magistrate who applies the resources of a very keen intellect to the study of social and criminal questions. It contains both a criticism of the ideas which have been circulated and received with favor during the last few years by the school known as that of criminal anthropology, and a statement of his personal ideas. Full of insight of all sorts, it is nevertheless somewhat involved and diffuse, and the reader has some difficulty in grasping the principal outlines of the book. In a word, it does not seem very systematic; but it is eminently suggestive. The author warns us, however, that his theories are concerned with three different questions. First of all, an attempt to reconcile moral responsibility and determinism, conscience and science, which the notion of free-will had appeared to separate by an impassable gulf. Next, and especially, an explanation of the criminal side of society, in conformity with a general point of view which the author has endeavored to

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apply to the several aspects of social life, in another book "The Laws of Imitation." Finally, there is the indication of some legislative and punitory reforms which are the practical conclusions of his theoretical premises.

In spite of this attempt at division, the analysis of the book is very difficult. It is composed of nine chapters, of which these are the titles: 1. "Preliminary Considerations" (in which the author chiefly seeks the causes of the present crisis in the state of the penal law, causes which are partly the same as those of the crisis in morals); 2. "Positivist School" (and under this perhaps ill-chosen title he designates the new Italian school of criminal anthropology, of which the most illustrious members are Messrs. Lombroso, Enrico Ferri, and Garafalo); 3. "The Theory of Moral Responsibility" (in which is found a criticism as to moral responsibility from a new point of view); 4. "The Theory of Irresponsibility" (studied successively under the following heads: madness, drunkenness, hypnotism, old age, the moral "revival," surrender to the domination of others; and which serves as a counterpoise to the theory of responsibility, put forward in the preceding chapter); 5. "The Criminal" (who, according to the author, is neither a madman nor a savage reappearing among us by a phenomenon of atavism, nor an epileptic in spite of what there may be fundamentally true in this idea: the criminal type is a *professional* type, this is the formula in which M. Tarde's theory is summed up); 6. "Crime" (studied in its physical, physiological, and social causes, the two latter far more important than the first); 7. "Trial;" 8. "Punishment;" 9. "The Penalty of Death" (it is especially these last chapters which contain the indication of the legislative and punitory reforms suggested by the author). This brief enumeration is quite insufficient to give an idea of the extreme abundance of ingenious and nearly always original thought which is the great merit of this book. We will here examine only two of our author's theories: first, that of responsibility, then that of crime and the criminal. M. Tarde maintains that the name and notion of responsibility should be preserved, and yet he thinks it impossible to continue to ground it upon the belief in free-will, "a belief shattered by the progress of scientific determinism." So he seeks another basis for moral and social responsibility, and he claims to have found it in "*individual identity*" joined to "*social similitude.*" In order that a person may be responsible for an action attributed to him, it is necessary and it suffices that, on the one hand, he is really identical with the author of the action, and on the other hand, that he belongs to some extent to the same social grade as the person who has been affected by the act, and as those who make him accountable. According to the author, the idea of free-will has a theological origin. "It arose, and necessarily arose, at an epoch when the idea of the indefinite and absolute culpability of the sinner was predominant. If to be guilty of an act means to cause it, it follows that to be absolutely and indefinitely guilty with regard to all, without any restriction,—as is necessary to justify the notion of eternal damnation,—means, to be the absolute and first cause of the action, or in other words, the free cause, beyond which one can go no further in the chain of cause and effect. Liberty in this sense is a creative power ***ex nihilo***, a divine attribute bestowed upon man. The free agent confronts and can frustrate God; he is in reality a little deity evolved from the greater. But if, instead of an absolute and unlimited culpability, we are concerned with a culpability

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which is relative or limited like everything real and positive, then a causality itself relative and limited—what is called a secondary causality—is sufficient. To this extent liberty becomes a useless postulate. M. Tarde's theory is chiefly psychological and sociological; yet it involves a metaphysical postulate, viz., that the Ego is a reality. Here is a passage in which this is eloquently formulated, and which we quote in full in spite of its length, because it will furnish an idea of the author's style: "I challenge any one to discover the slightest ground which is not illusory, for the strong scientific prejudice which sets up as a dogma the fundamental homogeneity of the elements, the infinity and eternity of this disheartening monotony. It is an illusion to slowly evolve the variation of the theme, of the sensible from the insensible, through the asserted mutability of the homogeneous, differentiated, no one knows how. All laws are the agents of regularity and consequently of uniformity; were they exercised upon materials already regular and uniform, we ask whence could result the slightest note of harmony in the midst of the universal psalmody? There can be no doubt about it; so that matter, energy, force, this so-called omnipotent insensibility, owes its omnipotence solely to the conflicting sensibilities, working separately and each for its own end, of which it is composed. Hence originality, hence liberty, hence individual reality. Without this, what good would be the individual, a superfluous copy of an already superabundant edition? Each individual, no doubt, has his individual mark; and his mark, his original identity from birth to death, is caused by the persistence of some foremost element which, set in motion, it is true, and influenced by others, and even owing to their joint action nearly all its stored-up power, its inherent force available at any moment, has none the less appropriated, by stamping them with its seal, all these outward actions. One cannot, indeed, say that—at the moment when this element arises in the Ego and thus revealing itself more clearly to the consciousness, becomes determined—it would have been possible that it should determine itself otherwise; but one may say that, in willing this act, it makes it *its own*, and it is precisely because the act was not capable of being different that it is its own. Underneath all individual existence, therefore, if the individual does really exist, there is something very distinctive, which seeks to extend itself, to become universalized, something also which seeks to live, that is, to last."

M. Tarde endeavors to verify his theory that responsibility is based upon individual identity and social similitude, first by the historic evolution of the penal law, and secondly by a survey of the different degrees of responsibility; and it must be owned that he renders it at any rate plausible. Thus, madness makes us irresponsible, because it makes us unlike others, because it *alienates* us from them,—that is to say, it makes us foreign to ourselves. Here I can only draw attention to the very curious pages of the author on the relative irresponsibility of great men, of *converts*, of despots, etc. The article devoted to the causes of crime should also be carefully studied. Here M. Tarde gives a general criticism of the fundamental principles of his sociology. Now, according to him, the explanatory cause of all social phenomena is *imitation*. He studies its effects with singular acuteness, whether they are exercised upon the masses or in the family, and he thus distinguishes between the "*imitation fashion*," which he notices especially in towns, and the "*imitation custom*," which is the pecu-

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liarity of the country. The chief law of imitation is that its influence passes from superiors to inferiors. Hence, the action of aristocracies; hence also that of capitals and large towns. "However strange it may appear, there are serious reasons for affirming that the vice and crime localized to-day in the lowest ranks of society have descended from the upper classes." Again, "one may now see how crime is propagated from large towns to the country, from the capital to the provinces, and how capitals and large towns exercise an irresistible attraction on countrymen and provincials who have lost caste or fallen into vice, and who hasten thither to get civilized after their fashion, a new method of raising themselves in the social scale." Also while contrasting urban and rural criminality, the author observes that the second tends more and more to resemble the first, and to become confounded with it. Here may be found considerations most worthy of attention, upon the evolutionary changes of that form of criminality which, proud, vindictive, and passionate as it originally was, has assumed a more and more voluptuous, calculating, and covetous character. The same tendency is again met with in art and industry, and from the same general causes, "which in every social order have caused in civilized as compared with barbarous man the predominance of calculation over passion, of the wish for comfort over pride."

The application of the sociological method revives in the same way the question of trial and evidence in criminal affairs: it shows that the "*trial by ordeal*" (the judicial duel), torture, trial by jury, arbitration, are the successive links in one and the same chain, substituted one for another by the all powerful action of imitation, first fashion, then custom. We must call attention to a very forcible criticism on the institution of juries, and the proposed reforms for replacing them (the creation of a criminal magistracy absolutely distinct from the civil magistracy, and of scientific inquests). But we must stop, for, at almost every page of this book, new questions crop up, new ideas, to which full justice could not be done without trespassing on our limited space. One might almost say that the greatest fault of the book is that it is too rich in thought; but, of all faults, this is certainly the rarest and the easiest to forgive.

E. Boirac.

An Introduction to Social Philosophy. By J. S. Mackenzie. Glasgow: J. Maclehose & Sons.

Perhaps one chief reason why there are so few professed students of social philosophy is that even among highly-educated people, taking the ordinary acceptation of that term, very few are convinced there is such a thing as social philosophy, and fewer still have any clear notion what it is. While this fact gives a peculiar value to a work like Mr. Mackenzie's as a satisfaction of a want which ought to be a need, it imposes upon the writer a duty from which writers of text-books upon most studies are comparatively free,—that of claiming, and even to some extent of reclaiming, from neighboring realms of science the territory which it can establish as its rightful domain. It may be said at once that Mr. Mackenzie, in the opening chapter of his remarkable book, has shown great skill and metaphysical tact in this delicate operation of tracing the bearings of social philosophy to the bordering subjects of ethics, politics, and economics,

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and in making good its claim to the title philosophy. One of the chief merits of the chapter consists in the frank, repeated admission that precise definition is impossible, that there exist no real boundary-lines between such studies, each of which intrudes upon the others, with varying degrees of pressure, at innumerable points. So, too, he brings out fearlessly that which is often deemed a reproach against philosophy, but which is, in truth, her special intellectual badge and character,—the sense of incompleteness, the "unsatisfying" feeling which attends the closest and fullest study. "For philosophy, as we have already said, is the serpent of eternity, and within its circle there can be neither beginning nor conclusion, except the idea of a system which is both; any other beginning and any other conclusion must be wrong. The true philosopher will know that the truth of philosophy is not a truth which is grasped, but a truth which is an inspiring ideal,—an ideal which shows through at every point in the growth of our knowledge, but which can never be perfectly grasped till the system of the universe is seen in its completeness." (P. 35.)

A social philosophy necessitates an ideal of social unity. To give clearness to this ideal as a true motive-force of history is the most important part of Mr. Mackenzie's work. He shows that of the four ideals of social life which present themselves as possible in social evolution, the "organic" is the one towards which we are now advancing. The organic view stands not as a compromise, but as a logical mean between the "monadistic" view, commonly known as "individualism," and the "monistic" view, which is "communism." "The organic view is that which regards the rights of the individual as inseparable from his obligations to his society, and his obligations as equally inseparable from his rights,—each being but a different aspect of the demands of his nature from him as a being who cannot but be social." (P. 134.)

This distinction is of prime importance, and marks the clear, philosophical conception which gives value to Mr. Mackenzie's treatment, the idea that in social progress neither logical nor historical priority is to be conceded to the individual or to the state, but that the growth of the individual is one with that of his society, as the branch of a tree with that of the stem. But, though Mr. Mackenzie gives a convincing justification of his use of the term "organic" as applied to social growth, he is careful to protect himself from errors likely to arise from the exclusively physiological associations of the term he employs. Against the danger of too rigorous definition, I have said, Mr. Mackenzie is generally well on his guard. In his excellent examination of "mechanical" and "organic" unity, he is wise to insist upon the fact that "there is no sharp line of separation between the various forms of unity."

In his extremely valuable chapter upon "The Social Ideal," Mr. Mackenzie devotes some of his best thought to a consideration of the difficulties and dangers of socialism. This is not, however, because he is opposed to the gradual strengthening of social bonds, but rather because he clearly reads the forces of the age as making towards this socialism, and rightly considers it more urgent that we should investigate the barriers and pitfalls which are on our actual historic line of progress than those which would beset us if we were moving towards some other goal, such as the "monadistic" goal of Mr. Auberon Herbert.

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To say that Mr. Mackenzie wields easily, almost gayly, a great weight of learning, is to indicate one of the minor merits of this truly remarkable book. He has collected and put in his chapters much of the best that has been thought and said by others upon the many topics which come under his survey. But, though he quotes wisely and often, his quotations by no means usurp the place of plums in a philosophic pudding. Many of Mr. Mackenzie's own sentences will compare, for condensed force and brilliancy of literary setting, with many of the best he quotes. But these epigrams are not used, as is too often the case, to shirk criticism by hiding rifts in the process of argument. The proper place of wit and epigram is in illustration or summary of arguments already given. Mr. Mackenzie, especially in the opening chapters of his work, pursues his task of denunciation with a bare, relentless severity of logic which can only be enjoyed by those who recognize the urgent need for this close knife-play of metaphysics.

Mr. Mackenzie appears to me amply justified, in his later chapters, in passing a little beyond the strict limits assigned to social philosophy in Chapter I. A bare statement of principles, however accurate, would hardly suffice in a study whose definition from other studies is so difficult. Hence a frequent descent into the region of particular illustrations is required to mark the true, substantial contents of the subject, as well as to indicate its bearings with regard to the surrounding regions of ethics, politics, and economics.

Thus, the long discussion entitled "The Elements of Social Progress" cannot be regarded as a mere appendage, but as an integral part of a scheme of study in social philosophy. Dealing with the perfection of social machinery and personal development, Mr. Mackenzie does not attempt to adequately discuss the problems of co-operation and profit-sharing, the population question, discriminate charity, and forms of government and education. He is concerned only to set these various and intricate problems in the light afforded by the social philosophy he has introduced, in order to see them in the order and proportion which they so sadly lack as they are thrust upon us in the hap-hazard of ordinary reading. But in briefly touching these subjects he makes some extremely suggestive remarks. Two, at least, bearing upon education, deserve quotation. In speaking of the personal services of man to man as one of the necessities of the moral life, he says, "It is in such instances as this that we are made aware that the moral life is the most subtle and exquisite of the fine arts and requires a genius for its right accomplishment,"—an admirable illustration of the merging in the highest point of moral life of those two forms of the ideal called the good and the beautiful, which on a lower level of life may seem so widely divergent. The other remark is a "practical" criticism upon the blindness of the higher education of our country. Speaking of the English universities, Mr. Mackenzie remarks, "What naturally concerns the social philosopher most deeply is the absence of any adequate recognition of the study of social science, including economics, politics, and the theory of education." (P. 357.)

It is, indeed, not unnatural that, beginning his discussion of social progress with a setting of industrial problems, he should end with a statement of educational aims and needs, for education is nothing less than character in working, the process of self-realization in the individual as in the state.

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An adequate survey of so large and important a work is here impossible. It must suffice to say that Mr. Mackenzie has approached his subject along that road of idealism by which alone it is accessible, and that he has given the clearest, brightest, and soundest exposition accessible to English students. Finally, there is no trace in Mr. Mackenzie's work of that spirit of "academicism" which withers the life out of many of the subtlest intelligences bred in our universities, the spirit which is always balancing to produce an equipoise, afraid lest strong judgment should be mistaken for rashness or partiality, and who, removed from the stress and strain of practical life, necessary for good philosophy as for all other human work, cultivate in its place a holy calm of philosophic indifference, which allows no good works to issue.

OHN A. HOBSON.

A PLEA FOR LIBERTY. Edited by Thomas Mackay. Second Edition. London: John Murray, 1891.

The feelings of satisfaction which this book on the whole inspires cannot be said to be unmixed. It makes out, no doubt, a heavy case against Socialism and excessive Collectivism. But in several places the reader feels that more might have been made of the position, and that the victory is due to the weakness of the adversary, more than to good strategy on the part of the individualist leaders.

This volume consists of thirteen essays of very varying merits. Mr. Herbert Spencer contributes an introduction, written with his usual clearness and brilliancy. It admits frankly the evils which at present beset competitive industry, and makes its chief point out of the increased slavery which a Socialistic system would involve for the worker. Mr. Spencer predicts a tyrannous bureaucracy, and points to the complaints already made in trade-unions to this effect. (The great tendency of democracies to distrust their leaders may perhaps lead us to doubt if these complaints mean much.) The common objection has been the reverse of Mr. Spencer's,—that a democratic Socialism would not leave enough freedom to the captains of industry. The path runs, in fact, between the two dangers, and any deviation on either side would be almost sure to be disastrous.

Mr. Robertson on the Impracticability of Socialism is clear, but not very original. It might have been better if he could have found room for some demonstration that Socialism was not only impracticable but unnecessary. One of the strongest weapons of Socialism is its cry that the rich are growing richer and the poor poorer, and a summary of Mr. Giffen's telling statistics on this point seems wanted to complete the consideration of the question. The doctrine of distribution according to "social labor times," which Mr. Robertson attacks, quoting it from Schäffle's "Quintessence," is now, we believe, abandoned by the leading English Socialists.

Mr. Donisthorpe's article on the Limits of Liberty is, perhaps, the most interesting piece of work in the book. His attempt to prove inductively the law that state interference tends to decrease in extensity and increase in intensity is thoughtful and forcible. He wisely rejects the tempting, but dangerous, attempt to find some general formula which will limit the functions of the state, and works *a posteriori* with very interesting results.

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Mr. Howell devotes his essay on Liberty for Labor to careful discrimination. He approves of further legislation on protection from, and compensation for, injuries received by workmen, holding, apparently, that, even in bargains between economic equals, a man has no right to contract to undergo preventable dangers. He also demands more sanitary legislation, but protests against a compulsory eight hours' day, and objects to the extension of the factory acts to home industries. He appears to think that the latter would be driven out of the field by them. Without any great originality, Mr. Howell's views are well put, and derive much importance from his position. On the closing of the books of the Docker's Union he says, "The monopoly of the land, or the Upper Chamber of the Legislature, sinks into insignificance by the side of this unexampled piece of wicked stupidity on the part of the new leaders, the apostles of the new trade-unionism."

Mr. Fairfield brings heavy charges against State Socialism in the Antipodes. It seems impossible for any one to say anything on Australasian politics without receiving an immediate contradiction. In some cases, however, Mr. Fairfield has succeeded in making damaging attacks on the state socialists by taking their own admissions. The essays, on the Discontent of the Working Classes, by Mr. Vincent, on the Housing of the Working Classes, by Mr. Raffalovich, and on Investment, by the editor, contain some interesting economic facts, but do not contribute much to the discussion of the general principle.

Mr. Millar's essay on the post-office is perhaps the weakest in the book. In his argument for private enterprise he neglects to consider that the saving effected by a single postal service is so great that private companies would inevitably combine, and that the result would be a monopoly whose profits would go, not as now to the state, but to private individuals. And the comparison of the cost of telegrams sent by railways on their own service with those sent by the post-office, completely ignores the fact that the railway companies have to deliver their messages by hand at various distances.

The treatment of Free Education, by Mr. Alford, and of Free Libraries, by Mr. O'Brien, calls for no special notice. Mr. Beauchamp Gordon tells clearly and well the failure of the act of 1886 to control electric lighting. This essay is interesting as an illustration of the truth that the attempt to throw indefinite burdens on capital in the interest of the public can only succeed with capital already specialized, and only then at the cost of stopping all influx of fresh capital into the harassed trade.

Mr. Auberon Herbert ends the book with a rather disappointing essay on the True Line of Deliverance, in the course of which he professes a belief that the Wages Fund Theory is not as dead as has been supposed. If this sort of economics is all that the defenders of individualism have to give us, it is time to congratulate the Socialists. It is no longer possible to retort *ad homines* that people who believe in Marx have no right to quarrel with the densest ignorance of economics. Whatever may be thought of Fabian applications, the knowledge of economics possessed by the younger Socialist leaders is such as to render Mr. Herbert's antiquarianism a grave danger to the side with which he is connected.

J. Ellis McTaggart.

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TRIES AT TRUTH. By Arnold White, author of "Problems of a Great City," etc. London: Isbister & Co., 1891. Pp. x., 150.

This book consists, in the main, of a series of short articles contributed to the "Echo." It deals with such subjects as Strikes, Socialism, Sweating, Pauper Immigration, Colonization, etc. Mr. White writes in an earnest spirit which is worthy of all praise; his views are clear and decided. The general idea he seeks to express is that "the tender and personal charity appropriate and indeed due to individual misery by each of us, is calamitous when applied by the State to misery in the mass. Emotional benevolence applied to misery in the mass creates the evils it blindly seeks to destroy. Benevolence by government is more cruel than inexorable law." Speaking of "Gifts to the Distressed," he says, "Untutored emotion has wrought even more harm than deliberate wrong, because it perpetuates evils it wishes to destroy. Goodness of motive is no criterion of goodness of deed. Sorrow and misery in the mass require scientific treatment from which emotion is cast out." As a consequence the writer objects to our present Poor Law as an "immoral compromise," holding that relief of pain is not the function of the State; its function is to govern wisely, impartially, uprightly. Now, whatever truth there may be in these sweeping assertions, no one could well argue that it is more than a half-truth.

With many of the author's views we are in hearty sympathy, such as his insistence on individual responsibility, on moral changes, on so limiting competition that profits shall not be derived from the misery, degradation, or death of others, on the rights and important place of labor unions, on the evils of adulteration. In his views on these subjects there is nothing particularly new; but he puts what he has to say in a clear and interesting way. On the subject of Colonization there are some practical remarks which are worthy of attention, though one may not agree with the first principle he lays down,—that all foreign pauper immigration should first be legally prohibited. It is doubtful whether "a couple of Gardner guns, used with smokeless powder, would be a very effective answer to Socialism;" still more so, whether, as a nation, we are destined "to become an abomination." If so, we shall not have perished without a prophet's warning.

R. A. DUFF.

DREI MONATE FABRIKARBEITER UND HANDWERKSBURSCHE: EINE PRAKTISCHE STUDIE. Von Paul Göhre, Kandidaten der Theologie, Generalsekretär der evangelisch-socialen Congresses in Berlin. Zweiter Zehntausend. Leipzig: Fr. Wilh. Grunow. 1891. (222 S.)

A judicious man once remarked that those who intended to prepare themselves for the calling of ethical teachers should, for a time, share the life of manual laborers. It would have a good and lasting influence on their head and heart. The author of this meritorious study has adopted this course, and the beneficial effect plainly shows itself. He says that during the years he was devoting himself to the social question from a religious and clerical stand-point, he was especially prevented from gaining a clear insight and a sound judgment by one thing,—a too meagre knowledge of real life, of the actual condition of those on whose account we have a social, a labor question. It is true there is an abundant literature upon the subject; but who can guarantee that it corresponds to reality?

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How could one obtain reliable and full knowledge of the views of the working classes, of their material desires, of their intellectual, moral, and religious character? "The best, directest, though not the most convenient, thing to do," he remarks, "was for me to go myself, unknown, among the people, to hear with my own ears and see with my own eyes how it stands with them; to experience with them their needs, their cares, their joys, their daily monotonous lives; to become familiar with the longing of their souls, their desire for freedom, property and pleasure, and to discover for myself the inmost motives of their actions." Thus, in June, 1890, he went to Chemnitz, the centre of the manufacturing industry of Saxony, and joined the ranks of the common day-laborers. For nearly three months he lived among them as one of them, unknown, and with hardly any intercourse with his equals. He worked with them in a large machine-shop eleven hours every day; ate, drank, and dwelt with them; passed his evenings in their company, and took part in their Sunday recreations. In this way he obtained abundant material to form an opinion about the condition of the laborers, which he presents in the book before us. The book is dedicated to his "fellow-workers in the factory," in order to express to them his resolution to devote his life to the service of their cause.

The eight chapters of the book have the following titles: My Way; The Material Condition of my Fellow-Workers; Work in the Factory; Agitation of the Social Democracy; The Social and Political Views of my Fellow-Workers; Culture and Christianity; Moral Conditions; Results and Demands. The conclusion to which his life in the factory has led the author is that factory work is "an activity that strains and wears out every energy, and may be ranked, if not higher, yet equal to any kind of hard intellectual work. It is a kind of labor that requires the best effort of a man's strength, and it is this effort, and not the success, the larger and smaller profit derived from it, which is the true moral standard for its valuation." He also conceived a high opinion of the intellectual ability of manufacturing hands. He found among his fellows "a number of such skilful and ready speakers, with such acute and practical judgment, that he silently listened, with feelings of admiration and shame, to these plain weavers, locksmiths, and manual laborers, whose eloquence, resolute reasoning and appearance could be equalled by only a small number of persons of average education. In regard to the Social-Democratic movement he says, "In spite of everything that is morally objectionable and intellectually unripe in this movement, in spite of the serious and dangerous explosive material which it undeniably contains, it still has so much sound force, and such fresh blood pulsates in its veins, that, if rightly treated and influenced, it may yet be trained and become a significant factor in the progressive development of our civilization, with the favor and blessing of God."

German Social-Democracy, the author thinks, "can no more be abolished to-day than the modern labor movement in general. On the contrary, it is my well-considered opinion that it will grow in the future, that it will spread in many rural districts especially. . . . It has, as it seems to me, become an historical necessity." The labor question—this is his conclusion—is "no mere bread and butter question." "What is it that has for decades inspired the great mass in this general conflict? It is, above all, the intense desire, on the part of the whole

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factory population, for a higher esteem and appreciation; also, in contradistinction to political equality, which is merely formal, it is a desire for practical social equality; it is the belief that, in spite of all obstacles, a better order of economic production is possible, and an instinctive feeling that the working class, just growing into independence, are destined to bring about this better order through the democratic pressure of the masses, who are already represented in Parliament. It is the ardent desire that they, in this approaching economic order, should be no longer merely the silently-obeying, mute, unthinking tools of a superior will, —not only obedient machines, but men who co-operate with force and originality, —not merely hands but also heads. It is the irrepressible longing for greater intellectual liberty, the demand for the benefits of education and knowledge, and for greater insight into the highest and deepest problems of the human soul."

"The social desires and dreams of that party," the author thinks, "should as little trouble the church as the concern for the maintenance of the present conditions and for the existence of the prevalent form of government. To the church and its ministers it is immaterial whether they work in a feudal, *laissez faire*, or socialistic state. The church does not exist for the state, but for the men who dwell in it. And, therefore, what does it matter to us, whether in the distant or near future the most radical socialistic state should arise, or the mobilization of all citizens in labor battalions should become an actual reality? Then we, 'Evangelical Ministers,' would also join their ranks; then we, too, would work our four or six hours in the factory, in the mines, upon the farm, and the remaining twenty hours of the day we would preach, like the apostles, the gospel of our Lord freely and forcibly to every one who would listen. But we are still far from the realization of that ideal. Our task is to reach a great aim, which is nearer to us, namely, to prevent Social-Democracy from becoming completely Anti-Christian. Through our efforts the principle must be realized, that a Social-Democrat may be a Christian, and a Christian a Social-Democrat."

This interesting and important work is distinguished by the objectivity of its treatment, and the specific Christian stand-point of the author will not keep any judicious person from enjoying the book. May it not only find other "tens of thousands" of readers, but may the author's appeal to his contemporaries and colleagues also meet with a hearty response. "I urgently entreat them," he says, "to follow my example, singly or with others, without disguise, and for no other purpose than to become familiar with the life of their poorer fellow-men, to learn their condition, their thoughts, their cares, and their desires; to show them by such sacrifice the love and esteem which is due to them, and in future, while filling the office of the ministry, to take their side earnestly and without prejudice, whenever they are in the right."

Another noteworthy essay upon the social question by an opponent of Social-Democracy is the "Open Letter," which Karl Jentsch addressed to the President von Kunowski, under the title "Wird das Elend siegen?" Leipzig, Eduard Baldamus, 1891 (49 S.), as an answer to his book "Wird die Socialdemokratie siegen?" The attention of those who favor the existing economic order is especially called to this essay.

G. VON GIZYCKI.

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DIE SOCIALE FRAGE EINE SITTLICHE FRAGE. Von Dr. Theobald Ziegler, Professor der Philosophie in Strassburg. Zweite Auflage. Stuttgart: G. I. Göschen. 1891. (183 S.)

This little book is one of the many happy signs that there is at present a desire to change the existing economic order, not only among the millions who personally suffer under it, but also among those who are favored by it; for the latter perceive that a change is necessary, and they are willing to do all in their power to help bring it about. The extent to which the ruling classes are willing to co-operate will determine whether the impending change will be accomplished peaceably or by force.

The author is one of those who really have sympathy with the "weary and heavy-laden," and who are aware that they are wronged, and that to help them is not an act of charity, but a duty and an obligation. He is, therefore, not a representative of class morality, and he is free from class prejudice. "We want a morality of the people and not a morality of the ruling class," he declares.

Professor Ziegler is a socialist, but not a social democrat. He says, "Our aim is to overcome egoistic individualism by an ethical socialism." And he does not seem to doubt that this aim will some time be reached, for he remarks, "The Socialists are not lacking in a faith which gives a blissful hope, nor without an ideal which inspires them with enthusiasm." We learn from history this one thing: "That faith and idealism have always been the strongest forces and have always succeeded in maintaining their cause." Professor Ziegler praises the social-democrats for their idealism, for their courage and resistance; but in his opinion they lack "the spirit of subordination and discipline, and respect for all things that are intellectual and sacred. Their utopias have two defects,—they have no historical sense and no insight into the human heart and its laws." Against Bellamy's idea that the prospect of material gain as a motive to public-spirited conduct should be abolished, he remarks, "This would only mean that, in the future, we should walk upon one leg, while heretofore we have used two; but the use of one leg is not walking, it is only hopping and hobbling." But Bellamy, in "Looking Backward," and in his weekly paper, *The New Nation*, has said many things which meet this objection. Professor Ziegler recommends "slow procedure and a gradual transformation." "To-day," he remarks, "the new national and social order, described in the book, would find a generation without any preparation or education for it, and would therefore necessarily contain from its very beginning the germs of death. Herein lies the weakness of all socialistic utopias, and the fundamental defect of proceeding from without to within, a course exclusively recommended and preferred by social democrats." But the danger of a new social order being introduced "in a night" is really very small. The power of individualism is still so great that the advance of socialism will necessarily take place gradually. To recognize and desire a good and to know that it can only be approached gradually are not antagonistic to one another.

This little work is divided into seven chapters, which treat of "Individualism and Socialism;" "Socialistic Utopias;" "The Way to Social Peace; "State and Church, Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism;" "The Family and Woman,—

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the Woman Question;" "Poverty and Charity, Luxury and Happiness;" "The Problem of our Population."

It concludes with an appeal to the feeling of responsibility in the reader. The author only intended to treat the moral side of the Social question, and he has, in fact, only partially done this, but, as far as he goes, we follow him with appreciation. We wish a wide circulation for the interesting little book.

G. v. G.

DIE ETHISCHE BEDEUTUNG DER FRAUENBEWEGUNG. Vortrag, gehalten am 30. Sept., 1889, in Erfurt, auf der 15. Generalversammlung des Allgemeinen Deutschen Frauenvereins. Von Helene Lange. Berlin: L. Oehmigke (R. Appelius), 1889. (23 S.)

The meritorious author, whose work on "Frauenbildung" * has met with general approval, shows in the excellent address before us the moral justification of the Woman's Rights Movement, still condemned from so many quarters. The entire change in this century of the facilities of earning a livelihood, and of the ways of living, leaves woman, for the first time, without protection in the struggle for existence, and compels her to encounter it with her own efforts. The necessary consequence of this is the emancipation of woman, giving her a position equal to that of man, investing her with human rights. This movement represents a great advance in civilization and the benefits it will yield are entirely beyond calculation. The highest moral ideal, namely, the development of a truly cultivated and independent personality, is no longer the exclusive privilege of man, and in consequence of this husband and wife will become companions and helpmeets in a higher sense than ever before, and woman will be better fitted for the task which modern times impose upon her as the educator of youth. The elevation of one-half of the human race raises the other half to a higher level. In no very distant time the good and righteous cause which the author represents will surely win a decided victory; and, first of all, the struggle for higher education, still denied to women in so many states, will be successful.

Let me take this opportunity to mention two other excellent writings of Fräulein Lange: "Rede zur Eröffnung der Realkurse für Frauen," Berlin, L. Oehmigke's Verlag (R. Appelius), 1889, 23 S., and, by the same publisher, "Die höhere Mädchenschule und ihre Bestimmung, Begleitschrift zu einer Petition an das preussiche Unterrichtsministerium an das preussiche Abgeordnetenhaus, 1888." (67 S.)

DIE STELLUNG DER FRAU IM ÖFFENTLICHEN LEBEN. Zwei Vorträge, gehalten von C. W. Kambli, Pfarrer in St. Gallen, St. Gallen und Leipzig: Yost, Kreutzer & Co., 1890. (68 S.)

The well-known clergyman of St. Gallen takes, in the main, the same point of view as Fräulein Lange. He is right in saying that, in treating this subject, the injurious effect of an uncritical worship of the letter of the Bible becomes evident and prevents a right understanding of its spirit. The Christian principle of

* An English edition has recently been published under the title "The Higher Education of Women in Europe," by Helene Lange. Translated by L. R. Klemm, Ph.D.

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the Fatherhood of God, which attributes an infinite value to each human soul, implies the equal rights of man and woman, a truth unfortunately not recognized by many Christians. It is true, says the author, woman has a specific calling in the family. But how many women there are who remain unmarried and are severed from all family connections. Should all their lives be counted failures? Then it would be better for them never to have been born. The only means of escaping this inevitable conclusion is to grant to woman an independent position in her relation to man, and to recognize that her life has a purpose of its own, in so far as this may be said of any human personality. The author calculates that in Germany there are five millions of unmarried women, who are obliged temporarily or permanently to gain their own livelihood, besides to some extent supporting others. What then is to be thought of the conscientiousness of those who intensify the struggle of women for existence, by excluding them from all remunerative occupation? "It is often alleged," the author says, "that the health of women would be threatened by extending their sphere of work; but so long as people look on unconcerned and see women ruining their health, working in mines, in factories, at sewing, as waitresses, and in the whirlpool of social pleasures, it can hardly be believed that any benevolent care would keep them from risking their health in any satisfactory and remunerative calling. Let it be openly confessed, it is the fear of competition that so often induces men, so far as they are able, to exclude women from new and especially intellectual callings." What gives man a better right to existence than woman? Is it might? In ethics might is not superior to right.

Women, it is said, are not able to pursue all kinds of callings. But woman's real capability, like that of human beings in general, can only be determined by practical test. Hence the author demands that all callings should be open to women. When they find they are not able to compete with men they will not try it. They will improve public life in so far as they participate in it. The author closes his valuable essay with the following words: "The emancipation of woman means no danger to man, but it will increase twofold the intellectual and spiritual power at the service of mankind."

G. v. G.

DER LUXUS NACH SEINER SITTLICHEN UND SOCIALEN BEDEUTUNG. Von C. W. Kambli, Pfarrer in St. Gallen. Frauenfeld: I. Huber, 1890. (208 S.)

This work of Pfarrer Kambli may be recommended. He has treated his subject in a judicious and exhaustive way. The author defines luxury in general as "the application of property beyond the limits of necessity to uses that give pleasure." Only narrow-mindedness, he says, can regard it absolutely as a sin. Luxury is a necessary result of civilization and an important factor in its progress. The author acknowledges that there is a refined and justifiable luxury which well befits even a Christian. He who has no sense for pleasure and joy, he declares, will be stunted in his spiritual life, and, although he may be proficient in science or business, he will be of no benefit to others. It is certainly the more urgent moral duty to warn against an excess of luxury than against the suppression of its justifiable enjoyment. The latter so accords with human nature that there is no danger that it will be neglected. Luxury becomes objectionable if it dis-

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regards the natural order of human wants, and seeks the merely pleasurable above what is necessary and salutary, if it serves pride and wantonness and causes a neglect of the welfare of others.

After discussing the opinions of ancient and modern writers on luxury, the author speaks of luxury in modes of living, in eating and drinking, in decoration and dress, in dwelling, etc., and then of the luxury of intellectual and social pleasures. G. v. G.

ENGLISH COLONIZATION AND EMPIRE. By Alfred Caldecott, M.A. London: Murray, 1891.

This is a volume of the "University Extension Manuals," edited by Professor Knight. The book is of course mainly historical, but it is a history written by one who is also a student of ethics. The ethical tone of it may be indicated by an extract with reference to the treatment of barbarous peoples by the English. "Looking back," says Mr. Caldecott, "over this whole history it does not appear satisfactory to our ideas of morality and humanity, to say nothing of Christian charity, for us to seek palliation or justification for our treatment of these nature-peoples, especially in America and Australia, by referring to the necessity for the survival of the fittest in the struggle for life. Man, as a spiritual being, cannot be judged by reference to the laws of the non-spiritual sphere of being. And that the spiritual principles of justice, kindness, and human brotherliness would have yielded different results is (1) certain on abstract principles, and (2) confirmed by many isolated instances, notably the brightest spot in all the history, the method of Penn and the Colonists of Pennsylvania, and (3) ratified by the comparative success in this century since higher principles have been both invoked and made effective. Where justice and charity have been combined, where courtesy and trust have been our weapons, even with high-spirited peoples, response has not been lacking on their part. The past is irrevocable, and in the future men must move on. Some of these peoples are plainly passing away: they are unable to live when called upon to make a sudden and almost a spasmodic effort to live in a higher stage of culture. But even for them it is not difficult to determine what should be our attitude. What is our conduct to the sick and dying among ourselves? all the alleviations and comforts we can think of are placed cheerfully at their disposal. Let it be so for these sick and dying tribes. Let us work gently *as in the sick-chamber*, and be ministers to their closing years in comfort, patience, and tenderness." This last remark seems to suggest a somewhat treacherous analogy. The book (as a whole) seems well adapted for its purpose, and will be of distinct interest to students of the philosophy of history.

J. S. M.

L'EVOLUTION JURIDIQUE DANS LES DIVERSES RACES HUMAINES. Par Ch. Letourneau, Secrétaire-général de la Société d'Anthropologie, Professeur à l'École d'Anthropologie. Paris: Secrosnier et Babé, 1891. Pp. 513.

Dr. Ch. Letourneau, professor in the School of Anthropology in Paris, attempts in his former works: "The Evolution of Morality" (1887), "The Evolution of Marriage and the Family" (1888), "The Evolution of Property" (1889),

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"Political Evolution in the various Human Races" (1890), and in his recent book, "Juridical Evolution," to reconstruct the scale of the moral development of mankind. For this purpose he utilizes the rich material of anthropological and sociological facts known at the present time, brings together and interprets the laws, institutions, customs, etc., of the various human races, beginning with the lowest, and does not omit at the end to rapidly forecast the moral future of man. In his last work the author first points out (chap. i.) "the origins of right," demonstrating its biological root, and describing its embryonic development. In the second chapter he sets forth the most rudimentary forms of right ("justice among republican tribes"). In the six following chapters he describes justice in the different monarchies (monarchical tribes, barbaric monarchies, large and small; justice in China).

The author next analyzes justice among the Berberic races (chap. ix.), among the Arabs (chap. x.), Hebraic justice (chap. xi.), justice in India and Persia (chap. xii.), justice in Greece (chap. xiii.), in ancient Rome (chaps. xiv., xv.), among the barbarous Aryans (chap. xvi.), then justice among the Germans (chap. xvii.), and, finally, feudal justice (chap. xviii.).

In the last chapter the author draws the conclusion which naturally follows the facts he has given: "The very imperfect sense of justice, actually prevailing to-day in the brains of most of those who have but little culture, is only a result of the life of their ancestors, a slow and painful acquisition, a psychical transformation, an idealization of the need of vengeance." (P. 488.)

This need manifested itself at first with continual regularity, in the form of retaliation, then in that of pecuniary compensation, which was given first to the injured person, then to the chief, the state. This last form of compensation did away with the primitive desire for vengeance, the individual having no longer any hope for material advantages for himself. When the state charged itself with the prosecution of crimes, the idea of abstract impersonal justice began to take shape in the minds of men. Henceforth it was organized society itself which took revenge, and not the injured individual.

The punishment of criminals is still to-day looked upon as social revenge. "Our tribunals," the author truly remarks, "have not ceased to regard themselves as more or less charged with a mission of revenge; our courts are still inspired by a vague sentiment of legal wrath, a feeble echo of the ancient *talion* of primitive races." But juridical evolution will not stop at this phase. The author foresees the time when the courts will no longer punish. "They will only do the work of social preservation and, if possible, of education." (P. 511.) The great importance and unquestionable usefulness of this book and of the works of Dr. Letourneau in general, consist in the abundance of historical and sociological material, in the enormous accumulation of facts which support the author's assertions and conclusions. His patient collection and judicious coordination of evidences will undoubtedly render a great service in the construction of ethical science. And, looked at from an ethical point of view, a more exact knowledge of the past morals of mankind will greatly increase faith in the possibility of attaining, in the future, a moral ideal that will be purer and more elevated than that which prevails at present. It is in this way that the ethical movement which comes to us from America—the great culture movement of

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our time—will be able to explain in history its actual success and the hope of its future victory. T. GAVANESCUL.

University of Tassy, Roumania.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THEOLOGY IN GERMANY SINCE KANT, AND ITS PROGRESS IN GREAT BRITAIN SINCE 1825. By Otto Pfleiderer, D.D., Professor of Theology in the University of Berlin. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co. Pp. xii., 403.

This work, as the general editor of the "Philosophical Library" points out, is not a translation in the ordinary sense. It was specially written for the series to which it belongs, and was produced first in English dress from the author's manuscript, under the most careful supervision. Naturally, in these circumstances, the highest expectations regarding it were raised, not only among philosophical students, but also in theological circles. Perhaps those anticipations were too high; certain it is they cannot be said to have been completely realized. Not that a scholar of Dr. Pfleiderer's power and skill has produced a work unworthy of his reputation. But, since his "*Religionsphilosophie*," we judge him by a standard which could be applied to few others. The expectation had been for a final work on this momentous period in the evolution of religious thought, —final, that is, for the present generation,—even although it was remarked that an absolutely final judgment could not yet be pronounced, the movement being still in progress. Taken as a whole, the book is partly satisfactory, partly unsatisfactory. In its wide learning and critical penetration, as in its luminous treatment of certain writers, it cannot soon be surpassed. The easy mastery with which our author threads his way among the tangled mazes of German theological thought is impressive, more especially in the Third Book, where Dr. Pfleiderer is on his own chosen ground of "Biblical and Historical Theology." His acute critical penetration, again, is seen in his criticism of Hegel, and in his fine appreciation of Schleiermacher's true historical position. Here, indeed, he is expounding once more his own relationship to those two writers. The explanation of the historical influence which ought to be accorded to the *Glaubenslehre* is admirable; it is not only of the highest interest, it is also thoroughly fair. The essential ethical element in religion here receives just the kind of recognition which we should have expected from the author of the clear monograph, "*Religion und Moral*." And we can only express disappointment that Dr. Pfleiderer did not continue the treatment here accorded to Schleiermacher in other cases. He has too frequently forgotten that the truest theologians must, in the first place, possess religious affinities. He often tends to set the head in authority over the heart, and thus to mistake, or rather to minimize, those with whom he is not in agreement. A current of this kind can, for example, be detected in his treatment of Christian von Hofmann (pp. 173–177). But once more, on the other side, his account of thinkers with whom he sympathizes is often admirable. A. E. Biedermann (pp. 137–145) is fully and fairly appreciated; so too, though in a lesser degree, is F. C. Baur; and Vatke also receives the recognition, which too few have been willing to accord him, even although, strangely enough, it is granted only within the limits of critical theology. In the English section, further, Maurice, T. H. Green, and Dr. John Caird receive just attention. The

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work, accordingly, must be regarded as of high value, partly on account of its author's intimate familiarity with the complex problem of German theology, and partly on account of the independent attitude which his eclecticism enables him to adopt. He is not irrevocably committed to any philosophical theory. But, as a result of this, the interest of the work on the grounds mentioned, is much more for the professed theologian than for the readers of a journal such as this. Yet, for the ethical worker, as for the theologian, it has some obvious defects which unfortunately detract from its value as the last word on the subject.

I have already hinted at Dr. Pfleiderer's tendency to pass over those with whom he cannot sympathize, those, principally, to whom the ethical element in religion, especially on the side of faith, appeals most. This is illustrated on a large scale in the ground plan of the book. There is too much selection, and even when the selections have been made, their subdivision is not always satisfactory. If there be one thing more than another that may be taken as proved by Dr. Pfleiderer, it is that since Hegel *all* German theology worthy of the name has been rational theology. Yet, in the course of the treatment, we find ourselves continually asking whether, as is professed, we are being presented with the actual development of this theological progress, or only with a limited series of instances which are regarded as eminently illustrative of it. The truth seems to be that Dr. Pfleiderer had not fully decided with himself which of the two courses to adopt. The result is that, unconsciously, he is swayed by his own preconceived ideas to choose the latter alternative when he supposes himself to be carrying out the former. Omissions are made, some men are forced into prominence, and others relegated to comparative obscurity in a manner which, if the title "Development" is to be retained, can only be called unsatisfactory. Why, to take some instances at a venture, should Stahl, Thomasius, and Baumgarten, among many others who might be named, be wholly suppressed? Surely Dr. Pfleiderer would hardly have us conclude that they were outside the development of rational theology. Nay, rather they were in its very midst. Was not Stahl the founder of a school, and is not his "*Philosophie des Rechts*" full of rational elements? Thomasius's "*Christ's Person and Work*" may have been "dogmatic," but his doctrine of κένωσις is highly "speculative," and had important results. While in Baumgarten's life have we not a microcosm of the development which had been proceeding in the macrocosm of which he was a part? And if it be unjustifiable to omit the Neo-Lutherans, the suppression of such mediating theologians as Beyschlag and Bunsen is equally unfortunate. So too, and in a special sense, is the absence of F. H. R. Frank, whose "*System der christlichen Wahrheit*" is—in opposition to the Neo-Kantian agnosticism—as "speculative," in the best meaning of the term, as it well could be. Passing from this, many will consider that too much importance is assigned to Biedermann. No theologian ever gave freer scope to the abstract and intellectual as opposed to the personal and ethical interests of theology; hardly any, if some fantastic extremists be excepted, ever divorced it more completely from the human elements on which religion ultimately depends. But Dr. Pfleiderer sympathizes with his freedom from dogmatic as distinct from philosophical presuppositions; hence the result. Finally, in this connection, the mere references to men of such importance as Baader (p. 145), Hüller (p. 124), Stade (p. 176), and Harnack (p. 299) are at once

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inadequate and tantalizing. It might no doubt be urged that, within the limits at disposal, it was impossible to discuss all writers. Were this the case, it would have been preferable to have altered the method, and to have abandoned any attempt to trace historical development in individuals, substituting for it a discussion of principles only, and using special writers in illustration of them. This would have obviated the somewhat curious subdivisions which, to take a case, result in the classification of the author of "*Stille Stunde*" with Strauss, Feuerbach, Biedermann, and Weisse. The great majority of these omissions in detail can easily be supplied in a second edition, and the work thus rendered at once worthier of its author's name, and fitter to fill an acknowledged gap in literature.

The one hundred pages devoted to the development of theology in Great Britain since 1825 are naturally full of interest. They enable us to see ourselves as others see us; and in this aspect of it they are luminous and remarkably well informed. But Dr. Pfleiderer obviously finds this part of his task by far the more difficult; and, as a consequence, his execution of it is not equal to his discussion of his own countrymen. To begin with, the method which he adopts constantly stands in his way. He devotes rather more than one-half of the space at his disposal to a review of "the schools of philosophy in their relation to theology." Now, however fruitful such an inquiry might be with respect to German theology, it is almost misleading when applied to English theologians. No doubt here, as in Germany, philosophy and theology overlap. But such are the social and educational conditions of the British people that the two do not necessarily stand in organic relationship with one another. Dr. Pfleiderer is continually puzzled by this, and his German attitude not infrequently places men and movements somewhat out of their proper perspective. He has failed to understand that theology is not taught in Britain as it is at the German universities, or, to take another parallel, as philosophy is at the Scottish universities. In England its chief professors and its most promising students are, *first*, members of the Anglican Church, or Unitarians, or, say, adherents of the Congregational churches, and, *secondarily*, theologians. In Scotland practically all theological professors and students are Presbyterians in the first place, and theologians afterwards. In other words, theology has certain ecclesiastical presuppositions, and is deeply affected by them, just as is German theology by its philosophical implications. Consequently, although Dr. Pfleiderer's review is in many respects remarkable, its results are distorted by non-appreciation of this fact. I find, for example, that fifteen pages (336–350), or about one-sixth of the entire discussion, are devoted to the elucidation of movements which have produced but one book that can be considered theological, and even this single volume is very largely philosophical. While, on the other hand, simply because they have no articulated relation to general philosophy, theological specialists like Plumptre, Mr. J. B. Crozier, Professors Dods, Milligan, and Salmond, and critical experts like Professors Cheyne, Sanday, and Driver,—in short, the men who make our theology,—are most of them not even referred to. To any one who is familiar with the living theology of Great Britain this is little short of absurd. And, even within the sphere of philosophical influence, where this has had clear effect in the formation of theological opinion, the names of Buckle, and, more remarkable, of

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Dr. A. M. Fairbairn are passed over. The Cambridge school, led by Lightfoot, which has done so much for New Testament inquiry, does not suffer this complete extinction. But it is strange to the English mind to learn that Lightfoot's fame, or, rather, want of it, rests exclusively upon some ephemeral contributions to the *Contemporary Review*, which were called forth by a long-since discredited work. Dr. Pfleiderer's want of living contact with the conditions of English theological thought is nowhere more aptly illustrated than in the closing sentences of his book. "The place where Green and Hatch labored and cast the light of philosophical and historical knowledge cannot fall back again into the night of the Middle Ages. The days of a Newman and a Pusey are forever past for Oxford and for England." "*Lux Mundi*" and "*Science and the Faith*" made almost immediate reply to this prophecy, a reply which affords very ample food for reflection to those who would chronicle the development of theology in Great Britain. "The High Church bees had carried off the honey from Green's hive."

R. M. WENLEY.

DIE LEBENSANSCHAUUNG DER GROSSEN DENKERN: EINE ENTWICKLUNSGESCHICHTE DES LEBENSPROBLEM DER MENSCHHEIT VON PLATO BIS ZUR GEGENWART. Von Rudolf Eucken. Leipzig, 1890. 490. S.

When the logical premises of the Hegelian system were abandoned, important changes necessarily followed in that field, so successfully cultivated by the Hegelian school,—the history of philosophy. It was impossible henceforth to treat the development of philosophical thought merely as a logical-metaphysical process evolving by an inherent necessity. Though recognizing an inner necessity and sequence in the development of philosophy, it was nevertheless observed that its development was brought about by men, and that these men might have been influenced by other than logical motives in forming their individual theories of the universe. Especially the most general conceptions of the worth of life, of the place of man in the world, of his relation to God and to his fellow-men, thought in part illogical, were recognized as very important preliminary conditions, and consequently as factors of the highest significance in the building up of systems of philosophy. An exhaustive presentation of them is the skilfully-executed task of the work under consideration. Let us not be misunderstood. It is not the author's opinion that the development of philosophy should be explained by the purely subjective moods in which the thinkers have framed their theories of the world, instead of by the strictly logical method of treatment formerly in vogue. Just herein lies the value of the book, that it shows how these apparently subjective moods, especially of the greatest thinkers, result from the solution of universal problems; how general convictions concerning man and the universe are caused by the ethical problems which are peculiar to each time, and which, upon high penalty, must be solved; how from this point of view the great systems are to be regarded as the different methods which men have employed in order to solve the ethical problems before them. On the other hand, this work shows that there never has been any problem of vital importance which has not received expression in the fundamental ethical principles of each great system. In this light the history of philosophy appears

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as the quintessence not only of the scientific but of the entire mental life of mankind.

The gravest fault we have to anticipate is that the author limits himself to a consideration of the great systems. Although the treatment is thus simplified, the greater interest of the reader to learn about all the various ramifications and transitions of philosophy, which appear with each new formulation of the problems of life, remains unsatisfied by this book. We hope to see an equally thorough treatment of this phase of the subject. This hope is justified by the fact that the only chapter which goes somewhat more into detail—"The Reconciliation of Christianity with Hellenism"—is by far the most successful and interesting of all.

Objection might perhaps be made to the author's attempt to establish for our time a distinction between "the new" and "the modern," or if not against the distinction itself, yet against the way in which it is carried out. It is only possible to consider these forces,—"the new" and "the modern" as parallel currents, if we regard the spirit of criticism as the specific criterion of the "modern" mind. But neither is this possible, nor does the spirit of criticism fully characterize the modern mind, if it is to be distinguished at all from "the new." Equally objectionable is the pessimism expressed at the conclusion, which, in my opinion, does not do justice to the scientific work of the present time. But since these slight objections are all that we have to bring against the book, after reading it, we shall not make a mistake in declaring it to be a very valuable treatise upon the history of philosophy, especially of its ethical features, and we desire to express to the author our sincere thanks for much instruction and inspiration.

PAUL HENSEL.

Strassburg University.

SYSTEM DER ETHIK, MIT EINEM UMRISS DER STAATS UND GESELLSCHAFTSLEHRE Von Friedrich Paulsen, a.o. Professor an der Universität Berlin. Zweite verbesserte Auflage. Berlin: Wilhelm Hertz, 1891. Pp. xvi. 907.

The second edition of Professor Paulsen's Ethics, the first of which was discussed in vol. i., No. 1, p. 124 of this journal, shows, so far as I have noticed, no essential deviation in any direction from the stand-point taken in the first edition.

In this edition this excellent and valuable work has been better finished in its details, and some parts have been more fully elaborated. As the author points out in his preface, the second book has been thoroughly revised and its fundamental conceptions have been more precisely stated. But the changes made will not, as it seems to me, modify the judgment passed on the first edition. It might be called a Theodicy in a grand style, since it endeavors to show that there always has been and is "a soul of goodness in things evil." If we take into account, furthermore, the author's belief that mankind as a whole neither grows happier nor better, we need not be surprised at the conservative tone which runs through the whole work. The book shows only slight indications of the warmth and passion of an ethical reformer.

In the first edition there were wanting, as it seems to me, two important chapters: One upon the "Ethics of Belief," expounded to us so forcibly by the late

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lamented Clifford, and another upon "Duties towards Animals." Professor Paulsen has not deemed it necessary to supply this omission. He defends with great vigor his fundamental ethical theory, which he calls teleological, both against hedonistic utilitarianism and intuitional formalism. His criticism of hedonism is indeed one of the best that I have seen, yet he does not seem to me to have made good his objections against it.

The author firmly maintains the opinion that morality is essentially connected with religion,—that is to say, with faith in a transcendental world. According to him, religious indifference results from a defect in spiritual development, which he, like Rousseau, especially attributes to city life. He believes that "the best minds always have been and will be the most receptive to religious impressions." A people cannot, in his opinion, live without religion. But "religion can have no permanent existence if it contradicts the fundamental conceptions of science." Professor Paulsen casually observes (page 398, note) that the Societies for Ethical Culture are the realization of the idea, outlined in Benjamin Franklin's autobiography of a "united party for virtue;" yet he overlooks the fact that Franklin's creed begins with the words: "There is one God, who made all things. That He governs the world by His providence; that He ought to be worshipped by adoration, prayers, and thanksgiving,"—whereas the Ethical Societies do not require any such profession.

This interesting and instructive work will undoubtedly find an increasing number of readers and admirers. G. v. G.

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VIERTELJAHRSSCHRIFT FÜR WISSENSCHAFTLICHE PHILOSOPHIE. XVI. Jahrgang. Erstes Heft.

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December, 1891.

"The Rights of Capital and Labor." *Blackwood's Magazine.*

"The Religious Opinions of Robert Browning." Mrs. Sutherland Orr. *Contemporary Review.*

"Phases of Crime in Paris." Hughes Le Roux. *Fortnightly Review.*

"Browning's Life and Teachings." *London Quarterly Review.*

"The Provident Side of Trades Unionism." George Howell. *New Review.*

"The Drink Question and Legislation." W. S. Caine. *Welsh Review.*

"Effects of the Doctrine of Evolution on Religious Ideas." Richard Crosbie. *Westminster Review.*

January, 1892.

"Dr. Hertzka's 'Freeland.'" Arthur Ransom. *Seed-Time.*

"The Idea of Value." S. Alexander. *Mind.*

"Mutual Aid among the Barbarians." Prince Krapotkin. *Nineteenth Century.*

"Man, East and West." Rev. Samuel A. Barnett. *Nineteenth Century.*

"Mazzini's Political Philosophy." Rev. A. Chandler. *Economic Review.*

"The Church and Labour Problems." Various writers. *Review of the Church.*

February, 1892.

"The Labour Platform. New Style." Tom Mann. *New Review.*
" " " " " Ben Tillett. *New Review.*

ERRATA. Vol. II.

Page 176, ninth line from top, for "better" read "both."

Page 264, twelfth line from top, for "Carlyle at bottom is Puritan," read "Carlyle, at bottom a Puritan."

Page 267, nineteenth line from top, for "dealt" read "dwelt."

Page 268, eighth line from bottom, for "talent" read "latent."

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SCHOOL OF APPLIED ETHICS.

The Second Annual Session of the School of Applied Ethics will open at Plymouth, Mass., Wednesday, July 6, and continue six weeks. We can make at present only a general announcement of the course of lectures to be given.

I. ECONOMICS.—In this department there will be the following courses: Changes in Theory of Political Economy since Mill, Professor H. C. Adams, University of Michigan; Theory of Social Progress, Professor F. H. Giddings, Bryn Mawr College; Function of Philanthropy in Social Progress, Father Huntington, of New York, and Miss Addams, of Chicago; Function of Law in Social Progress, Professor F. W. Taussig, Harvard University; Statistical Presentation of Industrial and Social Questions, Hon. Carroll D. Wright, Commissioner of Labor, Washington, D. C.; Critical Study of the Labor Problem and the Monopoly Problem, Professor H. C. Adams.

II. HISTORY OF RELIGIONS.—In this department the week-day lectures will be devoted to the study of the religious ideas of the Hebrews. There will be six courses, of five lectures each, as follows: The Prophets, by Professor Moore, of Andover; Persian Influence on Judaism, by Dr. Jackson, of Columbia College; The Ritual Law, by Professor Jastrow, of the University of Pennsylvania; The Psalms, by Dr. Peters, of New York; The Wisdom-books, by Professor Toy, of Harvard University; The Talmud, by Dr. Hirsch, of Chicago. The Sunday afternoon lectures will deal in general with the relation of religion to the social questions of the day.

III. ETHICS.—The principal course in this department will be given by William Wallace, M. A. Whyte's Professor of Moral Philosophy at Oxford, England. It will consist of fifteen lectures on Variations of the Moral Standard, illustrated by the History of Ethical Theories. The shorter courses will probably include an historical treatment of the Relation of Church and State by Professor Burgess, of Columbia College; the Temperance Question; the Idea of Justice; and the Moral Evolution of our Political Institutions.

S. BURNS WESTON, *Secretary*,
118 South Twelfth Street, Philadelphia.

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INTERNATIONAL

JOURNAL OF ETHICS.

JULY, 1892.

NATURAL SELECTION IN MORALS.*

In the battle of Darwinism the point of hottest fighting has shifted from the world of nature to the world of man. In the natural sciences the theory has won all along the line. No one disputes that natural selection can account in part for the origin of species. The conflict amongst the scientists which is raging at the present moment is a conflict amongst the conquerors themselves: between those who adhere in the main to the original doctrine and those who would be more Darwinian than Darwin himself, who assert that not only is natural selection one cause of the origin and development of species, but that it is the only and sufficient cause, and that the other causes which Darwin admitted, as the transmission of acquired habits, of the effects of use and disuse, are of no influence in themselves. But directly we extend the idea to human action, to ethics and to politics, we encounter a mass of opposition, and, as I shall endeavor to show, of prejudiced opposition. This opposition is sometimes concealed. Evolution, which is the popular synonym for Darwinism, is an idea which has become a commonplace throughout all thinking, and the word slips glibly off the tongue. Who would deny that there is evolu-

* A lecture delivered before the Ethical Societies of Cambridge and London. The form of the lecture has been left unaltered.

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tion in morals, in society, in art, in religion? But this concession is often no more than appearance; for if evolution is understood to mean only development in general, it means something far less than the doctrine associated with the names of Darwin and Mr. Wallace in science, and of Mr. Herbert Spencer in philosophy. In a very interesting series of essays published lately, a well-known critic (Mr. J. A. Symonds) has eagerly confessed himself an evolutionist, and has justified his confession by proving that there has been a gradual development in the forms and the animating ideas of literature. But, if Darwin had done nothing more than to demonstrate the progressive development of organic forms, his theory would hardly be entitled to the claim of originality, and would hardly have effected the revolution it has effected. The central point of that theory is the idea of natural selection, and it is for this reason that I have emphasized the point in the title I have chosen for this lecture. But natural selection, the theory of the struggle for existence, in spite of Mr. Spencer's advocacy, and perhaps partly because of that advocacy, encounters, when extended to morals and society, persistent opposition.

The grounds of this opposition are very various. To some minds any attempt at an explanation of moral ideas which seems to class them along with plants and animals is repugnant, because it seems to deprive moral distinctions of their value and sanctity. All the forces which have always been arrayed against the derivation of moral ideas from experience of pleasure and pain, from calculation of public advantage, are active against the latest and most thoroughgoing of the naturalistic solutions. It is so easy to ascribe a peculiar origin to deeply-rooted habits of thinking and acting, and so natural to be timid lest any explanation should undermine them. But there are others not less averse, who are not thus timid, who hold the faith that nothing valuable in action can be injured by clear and honest thought, and that conversely no evidence scientifically employed can discredit other evidence equally scientific. The doctrine of natural selection seems to many such to be a cruel and heartless doctrine, to reduce human life to a succession of internecine conflicts.

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"Nature red in tooth and claw" is thought to be the lesson of evolution everywhere. The teachers of the doctrine have been themselves to blame for this belief. I have said that the repugnance to evolution was partly in consequence of the advocacy of Mr. Herbert Spencer. Mr. Spencer has associated his name in politics with the most violent assertion of individualism; he has set his face against any attempt of society to save its members from their own weakness, and he has done so on the ground of the truth of natural selection. Professor Huxley, in season and out of season, preaches the gospel that all our success is a struggle for existence amongst individuals, so that in the competition it is the weaker who go to the wall, and it is implied justly. It is no wonder that competition pure and simple is identified with natural selection, when we know that the Malthusian doctrine was one of the things which suggested to Darwin himself his theory. Now from competition, which is thus identified with natural selection, the feelings of the age are becoming more and more estranged. The determination not to leave people to their follies and their vices, to their lack of strength and intelligence, is becoming more and more dominant, and society is interfering at every point like a philanthropist. Instead of asking, as they once asked, how is the intense spirit of competition to be checked? moderate men ask themselves, how are we to prevent society from rushing headlong into a general socialism? how are we to ensure the liberty for the individual to live for himself and to neglect others? It is this spirit, making for co-operation and help to the weaker, which thinks that it is confronted in natural selection with a doctrine of cruelty and selfishness, which would justify the evils produced by competition and the miseries incident to weak natures. There is also another ground of opposition. Many persons nowadays are pessimists. There is less pessimism, perhaps, in England than in some other countries. People who live in a bracing social atmosphere, and who have plenty of work to do, have no time to be pessimists. Still there is a very large number of persons who ask themselves, What is the use of this perpetual conflict and its misery, and what is the value of life, if every effort

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means only fresh struggle, and there is apparently no end to the history of human evil? It is these practical questions which make it important to discuss the question of natural selection in a society like this, which I know repudiates any weak-minded attempt to dissociate practical interests from scientific theory; and this practical importance must be my excuse for choosing a subject of a less directly practical character. Holding strongly the doctrine that natural selection is in morals and politics as illuminating as it is in the animal or vegetable world, I believe the opposition to it is founded upon misconceptions. I shall try to show first that it operates, and how, and then I shall point out what the differences between its operation here and in nature are, and how from a misunderstanding both of its mode of operation and of these differences the misconceptions arise which provoke antagonism to it.

What is Natural Selection? The title-page of Darwin's work contains his theory in a few words, "On the Origin of Species by means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favored Races in the Struggle for Life." The shortest explanation suffices to recall to you a theory so well known. A species produces many varieties different from one another and from the parent species. These varieties compete with one another and with the parent species. Certain of them, in virtue of their character, are better able, under the circumstances in which they are placed, to obtain food and propagate their kind. These particular varieties persist. The rest are exterminated either directly at the hands of their competitors, or indirectly because they cannot obtain food. Darwin did not know how the original variations arose upon which natural selection thus operates, and therefore he called them accidental variations. It is an entire misunderstanding to suppose that these variations are the result of mere chance. Accident in the scientific sense means unexplained causation; the word indicates our ignorance of the cause, not the absence of any cause. At the present day a theory is offered of how those variations arose, and the *lacuna* in Darwin's theory may be filled. Before we go on to verify the operation of the same cause in morals, let us first recall how Darwin led up to his

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great discovery. It is an old story; but it is a story which tells us how simply and with what directness genius works. Darwin showed how breeders select for some reason, of fancy, or other, a particular character, and develop it by pairing together individuals which possess it to a remarkable degree: how the pigeon-fancier wishing to get a pigeon with a large crop selects individuals which already have well-developed crops and pairs them, leaving the rest unpaired, and by thus accumulating this character through successive generations obtains the pouter. No facts could have been better known; the discovery lay in interpreting the facts in a particular way. The will of the breeder acts as the cause which favors one set of individuals to the exclusion of others. Apply this idea to nature; the will of the breeder is now replaced by the natural conflict of the varieties in order to discover which is the better fitted under the conditions, and we have the phenomenon of natural selection.

If we would see, then, how natural selection operates in morals, let us follow Darwin's example, and, instead of inquiring in general into the origin of moral distinctions, let us watch an instance in which ideas about conduct are being changed under our own eyes in what we call reform. Moral ideas, it will be admitted, are sentiments which incline us to certain courses of action in preference to other courses; for example, the idea that it is wrong to steal is a feeling which prompts us to leave others undisturbed in the possession of their property. In general, moral ideas are the feelings which attach to certain observances, and reject observances which contradict the first. For us it is very difficult, when we think of moral ideas as such, not to put a great deal of reflection into our notions, because when we talk about moral ideas we are not in the same position as when we merely act upon them: we begin to theorize at once. Now, it is plain that to get a true account of how our ideas grow we should try to put ourselves as far as we can into the state of mind in which we act. And we should remember that in early times life consists almost entirely of customs performed without reflection, and that this is true also of the greater part of our own lives. So

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that we must try to keep our observations as simple as possible. We might take an example of reform in some fashion of clothes, which also is a reform in conduct, or we might watch with more profit the growth of a political reform. All I mean is, that if we watch a reform which can be called moral, we must be careful not to prejudice our observation by supposing that it is settled beforehand what is right and what is wrong. We must simply state what happens, and what happens, whether in a change of fashion, or a political change, like the adoption of local option, or in a more strictly moral change, such as the repression of cruelty to animals, or the enfranchisement of women, or the growth of friendliness towards foreigners, is much the same in all cases. Political reforms are, perhaps, the easiest cases to observe, for in politics we have very palpable changes; in moral sentiments changes are often very slight, and only appreciable to a very sensitive mind. Politics act as a kind of microscope for observing moral phenomena. But in all cases of reform we have something of the following kind. A person arises (or a few persons), whose feelings, modified by more or less deliberate reflection, incline him to a new course of conduct. He dislikes cruelty or discourtesy, or he objects to seeing women with inferior freedom, or to the unlimited opportunity of intoxication. He may stand alone and with only a few friends to support him. His proposal may excite ridicule or scorn or hatred; and if he is a great reformer, he may endure hardship and obloquy, or even death at the hands of the great body of persons whom he offends. By degrees his ideas spread more and more; people discover that they have similar leanings; they are persuaded by him; their previous antagonism to his proposals is replaced by attachment to the new mode of conduct, the new political institution. The new ideas gather every day fresh strength, until at last they occupy the minds of a majority of persons, or even of nearly all. Some have been convinced, others who formerly opposed are dead, new and younger individuals embrace the new sentiments, and perhaps it is on the young that the reformer's hopes are built. Harvey said that no men over forty were convinced of the circulation of the

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blood. A kind of revulsion of feeling has taken place. In politics we may see a statesman educating his party, a reform suggested by an insignificant minority winning force in the county till it is strong enough to obtain that legislative sanction to which both parties in the State are habitually loyal. Now observe that when this change of sentiment about conduct has arisen, a new demarcation has taken place between what is politically or morally good or bad. The reform when first proposed was decried. When it is carried, the few who are unprepared to obey its commands are the objects of disapprobation. Those who follow the new custom are good, those who still oppose are called bad; or in politics, the first are loyal, the second disloyal. People do not always accept the change because they approve it, but when they find that it is approved by the majority, they agree to it, too. And every new change thus slightly or greatly alters the boundary line. In comparatively inconsiderable reforms, such as some of those mentioned, this new distinction of good from bad will not divide the society into classes markedly different. Most of those who were called good before will have accepted the new observances. But there *is* a change in the standard of what is good, and the line between good and bad conduct is differently drawn. And there will always be a certain number of actions done which conflict with the new standard, but are consistent with the old,—just as we may see to-day with our own eyes how the less advanced members of a political party drop away from their fellows, and by degrees attach themselves to the antagonistic party. Only it will be remembered that a party distinction in politics is not a distinction of good and evil, though the new demarcation of party illustrates the new demarcation of good from evil.

It need hardly be observed that great moral revolutions, such as, for instance, the morality of Christianity, repeat the same story, with greatly accentuated features: the arising of the new sentiments, the derision of the reformer, his suffering, the extension of his teaching from his disciples to a wider society, its final victory, and a new standard of conduct established. Nor is there anything in the description given of how

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changes in conduct are produced, which is not matter of the commonest observation. It was necessary to describe these simple facts, because if we are to venture a theory as to the origin of distinctions of right and wrong we must observe without prejudice the cases where we can see these distinctions in the making. And now observe how this process, thus described, is the process of natural selection going on within the community. The reformer is the new variety, or rather, to speak more properly, he represents a plan of conduct which is a variation from the original and generally accepted plan. He modifies existing conduct by extending to foreigners the courtesy which is the acknowledged right of a fellow-citizen, or he will accord to women the same privileges of education, of industrial employment, of political rights, which belong to men. Why the reformer comes to exist, why this change of sentiments should once arise, is a question difficult to answer, and therefore we might speak of him as an accidental variation; though we should have no doubt that if his antecedents and his circumstances could be known, we should find the clue to his character, and though in certain cases we can perfectly well see how different strains of feeling or reflection blending in a given person's mind produce a new result, in the same way as a child differs from his parents, because in him the qualities of each parent are modified by those of the other. But given the reformers, this new plan of life grows by extrusion of its rivals; the men with whom the reformer comes into antagonism represent ideals of conducting life in which his sentiments find no place. Gradually these men's minds yield to the influence of the new ideas; their old plans of life disappear, and they confess their adherence to the new ideals. This repeats precisely the process which is called in the natural world the struggle for survival. The old unmodified or unrevolutionized plans of life succumb, being abandoned by their professors. The means by which this substitution is effected are persuasion and education. Persuasion and suggestion mean the implanting of one man's ideas and feelings into the soil of another man's mind, from which all contradictory ideas and feelings are weeded out. Education is but a systematic

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form of persuasion. How rapidly the victory of the reform on the old habits of life and action shall take place will depend partly on the receptivity of others for the new ideas; in other words, on the low or high vitality of the old ideas. But partly it will depend on the original numerical strength of the reforming minds. This is a point of importance. In the animal world a variety represented by only one or two individuals has little or no chance of ultimate success. In the world of man, a reformer is usually a person who, being a little ahead of many of his contemporaries, strikes out a scheme for which their minds are already prepared. For it is a commonplace that reforms are not isolated phenomena; they grow out of a need which is felt widely, but felt dimly; the reformer is he who can see clearly what others see darkly, and thus the reform, when proclaimed, becomes the adopted standard of many. In some periods a new sentiment is so widely spread that the reformer appears but as a man who has caught and rendered palpable something of which the atmosphere was full. The reformer and those who work with him thus represent a variety of conduct, with a certain numerical strength, and this variety overcomes and extirpates by persuasion or education the old type of conduct. And it has to struggle not only with representatives of the old or parent type, but with other varieties on a level with itself. For the reformer does not stand alone. A certain need being felt, many persons are ready with other proposals of change. When any change is about to take place, the atmosphere is full of change. The true reformer is only distinguished from his competitors in that his idea has vitality, is really suited to the needs which are felt, and his experiment succeeds while theirs fail. Here, then, in the successful reform is the growth of a new variety, the fitness of which is testified by its expelling its rivals. By the gradual accumulation of small changes in conduct, or minute changes in sentiment which issue in conduct hardly definitely distinguishable from the old, a new species of observance like the moral code of Christianity is established. Now the establishment of this new species, the success of the new reform, is indicated by declaring the conduct comprised under this reform

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to be good, and antagonistic conduct to be bad. Here, then, we see how a process reproducing the natural process of the struggle for existence results in the creation of a fresh distinction of good from evil, and we infer that this distinction is the name we give to the victory won by one plan of human conduct over its competitors.

Before going on to further explanation, let me obviate a possible misconception. The victory of the reformer over his opponents creates, as we see, a new division of good from evil, and we are entitled to conclude that this cardinal human distinction is the result of a process of struggle, the combatants in which change from age to age, as humanity proceeds to ever new forms of moral life. But no one is entitled to conclude from this phenomenon that the success of a moral ideal is the reason why we call it good. This would be very like saying that the reason why the single-toed horse is a better animal, is better adapted to present conditions than the three-toed horse of the tertiary period, is that the one-toed horse has beaten the three-toed horse out of the field. On the contrary, the success of the first is not the cause of his superiority, but the proof of it. The cause of his success is that he has one toe to each foot instead of three. The mammoth's defeat in the struggle for life is not the cause of his want of adaptation to his condition, but the reverse is the case; he was beaten because he was too big to get food enough. In the same way a new plan of life is not made good because it succeeds; its success is the stamp, the *imprimatur* affixed to it by the course of history, the sign that it is good. It succeeds because it possesses certain characters by which it appeals more to the minds of men than other plans of life. The fashion-maker succeeds because his fashion tickles the taste of his customers; the politician carries his bill because he wants to enforce certain observances which other people also want to enforce; the moral reformer succeeds because he enjoins courtesy or tenderness, and the want of courtesy and tenderness shocks the persons for whom he legislates. It is not my business at this time to point out what common characteristics are possessed by all ideals which are to succeed,

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and are therefore to be marked with the appellation of goodness. Probably very few would wish to controvert the position that that common characteristic consists in that such a plan of life is adapted to the conditions of existence; that under it the society reacts without friction upon its surroundings, or, as I should prefer to say, that in the conditions in which it is placed society can with this ideal so live that no part of it shall encroach upon the rest, that the society can be in equilibrium with itself. But whichever of these positions we may choose to adopt, the point I am maintaining remains the same. The struggle by which the distinctions of morality grow and alter, the natural selection of moral ideas, represents only the play of the forces by which the distinctions are established; the phrase describes the mechanism by which ideals prevail; it indicates that the test of goodness is that goodness shall endure the trial of strength. But it is the strength of the ideal, as determined by its character, which is the cause of its success, and that strength operates by the process of natural selection, by so monopolizing the field that rivals are destroyed or perish.

Let us return to the process itself as exhibited in morals. The struggle, we have seen, is a struggle of plans of conduct and of ideals, of proposals for carrying on society in certain ways. I have had some difficulty in accurately describing it, because, of course, plans of life have no outward existence of their own; they live in the minds of those who propose them, or act upon them. But if we should say, without further qualification, that natural selection in morals means a struggle among persons or among states, we should be guilty of misstatement, and we should miss the very point which gives its peculiar character to natural selection as it exists in man, the overlooking of which point is the source of all misconceptions which create against the idea so vehement a prejudice. The authors of great reforms often perish without seeing their wish fulfilled; the world which was not worthy of them may even in its anger destroy them. But the animal which did not live to propagate its species would have no chance of establishing a new species. In the animal world, rivals are exterminated,

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or perish from inanition. But the reformer does not desire the destruction of his enemies; he desires to preserve them and attach them to his side; even Mahomet (though he enforced his gospel with the sword) was satisfied with conquest, and did not desire extermination. Persuasion and education, in fact, without destruction, replace here the process of propagation of its own species and destruction of the rival ones, by which in the natural world species become numerically strong and persistent. This leads us to assume that even when a reformer like Savonarola or Christ is destroyed, it is not his destruction which corresponds to the destruction of a casual member of the successful society in its struggle with its competitor; what corresponds to the last process is the obloquy heaped upon him while he is alive, and the antagonism which keeps him under without destroying him. The reason of all this is, that we are dealing here not with animals as such, but with minds. The victory of mind over mind consists in persuasion. I hope no one here will imagine that in the year 1892 I am assuming that a mind can act independently of a brain, and is, therefore, exempt from the laws of the animal world. But we know the difference between two brains of equal power, of which the one has, by opportunity, acquired knowledge, and the other has not. Within certain limits the minds of men may become changed, because, as the physiologists tell us, there is room in the myriad cells and fibres for storing up new ideas, which also modify the feelings. And thus a man without losing his life may take on a new life of ideas and feeling. Now, in calling natural selection in ethics a struggle of ideals, I am trying to represent shortly and compendiously this possibility of life, growth, and alteration of people's minds through the spontaneous or artificial production of new ideas, and above all, to emphasize the truth, that the struggle here does not imply the destruction of the person who opposes the reformer, but implies the suppression, or let us say destruction, of those sentiments in him which are antagonistic to the sentiments of the reformer. Persuasion, I said above, corresponds to the extermination of the rivals. Education corresponds to that propagation of offspring which

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is accompanied by inheritance of the parents' characteristics. The spread of human institutions uses positive means in order to attach, not negative means in order to destroy. Only when the existence of the human being as such is incompatible with the persistence of moral observances is his life actually destroyed. It is in this sense, then, that natural selection works in transforming and creating moral ideals. These moral ideals consist, I repeat, in certain habitual modes of action, and in the sentiments which prompt them. Sentiments of conduct, plans of life, ideals of conduct—all these are convertible expressions. The name "ideal" is of all the most convenient, because it indicates the fact that in acting morally, in habitual moral conduct, we are not creatures of mere blind impulse, but directly or indirectly are aware of what we do, or have before our minds the idea of our action. It must not be taken as equivalent to those ideals which are thought to be, and really are, in their nature unattainable. On the contrary, every man acts upon a plan of life, though he may never have formed a reflective idea of what that plan is. His character stands for certain actions, for certain observances; it represents, let us say, a certain ideal of life.

Let us note a characteristic of these ideals which will serve further to explain their power of winning adherents, and of conversion. They are social ideals. Not that any one in pursuing a plan of life proposes it to himself as for the good of his society. The author of a great reform may do so, but in general we do not think of society as such until we begin to reflect and theorize,—in other words, till we talk about our ideals, for when we talk we theorize. Still, though no idea of the effect of any action upon society may enter into my plan of life, that plan is still a social ideal. It is a plan of how I, placed as I am with my connections and relations to others, am to act; and however self-centred my ideal may be, it is one which has to fit in, in some way or other, with the ideals of others. For no man stands alone: but even his mere animal wants prove him to depend on others, and education does the rest, in teaching him to respect the rights and feelings of others. Moreover, no man starts alone; we are not

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born on desert islands and transplanted at manhood into the world, but into a world of living persons; and Lear says that then we cry, that we are come to this great stage of fools. And so a man may be as egoistic as he pleases, and as different from others as possible, yet somehow his conduct is adjusted to the claims of others as well, and as the most of us are not placed in difficult situations, we find our education carries us comfortably along. And indeed there must be few men who do not think directly and consciously of the welfare of a few who stand nearest to them. In fact, all the members of a society obey the institutions of that society, which have been struck out by experiment, by this process of natural selection, in the endeavor to do justice to the wants of all, and harmonize their claims. We may then press the analogy of moral ideals to animal species a little further, and may call the build of the society as a whole the genus of which individual citizens represent separate specimens. These specimens vary very much among themselves, because the constitution of society arises out of the conflicting claims of its many members, and so each person has his own special modes of living. He has to a large extent the same inclinations as others; but even here he has special tastes, and besides the common wants of mankind, he has aptitudes and gifts which may be entirely confined to himself, and society strives to make the most of all the different gifts of its members. So then society represents a kind of class, of which each single person is a member, and because each person's plan of life is social, it appeals to the sentiments of the rest. Even a mere egoistic plan of life which seeks to gratify ordinary self-regarding inclinations, appeals to the similar feelings of others, and so far establishes a kind of community between them. But there is more than this. A man's life is not merely similar to those of others, but actually joins them at various points, because of the ties which bind man to man. And so the ideal of one man not only can be appreciated by another, but actually implies the existence of that other, and embraces their lives in a partnership, in which each plays a different part, but each depends upon the other. The victorious ideal, therefore, while

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destroying rival ideals, not only aims at preserving the life of the person whose ideal it destroys by reforming his character, but actually needs his preservation, because the very existence of a moral ideal requires his co-operation.

The characteristic which I have pointed out in human selection is so important,—the characteristic that the process is primarily a matter of persuasion and education, and not of actual destruction of life,—that I will endeavor to enforce it by a reference to two more practical considerations. It is difficult to fix the point at which persuasion begins to be possible, and destruction of the individual ceases to be necessary. In the history of toleration we can actually see the emancipation of human selection from all contamination of the methods of animal selection. Toleration is an invention of the end of the seventeenth century. Before that time no one dreamt of allowing another man to remain in possession of different religious opinions from those which were dominant. They were deemed incompatible with the security of society. Catholic persecuted Protestant, and Protestant Catholic; even in the seventeenth century in England, toleration was only an idea of a few Independents like Cromwell. But first destruction of life ceased, and was replaced by fines, until now we leave each man free to profess what religion he pleases, and if he pleases, none. In other words, we have left opinions to their own unaided strength; if they can persuade and proselytize, they may; and may by such struggle of ideas drive their rivals from the field if they can. Only they may not employ the arms of primitive life, nor yet the more refined and perhaps pettier oppression used by a more advanced civilization. We are half animals, half men, and only by slow degrees do we put off the habits which belong to us of descent, in favor of the new acquisitions which are the privileges of our humanity. Nor do we alter our methods in principle: we give them a new character in their application to higher needs.

A second illustration may be found in inquiring into the nature of punishment—an inquiry which is not so completely theoretical as it may seem. It is at least valuable to have clear ideas upon a question which is visibly stirring men's

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minds at the present moment, leading them to speculate upon the usefulness, the limits, and the objects of punishment. Partly these speculations are due to the investigations of the Italian criminologists, of whom the most eminent is Professor Lombroso, who seek to establish the existence amongst us of a class of criminals from whom it is vain to expect reformation. Accordingly, Professor Lombroso proposes that society should get rid of these irremediable criminals much in the same way as philosophers proposed in ancient Greece. There can be no doubt that a grave practical question is presented by these investigations. But besides this practical question, there is a noticeable change which has overtaken our general attitude towards criminals, a change which is undoubtedly related to that general spirit of kindliness and co-operation which, sometimes degenerating into sentimentality, represents a new and vital force in our social life. We have come to look upon crime as a disease which must be cured. There is probably much obscurity of ideas in some persons' minds on this subject. I do not give much for the clear-headedness of a person who thinks punishment unjustifiable because a criminal cannot help his crimes, and is therefore not responsible; I fancy that such a person has forgotten that good people cannot help their virtues either; I fancy that he means by responsibility something which ordinary people do not mean by it. But my object is to point out that the principle of natural selection (as it has been explained) is on the side of those who regard crime with pity rather than vindictiveness. Paradoxical as this assertion may seem, it is justified by the explanation which has been given of natural selection. The same process which in the organic world of species destroys its enemies, becomes in man the process of reconciliation. Some have thought that punishment was vengeance, and this brutal theory has been entertained by eminent philosophers. And in so far as it means that society reacts upon a criminal, or reacts upon the hand that strikes it, as an animal species against the animal which would deprive it of food, the theory may pass. But the value of human institutions lies in the object with which they are instituted, and the theory of natural selection teaches

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us that punishment, the pain which brings home to the mind of a man the consciousness that he has injured the society of which he is a member, is the means by which that society endeavors to bring the wrong-doer back within the fold. The object of the punishment is to extirpate the false ideal, the incompatible plan of life which the criminal represents, and in doing so to save him for a life of social usefulness. In destroying his plan of life it preserves him. According to the theory of natural selection, morality desires "not the death of a sinner, but rather that he may turn from his wickedness and live."

The same operation of selection which we have followed within the walls of any one society may also be observed in the dealings of societies or nations one with another. These are not often thought of or spoken of as moral, yet we must remember that so-called moral observances are only part of a larger class which includes political observances as well. Nations make use of the method of conversion tempered by warfare. But however much bloodshed is involved, no struggle of nations aims at extermination, but either as in the case of conquest the conqueror is satisfied if the conquered adopt his institutions,—if Scotland becomes British, and Alsace and Lorraine German; or, when nations part from the conflict undisturbed in their possessions, if one party agrees by treaty to a behavior which is compatible with the claims of the other. And by degrees greater freedom of communication renders possible an exchange of ideas and habits, by which a public opinion is formed which enforces the settlement of national difference without resort to arms; or a silent and peaceful conversion of sentiment takes place, which makes all thought of armed interference unnecessary. Contrast the wars by which the idea of the French Revolution effected their victory throughout Europe with that steady spread of democratic ideas, or of socialism, from one country to another, which is proceeding under our own eyes. The very existence of parties in our politics is another testimony to the same law of human selection. Party warfare is civil war disguised. It is a true struggle of ideals of political life or institutions; but except

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in Ireland it needs no broken heads, and because it pursues its way peacefully, trusting to the forces of intelligence, stupidity, wealth, poverty, enterprise, inertia, it has so laid aside its original character as to become a part and parcel of the mechanism of settled national life.

The principle that I have been trying to explain, then, is, that ideals of conduct are established, that distinctions of good and bad are created and changed by a process of struggle,—an internecine struggle which is identical with that of natural selection, but works upon minds, not upon bodies, or rather it need not, though it sometimes must, work upon bodies as well. There may be, as incidents in the struggle, death of human persons; there may be only repression; but the object of the struggle is persuasion, conversion, reformation, the extirpation of certain ideas to make room for others. Those which are extirpated are bad, and those which prevail are good. The whole question of the relation between Darwinism, the idea of natural selection, and individualism, is raised and is answered by these considerations. The burning question of individualism *versus* socialism, of the man *versus* the state, may not seem to be an ethical matter at all. But though it is a political matter as well, it is much more a social matter, and I am thinking of it mainly on that side, and I do not know how to keep apart a social problem from a purely moral problem. There can be no doubt that at the basis of the socialistic tendency of the day lies a vigorous upgrowth of strictly moral sentiment; it might be called an extension of that feeling of love towards our neighbors which has been preached and forgotten since the world began. It is a feeling partly of kindness, of disinterested affection, of pity for the weak in body, the poor in fortune, the feeble in character, the seemingly worthless. This is the one side of the movement. The other side is, that those who have hitherto been in a position of inferior fortune, and have accepted their inferiority, assert their claim to greater opportunity of efficiency and happy life. However, I am concerned more with the first side of it. We may describe it by many phrases, but it is best known by its fruit, and both in politics and in social institu-

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tions it displays itself in a tendency to collective action, in opposition to the tendency towards unrestrained liberty and competition, which were dominant till the present day. Some persons regard it with dislike and dread its extension. Mr. Herbert Spencer is one of these. Others of us regard it with satisfaction and admire its progress. But that it is in progress there is no doubt. Nor is this spirit of collectivism anything which distinguishes one party to the exclusion of the other. It is something in which both parties agree. Conservatives and Liberals alike legislate in the spirit of this creed. It is a change of tone rather than a distinction of measures. In the same way, the political tone of all Europe is now democratic; but this is compatible with all possible varieties of constitution, some of which are in form not popular at all. A person who tried to show in what way our two great parties differ in respect of this question might be puzzled to answer, and I am glad the subject is no part of my task at this time. But how are we to reconcile this spirit of collectivism, this tenderness for the weak, with the doctrine that the strongest survive? Why not say with Mr. Spencer, that the lazy, the improvident, the maimed, deserve their fate, and in going under they leave society stronger? Yet at no time has this doctrine ever been enforced consistently. The stupid have always been with us, but we have not left them to their stupidity; they cannot have much instruction, but what little they can have improves them. The poor have always been with us, yet we have relieved them, though we have not as yet found a means of preventing their relapse. There is some justification, however, for those who would leave men to themselves to succeed or to perish. In the first place, it is true that some persons are so morally weak, or criminal, or lazy, or thoughtless, that they can never be of any profit to society whatever,—they act like clogs upon the progress of the rest. Supposing this to be established, we may have to face calmly and without flinching the necessity of ensuring that they shall at least do no harm, and that their qualities shall not be transmitted. But in the next place there is the feeling that collectivism merely makes the strong pay for the weak, and puts all classes upon an equality,

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while demanding no equality of services. If this were so, reasonable men might justly complain. But the evil of the competitive system lies just in this, that the strong do more service towards the increase of wealth than is desirable for themselves or the state, and shut out the feeble from doing what they otherwise could. Our problem is no other than that of finding a distribution of work which would allow the weak to render a service proportioned to their ability, in the same ratio as the service required of the strong.

But be this as it may, the law of natural selection holds out no favor to the principle of competition. And we have seen a twofold reason why. We have seen, in the first place, that the war of natural selection is carried on in human affairs not against weaker or incompatible individuals, but against their ideals or modes of life. It does not suffer any mode of life to prevail or persist but one which is compatible with social welfare. But it seeks, on the contrary, to preserve persons, not to let them die, so long as they can be serviceable for the public good. And in the second place we have seen that the ideals, the forms of life which prevail, are social ideals; they concern the whole society as such, and require for their existence the co-operation of many persons. There is, therefore, no reason in the process of natural selection as such, why every member of society, provided he be not utterly criminal, should not be preserved and helped to live as effectively as he can. Such a consummation depends on two conditions: first, that the institutions of society be such that all its members can maintain an efficient existence under them. How far this condition is from being fulfilled at the present time it is not necessary to enforce; but this is the problem, at the solution of which we are aiming, and aiming not because of anything for or against natural selection, but (as human improvements are everywhere worked out) because of the growth of new sentiments, which will not allow us to look on while numbers of our fellow-men sink down degree by degree. Given that such a form of society, and especially such an economic system, has been discovered, the other condition is the converse one, that each person shall do honestly the work for which he

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is best fitted. If he refuses, morality uses the instrument of punishment in order to reform him; or, if he is incurable, to render him incapable of mischief, like a lunatic or an idiot.

Such an ideal as this is perfectly compatible with the process of natural selection as it operates in human affairs. Whether the weak shall be put into the way of efficient and happy life or not is not a consequence of natural selection as such, which by no means requires that the individual members of society should be free, the stronger to rise higher, and the lower to fall lower; but it depends on the conditions under which existence is carried on. During periods when states are in constant warfare, the presence of a large body of weak though otherwise useful persons is a source of weakness to the whole. And accordingly in the early history of civilization, amongst savages and even amongst early peoples like the Greeks and Romans, the integrity of the society is preserved by destroying female children, or by exposing the unhealthy or deformed, while the economic difficulties of poverty either do not arise, or are solved by the system of slavery. In times like the present, which have a more industrial character, these considerations do not hold, and, exposed to less danger from without, the state can afford to give the fullest care to individuals within. The system of competition, of individual left free to fight with individual, has no superior claim to be regarded as fundamental. As a matter of fact, such competition never existed before this century. Custom had before then been the most potent factor in social and economic life. But competition as we have known it in this century was an invention due to the movement of disintegration which has played so prominent a part in moulding our present state. I have no skill to trace in detail the causes of this movement towards liberty of the individual, but it was a movement springing from the belief that in this way the efficiency of society was best secured. And as it came into birth from a condition of society in which it was unpractised, so let it pass away, and let the good that it has done live after it.

Whether it pass away or not, and whether soon or late, it is no corollary from the truth of natural selection. And in vain

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do some upholders of this universal truth seek on the strength of it to render permanent a transitory phase of human society. The natural selection which exists in morals and society is never a struggle between individuals as such, but either one society struggles directly with some foreign society, or, so far as natural selection proper prevails within a society itself, it is carried on by individuals who fight, not for their own hand, but for society. Where is natural selection in the conflicts of to-day? Not in the efforts of bulls and bears upon the Stock Exchange, or the struggle of the sweaters to supply the public with cheaper goods; but in the struggle between collectivism on the one hand and the system of competition on the other. Here are two social ideals supported by different armies of individuals whose ideals, set up for themselves directly and for society indirectly, involve different social structures. And to all appearances the collectivists (I use this word for short, and to include many different persons, not as equivalent to socialism or any one form of socialism, but as I defined this movement before) are carrying the day. What, then, are we to conclude, when we find an age of individual competition wedged in historically between an age of collectivism in the future, when the weak shall be helped to be useful, and an age of collectivism in the past when the weak were got out of the way? We must conclude that individual competition has arisen out of historical conditions as one among many forms in which social life is to be carried on, because it was thought to be the most efficient method of social existence. Such competition differs from the competition we find among individual animals or plants, because it is legitimized competition. It is part and parcel of the structure of the state, not a condition of warfare, but a condition of stability. The state in its wisdom discovered that its work was best done by leaving individuals free to get for themselves as much as they could, irrespective of their fellow-citizens, and it tacitly legitimized individual competition. In the same way it legitimized civil warfare in the system of party politics, where no one would dream of saying that the state was in perpetual civil war, just because the war is legitimized war. In this way, to go back to an

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example I have already employed, the state suppressed the persecution of opinions, and substituted in the system of toleration an organized liberty for every opinion to try its strength. The evils which unrestrained competition has fostered are, in their turn, teaching us that a greater efficiency of society may be secured by a greater care to develop the growth of all, without the present hypertrophy of a few. The sense of the evil and the corresponding sentiment of compassion for weakness have fostered each other reciprocally; the very success of the previous *régime* has opened our eyes to a progress beyond it. And this is the regular rule of human progress. The success of one ideal of life allows new variations to arise with other requirements, and the offspring in the end destroy the parent type.

Natural selection in the animal world has been exposed to many misunderstandings; it is unfortunate that those who have best understood the process there should have used it here to bolster up a falling, and deservedly falling, faith. It is worth while to track the fallacy a little, in further explanation of what natural selection really is. In declaring competition to be the system inculcated by all analogy, those writers have been guilty of declaring the process by which social structures grow and develop to be a necessary portion of the structure of society itself. Natural selection is a name for the process by which different species with characteristic structures contend for supremacy, and one prevails and becomes relatively permanent. But, as we have seen, the motive force which produces the success of the successful variety is the strength which comes to it from its peculiar structure. It is natural selection by which it prevails; but the natural selection has nothing to do with its structure. I knock a man down because I have a stronger muscle; but fighting is no part of my muscle. Thus we cannot conclude, because competition is the law by which societies with their standards of good and evil come into being, that competition forms a part of the internal structure of the society. If it does so, this fact has its historical foundation. Natural selection produced the victory of the competitive system over the previous systems of

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trade guilds and chartered monopolies. Natural selection may in its turn destroy by competition the system of competition itself.

And now, having tracked the fallacy to its lurking-place, let me add the further remark, that natural selection as such makes neither for a competitive, nor for co-operative or collectivistic structure. Whichever shall prevail will be the result of natural selection. But the process does not account for the structure of the parties to the process; it accounts for their existence, and the continuity between the species of animals or society which take up the relays of progressive life. But the law of progress can only be discovered by watching what forms of society are thus preserved by the process of competition. I do not know that one can formulate such a law. But many evidences seem to point out that the process of competition produces structures of a more and more co-operative character. The passage from animal to man is a case in point. The simplest forms of human life are all social in character. Solidarity is the mode of human life. But it would take a long and careful survey of history to verify the law that this solidarity has become more and more intensified from the earliest ages onwards, and that the apparent disintegration belonging to the spirit of competition was only a step backwards in preparation for a better advance. But in more strictly moral conduct, in those observances that concern the simple and elementary feelings, we can observe the growing solidarity, and the gradual extension to all, of duties recognized only as between a few. So that respect for life, for chastity, for truth, have become more and more universal in Christian, and especially in modern times, as compared with more ancient, till the foreigner of whatever color and whatever sex has come to be recognized as the subject of the same rights as the member of the class or the nation. In certain observances the whole Christian world forms one society. And this result, this increasing socialization, this breaking down of isolation between individual persons and individual communities, has been the handiwork of the system of natural selection; the societies whose persistence is due to external

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struggle, appear to be those which in their internal structure imply the greatest suppression of conflict, the completest mutual help.

A Greek philosopher says that anything may happen in an infinite time. If a lecture lasted an infinite time I might hope to present to you, with less imperfection than I have done, the evidence which shows how completely the growth and change of moral and social ideals are explained by the process of conflict I have described. I have had to assume your agreement in the proposition that our moral ideas are in a constant change and constant enlargement. Probably no one will doubt this who is not misled by our habit of using the same words for observances which may vary very much. The duty of truth-telling is called now by the same name as in ancient times, when it only meant the duty of telling truth to your friends, or fellow-tribesmen, or the doctor; when it means a duty of telling truth to every one without exception, or except under most particular circumstances, it is a different moral idea. So is the respect for liberty which is compatible with slavery different from the respect for liberty which repudiates slavery. But assuming consent upon this point, and having shown, by watching the process, how a new demarcation of good from evil replaces a preceding one, through the origin of a new variety of social ideal, and its ultimate conquest of all other minds, we were entitled to extend this result, and declare generally that moral distinctions are established by a perpetual struggle which reproduces the process of natural selection lower down, with the modifications due to its working in different materials. To trace out the further identity of the two processes, how they create phenomena in the moral world analogous to those of the organic world, would be possible in less than infinite time, but not within the limits of your attention. But the outline of the process itself has been traced, and I go on to touch shortly on the bearing of this principle on the two other points which I suggested at the beginning. Though the tone of Darwin's and Mr. Spencer's writings is decidedly one of optimism, yet there are many to whom the spectacle of perpetual struggle and its accompany-

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ing pain, without any prospect of any close to the long future, even though the spectacle is one of continual advance, is repellent. I do not think that pessimism owes its origin very largely to this cause, but rather to the impression produced on people's minds by the sight of so much distress, the material distress incident to unhealthy economic conditions, the mental distress of a nervous and questioning age. Yet I am anxious to point out that the theory of natural selection is not without a positive answer to the question that pessimists ask, of what use, or what value, is life? and that the answer, although not recondite or more than the commonplace of the healthy, sensible man, might save them much trouble of spirit. The more obvious and formal reply is, that there is no evidence for deciding the question one way or the other as it is put. I cannot tell why existence is worth having because I know nothing of non-existence, and cannot put them into competition. And this reply, though it may seem heartless, is serious and complete. But it will, perhaps, satisfy no one. However, the theory has a more positive answer to make, because it accounts for the existence of such a thing as value at all. For the distinction of what has value, and what has none, is itself the outcome of the process of selection, the very meaning of which is, that certain forms of life have permanence, stability, vitality, and authority over against others which perish. It is the first which supply us with our standards of value, and it is this constantly-repeated experience which makes us familiar with the idea of the valuable or useful. We cannot ask what is the use of life, because we cannot compare life with the absence of it; but we can alter the question and ask, What life is of use? What life has value? And here we are answered by the theory that the life which has value is the good life; for the same act which parts off the good from the evil assigns value to the one and refuses it to the other. The same theory goes further; for recognizing that ideals begin to be unsatisfactory because new wants are generated, it tells how this process of demarcation of standards of value is in constant progress, and never stops so long as one element of unnecessary unhappiness exists. Though it

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does not pretend that evil will ever cease out of the world, but on the contrary holds that as new sources of unhappiness are sealed up, fresh ones are opened, it thinks of the separation of good from evil as arising from the effort to remedy any maladjustment in the conditions of life. The theory of evolution is not on the side of feeble and fatalistic acquiescence in that which is, still less does it regard with the complacent optimism of the mere theorist or the comfortable man the evils of our social condition. On the contrary, it is on the side of constant amelioration, and its chief danger is, that its principle may be mistaken for restlessness. Its sympathies are, if I have rightly interpreted it, with the weak; it aims at discovering institutions which will make life possible for them without at the same time enfeebling the strong; it weeds out of existence, and precludes from the possibility of perpetuating themselves those whose characters are incompatible with social equilibrium, who cannot adjust themselves to their fellowmen. It is, therefore, against all preventable unhappiness, and it shows how, in the effort to discover what happiness is preventable, those forms of life are discovered which are truly worth living. I know that it is small comfort to those who meet with a manly endurance the injustice of social conditions, to be told that they are on the side of progress, and that it is still less comfort to the miserable, who are unable to contend against fortune, to be told that only by doing their duty can their life be redeemed from worthlessness, and become useful for the advance of mankind. But it is not these who raise the cry of pessimism. They are unhappy, but not pessimists. Pessimism is a mere theory, which does but reflect the multitudinous misery of our time. And being constructed on false principles it magnifies the evil which it reflects: and because of this it seemed necessary to expose the theoretical misapprehension from which it derives its strength. The theory of evolution or of natural selection is neither optimist nor pessimist; but it shows us how the standards of value themselves are made, and, while it thus discharges its duty as a theory, it leaves to practical effort the duty of carrying on the war against unavoidable and, I might almost say,

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legitimate evil, and fostering the discontent with avoidable evil.

One other question remains. It will be asked if moral distinctions of our standards of goodness are thus the subjects of an unceasing process, what becomes of the sacredness of right and its obligation? Does not right become a thing transient and impermanent, about which no sentiment of reverence can gather? Those who ask such a question are probably by their whole attitude of mind so removed from the attitude of those who, like myself, believe in natural selection in morals, that a short answer will hardly convince them. But I should like to win them to my side if I can, and I will insist to them that the distinction of right from wrong, of the valuable from the worthless, which the struggle of ideals effects, is a distinction of kind. Though good may be parted from bad by almost imperceptible differences, as the successful animals are from some of the unsuccessful, the distinction is complete, the good man is absolutely different from the bad man. What slight differences they are which are added to the man of talent to make the man of genius; and yet when the qualities exist, how unique and incomparable they render their possessor. "The little more and how much it is; the little less and what worlds away." I suspect that the constant shifting of the boundaries of this sacred enclosure puzzles only those who attach to the valuable, the sacred, the elevated ideas of long-continued duration. But the sacred and the valuable, one may even say the eternal, are not necessarily repeated. There are instances where, to quote again from Browning, "eternity affirms the conception of an hour." We are apt to use ideas of enormous magnitude where we mean to indicate something which is individual and unique. Those who speak of the infinite wisdom of God need not mean a wisdom twice or a thousand times, or even an inconceivable number of times, greater than the wisdom of any one of us here; they may mean a wisdom of a different character altogether, and incommensurable with man's. I have no desire, however, to broach any question of theological doctrine. I only mention the case to illustrate my point, which has already been

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enforced for me by the Scotch student, who said to his fellow-student, "Let us swear an eternal friendship for two years." What is sacred and what has real value are not one whit altered for lasting a moment or an eternity; they represent a particular flavor in standards of living, besides which all other standards of living are foul. Those who still would cling to the notion that what is good must last a long time, may also remember that in practice the distinctions produced by natural selection are relatively permanent. Though morality is in constant change, its changes during long periods are insensible, and produce no appreciable difference in conduct.

If the necessity of perpetually refighting the battle of right and wrong, and establishing a new heaven and earth, does not destroy the sacredness, the intrinsic value of good, neither do the other notions which cling to morality disappear. The authority of morality remains, and the obligation towards it remains. These ideas receive a new interpretation; they express only the claim of the whole social structure to the conscientious work of each portion of it. And perhaps the ideas of obligation and authority, which always imply some degree of constraint, are not completely suitable to represent the exact relation in which each of us stands. If we think of the social ideal, the institutions of society under which we live, not so much as impressing themselves upon us by force, but as attaching us to themselves by reason of their accommodation to our nature, we shall think of the individual,—not as owing an obligation to what is right so much as rendering a willing service to the work of society. But all that is valuable in the idea of obligation is here retained. Moreover, we can go further. The very idea of duty towards a superior power, who is supposed to be the author of eternal moral laws, finds in the theory of natural selection its proper representation, and as some may think (for such questions I leave open) its justification. I wish, indeed, to conclude by pointing out how this theory of natural selection, which may be thought hostile to the idea of any comprehensive system or structure in the world's history, gives precision to such an idea by showing us how that structure is itself created; how from the

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lowest forms of organic life, and probably from inorganic life below that, up to the highest forms of organic life, and again in the minds of men, piece by piece is added to the fabric and the meaning of the universe, the highest forms being linked on to those below them, and thence to the very lowest, and representing *in petto* the laborious acquisitions of centuries. No preconceived plan is here, but the slow elaboration of a universe, each phase of which is continuous with the phase which immediately precedes. In this process the successive forms of social life take their place; and there is no little elevation in the idea that any act done on the side of right and against wrong is a stone added to the building of the permanent structures which history is raising. Though it may be undone in the future, it had to be done now. Each act done on the side of wrong is self-condemned; it has to be undone and had not to be done. And while this work is secured by struggle, each stage in it is attached to the preceding by the closest of ties, and when the eye turns away from the struggle it dwells on the bond which binds the sons of time together. For observe what the forces are which are in the process. The struggle of natural selection operates in the animal world upon varieties which are the offspring of existent species; those which are selected in the struggle are approved as the true descendants, because they are able to maintain the same effort after vitality as their parents. And as they are the fruit of their parents' love, so they are bound to their parents by inherited qualities. In the struggle of ideas which is the natural selection that we find in man, new phases of life are the issue of the old, and those which have vitality assert their vitality by conflict. In the conscious mind of man the fight against competition takes the form of moral disapprobation, while his inheritance from his predecessors inspires him with the feeling of attachment to the past from which he sprung. The good men who fully render their service to their society are thus the progenitors of the future, for which they work in hope, as they are the inheritors of the past, to which they look with reverence. There is an old theory which declared that the universe was created by the

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two forces of Love and Strife. Those whose minds dwell upon the process by which the world is built, dwell upon the strife by which the unappropriate variations of creatures are extirpated. But the struggle from which the permanent and vital forms arise serves only to throw into intenser relief the peculiar bond by which the forms themselves are allied. The evils against which they continually fought are forgotten, in that relationship to past and future which is felt in the joy of victory, in the natural piety which links together the successive types. The history of humanity is like a life which a man should spend in a continual prayer of thanksgiving, the outpouring of ecstasy purchased at the price of inward conflict. As he prays he tells a rosary. The beads represent the successive ideals of mankind. As each portion of his prayer is said, as each new ideal is lived and its use is over, he pushes down a bead with his fingers. The name of the thread on which the beads are strung is Love.

S. ALEXANDER.

WHAT ATTITUDE SHOULD THE PULPIT TAKE TO THE LABOR PROBLEM?

A FEW years ago wide-spread attention was called to the fact that the pulpit had actually invaded Wall Street. Business men in that great centre of trade and commerce had been attending religious services day after day. It was at the time of Lent. A well-known preacher from New England had visited their city of New York and was proclaiming the sublime doctrines of the Cross right at the very gates of the world's colossal money-market. Trinity Church, which stands just at the head of that famous thoroughfare, was said to be drawing its congregations from the Stock Exchange.

It was a novel and striking experiment. The pulpit had taken its stand once more in the market-place and established its right to be heard. Men whose only care had been to buy and sell and get gain, had been drawn away from their imme-

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diate pursuits, and been led to turn aside and think for a while on what was said to them of the eternal verities of religion. It almost seemed as though the life of the spirit was to regain its ascendancy in the world. The Church had gone out to men, inasmuch as men would not come to the Church.

But there is another step to be taken. It is not enough to call men's thoughts away for an interval from their immediate cares. It does not make men religious just to dwell on those higher truths. They go back to their occupations and come under the influence of the same old interests. It is of much greater concern to discover how we can bring those truths to bear on the lives of men *just where they are.* To be "Heirs of God," "Seekers after Righteousness," or "Followers of the Cross," implies not only attending a religious service or having certain deep religious feelings, but also the way a person acts and the spirit he displays as a business man while transacting his affairs on the floor of the Exchange. Until this is thoroughly understood, we cannot assume that the world has come once more under the sway of religious influences. We have only taken the first step when we have drawn men's thoughts away for a time from the life of the world to the life of the spirit. What is to be done when they go back again into the world? We accomplish little, simply by taking the attitude of devotion for a given occasion. By doing this we may only throw an air of consecration over what is glaringly, if not defiantly, secular. We do not exert a religious influence on a political convention, for example, by opening it with prayer, when it is quite certain that the proceedings afterwards will be in utter indifference to the whole spirit of that aspiration. Religion should tell a man how he should conduct himself as a carpenter if he is a carpenter, as a ward delegate to a primary meeting if that is his immediate occupation, or as a bank president if he is a bank president. It should speak to the employer of labor, and have something to say as to the way he should deal with the hundreds and thousands of men and women whose efforts are being consumed day by day under his guidance and authority. The pulpit should have its influence on Trades-Unions, and be on the

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platform with the labor agitator. It should in some manner go into the City Councils. It should manage to sit with the Board of Directors that conduct the affairs of the banks, railways, and other great corporations. It will not do for the world to be actuated by one motive or principle on the week-day, and by another on Sunday. If it comes to be understood that a man can enter into the spirit of a religious service, practically undisturbed in mind by his previous conduct in his business relations as wage-earner or employer,—then it would imply that the pulpit was not to influence men in their lives, but only to play on their religious emotions. The clergy would not for a moment be willing to accept so inferior a construction of their office. They are only too anxious over the widening chasm between the week-day and Sunday.

It would be idle, therefore, to dwell on the necessity of taking some very positive measures for meeting the difficulty. We are met rather with the embarrassing query, How is it to be done? How shall we as the clergy, or as ethical lecturers, exert an influence on the Social Problem?

It would be of no avail for us in the spirit of loyalty to our ideals, to make suggestions or pour forth denunciations, if we knew that the people who have been listening to us,—practical, hard-headed business men,—would shrug their shoulders and say: "It is all very good, what you say; but, after all, it cannot be done; it is beautiful, but really you do not know the world." It may be said, and said truly to us: "You never sat at a Bank-Directors' meeting; you never belonged to a Trades-Union. What do you know about a boycott or a lock-out? What have you ever had to do with settling questions between laborer and employer? How do you know that we would not make the conditions worse rather than better, and involve ourselves in a still greater tangle of difficulty, if we acted on your suggestions?"

It is just this perplexity which stares us in the face. How can we as the clergy escape the charge of being "dreamers" and "theorists," when we speak on practical affairs? We are told that we ought to talk about what interests or concerns the life of the people. When we do this,

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however, we are at once reminded that we are attempting it in the wrong way and speaking on matters we know nothing about. There would be no purpose in offering suggestions, if men will not listen to them. It would be only a waste of effort to pour forth our judgments unless we can make them heard. Reforms and changes do take place in political life and in the business world. But the men of affairs have a different way of going about it. Perhaps they are to some extent justified in their dislike of "clergymen's reforms."

The reason why the clergy help so little or none at all in such movements, is that we have not ourselves been down in the ranks to share in the actual work; and so we have not been able to discover where are the lines of least resistance along which to urge men's action. People do want higher methods and better conditions. But they do not like to go in a round-about way to establish them. They desire to be "business-like" in measures of this kind, as well as everywhere else. It is essential, therefore, if we are to have any influence on the outside world in this direction, that we should know thoroughly what we are talking about, so as not to make utterly impracticable suggestions.

The first need, therefore, for us is that we leave our studies and libraries for the time, and step forth into direct contact with what is being done in the week-day by the average world. It would be well for us to take the attitude of a learner for a while. We have done too much preaching. We should put questions rather than give advice. We ought to attend the mass-meetings of the working-class, to mingle with the labor element in their May-day or September festival. It would be wise for us to understand the Banking System before we undertake to say what is right and what is wrong in the management of a Bank. We should talk with business men and become acquainted with their kind of work; we should let them instruct us on the affairs of the world. It would be well for us to know what Trades-Unions are trying to do, before we undertake to warn the wage-earners of the evils of Trades-Unionism. If labor leaders visit our city we should go and listen to their addresses, and if possible

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become acquainted with them personally. We should visit political conventions, attend business men's clubs, climb the stairs of tenement-houses, be present at the meetings of Socialists, Single-Tax Leagues, and Nationalists. We cannot get this kind of knowledge altogether out of books. It is absolutely essential that we mingle with human life and come in direct connection with what agitates other people. If we are going to exert a religious influence on business men, we should study the Silver Question as well as Theology. If we care to be of help to the working-class, we should master the principles of the labor organizations as well as the history of the Church. We are to do this, however, not in the first place in order to solve the difficulties involved in those problems, but rather so that we can meet the people we care to help, on the plane of *their* interests, instead of asking them to come to the special plane of *our* interests.

What may be liable to bring the clergymen's reforms into disrepute, is the inclination on the part of such men to take the same kind of leadership, or to speak with the same kind of an emphasis and authority on practical affairs, as they would when appealing directly to the human heart in the sphere of pure religion. We have not yet learned just where to draw the line so as to know when to speak with hesitation and when to speak with absolute certainty. When we address ourselves to the human heart we know exactly where we are. Within that special sphere there are certain elemental universal convictions. Every man can find them more or less distinct in his own consciousness. What we as the clergy have to do in the first place is to draw those feelings out, to insist they shall have their influence and authority. The life of the world tends to obscure those deeper experiences. We have a perfect right to say to men, with reference to those feelings, "You *shall* listen to them; you cannot escape from them; you have them within you; you *must* obey them." When addressing the world on that point we can do it with an absolute authority. There should be no wavering or hesitation in our utterances on this issue. We speak of what we know. We are devoting ourselves to calling forth the neg-

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lected chords of religious feeling in the human soul. No man dare say to us under those circumstances that we do not know what we are talking about. We are the very persons who do understand that sphere of human life. We are justified for this reason in throwing into our utterances on that question the whole energy and emphasis that would come from absolute assurance.

But it is altogether different when we come to *apply* those elemental religious feelings to the every-day life of the world. It is not so easy for us to determine exactly in what way they should influence human action. It is perfectly certain that they ought to exert some kind of an effect on practical affairs. We cannot live with our feet on the earth and our souls in heaven. Either the life of the world or the life of the spirit is going to have the ascendancy. We shall be obliged, however, to look in an altogether different direction for the basis of our authority in applied religion. We do not draw our inspiration on this subject directly out of the human heart. It is largely a matter of personal experience. It is not so easy to decide at once what is exactly honest in business relations. We cannot assert on a moment's reflection what should be the true or normal conduct between laborer and employer. Who can say without a great deal of study and observation what is the best way to initiate reforms? We may say with Aristotle, "neither the evening nor the morning star is more beautiful than justice." But it would be another matter for us to specify always what would be the just act under particular conditions. At this point we shall often be obliged to turn to our own listeners for guidance and suggestions. We may have to say to the laity, "Give us of your practical experience; tell us of the measures you have tried, let us know of your success and your failures. What do *you* think could be done?"

It is quite true, this would bring us down to a much more commonplace level. We are no longer on the superior plane of keener insight or wider knowledge. We stand humbly waiting for guidance. We desire to be told what to do. Furthermore, if we take this attitude it is quite certain that

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people will not listen to us with the same kind of awe as before. There is a special power that always goes with perfect assurance. A man who can speak with authority will induce men to listen to him with far greater respect for a length of time. But when they have once acted on his suggestions and found them a failure, he may have lost his influence forever.

We, as the clergy, do care to be reformers. We have no other purpose in life than just to be always urging men forward to higher methods and nobler human relations. It is for us to make men feel troubled and disturbed, just so that they may find the peace that comes alone of rectitude and loyalty to better ideals. We must be constantly telling men that they are wrong in their actions. It is equally true that if we do not indicate at times just when and where they have done the wrong and left undone the right, then our reminder becomes only a platitude. They will soon come to say over the words as they would count their beads, and have little thought that there are certain things which they really should or should not do in their personal or business relations. It is plain enough that in practical affairs human opinions as to what is just and what is unjust, is largely a matter of habit. If men do apply the rules of ethics, they do it only within the same old sphere. We are all scrupulous in certain directions and singularly unscrupulous in others. And the religious teacher has for his work to insist that men shall deepen and enlarge the scope of those rules, when applying them to their every-day affairs.

In applied religion the difference between us and the laity is not, therefore, in our superior judgment or insight. The contrast is rather in the *spirit* in which we work.

What should characterize us is that we care more for what is eternal than for what is ephemeral. We are more interested in that which is below the surface. It is the ideal which holds our enthusiasm. We are as much swayed in our feelings for the cause of the human race a thousand years hence, as for the welfare of our brothers in our own century. We are stirred over the extent to which justice is winning recognition, much more than by the variations in the world's material

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prosperity. We do not belong to the makers of wealth. In the highest sense of the term we should neither be bread-winners nor money-makers. The vast majority of men must necessarily devote their attention to earning their living. The welfare of the race in the material sense justly requires the larger share of interest for the greater portion of the world. For that very reason it is natural and inevitable that the individuals whose cares are in that direction should be disposed to think too much of their personal needs or of their immediate difficulties. But on that account there should be one class of men constantly holding forward this peril, and insisting on the recognition of the Ideal in the obedience to Universal Law. They must be the Standard-Bearers of Justice and Right.

Unquestionably we as the clergy or ethical lecturers for that reason have a solemn and difficult task before us. The world must largely be against us in our efforts. It is not that men are instinctively opposed to the deeper interests. It is not that they would prefer to defy the Higher Law. But the very struggle for existence must to a certain degree compel them to be less devoted to those superior demands. We, above all others, therefore, must preserve the higher spirit; we, more than any other class, should be least concerned with making or accumulating wealth. We should have only one purpose or mission,—to uphold the life of the spirit.

What, then, are we going to do? The world wants to be let alone. It devolves upon us to induce men to apply the higher spirit, the universal law, to their immediate personal or business relations. We talk to them of righteousness on Sunday. They listen and approve; but they go on in the week-days doing just as before. We fail in our life-work if we do not exert a positive influence with this other spirit on the practical affairs of the world. The problem for us is, not whether it is to be done, but how to find our sphere of opportunity. Supreme attention at the present day, for example, is being called to the difficulties between the laborer and employer. The conditions are strained; the two classes cherish hard feelings toward one another; the chasm is becoming ever wider.

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Selfishness and crime in one class encourage, if they do not compel, selfishness and crime in the other. What are we going to do toward breaking up this ill-will? How can we induce men under these conditions of distrust and anger to recognize the law of justice? If we confess that we can do nothing; if we acknowledge that there is no power in our mission or message to bridge over the chasm, to soften the feelings, to quicken the sense of human brotherhood, to overcome to some extent the attitude of strife; if we acknowledge that we can do nothing toward making men join hands in fellow-sympathy,—then we grant outright that religion can do nothing in the sphere of morality.

For my own part, I believe that we should talk on these practical subjects from the pulpit or the ethical platform on Sunday morning. The "Labor Problem" should be as much the text or subject of our sermons as the "Love of God" or "the Brotherhood of Christ." We know perfectly well that men will be concerned and anxious when we venture to do this. We are so liable to be mistaken! What is more, we shall be told that if we agitate these questions we are liable to disturb the social equilibrium. If we suffer men to think that they are being treated unjustly, they may exaggerate their condition and strike out wildly in the wrong direction for redress. It will be charged against us that we have been responsible for their mistakes. But it is forgotten that what we have to do is to tell men not that they are suffering injustice, but that they are *doing* injustice. This is a fact which the human mind does not like to face. Men will not think of it unless they are made to do so. They find it out more often only when it is too late and the sufferers have begun to seek to right their grievances in such unfortunate and often criminal ways. We would like to influence the laboring-class, to encourage them to higher methods, to loftier and more ideal purposes. We would be glad to awaken a deeper sense of responsibility among the wealth-owners of the world. Unless we can do this, it is perfectly certain that the methods of the wage-earners will become worse rather than better, and the

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capitalist class be led to ever greater and greater repressive measures in order to preserve a temporary equilibrium.

People of wealth would like to have us influence the wage-earners by making them contented. They blame us because we do not do this; they think that we should inspire that element with loftier ideals. They would have us denounce the reckless methods of the proletariat. It is thought that we should raise our voice in warning and denunciation toward the crimes of the working-classes.

But if we do this, what is the result? The wage-earners say that we are speaking in the interest of the wealth-owners. They charge us with belonging to the upper classes; they tell us that we do not know the conditions; they assert that we are selfish or insincere; they believe that we care more to preserve our position than to improve the condition of our fellows. They suggest that we stay with our own class where we belong, and not to try to influence the vast element with which we have no sympathy or of whose interests we have no appreciation.

On the other hand, when speaking of the social problem to the wage-earners, the latter element would like to have us denounce the capitalists. They think that we should lay heavy stress on the crimes of corporations. They would have us constantly point out the selfishness of the wealth-owners. They think we should dwell on the oppression which the employer manifests toward the laborer. They are pleased and glad when we burn with indignation over the crimes of wealth. But if we do this, then the wealth-owners of the world accuse us of taking sides with the laboring-class. They tell us that we do not know what we are talking about, that we are pursuing a line of sentiment rather than a straight course of justice. It is suggested that we let the labor problem alone, and preach the Bible.

The perplexity is great. The difficulty for us as clergy or ethical lecturers is, that we cannot take up exclusively the cause of any one class; and yet it is so very hard to have any influence unless one class does recognize us as belonging just to themselves.

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But there is one truth for us in this regard, fixed and everlasting. We cannot have influence where we do not show sympathy. This is the fact so easily forgotten by the well-to-do class, when they would have us influence the wage-earners. We cannot help that element unless we are privileged to acknowledge that *they have a cause* in their present struggle. It was an old, old law, expressed by George Eliot when she said, "Those who trust us educate us." Unless we can take the hand of the working-man and confess to him that he does not receive full justice; that he is right in a certain degree in his efforts to change his condition,—unless we can admit to some extent that there is a measure of oppression exercised toward him, we cannot make him listen to us. He will always be able to answer, "You do not understand, because you do not sympathize."

There is one kind of work which I do believe that we, as clergy, could do in the social problem. It would be by no means so great nor so dignified as might be the case if we could offer a definite solution to the difficulties. But the solution itself should not come from us, but rather from the men of affairs. It devolves upon us rather to bridge over the gulf of ill-will, to do what we can to quicken a larger sense of fellow-feeling and brotherhood, to compel both classes to feel that *something must be done*, and that whatever is done should be in the interest of permanent justice and not in order to escape an immediate difficulty. What the classes need above everything else is to know and understand one another. We could help, at least, in this particular direction. We ought to be the one body of men that come in contact with all the various strata of human society. We have no right to the name of religious teacher if we have not climbed the back-stairs of tenement-houses, or been at the door of the homes in the by-ways and alleys of our cities. The conditions are such at the present day that the two classes practically live in different sections of the community. They seldom or never come in contact with one another in their homes or their social life; they have no means of personal communication. They meet in business relations, they make contracts, buy and sell;

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but they exchange no familiar look of recognition. They have not been in each others' homes, nor talked together by the same fireside. That is the only way, however, by which the classes ever can be known to one another. The clergyman should be the individual who has sat at all such firesides.

The pulpit could do a great work simply by explaining the attitude of mind and the conditions of life of the various elements of society. The clergy at the present day for the most part belong to the well-to-do class. For that reason they could do a great work in simply explaining the feelings and conditions of the wage-earners to the outside world. They could describe the homes and the way those people live; they could picture the conditions of life which they meet; they could tell both of its joys and its sorrows, its pleasures and its struggles. They could point out the restrictions in that kind of an existence. They could make it plain that such persons, whole families living in a few rooms, cannot have the same enlightened thoughts and wide experience which would come to others under healthier and happier conditions. People cannot be quite as sober and rational, who live in a tenement-house, as those who live in comfortable homes of their own. If they act at all, it cannot be as philosophers.

What is more, the clergy could explain the opinions and views of the working-people on the social problem. It is painful at the present time to see how little those opinions are understood by the most intelligent element of our large communities. The wage-earning class at the present day is doing a great deal of thinking. Their ideas may be very much confused; they may not be very rational or very logical; but they have their positive convictions. They even know something of political economy; occasionally they know a great deal. They are widely opposed to one another in their various measures; they offer very different solutions to the social problem. It would no more do to bring anarchism, the single tax, trades-unionism, and socialism together in the same chapter, under the one heading of "what the laboring-class are thinking of," than it would to bring together all the utterances or mad ravings of religious enthusiasts, and label them

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"Christian thought." It is that confusion on the part of the upper classes which, by its very lack of sympathy, may by and by *drive* the wage-earners to a common attitude of mind. They may fuse together just because of their own isolation. These different theories stand not merely as rivals, but often in the strictest contradiction to one another. It is not so difficult a matter at the present day to get some clear understanding of these various social ideals, provided men will not take them second-, third-, or fourth-hand. It would be comparatively easy to read them in compact form. A pamphlet of sixty pages by Schaeffle, recently translated from the German, gives very clearly "The Quintessence of Socialism." It would not require a very long time to read "Progress and Poverty," and so have the stand-point of the "single tax." We can get the main ideas of trades-unionism from a single volume by Professor Richard Ely on the "Labor Movement in America."

It is true we may read these volumes only for the purpose of denouncing them and pointing out the mistakes in such opinions. But if we do not study a subject in order to learn something from it, it would be better to let it alone. Unless we can go to the thoughts of a certain class with some degree of sympathy, unless we can feel that there must be at least an element of truth in what they are thinking, it will do neither us nor them any good to make that kind of an investigation. We cannot help any person unless we can also learn something from him. We cannot exert an influence on the wage-earning class, unless we are satisfied that they have something to teach us, at the same time that we have something to give to them.

It strikes me, therefore, that, besides studying the works of abstract ethics and the doctrines of theology, we would do well to read the writings which stir the masses of the people,—that is to say, that we find out what is their Bible while studying our own Bible. We cannot at once reach their feelings or influence them, by quoting St. Paul when they do not read St. Paul, but give their attention to Bellamy, LaSalle, Carl Marx, or Henry George. I believe we should make those

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writers the subjects of our sermons or addresses from the pulpit or the platform on Sunday morning. It may be said to us that such topics do not come within the sphere of religion. We shall be told that we are secularizing the pulpit if we address the people on subjects such as the "Ethics of Trades-Unionism" or the "Single Tax." But we must not forget that that is just what a certain class of people would like to think; because they could then regard their conduct in their business relations as secular, and, therefore, feel that they need not be disturbed in such matters by scruples of conscience or of religion. What we have to do is to make it plain that there is nothing secular,—that, in fact, the men who take that stand-point are committing a sacrilege in the sphere of religion. It is of tremendous consequence that we bring this labor problem under the influence of moral and religious considerations. We do this best by connecting it with the time and occasion when our thoughts are turned inward and upward to that which is highest and most sacred. It will be said to us that such topics do not inspire men with thoughts about Jesus or about God. We can only reply that a sermon could often be given which might not once mention the name of the Supreme Being, and yet be full to overflowing with the spirit of that Being. What did the great prophets Isaiah and Jeremiah talk about, if it was not the social problem? They rise to the loftiest heights of grandeur when they touch upon that theme. What, after all, was their ideal Israel, but a Social Ideal? What was the Sermon on the Mount, if not in part a discourse on the labor problem?

Our duty is in some way to exert a religious influence on the every-day life of the world. If we cannot do it in one way, then we should try another. If people will not listen to our Bible, then let us for a time make use of their Bible. We have to elevate human aspirations. If we can do it by talking about Carl Marx, let us do it through Carl Marx. By and by they may be willing to listen to us when we talk about a greater than Carl Marx. On the other hand, if we cannot make the upper classes understand and sympathize with the condition of the wage-earners or appreciate their

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ideas and aspirations, by talking of Jesus, then let us rather pursue the method of the great Master himself and talk directly about those conditions. Let us give a little positive application to the "Sermon on the Mount."

If the opportunity offered, it would devolve upon us also to explain to the wage-earners what was the true attitude and feeling of the other class of society. The misunderstanding in this regard is equally great, though possibly more justifiable. The self-sacrificing spirit of reform, the longing to help and change the world, does not prevail exclusively among workingmen. Many a person of wealth would be willing to lay down all his possessions, if he could see just what it would avail to do so. Business men in numbers are considering all possible means and suggestions. Some of them would make any degree of sacrifice, provided they knew just what would be the true course to be pursued. Experiments in reform measures are being tried both in Europe and America. We of the clergy should watch these efforts with exceeding care. We should report them wherever it is possible. It is by these experiments made both by wage-earners and capitalists, that the final solution is to be discovered. It is essential above everything else that people rid themselves of the habit of taking any particular set of views or feelings as representing any one whole class. If the clergy would exert a part of their efforts in doing nothing more than explaining to the public the condition and work and opinions of the separated classes, they could feel that they had achieved a vast result in the great cause of reform.

It will be said, and with a certain degree of truth, that we are taking sides. This result will be almost inevitable. We *must* lean a little toward the wage-earning class. From the earliest dawn of history it has been the recognized duty of the religious teacher to espouse the cause of the weak. This would not imply that he should justify them in their methods, encourage them in their errors, or quicken their sense of oppression. It only means that he should make it his first consideration to appreciate the situation of the under classes. They are "the weak." They are the least liable to be under-

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stood. Unfortunately they only half understand themselves. They make their own cause suffer, by not being able to express themselves clearly. They talk through their emotions. Their restlessness speaks, more often than their philosophy. It is impossible to come directly into their thought or opinions just by taking their words as we read them. At the present time, however, it is being said that the wage-earning class should rather be considered as belonging not to the weak but to the strong. It is asserted, and with a certain degree of truth, that they too exercise tyranny and oppression. By their united effort undoubtedly they are becoming a power for good or for evil. Nevertheless, in the long run the non-possessing class is liable to be beaten in their struggles unless the world is guided by loftier motives. Men cannot hold out long without capital in reserve. The wage-earners are the weaker class by their very lack of experience. Their power is short-lived. Hunger is sure to make them succumb. The clergymen should espouse their cause, not by joining with them directly in their efforts, but by trying to understand them, and then later on by explaining them, truly and sympathetically, to the other class of society. It is not a question of agreement or disagreement with their social theories. That is a second consideration. The first and supreme requisite just now is, that the under stratum should be understood and explained to the world by the one class of men who are least concerned in using their blood or muscle as a means of profit or money-accumulation.

We do not by any means imply that the ethical lecturers or the clergy should be continually giving their opinions on the social problem. We are not called upon, at every occasion, to give our views. We may know very often that our judgment should not be expressed, for the very reason that it is not based on thorough or wide experience or information. There are times, however, when we are bound to take our lives in our hands. We may have mastered the subject; we may be perfectly sure of the facts before us; we may be clear as to the laws of history. When a crisis occurs, the classes tend on both sides to lose consciousness of right. At that time

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selfishness is always very strong. Every man is in a tremor lest he lose his position or his property. Justice is liable to be forgotten. Men think at that time largely only of their own. At such an hour the clergy ought to speak and say what they think, though it shipwreck them forever. They are the one remnant of society who, at such a crisis, by their interests and profession, should keep the public from losing sight of the fact that justice is of greater consequence than material welfare or prosperity. Emerson was right on that point: "If there are inconveniences and what is called ruin in the way, because we have so enervated and maimed ourselves; yet it would be like dying of perfumes to sink in the effort to re-adjust the deeds of every-day life to the holy and mysterious recesses of existence."

The true religious teacher, to my mind, never can receive that peculiar sympathy which befalls the man of generous deeds and kindly heart, who simply goes about doing good. He has to be a judge as well as a "brother of mercy." He is compelled now and then to say, "Thou art the man." It may fall upon him to tell his listener, "Thou art thy brother's keeper." The world will not like to be told those unpleasant truths. The man who does it, takes his life in his hands. He must do it with the greatest caution, and very rarely. It will not do to be over-dramatic. The individual who does the true religious teacher's work will always tend to have that inward pressure of the lips, which implies the peculiar reliance he has on his ideals and on their immutable worth, though he walks alone and has few sympathizers. Every true pulpit teacher ought to have in him the elements of Marcus Aurelius and Savonarola.

We might say that the supreme work for the pulpit on the labor problem should be, *to explain and point out the symptoms* rather than to suggest the remedy or cure. He must lay his finger on the wrong. It is for him to dwell on the injustice which is being done. He can tell the world what will be the inevitable result of these acts on all human society. It requires one kind of man to discover and recognize an evil, and another kind to suggest the measures for its removal. The

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agitation which is going on implies something more than the particular remedy which is being sought after by the wage-earning class. Socialism, communism, and anarchism indicate certain symptoms of heart and character in all classes of society. We do not root them out by argument. We only get at them by getting at the conditions which called them into existence. What the clergy need to do is to discover and unfold the causes, while they urge the need of a remedy. It is a discovery, of course, which can only be made by direct contact with the world. The labor agitator and the capitalist are both in a certain way products of social conditions. We can say distinctly that under given circumstances in human society at any time in history, a certain general tendency or attitude of mind will arise. We can, therefore, suggest to the men of affairs to some extent what are those elemental causes. They are to be traced and recognized all through the past. The symptoms were as manifest in early times as they are to-day. We can say to the leaders who control events in the every-day world: "These are the conditions; here is the wrong; this is the law of history. It devolves upon you as the men of affairs to find the remedy."

I believe we, as the clergy, make a mistake, however, if we venture to take the personal leadership in reform movements. There is a certain kind of experience we can never possess. We shall always tend to be men of thought rather than men of action. Suspicion will always be upon us that we do not know the world. We must constantly, persistently, urge measures of reform; but there is always a point where we should hand the leadership over to the men of affairs who can do the work; we should keep ourselves in the back-ground. We may as well accept it first as last that the world will not receive us as practical leaders. We can fire the spirit. We can point out the necessity. We may even suggest a direction. But it must devolve upon others to determine how the measure is to be carried out. As for us, we are to initiate the movement, to induce men to care for reforms.

It is no light duty for us to do even this simple kind of work. Men do not like to face disagreeable facts. They

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would rather go on as before. When they think of such matters it gives them a tremor of uneasiness for the stability of society. If a remedy is to be found, we must first point out what is the ailment. What we need to do is to *study and explain the conditions.* The solution of the difficulty is being offered too soon. The physicians of society have first to describe the case and make it very clear just where is the seat of the wrong.

It is difficult and painful enough to talk upon this subject to the established classes of society. The people of wealth do not care to hear the story. But it is even more serious and embarrassing for us to tell the plain truth to the wage-earning classes. The message we have to give them is not palatable. We may remind the rich of their responsibility. But we have to say to the working-man in equally positive words, "you, too, are looking for the causes of the evil in the wrong direction." That particular element of society is saturated with the conviction that the conditions make the man. And therefore they care above everything else to change outside conditions. As an individual once said to me, "There is no use talking about ethics when wages are so low." We as the clergy or the ethical lecturers, on the other hand, must call the attention of those persons to the fact that outward conditions also depend largely on inward character. I was asked once at a meeting, "Do you not think that the selfishness of to-day is due to the present commercial system?" I did so much want to answer "Yes," for the sake of showing my sympathy. But as a religious teacher I had to give him the inevitable reply, "No; the present commercial system is rather the product of human selfishness."

What can we do to bring this truth home to the working-man? He does not know it, and he will not believe it. We have discovered it only too plainly through all past history. It has become a commonplace assertion among the clergy. We desire to tell that struggling class, "You also in part make your own conditions." We wish to remind them that there is no use in reforming *external* institutions, if a like reform does not take place in the inward character. But there is

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no use in saying this to them if they will not take it home. We gain nothing by exasperating them. They know very little about history; but they are quite conscious that there is a world of difference between their own environment and that of the other classes of society. It will not do for us to be too bold in urging contentment and surrender. The clergy themselves for the most part live in comparative comfort. We do not know what would be our state of mind if we were living in the condition of the wage-earner. Only the man who has himself endured is able to influence other men to a like heroic endurance. It was the Man on the Cross alone who could deliver the Sermon on the Mount.

It is right here, no doubt, that the pulpit tends to lose its hold on the wage-earning class. That element of society comes back to us with the query, "Have you ever lived with your family, your wife and children, on a dollar and a half or two dollars a day? Do you know what it is to live, work, eat, and sleep in one or two rooms? Does it never affect your fineness of character or depth of sympathy, or your fellow-feeling, when your personal income is reduced? You tell us that we should care for higher character in spite of the conditions of our environment. Possibly it is true. But we see only too plainly how often it happens that when the refined individual is brought down to our position in life, he too adopts our level of interests. If you can show us that you too can be quite indifferent to the influences of such conditions, we will walk in your footsteps and follow your example." The charge is correct. We can never altogether escape it. We are not able to assert that if we were in their position we would not have exactly the same thoughts and take precisely the same attitude of mind. The clergy, just because they must belong to both classes, cannot take up the life of either one or the other. They could not live and do their work on two dollars a day. Nevertheless, so long as that is the case, they must to a degree be paralyzed in their efforts to reach the lower stratum of society.

We touch at this point the most delicate question in the whole social problem. Who are to be the coming religious

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leaders of the wage-earning class? What kind of a person would be able to take to them the gospel which they need, and at the same time to command their sympathy and attention? They are disposed to listen only to men of their own number. This is perfectly natural. It would seem for that very reason that the true guide should appear from their own class. And yet there is one great difficulty. It was different matter a thousand years ago to be a teacher of the poor. At that time all that could be done was to urge endurance and passive submission. The religious teacher could only plead with them to keep the heart firm while nothing could be done to change the conditions. It required little experience to proclaim that truth. It was a gospel to be found in each man's own heart. They had to submit, because nothing could be done. The humblest and most ignorant person could urge that lesson, just as truly and completely as the man of great learning or the most profound philosopher. But to-day the circumstances are different. There is the conviction, strong and definite, that now something positive could be done. It is no longer at the present moment simply a question of passive and heroic endurance. The leader must now suggest to that class of men what shall be their associated efforts, how shall they act together, what methods and principles shall they adopt in order to improve their own condition. It would imply that such a person, if he is to be a wise and safe leader, should be a man of affairs who had dealt with masses of men, who had insight into character, and was acquainted with the laws of history. He should know of other efforts and movements; he should be familiar with past failures. It would require, indeed, a combination of qualities and experience possessed by the president of some vast business corporation, such as Mr. Rockefeller, the learning in sociological science of Herbert Spencer, the religious spirit of Luther, the insight into character of a George Eliot, and the self-sacrifice and devotion of a Father Damien.

The wage-earning class is convinced now that they can do something to improve their condition. They are groping in many ways to find the methods. Wise men of the world

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look askance and tremble at their mistakes. Who shall be their leader and give them the true kind of inspiration? There was a time when I looked for the possible coming of a "Felix Holt." He was to me the one only solution,—a man born of the people, who earned his daily bread, gifted with superior intelligence, but with that sympathy for his class, which could make him say: "The fact is, there are not many easy lots to be drawn in the world at present; and such as they are, I am not envious of them. As it is, I prefer going shares with the unlucky. I would never choose to withdraw myself from the labor and common burden of the world, but I do choose to withdraw myself from the push and the scramble for money and position. I am a man of this generation. I'll try to make life less bitter for the few within my reach."

This would have been the ideal for a labor leader a thousand years ago. We would have the picture of a man capable of rising to prominence and power in the world, who yet chooses to stay with his own class, and to live just as they live, in order to be their helper. But there would be the one great difficulty. It is not enough to have the superior intellect, the self-sacrificing devotion, the true and perfect spirit; it is essential that the new leaders should be men of wide learning and great practical experience. When we consider the delicate and complicated questions at the present time to be settled or acted upon by the labor leaders, it is astonishing that they do not make even more mistakes.

My hope as a religious teacher lies in another direction. It is in the possibility of a second coming of men somewhat of the type of St. Francis of Assisi; that is to say, men who have lived the life of the world, done great work, equipped themselves with knowledge and experience, gifted with insight and judgment, eminent for wealth and social position,—who may sacrifice their personal opportunities, abandon their station in the world, and go down to apply their gifts and acquirements to the cause of the lower stratum of society. They would have to be so qualified as to lose nothing in delicacy or refinement of character, while they would be required to live to the very end of their days the life of the humble and the poor. It

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would demand unusual physical and intellectual strength for them to experience that change and endure all those conditions. But if they could do it, if they could go down there and live in that way, as the working-man lives,—so winning his sympathy and confidence, trusted by him as well as by the class from which they came,—they might be able to inaugurate a movement that could transform and elevate the efforts of that wage-earning element, which is now groping so blindly for its own amelioration. That class will not accept guidance unless they first have received sympathy; and the guide himself can accomplish nothing unless he be acquainted, by study and experience, with present social conditions and the laws of past history.

Whether this other kind of leader will come, we cannot say. For the present we can only hope for a partial solution of the difficulties. We, as the clergy, would like to do so much, and yet are conscious that we can do so little! We must venture ahead slowly. An almost unexplored sea is before us. We know perfectly well what may be the chart for the feelings of the individual soul. But the chart for human action, in its delicate and ever-widening complications, is hard for us to read. The literature of the past does not help us very far forward. It points out the direction. But to know what to do in order to aid in the long, slow voyage of human society to its goal, must give us much weary thinking. We never doubt that the goal is there; we are sure that justice must be the guiding star. But how to apply the chart, how to find the true method to ever keep that star in view,—all this is no easy task. Nevertheless, it is equally certain that if we as the clergy or as ethical lecturers do not push on ahead,—if we do not insist and insist that the work has to be done,—if we do not stand to the work ourselves, whatever others may or may not do,—if we do not begin to apply these religious feelings to the actual world, then we have failed in our mission. We must make the effort until the better leader comes. When he appears, we can lay down the mantle and give it to other shoulders.

W. L. Sheldon.

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ETHICS OF THE JEWISH QUESTION.

"God made the country, man made the town." In the spirit of Cowper it is maintained that God made the Israelite, but man made the Jew. Because of this abnormal development of the Jew, we are responsible with him for his future. It is the object of this paper to show the irresponsibility of the Jew for his "peculiarities." His is not a pure race, as is erroneously supposed; his characteristics are the result of seclusion and persecution; he has been the victim of environment. But with opportunity he can change. In studying the growth of this people, we may learn not only our duty toward them, but also the solution of many of the race problems now confronting the American people.

It is the general belief that the Jew has inherited from time immemorial certain characteristics which have always distinguished him, and will ever continue to do so. Examples are even adduced from Old Testament history, such as Jacob, to show that the same characteristics were evidenced in those early times that we see to-day; as though the story would not have been just as possible of Mohammed or Aaron Burr!

Höffding says,* in speaking of the relations between men and women: "One must always be careful, when speaking of natural peculiarities and natural differences as eternal and unchangeable. Nature finds herself, especially in the sphere of living beings, in a continuous development. Every nature we see has always *become* itself, and it will develop from this a new nature for itself. This development takes place slowly, and we must carefully observe how far we have come in a given time." This may be readily illustrated by the development of the female among human beings. We know that formerly the female, as among many lower animals, was

* "Ethik," p. 222.

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the stronger and larger of the sexes. The habits of man have utterly reversed this condition. It is no indignity to point to the possibilities of development, as illustrated by the production of certain fine specimens of the domestic animals, notably the race-horse and Alderney cattle. It is idle to deny the existence of the same laws in human development. Some one will object that no such systematic cultivation of a particular breed has taken place among human beings. Perhaps not with the same end in view, but certainly in the history of slavery, a very similar instance might be shown—the mulatto.

Whatever doubt may be cast upon the reliability of the Hebrew Scriptures, they preserve for us certain ancient traditions which are universally accepted as having their basis in fact. Allowing that Abraham may have been a mythical character, the evident Babylonian coloring in the traditions of Genesis permits us to accept as undeniable the fact that the Israelites came from the region of Ur of the Chaldees. Hence they came from the very home of the Semites, as the various flood traditions show.* Dr. Moritz Alsberg, of Kassel, has written a valuable brochure,† in which he claims to show conclusively that thousands of years ago, in Palestine and adjoining countries, a mixture of Israelites with an Aryan people took place. He maintains, also, the possibility of intermarriage with Mongolians. From these racial mixtures has come a people which should not be considered the pure race that we are accustomed to think it. As other eminent scholars unite in this belief, it is but fair that we glance at the facts they present, and admit the resultant conclusions as evidence in helping us to an understanding of the Jewish people.

Sayce‡ was surprised at the number of blue-eyed and blonde-haired children among the Palestinian Jews. These were formerly considered elements introduced by northern Europeans after the crusades or some similar expeditions or

* "Andree, Die Flutsagen," p. 135, and "Zur Volkskunde der Juden," p. 144.

† "Die Rassenmischung im Judenthum" (Gemeinverständliche Wissenschaftliche Vorträge).

‡ "Nature," August 2, 1888, "The Races of the Old Testament," p. 171.

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migrations. Flinders Petrie * shows what Osborne has already claimed, that Shasa, from Canaan, who lived south of Hebron, and the Amorites, † had blue eyes and reddish hair and beard. This would indicate that already in the fourteenth century B.C., before Israel entered Canaan, there had been an Aryan mixture in Palestine. Captives of the tenth century,‡ pictured on Egyptian monuments, have both Jewish and Aryan facial types. Among evidences indicating the presence of Mongolian tribes in Palestine may be mentioned the reliefs in the British Museum, representing Hittite captives from the time of Rameses III. § Dr. Alsberg not only maintains the Mongolian origin of the Hittites, but further presents evidence in favor of considering the Sunero-Accadians, the original inhabitants of Babylon, as of Mongolian origin. ‖ Add to this the resemblance to the Mongolian type found in monuments from the Hyksos period in Egypt, ¶ and we find the neighbors of the Semites invaded on all sides by other races. Does any one ask, in what way would this affect the conservative Israelite? We have only to refer to numerous Biblical narratives in answer. The very laws against intermarriage in the Pentateuch testify to its frequency. The practice began among the patriarchs. Abraham had an Egyptian wife; Isaac and Jacob married Arameans; Joseph's wife was an Egyptian; Moses's a Midianite; David, who was descended from the Moabite Ruth, and Solomon, whose mother was the Hittite Bathsheba, both ignored all opposition to taking wives of foreigners. Yet they were, doubtless, examples to their subjects, and we have abundant evidence of the mixture of Amorites and Hittites with Israelites. The practice of keeping concubines alone sufficed in any wealthy man's household for the introduction of as great a variety as his purse allowed of the fair ones of the Gentiles. The condition after the exile,

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* "Racial Photographs from Egyptian Monuments," cf. "Nature," Dec. 6, 1886.

† "Alsberg," p. 5, cf. Academy, Oct. 3, 1891.

‡ "Alsberg," p. 7. § "Alsberg," p. 12. ‖ "Alsberg," p. 13.

¶ "Sitzungsbericht der Berliner Akademie der Wissenschaften," vom 12, Juli, 1888.

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when we usually think of a revived and purified people, to be known thenceforth as Jews, is well indicated by Ezra x. 10–12, and Nehemiah xiii. 23, 24.

Nor did the mixtures cease with the introduction of the rigid ceremonial conservatism of the Talmud. Josephus tells of proselytes in the dispersion. Alsberg cites instances in the early centuries of the Christian era, when numerous conversions to Judaism led to frequent intermarriage.* The laws passed by the church in the middle ages are indicative of the frequency of marriage between Jew and Christian. From the eleventh to the thirteenth century unions between the Magyars and Jews in Hungary were frequent.† The instances of intermarriage in Spain and Portugal were innumerable.‡

Are these facts supplemented by evidences which to-day lead us to believe that the Jews have been affected greatly by intermarriage? We are accustomed to speak of a peculiar Jewish type, and we usually have little difficulty in discerning Jewish features or traces of Jewish blood. The most accurately reproduced representatives of the ancient Semite we find in the Bedouins of the desert. As a race they are better preserved than the Jew. Yet Le Bon tells us § that there are two quite distinct types of Arabs. We shall also find two markedly different types of Jews.

Ludwig Stiedas || divides the European Jews into two classes, according to their skull development, brachycephalic and dolichocephalic. He says,—

"There is no doubt that among the Jews are to be found two different types of skulls: the one, long, with narrow face, long, narrow nose, and thin lips; the other, short-headed, a broad face, low, broad, and small nose, and thick lips."

Karl Vogt writes: ¶

"In the North, in Russia and Poland, Germany and Bohemia, one finds a Jewish type with occasionally red hair, short beard, short, flat nose, small, cunning,

* "Alsberg," p. 19.

† "Alsberg," p. 19.

‡ Graetz, Geschichte der Juden, viii. 301.

§ La Civilization des Arabes.

|| Archiv für Anthropologie, xv. 69. Sayce, "Races of the Old Testament," pp. 78, 171.

¶ Vorlesungen über den Menschen, ii. 238.

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gray eyes, solidly built, with a round face and generally with prominent cheek-bones. There is often a resemblance to some of the northern slavic tribes. In the East, on the contrary, and in the neighborhood of the Mediterranean Sea, as well as even in Portugal and Holland, one sees the typical semitic type, with long, black hair and beard, large, almond-shaped, black eyes, long faces with melancholy expression, prominent nose; in fact, the type that Rembrandt reproduces in his portraits."

Statistics gathered among the school-children of Prussia indicate clearly the variety of type among German Jews. Virchow estimates * as follows:

"Among the Jewish school-children examined in Prussia, 18.7 per cent. had blue, 18.8 per cent. gray, and 53.5 per cent. brown eyes (in contrast to 43 per cent. blue-eyed, 32.7 per cent. gray-eyed, and 24.3 per cent. brown-eyed Christian children), while 32.4 per cent. Jewish children had blonde hair, 55.5 per cent. brown hair, 10.1 per cent. black hair, and 0.5 per cent. red hair (in contrast with 72.2 per cent. blonde-haired, 26.1 per cent. brown-haired, 1.2 per cent. black-haired Christian school-children in Prussia)."

As Alsberg says, we need not be surprised at the long continuance of the influence of these early mixtures if we bear in mind the tenacity with which racial characteristics endure, and the marvellous repetitions of earlier traits through the now recognized atavistic law. It is impossible to account for these varying types by present-day intermarriage. If the Jew has not inherited his distinguishing traits from time immemorial, if he is not a peculiar species, how shall we account for his unmistakable characteristics? If we call to our assistance some historical facts, we shall find that persecution is responsible for the Jew's development. His own exclusiveness, accompanied by enforced isolation, have stamped his physical nature and his character. An excellent *résumé* is presented by Döllinger in a lecture entitled "Die Juden in Europa." † We shall quote freely from this comprehensive treatise.

At the time of the fall of Jerusalem the Jews were the most widely-dispersed race on the globe. Pharisaism was rising and suppressing other sects. The Talmud aided in completing the isolation of the people, and the Roman law contributed toward this by forbidding circumcision to other than Jews.

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* Zeitschrift für Ethnologie, 1876, p. 178. † Vorträge, i.

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Juvenal in his satires portrays vividly the condition of the Jews in Rome.* Their sufferings under the heathen were, however, not to be compared with the persecutions they endured when Christianity came to be the Roman state religion. The synods forbade Christians eating with Jews; Ambrosius called the burning of a synagogue a godly deed; Theodosius excluded them from all offices. As relieving the dark side of the picture which he is compelled to present, Gregororius says,† "On the whole, the Hebrews in Rome, with the exception of an occasional outbreak, did not suffer the persecutions which they endured in the other cities of Europe. Rome never furnished soil for religious fanaticism. There ever lived in the hearts of the Roman people the old tradition of cosmopolitan tolerance and humanitarianism. Then, too, they had been accustomed for centuries to the Jews." If the treatment of these people in Rome may, by any exaggeration, be called tolerant, it is but a commentary on the frightful abuses elsewhere. The first persecution of the Jews in the Frankish kingdom took place in the sixth century. This was imitated in Spain. In 612 Sisebut gave the Jews the choice of being baptized or emigrating. The Franks forbade the marriage of Jews with Christians, the holding and sale of Christian slaves by Jews, the power of judging Christians, the eating together of the two sects, and the employment of Jewish physicians.

Döllinger, who finds in the crusades the beginning of anti-Semitism,‡ shows how there was, in the eleventh century, a general change of sentiment toward the Jews caused by the thirst for fighting non-Christians. The real aim of the crusades was to free the Christians in Asia Minor and Palestine from the power of Islam and to insure the safety of the Holy Sepulchre. The result, however, was the advance of Islam and the weakening of Christianity. The theories of absolution and the world-power of the pope succeeded in dragging in criminals and outcasts, and in demoralizing

* "Satires," 3, 6, 14.

† Wanderjahre, i.: "Der Ghetto und die Juden in Rom," p. 75.

‡ Vorträge, i.: "Orientalische Frage in Ihren Anfängen."

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the better class of the crusaders. Among the unfortunate and permanent results was this hatred of the oriental, which found vent in the persecution of the Jews. Before beginning their voyages the crusaders would sometimes plunder the Jewish houses. The kingdom of Jerusalem was formed by first burning the synagogues. Councils ordered all copies of the Talmud to be destroyed and all Jewish literature containing offensive references to Christianity. Thomas Aquinas held that the barons could make the same use of Jewish property as of their own land. The Jews were offered protection through heavy taxes. The Council of Vienna, in 1267, forbade a Jew to visit a bath-house, hotel, or inn. No Christian was allowed to buy meat from a Jew lest he be poisoned. The Synod of Salamanca, 1335, declared that no Jewish doctors could be employed, because they were attempting to destroy all Christians by force. The great epidemic in Europe in 1348 was laid at the door of the Jews. This belief was made certain by the small number of deaths among the Jews. On the rack some Jews confessed to this. Then broke forth fanaticism. The Jews were killed by thousands. Clement VI. vainly declared them innocent. Already in the twelfth century had arisen the belief that Jews sought Christian blood either for healing or offerings. A child found dead was always cause for abuse of the Jews. To pay for the civil wars in 1390, all Jewish debts were taxed fifteen per cent. In Spain, where the situation had been better, in 1391 the priests with their followers burned the synagogues. Twenty thousand were forcibly baptized, many of whom afterward returned to Judaism. Thousands were killed.

In 1492 all Jews were banished and their property confiscated. Deprived of all means, many perished from hunger and epidemics; others found a home in the Orient or in Italy. A temporary refuge was found by some in Portugal. For a long time the Jews had prospered in Portugal; they owned land, cultivated it, and engaged in trade. In 1495, however, King Manuel seized all the children under fourteen and baptized them. In 1506 a proselyte doubted a miracle performed there, and in three days two thousand proselytes were killed.

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There can be no doubt that since the Reformation the position of the Jews has been gradually improved. Persecution has not been general, the attitude of the Christians toward them has become more favorable, and they have undergone a reformation within themselves. The influence of Mendelssohn and other Jewish leaders has been extremely beneficial in England, France, and Germany. The Polish Jews and those of the Orient have not yet been able to throw off the yoke of the Talmud.

Before we speak of remedies for the present condition of affairs, let us add to the facts concerning the physical and historical development of the Jew some evidence showing by his dissimilar condition in different parts of the world to-day that environment has been the great force in his evolution.

It is claimed that the Jew is incapable of hard manual labor. He is said to have an innate tendency for trading. Holtzmann * says they possessed this even in the time of Alexander. Andree † claims that they are *naturally* limited to lighter pursuits. While there is much truth in the fact that Jews avoid manual employment, it is a mistake to suppose that this has always been the case, and it is not only unjust, but untrue, to say that he is incapable of more exacting occupations. Andree himself records ‡ the fact that Jews living in isolated colonies south of Morocco engage in all kinds of manual labor, and even carry arms, which it is claimed by some a Jew never does, although Russia itself can refute this. The Jews in Smyrna, according to Karl von Scherzer,§ engage in all kinds of hard work, as do those in Damascus, by the admission of Andree. The explanation of these isolated instances may perhaps be found by reference to the history of the Jews in Aden and Jemen. In the former, till within forty years, the Jews were virtually slaves of the Arabs. Since the English have obtained control, their condition has been so improved that they stand now on the same footing

* Stade-Holtzmann: "Geschichte Israels," ii.

† Volkskunde, pp. 186.

‡ Idem., pp. 197. "Münchner Allgemeine Zeitung," 1880, Beilage, No. 148.

§ "Smyrna," pp. 46, 51 (quoted by Andree).

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with the Arabs. In Jemen, on the contrary, the Jew has been more and more limited. Not very long ago he was engaged in agriculture, but, being excluded from that, he has gone the way of his brethren elsewhere, and been compelled to take up what pursuits were opened to him. The instance of the advance of the Jews in Aden is duplicated by those in Algiers under the French, and in Turkestan under the Russian Christians.*

Dr. Kempster, one of the immigration commissioners, made a special study of the Jewish agriculturists in Russia. His report indicates that the Jew needs only opportunity to become a good farmer. In nearly every case they have been forced to live in each community in greater numbers than the land would properly support, and yet the results are favorable to the Jews. It was found that those who intended to emigrate were expecting to be farmers in their new home, because that was the only occupation they knew. The laws have made it difficult, if not impossible, for the Jews to remain agriculturists, as they have been forced to live in the towns and cities. Much of the distress in Russia last winter was caused by the removal of Jewish farmers and middlemen from the soil just at harvest time. The evidence conclusively shows that the Jew who becomes an agriculturist loses his taste for other employments and becomes thoroughly wedded to the soil.

Whenever the Jews have been given opportunity, they have risen. Whenever they have been oppressed, the evidence of Ghetto life and similar restrictions have left their impress. Döllinger, Gregororius, Andree, Alsberg, Leroy-Beaulieu, and others unite in laying blame upon the Ghetto life. In the tendency of population to collect in cities the Jew has been the chief sufferer. When in the middle ages the uncultured masses were drawn into urban life, they were incapable of following trade. The aristocracy thought it belittling. The Jew became the scape-goat. His economic history has been as unfortunate as his social.

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* Andree, p. 130.

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If we find it hard to accept the awful tales of the middle ages, we have enough corroborative evidence in recent times. Alsberg * writes that in Prague, in 1786, there were twenty-nine to thirty persons in each Jewish house; in 1843 the number had been reduced to the still considerable sum of twenty to twenty-one persons. In Frankfort, in 1811, the average number of Jews to a house was fourteen. The injurious physical and moral results are seen in the fact that the more densely settled they are the more illegitimate children are born. In the year 1870 there were among the Jews in Austria the following percentages of illegitimate children: Lower Austria, 3.5 per cent.; Bohemia, 2.2; Mähren and Schlesien, 1.9; Galicia, 13.9; Bakowina, 44.8. It is noticeable that the general percentage of illegitimate births among the Jews is almost invariably smaller than among the Christians.

Another striking evidence of external influence is found in the appearance of Jews in different localities. Every one has noticed the contrast between the native American and the Polish Jew. A most marked contrast is found between the Spanish Jews, or Sephardim, who are scattered now through Northern Africa and Eastern Europe, and the Ashkenasim, among whom are counted the Polish and German Jews and many in the Orient. These differences may be accounted for by intermarriage and local influences. A noticeable fact which escapes the observation of few is the beauty of the Jewish women. The Jews take excellent care of their women, and their admirable family life in not only exhibited in feminine beauty, but in the small death-rate of children under five years. The force of this fact of the beauty of the women is particularly noticed in such a country as Morocco, where excessive persecution has developed very ugly faces among the men. The women, however, who are shielded as far as possible, retain the handsome characteristics of the race.

Collateral evidence, showing the influence of environment

* "Rassenmischung," 629.

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on racial characteristics, might be presented in the analogies found in the contrast between the Haytian and the United States negro, between the Normans in France and in England, between the Arab nomad and the Arab of Bagdad and Cordova, between the Germanized American and the Americanized German. Even in the history of the Jews themselves we find a nomad race of the desert become sedentary in Egypt, develop into agriculturists in Palestine, and following in the dispersion whatever occupations were open to them.

Environment has not only affected the occupation of the Jew, but, as we have seen, modifies the facial characteristics. If it is such a powerful factor, why should it not be used to improve an oppressed race? The writer maintains that centuries of development can only be undone by centuries of counter-development. If the Jew in Russia is said to have had sufficient opportunities given him to turn to agriculture, it is merely the assertion of ignorance or culpable ignoring of known facts. The laws of evolution are well enough known to warrant our giving time to experiments. Darwin and Wallace may have succeeded in developing new varieties within their lifetimes. Let us be content if we may accomplish something with the negro, the Jew, or any other "peculiar" people in such a limited time. The experiments of Baron Hirsch, in affording Jews agricultural opportunities, must not be judged for many years. There are centuries of habit to be untrained on those farms.

The friend of the Jew cannot deny that, in the first instance, the religious as well as economic opposition to Judaism is caused by its own exclusiveness. Of course this does not excuse persecution, but it helps us to understand it. The spirit of the Slavophile, who would drive all other races out of Russia, is but the counterpart of the spirit of conservative Judaism. Before accusing the one or the other too severely, let us recognize the existence of this same narrow spirit under the name of Chauvinism in France, and Philistinism in Germany, England, and America. The spirit which would prevent the production of Lohengrin in Paris, or the sending of paintings by French artists to Berlin, which retains

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Alsace-Lorraine at the expense of millions annually, the spirit which lays a duty on English books coming into America, or which keeps negroes out of the machinists' labor organization, is the same which drives Jews from Russia. It is *selfishness*, the lowest motive that incites men to action. Hourwitch says* of the Russian persecution: "Material benefit, that prime motive, is held out to the orthodox Russian middle-class as a bait for their support to the government, by identifying material interest with the safety of the present political system." The tyranny of Russia may or may not be as severe as the persecution of the middle ages. It is the more disgraceful because it exists at the close of the nineteenth century. The anti-Semitic spirit is not confined to Russia. A Catholic daily paper † published in Paris, commenting on the inability of a legitimate number of Jews to enter the Russian universities because of offensive restrictions, deprecated the perfect freedom of the Jew in the University of Paris. The recent effort to excite prejudice in the Chamber of Deputies against Jewish bankers is only duplicated by the similar experiences in Berlin. There is a paper published at Leipzig, ostensibly in the interest of the laboring-man, which actually devotes all its energies to inciting the people against the Jews. What can be expected from the uneducated in Germany, when the leader of the *Innere Mission* is a rabid anti-Semite?

In the *Century* for January, "Josephus" aptly says:

"To approach the Jewish question is to be confronted with every great question of the day—social, political, financial, humanitarian, rational, and religious. Each phase should be treated by an expert and specialist, for in each lies a deep, urgent, practical problem, which requires the wisest and most skilled handling; but however discussed or dealt with, there is one point of view which should never be lost sight of,—namely, the point of view of humanity. . . . First and foremost, we must be human if we would raise our voice on so human a theme involving the lives and destinies of so many unhappy human beings."

For the ultimate welfare of the Jew and of his neighbors, it is necessary that there should be a humanitarian movement within and without Judaism. The internal reform must be

* "Forum," July, 1891.

† "La Croix," Paris, October, 1890.

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effected by the Jews themselves. Strasburger says, * "The real life of Israel is rooted in the school. In the school lie her might, her cosmopolitan and historical significance." It is true that the Jewish schools have prevented the race from being illiterate, and, under the rule of the rabbis, have preserved Jewish traditions. It is also noticeable that no Jewish teacher, from Jesus and Paul to Spinoza and Marx, whose words have had value for *humanity*, has remained a Jew. The teaching of the orthodox Jew has been intended only for Judaism, and has often been more baneful than helpful. Mendelssohn, by purifying Hebrew speech, teaching and writing high German, gave the Jews a better standing, opened to them new ideas of the Bible, and paved the way for progressive acquisition of secular knowledge. So to-day, if the eyes of the Jews were opened to Biblical criticism, to see ethical teaching rather than theology in the Bible, and to scientific knowledge, it would lead to a community of ideas between Jews and Gentiles that would tend to destroy the present barrier of exclusiveness.

As early as 1840 a convention held at Frankfort-on-the-Main anticipated the liberal Jew of the present, by taking the advanced ground indicated in its three items of confession: 1. The Mosaic religion is capable of unlimited development. 2. The Talmud has neither dogmatic nor practical value. 3. No Messiah is expected nor a return of the Israelite to Palestine. It is not necessary for the Jew to discard all of his traditions, but he must eliminate the unessential beliefs and reach high ethical ground if he would purify Judaism. Jewish ethics have been distinctively national ethics. Even the beauties of the Psalms are marred by some of their teachings. Still there is latent in Judaism that which may be of great benefit to itself and the world if tradition be made subservient to progress.

On the other hand, we must recognize our duty to the Jew for the altruistic reason that we should aid the oppressed, and for the egoistic reason that the solution of this problem will enable us to solve the greatest question before our nation,

* "Geschichte der Erziehung und des Unterrichts bei den Israeliten."

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—the assimilation of races. We must see that the Jew has opportunity.

Chief Rabbi Adler (London) has given the key to the problem in the *North American Review* for November. What the Jews in Russia most need is "*Freizügigkeit*, liberty to circulate through the length and breadth of the land." The numbers are too great for a large proportion to emigrate from Russia. There is, however, abundant room for extension in Russia. Despite the hopes of biblical enthusiasts, Palestine is uninhabitable. Jews are now starving between Joppa and Jerusalem. The solution of the problem is to make room for the Jew and to prevent his resorting to his past gregarious habits. There are thirty thousand Jews in one colony in the heart of Chicago. In our large cities we must legislate not only against the Jew, but against all people who attempt to collect in dense colonies. There must be no discriminating legislation. We must guard against all cheap labor. All must be afforded the opportunity to rise above the "cheap labor" stage. Adopting this principle, the races hard to assimilate will ultimately die out, as the "poor Indian" has, under slightly different and much less commendable circumstances, or finally become an actual part of the blood and brawn of the nation, as the Slavs in Prussia.

While multitudes in Great Britain and America indulge in the easy, conscience-allaying practice of sending petitions to the Czar, while other citizens in great number raise a hue and cry against wealthy Jewish intrusion at Long Branch, or at jewellers' dinners, or against pauper Jewish labor in New York, let the sober-minded cultivate a scientific, humanitarian spirit. Thus will the happiness of Israel become the glory of humanity.

CHARLES ZEUBLIN.

CHICAGO.

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MACHIAVELLI'S PRINCE.

I.

ONLY Judas Iscariot has been more detested than Machiavelli, whom our early dramatists used to introduce as a villain into their plays. His name was used as a scare to children and as a synonym for Satan. Among his contemporaries were many men whose wickedness and cunning he commented upon, earning more odium for daring to write than they earned for daring to do. The cruel and crafty Spanish king, Ferdinand, holds a high place in the history of Spain; Leo the Tenth, a sensualist and a trickster, is popularly regarded as the model patron of a Golden Age; even the Borgian pope, Alexander VI., the most abominable of recorded rulers, has had no such persistent vituperation levelled at him as that which, for three centuries and a half, has blackened the memory of the Florentine secretary. His works were among the earliest pilloried in the *Index*, but, though forbidden, they were read by succeeding generations of theologists and politicians, and splashed with fresh abuse. To deny that they agreed with Machiavelli has been the common practice of the best men and the worst.

Nevertheless, we infer that the opinions of a thinker so vilified must be worthy of attention, if for no other reason than that they have not been overwhelmed by this great burden of abuse. The world does not go on throwing stones at mere phantoms; Machiavelli is still to be reckoned with. Surely the time has come for reckoning with him soberly and dispassionately. If he uttered truths, or only half-truths, we shall profit by knowing them; if he pût forth fallacies, we shall be able to disprove them, and so be happily rid of them and him forever. For either purpose, it is indispensable that we understand exactly what he meant. Disregarding the popular conception of him, sweeping aside the cloud of odium,

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we must approach him fairly and with no partisan intent; and this not so much on his account as our own; for though it is our duty towards the dead to see that their memory be not calumniated, much more is it our duty and our need to know the truth for ourselves,—unless, indeed, we are afraid of the truth.

Fortunately we can at last do justice to Machiavelli by simply employing in our examination of him those methods by which modern history and criticism are patiently excavating the past and letting it tell its own story, as the buildings and paintings of uncovered Pompeii tell their own story. Of great aid in this endeavor is Mr. Burd's recently published edition of "Il Principe," * that work of Machiavelli's, a knowledge (and more often an ignorance) of which has been the text of anti-Machiavellian polemics. On its face "The Prince" is a treatise designed to teach a ruler the art of government. It is wholly practical. Machiavelli does not pretend to discuss right and wrong from the stand-point of the moralist; he simply states that a certain line of action succeeds and a different one fails. To succeed is the ruler's whole business, because if he fails he ceases to be himself; a king without a kingdom is like a body without life. Looking out upon the political conditions of his time, and surveying the history of the past, Machiavelli's keen, undazed eyes discerned certain grim laws controlling the rise and fall of monarchs and States. That those laws are moral, in the sense that virtue is outwardly rewarded and wickedness punished by them, he saw no evidence. A State preserves its independence by being strong in brute strength: if weak, it will inevitably become the prey of a stronger neighbor. Superior refinement, a larger respect for justice, wiser laws, not these, nor any of the other attributes of civilization, avail against an enemy who, though inferior in all these, has power on his side. *Be strong* is therefore the first and last commandment for nations and princes to observe; and Machiavelli instructs them how to use their strength. He

* "Il Principe," by Niccolò Machiavelli. Edited by L. Arthur Burd, with an Introduction by Lord Acton. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1891.

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tells a prince that it is safer for him to be feared than loved; that he must not stick at any cruelty, provided it be necessary for the preservation of his State; to lie and dissimulate; to make a pretence of religion; to exterminate without compunction those rivals or rebels who will not submit; to indulge the masses with splendid shows; to play off the people against the grandees and so to weaken both,—these are among the precepts of Machiavellianism that most shocked the world; but instead of inquiring whether they were justified by experience or not, the world, after its usual fashion, set up a mad chorus of denunciation and assumed that it was guarding the Tables of the Moral Law from a ruthless and impious iconoclast bent on destroying them.

But to huzza for the Ten Commandments did not touch Machiavelli's case at all, because he had not assailed them. What he had done was to describe things not as they ought to be but as they were in his time, and to deduce the laws which actually controlled the public deeds of rulers. He supported every maxim by concrete examples, showing, for instance, how bribery was an instrument successfully used by Alexander VI. in obtaining the papal throne, and how reliance upon popular good-will wrecked the virtuous Soderini. Berate him as much as you like with proclaiming an immoral code, his answer is, "I but register facts, for which I am nowise responsible; show me that unselfishness and righteousness have been the first considerations of princes and I will gladly make correction. The princes I cite rose to power in the evil ways I have described; therefore I conclude that he who would emulate them must imitate them—that these methods inhere in the universal order."

In thus resolving to study man only on the political side, Machiavelli has been compared to the modern political economists who observe men wholly as commercial creatures, governed by the laws of supply and demand. We might further compare him to the physician who watches the action of diseases, and calmly writes a description of them, but without feeling called upon to express his abhorrence of disease, nor even to suggest remedies. Machiavelli differed from his prede-

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cessors in state craft in that he confined himself to observation and experience; by adopting the inductive method he broke away from the barren circle of abstraction in which the mediæval mind had vainly plodded.

But what purpose had he in giving to the world a work of this quality? Granting that his facts are correct and his conclusions sound, why publish them in such a fashion that they may teach other Borgias and Medicis how to become successful tyrants? To this question one class of Machiavelli's opponents deemed it sufficient to assert that he was a wicked man, who took a malicious pleasure in propagating wicked doctrines, while others insinuated that he wrote what he thought would please the particular Medici to whom he dedicated "The Prince" in order to secure favors and an appointment for himself. His apologists, lacking courage to make a bold defence, resorted to artifice. They hinted that "The Prince" had a hidden meaning which Machiavelli had not dared or cared to announce. A stanch republican at heart, he had written this book to expose tyrants and their iniquities so that republicans, being cognizant of their oppressor's wiles, could guard against them. Others, again, said that Machiavelli hoped Lorenzo de Medici would follow the fatal instructions given to him under the guise of ingenuousness, and so plunge all the more quickly headlong into ruin. I need not examine these various theories, which have provoked endless clatter among controversialists, because I believe none of them to be the true one. In this case, as in so many others, the straightest path is probably the path of truth. Machiavelli wrote in good faith. He saw Italy the prey of foreigners: the French, the Germans, and the Spaniards fought over her spoils; her provinces were overrun by mercenaries and robber barons; her cities were torn by the quarrels of fierce nobles or implacable factions. Before she could hope for peace or security two things were necessary: she must be united, and she must be free. But unity was of more immediate importance than freedom; for as long as the foreign "barbarians" remained, the evils under which she groaned could not possibly be cured. But to drive out the

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barbarians the Italians must rise and act in harmony, and this they could do only when they had a leader strong enough to command them. It was inevitable that such a leader would be a tyrant, since a tyranny was the form of government natural to that age; no matter,—better for the present one tyrant than twenty; and after he should succeed in ousting the foreigner and in building up a national State, it would be time to think of discrowning him and of establishing a freer government. He must prove his fitness by overcoming his rivals; therefore, he must needs know the methods that they would employ against him, and the rules by which, according to the sure witness of history, a prince may conquer and command. These methods Machiavelli unfolds in his book, these rules he sets down as dispassionately as the chemist states his formulas, in order that the prince, the liberator whom he dreams of, may be adequately equipped. To fight fire with fire, to surpass in cunning antagonists who are masters of cunning, to use the weapons at hand instead of waiting for better weapons to be invented,—these were the lessons Machiavelli inculcated. And as at the moment he completed his treatise Lorenzo de Medici was the prince who seemed best qualified by fortune and talents to achieve the great enterprise, to him the work was dedicated. Doubtless Machiavelli hoped that it would bring himself employment, but it is idle to suppose that that hope was the original or even the chief object for which he wrote.

This explanation, I believe, represents more nearly Machiavelli's purpose in "The Prince" than does any of the other theories which his enemies and his apologists have set up. Unless it be the true one, the last chapter of "The Prince" is superfluous and meaningless, and the omission to discuss republics is inexplicable. That he deemed his scheme feasible, there is good reason to affirm. A man who had witnessed such vicissitudes and changes as he witnessed during the twenty years previous to 1513—the year when he wrote "The Prince"—might well imagine that the change he most desired—the expulsion of the foreigners—lay within the radius of possibility. The very nearness to success of Cæsar

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Borgia's attempt to make himself lord of Central Italy—"I had prepared against every accident but one, my own ill-health, and that has ruined me," is the substance of his explanation of his failure—fortified Machiavelli's belief that the task could be accomplished. To educate the prince who should undertake it was accordingly his purpose.

And here I might leave him and his terrific manual were I only concerned in clearing up misapprehensions of immemorial standing; but I have a far deeper concern than the mere rectification of an historical verdict or the rescinding of a bill of attainder unjustly passed upon a man dead three hundred and sixty years ago. The question, Why was "The Prince" written? would have chiefly an antiquarian interest to us were it not involved in the far more important question, Is "The Prince" true? A shocked world has protested generation after generation that Machiavelli's doctrines are false and diabolical, and yet, despite shouts and protests, these doctrines loom up generation after generation to challenge the world's pleasant optimism. Their vitality argues that they cannot, like the Indian devils, be exorcised by a loud beating of tom-toms. Fallacies, we know, are hard to kill, and lies travel far; but why should men keep on assailing Machiavellianism, if, as they assert, it was long ago proved untrue? Why not let it moulder in oblivion along with Ptolemaism, belief in witch-craft, and all other exploded systems, which no man of sense thinks of refuting? Why, but for the reason that the truth in it keeps it alive and endows it with as much interest for us to-day as it ever had for men in the past?

How much, then, and what parts of it are true? Did the rules of action which, Machiavelli declares, characterized the princes and States of his time prevail before his time? Have they subsequently been replaced by other rules, and, if so, when were they replaced?

No one competent to speak will deny that Machiavelli has dissected with a surgeon's skill the political morals and practices of his own age, not only in Italy, but in all Europe. So far as I can discern, there was not then a ruler nor a State that was not guided by selfishness; not one that recognized the

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existence of a moral law, or of any law save that of self-preservation and self-aggrandizement. That might makes right, was the common creed. Brute force and unscrupulous cunning—the Lion and the Fox, as Machiavelli personified them—were masters of the world; and any one whose destiny it was to live at that time might well be forgiven if he failed to detect any honorable motives influencing the rulers of his own and other lands.

But that era was not exceptional in its disregard of right; it was very wicked and very cruel, and therefore its abandonment to selfishness resulted in unusually monstrous deeds, but the principle to which it bowed was not new. Go back through history, and you will see that principle everywhere dominant. The Hohenstaufens, and after them the Hapsburgs, prevailed in Germany not because they were juster or more righteous than their rivals, but because they were stronger and craftier. By the same means the descendants of Hugh Capet gradually made vassals of the great feudatories of France. In Saxon England the House of Wessex took the lead because it had the power. Charlemagne's empire was founded by the sword, and when the hand which held the sword grew weak the empire fell asunder. Go back still farther: follow the expansion of the Roman State; see how the sturdy men of the Tiber encroached first on their Latin neighbors and then spread, victorious, over all the antique world. Did they subjugate Sabines and Etruscans, Greeks and Gauls, for any other reason than that they were stronger? We are not concerned to examine whether the triumph of force was not often beneficial, but merely to determine whether any other principle than it dominated the affairs of States in ancient times. Force may be the instrument of a highly-civilized or of a savage race; in either case, it respects no other agents. Sometimes it is in the hands of a polytheistic Assyrian, who therewith makes captive monotheistic Jews; sometime a barbaric Brennus wields it to crush more civilized Romans; sometimes a Trajan or a Hadrian uses it to defend civilization against the assaults of barbarians. Evidently we cannot assert that force was always on the side of the more enlight-

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ened or the more righteous: it created the civilization of ancient Rome, and it swept that civilization away.

So far, then, as history up to the sixteenth century shows, Machiavelli gives a faithful statement of the means by which nations were won and ruled and lost; not, indeed, that he furnishes a complete explanation of all cases, but that, so far as he goes, he is correct. What we call Machiavellianism was a constant influence up to and including his own age; has it been superseded by other influences since then? I hardly think that any one conversant with the history of the past three centuries and a half will be bold enough to say that it has. Great as have been the territorial changes in Europe—not to mention other continents—during this period, and radical as has been the revolution in the theory of internal government, the attitude of States towards each other has remained Machiavellian.

To confirm this statement I need only refer briefly to the chief events and the dominant men of the past hundred years. The vast forces let loose at the French Revolution were caught up and controlled by Napoleon, who converted them into an engine for achieving his magnificent but unscrupulous designs. His motto was, "God fights on the side of the heavy battalions," and he remodelled half of Europe regardless of every consideration except his interest. When he fell, Metternich became the shaper of European politics,—Metternich, a Machiavellian of the vulpine rather than of the leonine species. In reading the famous eighteenth chapter of "The Prince," do you not feel that Machiavelli must have had the Austrian chancellor in mind when he wrote it? "The successful ruler," he says, "must seem all piety, all good faith, all humanity, all integrity, all religion. And there is nothing which it is more necessary to seem to have than this last quality; because men in the mass judge more by the eyes than by the hands, because it belongs to every one to see, but to few to touch. . . . Therefore let a prince take care to conquer and maintain the State; the means will always be judged honorable, and be praised by every one; because the multitude is always taken by what appears, and by the result of an

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event." How many of the pious protestations and moral reflections in Metternich's despatches were evidently inspired by this purpose! And how little his acts corresponded to them! After Metternich came Louis Napoleon, whose career began with the *coup d'état*, and who held France in check for twenty years by the simple Machiavellian device of amusing the masses with pomp and parades, and by tickling their vainglory. And then Bismarck, who had real force on his side, pricked Napoleon's bubble of sham, and with Bismarck another leonine Machiavellian rose to arbitrate for Europe.

Let me again point out that it is not here a question as to whether Europe has been benefited by the creation of a United Germany in the place of many petty German States; we are simply trying to discover whether the creation of the German Empire was due to any other agent than superior force. Prussia robbed Denmark of her provinces, whipped Austria, coerced Hanover, and crushed Napoleon, because she was stronger than they; the question of justice is not even debatable. According to any theory of justice which obtains among civilized individuals, it is as monstrous that a large State should domineer over a small State as that a man six feet tall should enslave his neighbor of only five feet. But this is the fact, an illustration of the doctrine that among nations might makes right. There is to-day no small State in Europe which owes its independence to the general recognition that it has a right to an independent existence; but solely to the antagonistic greed of the Great Powers, none of which will permit a rival to seize the spoil which many covet. But the conversion of Europe into a permanent camp is, of course, the most evident proof that the practices which Machiavelli formulated still survive, and survive with unabated vigor, in the conduct of the great States of the world.

The theory that the State can do no wrong, that its one concern is self-preservation, that success justifies itself, that might makes right; the idea, in other words, that while the individual is subject to ethical and moral laws, the State, being impersonal, is responsible to no laws, since it is its own lawmaker, was never more prevalent than at the present time.

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Whatever may be their professions, governments show by their practice that such motives as these—and these are all Machiavellian motives—determine their policy. Men of science tell us that in the great struggle for existence in the animal world "the fittest survive;" we cannot truly assert that in the competition of human life the same happy result is reached. Animal strength, though a necessary element, is by no means the highest element in the constitution of civilized man. Indeed, as we rise in the scale of civilization, excellence among individuals is measured less and less by physical qualities: which is "fitter to survive,"—your invalid Darwin, your frail Emerson, or your robust prize-fighter?

But it seems that among nations brute force has hitherto been the one indispensable equipment; in the long run the battle has always been to the strong, whether he were Miltiades or Tamerlane, Charles V. or Von Moltke. The justice of the cause has had nothing to do with the result. We fall into the comfortable habit of thinking that, on the whole, the best survives,—an assumption as unwarranted as it would be to pretend that all octogenarians are better than younger men whom they have outlived.

If it be established, therefore, that history has but one commandment for rulers and States,—namely, *Be strong, or perish*, it follows that they are justified in any method of self-preservation they may adopt. From the logic of events there is no appeal. "The apology of an age," says Cousin, "is in its existence, for its existence is a decree and a judgment of God himself, or history is but a meaningless phantasmagoria." From this sentence of the modern philosopher we might deduce all the most startling corollaries of Machiavellianism. Machiavelli's work has contemporary importance, because in it he has formulated from the practices of rulers the laws which actually guide them. He dared to tell what the world does, leaving it to the moralist to say whether it does well or ill; and the world, instead of mending its ways, persecuted him for his frankness. For one of the crimes which society never forgives is the exposure of matters which, though known to every one, society agrees shall not be spoken of. But until

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this evil system of politics shall be outgrown, until the code by which States regulate their mutual relations shall be at least as just as that which civilized individuals respect, Machiavelli's "Prince" cannot lose its interest or its significance, and by none ought it to be pondered more deeply than by those who have most faith in the perfectibility of mankind.

II.

I have stated Machiavelli's doctrines as strongly as possible, because I believe that we cannot hope to find a cure until we know the nature and extent of a disease; but of course the world has made some progress, at least on the surface, since Machiavelli's time. Cruelty, for instance, is now the exception rather than the rule in the treatment of subjects by their governors, and in the dealings of State with State. Even in war, certain customs have been adopted by civilized combatants in the hope of mitigating the inevitable horrors of warfare. A conquered people is no longer given up to slaughter, nor its property to destruction, if the victor sees more profit to himself in sparing lives and dwellings, and in exacting an indemnity. Thus self-interest, if not humanity, tends towards a better condition. In the settlement of minor disputes, international law is generally appealed to, and we hear much talk about submitting the gravest quarrels to international arbitration. But the vital fact remains, that there is no authority which can compel any disputant to accept such arbitration, or can prevent him from resorting, if he choose, to violence.

And this marks the difference between an individual and a State: the former is amenable to laws framed by public opinion, and if they do not suit him his only recourse is to emigrate; but the State is its own judge, and it owes no obedience to any of its neighbors. The individual is responsible, a moral agent, towards the State; whereas the State is irresponsible, unmoral, and, like corporations, it has no soul. If Germany, for example, despoils Denmark of a province, and the other Powers will not interfere, who shall call her to account? A nation never yet passed a vote of censure on itself, nor can I foresee that it ever will. But its iniquities are punished by a Nemesis

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which operates none the less surely because its steps are hidden and often slow. It would be easy to show the process of ethical retribution throughout history,—how successes won unrighteously never in the end profited the winner, and how, if punishment comes in no other way, it consists in having a character which delights in iniquity. What if Rodrigo Borgia did succeed in making himself pope? To be the bestial villain that Borgia was would be the greatest punishment which could be inflicted on any decent man. We must revise our standards of success, whether for nations or for individuals: we must teach them that success or failure depends on what we *are*, not on what we *have*. In no other way can I discover any basis for morals or justice in the universal scheme. Rascals and robbers and frauds *do* secure the external badges of success; the virtuous man is not necessarily rich, or honored, or understood; Christ was crucified while living, his memory has been crucified for eighteen hundred years by its being possible that a Borgia should be called his vicar; lives as precious as Lincoln's life have always been at the mercy of assassins. Yet the majesty of righteousness remains untarnished and invulnerable; vice cannot do the work of virtue any more than folly can speak for wisdom. The prizes which fall to wrong are temporal and deciduous; it is character and not possessions which determines real success. These are venerable truths, but the many are still sceptical of them; the many still envy millionaires and titles, and still idolize success however achieved.

Machiavelli, it is clear, had only this external success in view when he wrote his manual for princes. The question of right or wrong concerned him no more than it concerned Shakespeare in drawing *Iago;* he was bent on making a perfect portrait of a great type, and he succeeded. His *Prince* is the concrete embodiment of the evil side of the nature of a State, just as Goethe's *Mephistopheles* is the concrete embodiment of the evil side of individual human nature. Where is the perfect man? Where is the heart that has never felt envy or hatred or wrath; the tongue that has never spoken guile or malice? But the State is merely the aggregate of one or more

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score millions of individuals, each of whom is in some measure imperfect: how idle is it, therefore, to hope to construct a perfect whole out of imperfect parts! Rather should we be astonished, I think, that multitudes so faulty can be organized into any sort of political cohesion, and that, though there has never been a government that satisfied its best citizens, there have been many governments which have been better than the standard of the majority.

Machiavellianism in States can be cured by the same processes by which Mephistophelianism in individuals can be cured; that is, by putting morals into practice, by obeying ethical laws. It is time to abolish the old falsehood that there is one standard of right for the single citizen and another for all the citizens collectively. If it is wrong for one to lie and steal and kill, it is wrong for a million to lie and steal and kill; yet a Cabinet of humane and respectable men, acting for the million and representing the impersonal State, have no compunctions against voting for a policy which not one of them would apply to his private conduct. They declare war, for instance, in the name of the State, but if any of them had a quarrel with his neighbor he would not deign to settle it by brute force. The impersonality of all corporations, and of the State, which is the largest corporation of all, increases the irresponsibility of individual members, and therefore opens the door for corruption. Everybody's business is nobody's business; the single citizen, unless he be endowed with rare moral sensitiveness, does not feel very keenly shame or remorse for the misdeeds of his government; at the most he is only one in ten millions who ought to bear the blame. By one of the strangest of metamorphoses every vote goes into the ballot-box as the expression of the views of a particular man, but all the votes come out as the expression of an abstraction, a political party. Of old it was the king, now it is the party that can do no wrong, and out of loyalty to it good but deluded men vote for wicked candidates and dishonest measures, just as they once blindly supported any iniquity their king might indulge in. Under cover of the impersonality of party the Machiavellian politician wins his tricks to-day.

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Charlatans and adventurers and demagogues would have no occupation were the majority of citizens both honest and enlightened. It was by rewarding the corrupt few and deceiving the ignorant many that Louis Napoleon, for instance, controlled France for twenty years. But how could quacks thrive if the average citizen were not easily gulled? Teach him to suspect all appeals to his self-interest and passions, teach him to abhor flattery, teach him to despise sham-glory and to know what constitutes true success, and you arm him against the wiles of any Louis Napoleon.

I see nothing for it, then, if we hope to reform the morals of States, but to educate and reform the individual members of the State. If we would forge a strong chain, we must make every link strong. Neglect of the individual has been the weakness of every social and political panacea concocted by Utopian theorists during the past century; they are all engaged in the hopeless task of making the chain before they have made the links, of building a perfect edifice out of imperfect materials. But in truth this is impossible; although a man exercises only a part of his functions in his relations with the State, yet his conduct in this respect, his performance of a citizen's duty, will depend upon his whole character. A bad man can never be a good citizen. We must start, then, with the individual; we must train him to be honest and unselfish; we must convince him that there are not two moral laws,—one for the citizen and another for the State,—but one single and inflexible law. And we may rely upon it that when the majority of the citizens of a nation have attained to this ethical level, they will choose representatives to make and administer their laws, who will not approve of public murder, or public bullying, or public theft, or public deceit. And as among civilized individuals it is not fear of imprisonment that deters them from laying hands on each other, but a principle more cogent than a hundred policemen, so will it be among civilized states.

Never was there a time when ethical education was more needed than now. The world is emerging from feudalism; governments are being thrown into the hands of all the citi-

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zens. Under an autocracy, it was natural that the ordinary man, having no political rights, should feel no civic responsibility; under a limited monarchy, the privileges and responsibility belonged usually to a class; universal suffrage makes every one a citizen and every citizen responsible. But let us not suppose that having adopted the system which establishes civic equality we have nothing more to do; that we can leave it to run itself, as the Thibetan puts his prayer-mill in a stream and goes off about his business. Since every vote is now to be counted, it is of infinite moment that every voter be worth counting, or we shall discover that this system, which gives no more voting value to an Abraham Lincoln than to a boot-black, will hurry us into evils without a parallel in history. The tyranny of raw and brutal and greedy millions would be worse than the tyranny of a Machiavellian prince. Democracy possesses no amulet against Machiavellianism; it offers, on the contrary, new fields in which the devil can sow and harvest. Democracy is the political coming of age of a people; but what individual ever found the temptations of manhood less insistent than those of youth? I have hinted at the manner in which party has become a weapon of Machiavellianism; had I space I could point out many other forms in which the same Spirit of Evil operates in our modern governments.

Regarding the State, therefore, as the sum of its individual members, I believe that its ethical improvement must correspond to theirs. But of course the mass can be elevated much more slowly than any of its parts. Time was when the individual was as selfish and as lawless as States now are; when he took what he could, and kept it till a stronger hand snatched it from him; when every man's house was in very truth a castle, fortified and garrisoned against his neighbor. That time has passed, and just as civilized men have come to understand that they prosper better by being friends than enemies, so will States come to a similar understanding. There is much talk about war being a permanent instinct among nations; not so very long ago individuals held the same belief. The days of dynasties are about over, and dynastic ambition was one of the chief sources of war. Monarchs

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and ministers still find their interest in persuading the populations that there are ineradicable causes of hostility between them and their neighbors; they strive, by every means in their power, to encourage such fallacies. They flatter cupidity by setting up commercial barriers,—tariffs which imply that one nation can reap advantage by crippling another's productivity. They would still have the foreigner treated as a foe and his goods as lawful plunder. But all the forces of invention and commerce are against them; and in time the factitious excuses for periodic bloodshed will be unmasked. Unless we misread the portents of history, the era will dawn, however long delayed that dawn may be, when the nations shall recognize their mutual interdependence and live like brothers together.

But let not this vision blind us to the conditions which prevail to-day. We are still at the stage when politicians and philosophers deny that a State has moral obligations, and when nations practice what these preach, that success justifies any crime and that failure is the only unpardonable sin. The best nations to-day have not risen above Ben-Franklinism; if they do not cheat their neighbors it is because they believe that honesty is the best *policy*. Yet even their adherence to Ben-Franklinism is only intermittent, and neither John Bull nor Brother Jonathan can always resist the temptation to drive a sharp bargain, or to bully a weak neighbor. Make the State represent the collective conscience of citizens, the majority of whom are enlightened and honest; judge its acts by the standard by which you judge the individual; abolish the notion that though the parts must be moral the whole may be immoral; restrict corporate impersonality behind which lurks corrupting irresponsibility—and Machiavellianism will be overcome. Overcome, I say, but not destroyed; for as long as mankind exist they will be engaged in the cosmic struggle between the forces of growth and the forces of decay, between good and evil, between selfishness and unselfishness; and never will they achieve a victory when they can say, "Henceforth we need struggle no more." At each successive advance the difficulties become more complex,—a more subtle

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Machiavellianism is personified in Metternich than in Borgia, —but the principles which lead to the triumph of righteousness do not vary in essence. It was inevitable that a mongrel and materialized Christianity, teaching a system of rewards and punishments dependent on anything but conduct and character, setting up a local and material Hell and Heaven, and in all ways turning the morals of individuals topsy-turvy, should have caused equal confusion in regard to the morals of States. It is the duty of all men who perceive that the moral laws derive their authority not from the fact that they were uttered by this or that good man in Judea, but from the fact that they are true and universally applicable; it is their duty to sweep away that old falsehood that rulers and governments are absolved from paying heed to those ethical principles to which every individual is bound. But before any State can have a conscience and obey it—and consider how long it was before any individual had a conscience—the members of the State must be moral.

WILLIAM R. THAYER.

ON THE FOUNDING OF A NEW RELIGION.

IT is astonishing to see how much is written nowadays on the above subject. We say astonishing because the proposition involved is, strictly speaking, in direct contradiction to the increasing progress of science. However completely a man may have departed from religious belief, he cannot but be profoundly touched—in proportion as his heart is filled with love for humanity—by the spectacle of so many persons to whom Christianity no longer offers a consolation; but who, instead of being content with a system of pure ethics, continue to seek a new guiding star to direct their lives. Such a phenomenon is full of significance to every one who recognizes that the "greatest happiness of the greatest number" is the highest aim of civilization; and this phenomenon is the more worthy of consideration from the fact

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that the great majority of the seekers after a new religion belong to the enlightened class. Not that we would declare all orthodox believers to be uneducated; for, apart from the education of the heart, after which they strive, without always attaining to it, we also find scientific culture among them; only with this difference, that they place religion above science, and dispute the latter's right to have any voice in religious matters. The firm adherence to traditional doctrines they share with the great masses, who are not in a position to acquire an education that has its root in real scientific development; but this common point of view and common aim unites the two classes into a compact whole, and warrants us in opposing them to those who desire progress above all things, and who look upon science as its fundamental condition.

We hope by these words to have removed the possibility of any misunderstanding of the following discussion. Nothing is further from our thoughts than to offend genuine believers. Their heaven-directed gaze is sacred to us, and we respect it as much as we despise the sanctimonious air of the hypocrites, whose efforts we shall always and everywhere combat to the best of our strength. We have no quarrel with the sincere believers. We cannot indeed come to a complete understanding with them, for we speak different languages. They place faith above knowledge, and their ideal is an age when the entire human race will be won over to faith. This is perfectly natural from their point of view. But the easier we can grasp this, the more incomprehensible does it seem to us that men whose starting-point is science should arrive at the same conclusion and aim at a religion intended to embrace all mankind.

For the imagination, faith has certainly great advantages over knowledge; its path is constantly widening, and the obstacles disappear in the same proportion as one accustoms one's self to set them aside, instead of seriously probing them. It is a delusion, however, to look upon everything acquired in this way as solid gain. That in all branches of knowledge profundity is synonymous with a contraction of the range of

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certainty does not argue against knowledge; it is simply a consequence of the abandonment of the entire series of assumptions that have been proved unsound; and since what is lost in this way is worthless, the loss is not to be deplored. With faith, on the other hand, every deepening is at the same time an expansion; the path of mere supposition is never abandoned, and with every new assumption a whole mass of additional ones are admitted. Faith is determined by impulse and not by thoughtful experience. Its seductiveness lies in the ease with which it absorbs everything. But the consequent satisfaction disappears as soon as it endeavors to prove its assumptions. And while in the realm of knowledge, criticism leads to greater depth, in the realm of faith it has its outcome in superficiality. Consequently, knowledge as the higher of the two is, in truth, the enemy of faith, and its ideal can only be a humanity without religion,—a humanity neither allured nor threatened by promises of the world to come, but guided simply by moral law, striving with every effort for perfection.

Whether this aim can ever be reached is a useless question, because the human race may become extinct before it attains it. Fortunately this possibility is so very remote that, with the countless weighty problems engaging mankind, only he who has nothing sensible with which to occupy himself can afford to give it serious consideration. As far as science itself is concerned, this question is entirely irrelevant, because true science is an end in itself, and can only proceed by the path of experience. That its progress along this path is constant is sufficiently proved by its own history. And as this very history proves conclusively that for real knowledge there exists only critical philosophy, it follows that between the latter and positive religion there can be no union. Every attempt at such leads to another than the proposed result; either philosophy passes over into religion and is no longer critical, consequently no longer true philosophy, or religion passes over into philosophy and is no longer religion. Instead of a union there is a conflict of life and death, ending with the annihilation of the one or the other. Still, the situation is not so very serious a matter as long as one

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of the two survives, which is the case in the conflict between philosophy and a revealed religion; but the founding of a new religion as "wisdom's highest end" would mean the merging of criticism into something imaginary, and nothing, strictly speaking, would be left.

The assertion that the religion which the present age is engaged in developing is not something imaginary, simply illustrates the extent to which the conception of religion has already declined. A great deal may, it is true, be implied by this term, and by viewing only its subjective phase we may come to think exclusively of the religious feeling with which we yield ourselves to an opinion, an occupation, an inclination, and speak of a religion of knowledge, of work, of friendship, etc. But is this in reality a religion? Or are we not indeed deceiving those who seek a real religion when we endeavor to satisfy them with such flowery phrases? Ever since Christianity has developed to a dominant, positive religion the notion of religion has become definite. Though many Christians may oppose various additions and demands of the Church, every true believer clings tenaciously to the fundamental principle, by virtue of which Christianity transcends mere morality and becomes a revealed religion. This fundamental principle assumes that his belief rests upon a divine revelation, insuring him a beneficent providence and guidance on earth, and adjusting the apparent injustice of this life in a better world.

And what, to judge from its general outlines, does the new religion offer in this regard? A revelation, or a tradition pointing towards a revelation, is of course out of the question, and still less may the idea of God be strongly emphasized, inasmuch as it is science which steps forward in the garb of religion. But what kind of religion is this, and what sort of science? A religion without a God is—taking the idea of religion seriously—a contradiction in itself; and a scientific religion is—provided the religious factor is to assume tangible form—a mystic science. But what is the distinguishing feature of a mysticism that masquerades as science? What but an unconscious or intentional abuse of

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speculation, for speculation can only then be said to be scientific when it is employed for the purpose of bringing the data of experience into a rational order. If, however, a mere assumption by the aid of speculation is put on a level with an actual fact, or one hypothesis is supported upon another, then, although the scientific form may be retained, the true scientific character is abandoned. This process may be traced through all scientific systems of religion; and as soon as the mystic veil becomes sufficiently dense, it is no longer a matter of surprise that, with the help of a *quaternio terminorum*, Nature, in herself neither good nor bad, should be stamped as benign, and quite adapted to take the place of the dethroned God. In this way we imagine that we have saved the moral order of the universe, and that we require merely a glimpse into another world of some kind to satisfy the longing for personal immortality—the most important thing to the religiously-disposed individual. Monism constitutes the chief difficulty. It cannot be abandoned if the present course of science is to be maintained. If, however, one has thoroughly worked one's self into a state of religious enthusiasm, one grows capable of grasping the other world without encroaching on the world to come, by representing it as that which remains after the transitory features of this world have passed away. And this is all done in a strictly logical fashion, logical proofs moreover being adduced, the correctness of which cannot be gainsaid, as long as the starting-point is accepted as correct. If one ventures the observation that the whole science of criticism falls to the ground the moment the "things in themselves," proved by Kant to be illusions of the brain, are made realities, one is set aside as an agnostic; that is, as one who is content to dispense with definite knowledge. For this term we are indebted to the new science of religion, which, as a matter of fact, attempts, after the fashion of the gnostics, to know more than man can possibly know.

To obtain a clear idea of the value of a religion established in this way, let us put the question—for whom is it to be created? Certainly not for the genuine believers. They desire a real God and a real church, and if they find in these

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their happiness, it would be cruel to rob them of it, inasmuch as they, like the unbelievers, have only one life to live. All that may, and at the same time *must*, be demanded of them is, that their belief shall not degenerate into fanaticism, and that they shall not interfere with those who believe differently. The new religion would, accordingly, be intended for those who are no longer content with faith, and who turn to science to find there the reconciliation between the individual and the great whole. But can a hybrid that is neither faith nor science be of any service to them? Why not rather offer them pure science in all its simplicity, but also thorough reliability? It is of the first importance for them to decide with full freedom and from pure conviction in favor of one or the other, and in order to do this they must recognize clearly that science cannot explain anything transcending the sphere of experience. It is true, one needs no small degree of renunciation in order to be content with the visible world. But whoever is not equal to this renunciation had better cling to belief,—to the true belief,—that promises him with absolute certainty a better life. While it is an undeniable fact that the churches are constantly losing ground, and the gigantic opposition which their adherents offer to a movement that is, in their eyes, a retrograde one, furnishes the strongest evidence for this fact; still it may be asked whether it is in the interest of progress to set up in the place of waning forces others that are much in the same condition? As for the notion that some sort of a religious institution is necessary to hold the masses in check, we do not even care to consider it, for this is the most objectionable abuse to which religion can be put. Such a purpose is only admitted in secret, and is certainly not present in the minds of any of the more prominent leaders of the most recent religious movement. On the other hand, there are not a few influential writers who regard the new religion as a mere transitional stage, by means of which the vacillating can be more easily won over and alienated from a real faith. But, to speak frankly, this would not be right either; because, first of all, it would imply a deception, which would not only seriously compromise the result, but as an offence against veracity would

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undermine the basis of morality. Moreover, no one can tell what the new religion would lead to, in case it assumed greater dimensions. That it would be placed upon a false plane cannot be denied, and that it would result in a cult of some kind lies in the nature of things, inasmuch as what chiefly distinguishes religion from the critical conception of the world is its influence on the emotions. This fact, in connection with the formation of a community, would naturally result in a species of church with a species of priesthood, whence, sooner or later, a new priestcraft would arise,—the very last thing desired by progress. "But," they tell us, "that is not what we want; our religion does not go beyond a simple doctrine of morality." But this proposition is not as harmless as it appears to be. Morality and religion are two entirely different things. Through the blending with religion, morality becomes something else. Whether we speak of a "religion of morality," or merely of an "ethical movement in religion," what is really offered is "religious morality," and what alone gives morality its religious coloring is mysticism. Be the admixture ever so small, still it affects the nature of the case, and by the law of necessity will tend to gain ground constantly. It was this very admixture of the mystical that gave primitive Christianity, which otherwise would have been simply a doctrine of morality, its religious type, and which has made possible its development into the present form. Its growth was due less to its propagators than to the circumstances which made it appear to man in the light of a heavenly blessing. In addition to this, it differed essentially from the heathen religions in giving expression to a conception of life which actually represented the inner life of man as something eternal. However paltry a religion created in our day seems as compared to it, it is impossible to estimate what the desire for reaction and pious cant might gradually make of it. Precisely the scientific basis—which is quite as heterogeneous to genuine belief as the latter is to genuine science—would lead it into a perfect labyrinth of distorted ideas. And whether at a time when hylozoism runs riot, and spiritualism can point to results that would do honor to the middle ages, a new religion might not

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become the refuge of the crudest superstition, only he who is not aware of the devastations brought about in human thought through the confusion of ideas can fail to apprehend.

But putting aside the religious element, and leaving out of sight the founding of a new religion, let us consider a doctrine of ethics "merely" touched with religion. What would this imply? In all bluntness, we would be obliged to confess that under any conditions such a system of ethics would not be characterized by a clear consciousness of the problems and aims of humanity, nor by the recognition of the origin of man and the perfection to which he may attain, but by a mysterious "something" which affects us the more powerfully the less we are able to lift the veil that prevents an insight into its nature. Such a system of ethics would be not only a retrogression; it would be an open confession that science renounces the possibility of creating a system of ethics in accord with her principles. The essential point of human life would be beyond the confines of experience; and man would need to be educated to strive for morality as a possession that the given world does not offer, and which does not exist for science. Let us leave to the believers their other world, and let us not increase their numbers by creating half-believers, whose false humility is not even ethical, since one can only be faintly attached to what one does not wholly accept. Let us educate our children in the proud consciousness that this is a glorious world for every one who strives for her gifts, at peace with himself and his fellow-man. For this we need no religion. In fact, it is only possible without religion, because there is no morality without contentment, and it is the highest degree of discontent to strive for something beyond this world. The objection may be raised, What are we to do with those countless numbers for whom there is nothing on this earth but privation? Surely, not to solace them with a semblance of happiness, especially valuable only to those who do not need it, but to help them as far as possible, and endeavor gradually to lessen their number, is the highest aim of a true system of ethics.

B. CARNERI.

MARBURG, AUSTRIA.

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AN ANALYSIS OF THE IDEA OF OBLIGATION.

In looking over the current Utilitarian ethical systems, many persons, not otherwise disinclined to accept a theory of this nature, must have been struck by the unsatisfactory treatment uniformly accorded to the idea of obligation. The fundamental moral force being placed in Altruism, or the love of our fellow-men, there seems to be nothing to do with the "ought," but to explain it as a relic of our training as children when we were subject to the authority of parents and teachers, or as the result of the handing down of certain customs, from generation to generation, till their observation has finally come to be a matter of instinct. Sometimes, indeed, the inadequacy of their theories, notwithstanding the element of truth they undoubtedly contain, is perceived in connection with some striking fact of the moral life, but in such a case we are bidden to note how an ideal may command. The face or landscape floating before the imagination of the painter allows him no rest till it is transferred to the canvas as perfectly as he is capable of doing it, and similarly a social ideal may fairly drive us on to do more and still more to make human life richer and better. This certainly is a step in the right direction, and yet even such a position as this seems still open to the most serious objections. For while it may doubtless be true that the perfect altruist recognizes in the words "the greatest possible happiness of the greatest number," a formula representing the sum of all he is striving for and longing to see attained, on the other hand the absolute egoist finds all *his* desire contained within the limits of his own personal happiness. Do we then make these two statements with the same indifference with which we might say, this little girl likes to play with her dolls, while her brother will have nothing to do with such a form of amusement, but spends his spare time at base-ball? By no means, for in the former case we approve of the likes and dislikes of the one and disapprove of those of the other, and say such

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and such *ought* to be this man's ideal, whether it really be or not. So that above and beyond all our accidental likes and dislikes, we feel there are certain things we ought to like, or at any rate certain things we ought to do. A comprehensive ethical theory is accordingly bound to give some account of the characteristic idea involved in such a statement, and to explain why we say, for instance, that a man ought to be benevolent, failing in which task it has confessed its impotence before one of the fundamental facts of the moral consciousness.

It is here that the intuitional school comes forward with an explanation of its own. It claims the idea of obligation is unanalyzable and unique, and is given us directly through the reason, the faculty of intuitive cognition. By means of this we know we *ought* to do this and that, utterly regardless of whether we are conscious of any desire to do it or not, and are accordingly convinced that certain ideals may properly be termed *right*, and others *wrong*. Such a hypothesis has at first sight so much the appearance of plausibility that it might be left to pass unchallenged, did not the introduction of a set of entirely new elements which it involves arouse the suspicion of an offence against the law of parsimony. But this being the case, it becomes necessary to examine it more closely, and try whether it may not be possible to arrive at a satisfactory explanation of all the facts by means of the simple principles which are and must be recognized to a greater or less extent by every school of thought. With this end in view, we will take a typical altruist and endeavor to trace the genesis of the idea of obligation in him.

The fundamental notion with which we have here to do is that of approbation and disapprobation. We begin by observing that the direction of this class of judgments is determined, in the first instance, at any rate by the fitness of things to the accomplishment of the ends that are the objects of desires. Accordingly the supreme ideal of the altruist being what it is, his approbation and disapprobation of particular actions will be distributed according as they are calculated to contribute towards its realization, *and this will be as true of others' actions as of his own.* Whether he ordered beef-steak

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or oysters for lunch yesterday he probably does not care, but it cannot be a matter of indifference to him whether he let slip an opportunity to improve his own financial condition, let us say, or that of a friend, to whom a word on his part might have been a great deal of assistance. For precisely this same reason it may be all the same to him whether his neighbor passes his leisure time in reading the newspaper or playing cards, but he does not feel indifferent any longer when the same man spends his evenings squandering the money his family need to supply them with the decencies and the comforts of life; for, with his broad sympathies, the privations and perhaps suffering thus entailed upon a group of dependent beings come home to him as closely as if they were his own. And this principle will hold good wherever he may look in the world. In so far as his desires are directed towards the happiness of his kind, the labors of those who, with him, are busy upon the great work of making man's life richer and better, will be viewed with approbation, while those who are engaged in pulling down the structure which he is helping slowly and painfully to build up cannot but be the objects of an intense feeling of disapprobation.

Where we are possessed with a strong desire for a person to do a particular thing, whatever it be, we do not allow matters to stop with a mere emotion of disapprobation when he fails to respond to our expectations; we appear before him with a demand that the deed be done, or under other circumstances that it be left undone, a demand which owes a large share of the energy with which it is expressed, not so much to the disapprobation pure and simple, as to the resentment against the offender which almost invariably follows in its train. Imperious natures do this upon the most trivial occasions, not only when another appears to be about to interfere with far-reaching plans of their own, but also when he exhibits little disagreeable traits whether in dress or habits. In matters of mere taste, however, the average man will not go so far as to make a formal complaint with a request that the offence cease; what agonies have many of us endured at hotel tables from certain peculiarities in the manners of the individuals oppo-

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site us, and all without anything more than an inner protest. But absolutely cruel treatment is almost sure to bring the cry of, halt! from the sufferer, if he possesses the slightest particle of energy in his disposition, and this demand will be echoed by the sympathetic spectator.

We may conceive of a grade of intelligence where every desire to have things act in a given way is immediately followed by a demand upon the person, animal, or thing to act in the manner desired. But with increase of knowledge we soon discover that certain things are possible, and others impossible, and learn to confine our demands within the limits of the former. We no longer command the wind to cease blowing, the lion to drop his prey, the Australian savage to understand Plato. And so, any one conscious of an unwelcome pressure of our will upon him has one way open to him (and but one, besides flight) to free himself from it, and that is to demonstrate the impossibility of a compliance on his part with what we ask of him.* The methods he employs with this end in view may indeed be various, but the underlying principle is always the same. Perhaps his arguments may reduce themselves to one of two forms. He may on the one hand try to show that the desire which finds expression in this particular demand is incompatible with and excludes the realization of some other stronger and more permanent desire which he knows us to cherish; for instance, that indiscriminate charity, although it would doubtless relieve a case of present need, would in the end do the receiver more harm than good; or he appeals to our interest in his happiness, and claims that the sacrifice we ask of him would cost him more than any one else would gain by it; or, taking a different turn, he appeals to our own personal interests and hints that insistence upon our demand will lead to its being made upon us, in due time, in precisely the same form, either by himself or others. On the other hand, the alternative is open to him to attempt to show that the general assumption in regard to

* This intimate relation between the conception of obligation and possibility, is recognized by Kant in his famous dictum, "Du kannst, denn du sollst."

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human nature upon which we have based our particular claim is false. He is a member of the *genus homo*, with all its general characteristics, to be sure, but with nothing more; accordingly, as he reminds us, when we appeal to something he does not possess, we are asking impossibilities. Whether the reasoning by which he seeks to establish his major premise is to the point or not, is in the first instance of no significance; provided he believes in them, he will not fail to urge them, and if he succeeds in convincing us we will withdraw the demand. Sometimes he may employ the *argumentum ad hominem:* judging by your conduct, you seem to find no motive within yourself for so doing; why, then, do you expect to find it in me? Or again he appeals to the facts of daily life; no man, he says, ever did such a thing; or if there has been one here and there who did, he must have been quite exceptionally organized, differently from me, at any rate. This is, on the one hand, a favorite mode of reasoning; on the other hand, one that somehow seldom operates to produce conviction. The great argument in his own mind for the impossibility involved in the expectation at the basis of the demand will always be the conviction that what is being asked of him he would never expect of another, while the secret consciousness that, were the places changed, he himself would be making this identical demand, is the only thing that can silence him.

The human race is so constituted that the pressure of one will upon another is capable of exerting no inconsiderable influence. Obedience is, after all, an easy matter, or the absolute monarchy would never have played such a part in history. In the army it may become through drill so natural as to almost appear to partake of the character of reflex action. The weak will never thinks of resisting, when confronted with a demand made with an air of perfect assurance that it will be followed with instant compliance, and to what length the power of one mind over another can be carried is shown by an incident related by Professor Preyer in his lectures on hypnotism. His two-year-old child was seated at the table, and was in the very act of raising a piece of *Zweibach* to its mouth. The father looked it straight in the

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eye, and in a very positive tone said, "You are not hungry." The child was hungry, for he had been without food for a considerable time, but the childish will was not even strong enough to affirm its own feelings in the face of the pressure exerted by the father's words, and, dropping the *Zweibach*, it said, "No, baby not hungry."

But if the impulses within the man, combined with the pressure arising from the fact that he knows you desire and expect a certain action on his part, are not sufficient to produce it, then you have no means left you with which to work upon him, except the promise of a reward or the threat of punishment, legal or social. Then it is that the demand shades almost imperceptibly over into the command.

These facts, it is believed, are capable of explaining all the phenomena of moral obligation. "Ought" involves an affirmation accompanied by an emotion; as the former, it asserts the necessity of a given action as the means to the attainment of a certain end; as the latter, it changes its character within certain limits, according to the relation of the subject, to the end in question, it being possible to thus distinguish four different forms. But the element of constraint is always present, and gives it a distinct individuality throughout.

The first "ought" (in logical order) that appeals to a man is no other than Kant's hypothetical imperative, pure and simple. Take as examples, "I ought to take regular exercise," or, "I ought to take care of my health." As a proposition expressing a truth, the former is equivalent to, "I must . . . if I am to have good health;" the latter, "I must . . . if I am to accomplish the work I have set before me," or, "if I am to possess one of the principal sources of happiness," etc. It is by no means necessary that the desired end should terminate in self; on the contrary, a man who has any regard for the welfare of his child will say, "I ought to give him an education"; a man of patriotism, "I ought to take some part in the political life of my country"; the humanitarian, "I ought to cultivate all my talents and develop all my powers of usefulness." The corresponding emotion in all these cases is a pure feeling of constraint. This is due, on the one hand, to

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a certain unwillingness to undergo the required privation or pain (for we do not ordinarily speak of being obliged, except when some form of self-sacrifice is involved); on the other hand, to the more or less clear consciousness of the absolute necessity of the action for the realization of the wished-for end. When the will has been weak and we have failed to do what we ought to have done (in this sense), then we feel disapprobation of self and regret, mingled oftentimes with æsthetic displeasure and disgust.

The second form of the idea of obligation is the simple "You ought." Of this there are two quite distinct varieties. The first is that of mere advice, *e.g.*, "You ought to take regular exercise." This does not necessarily imply any interest for the other person, or a care whether he does it or not. It is simply another way of saying "You must . . . if you are going to have good health," the only difference between the two being that the former rather presupposes the existence of a desire on your part for the benefit to be gained, while the latter confines itself to a pure statement of facts. But the accompanying emotions are of a decidedly different nature where the action in question is viewed primarily as something that is necessary to the satisfaction of some desire or the realization of some end of my own. When I say to a man, "You ought to educate your children," this is indeed only interpretable as, "You must . . . if your children are to be prepared for the highest happiness and usefulness." But if the welfare of this group of dependent beings is an object of personal concern to me, it calls up a far different set of feelings than if I am doing nothing more than directing the attention of the father, in an indifferent sort of way, to the relation between the education of the young and success in life. What is affirmed in the one case with all the coolness with which one might lay down the proposition, $A = A$, now takes on more of the nature of a demand, and the accompanying emotion is the consciousness of a desire to *constrain*, to bring a direct pressure to bear upon the other's will. These same feelings will evidently be present when I say, "You ought to devote yourself to the service of our Fatherland,"

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or, "to that of humanity." In case of the failure of the other to respond, we have once more disapprobation and dislike, and in this instance, perhaps, the additional element of resentment.

But the more impersonal forms of obligation are those with which the notion is generally associated, so that they will be recognized as the most familiar. In the case of the "I ought," this appears, when to the feeling of constraint, due to the necessity of the action to the attainment of the desired end, is added the consciousness of the pressure of other wills,—in the last instance, that of the whole community upon my own. The impersonal form of the "You ought" is composed of a similar group of elements. Here I feel that the desire which motives my demand is shared by others, perhaps by all, and that among this number would be the very man himself, if he did not happen to be the one called upon to make the necessary sacrifice. Hence, not only the objectivity of my judgment, but also the feeling of security with which it is put forth, for in the consensus of all I see the proof that nothing impossible has been asked for. Hence, too, in case of a failure to comply, the feeling that it is not so much I as "humanity in me," that has been defied.

It is here that the theological "ought" finds its systematic place. In this case it is the Deity instead of a fellow-man or society in general who expects the action from me, or whose approval and sympathy I know accompany my demand upon some third person. For one who *realizes* the existence of God, the impulses to respond to an expectation coming from such a source are of very great strength. To the tendency, so natural to man, to guide one's actions by what others approve and disapprove, are here added the consciousness of the fruitlessness of all opposition, in view of the omnipotence of the Creator, and the gratitude set flowing at the thought of his love. In bringing one's will to bear upon another, the belief that an omniscient Being echoes our demands gives us a feeling of confidence in the possibility of compliance (as above defined, page 503), such as could scarcely be attained in any other way. All these factors combine to give this form

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of the feeling of obligation at first sight an entirely unique character. But it will be found on examination to be made up of just the same elements as may be met with under the various conditions of human society, differing from anything this latter has to show only in degree.

We are now able to explain without difficulty how the æsthetic taste can be a source of the feeling of obligation, a rôle it plays (though usually under another name) in a great number of the intuitional systems. We have seen that the range of our demands has a tendency to extend itself till it covers the entire field of our personal likes and dislikes, the urgency with which compliance is insisted upon of course diminishing with the intensity of the desire, till it finally dies entirely away. If the thought of drunkenness or promiscuity is disgusting, this will accordingly be ground enough to make me condemn it as wrong, *i.e.*, as something that ought not to be indulged in. If the courage required to face the truth is for me an inspiring sight, I will never allow myself to be disappointed of an expected exhibition without a protest and a lively affirmation of contempt for the cowardice displayed. The same principle holds of the pursuit of culture, the struggle for freedom, and all those traits of character which impress and delight a spectator, and which Martineau and many other intuitionalists place in the list of duties. Each of us has an ideal of society more or less distinctly outlined in imagination, which, like the artist, he wishes to behold transferred to the canvas of life. Upon this grand painting every member of the human race is working and must work, either for better or worse, the overwhelming majority confined to some little square; a few, however, engaged in outlining great sections. In proportion to our interest in the work must necessarily grow the imperiousness of our demands that no one spoil the painting, either in plan or execution. And this is just as true where our ideal is an æsthetic one—where what is desired above all else is a state of society that offers an interesting, inspiring, or picturesque spectacle—as where the only condition accepted as satisfactory is one in which the greatest possible happiness of the community is realized.

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The broad range of our actual ordinary judgments of approbation and disapprobation is, at first sight at least, one of the most perplexing facts which the utilitarian theory is called upon to explain. There is no doubt that the lists which the intuitionalists draw up correspond more nearly to the instinctive judgments of perhaps all of us than the utilitarian is ordinarily willing to admit. The latter quietly selects out of all the various grounds upon which approbation and the contrary are commonly dealt out, a single one, the feeling of altruism, and confines his demands to what this requires. Such an operation is apt to strike one as exceedingly arbitrary, but in reality it is quite the reverse. For it is based upon a clear perception of the limits of the possible (as above defined, pp. 503–4); above all, of the compossible,—to borrow an expression from Leibnitz. For, turn and twist and hide your real meaning behind high-sounding words as you will, the attempt to enforce mere matters of taste is simply calling upon another to make sacrifices in order that you may enjoy the pleasure of seeing them done, a proceeding which is absolutely inconsistent with the true spirit of altruism. Not that the man who has awakened to this truth henceforth becomes a stranger to the impulse to set up indiscriminately his various likes and dislikes as a rule for the action of others; but he controls it, just as he does the impulse of revenge. And it is a fact well worth noting that, after all, as far as his demands are concerned, the æsthetic moralist keeps fairly well within the limits of what is required for the welfare of society. Of course he scorns to justify them by a reference to their relation to the same, but none the less some such relation will usually be found to exist. From which it would appear that even in the temperament which has produced this school of thinkers, a greater or less share of altruism must enter—though, without doubt, unconsciously—to reinforce the taste before the latter feels strong enough to urge its demands in the face of the opposition of a refractory world which knows very well how to set limits to all arbitrary law-giving.

If it be true that whenever we want a person to perform a certain action, we have an instinctive impulse to impose an

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ought, it may be asked why the absolute Egoist does not feel the world *ought* to serve him. For in such an instance there is no altruism to restrain him, as was assumed in the cases just cited. But we have seen that we limit our demands by our conception of possibilities, too; and so, ignorant, as we suppose him to be, of what a disinterested impulse means, he never expects anything else than that his fellow-men will try to cheat and get ahead of him, just as he is trying to do to them, and feels no more surprise or resentment towards them when they succeed than he might at a wild beast holding him in its clutches. He would accordingly as soon think of demanding mercy from the one as from the other.

It is now possible for us to justify the apparently paradoxical statement that right and wrong are always used with tacit, if not express, reference to some ulterior end, and yet may be applied to ultimate ends, or to the adoption of ends as ultimate.* Given a person filled with the love of his fellow-men, and he must not only disapprove of all attacks upon their happiness; he will demand that they cease, and the sum of all his demands will be this: "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." For if I desire another to so regulate his separate actions that they will be in harmony with my ideal, so much the more will this hold of his choice of final ends, by which the former will be determined. If it be claimed that according to this view there are as many kinds of right as there are species of ideals, this is cheerfully admitted. If in accordance with the one it be true that "truth ought to be spoken," and with the other that "truth ought not to be spoken," here is no contradiction! For they are relative terms, like above and below, left and right, as when we say the sun has gone down at night, although to the inhabitants of China it is coming up. If no two persons had the same ideal, we should no longer clothe our demands in the declarative form "you ought;" we should confine ourselves to the imperative instead. As a matter of fact, however, we find we may assume the wide-spread existence of

* See Sidgwick's "Methods of Ethics," p. 63, (4th ed.)

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certain emotions in greater or less intensity, and where they are absent we simply exclude the person from the class of moral beings. With the exception of such isolated cases, we know certain demands are sure to awaken an echo, be it faint or strong, in every human breast. In other words, on account of the practical uniformity of human nature, there is a practical uniformity of demands, and therefore in the use of the terms "ought" and "ought not;" so that we really apply them with a precision which could only be equalled by such an expression as "The sun is going down," in case there were no antipodes.

If all this be true, however, a man without the trace of a disinterested impulse could never say *to himself*, "I ought to love my neighbor," any more than he could pull himself up by his boot-straps. Where apparently through-and-through selfish men actually do this, it is due to the fact that they feel, at least in quiet hours, when self has withdrawn a little for the time, the impulse of altruism or the charm of a beautiful character, to the attainment of which unselfishness is a necessary condition; one or both being combined perhaps with the consciousness of the pressure of the will of another or others upon them. And, although the absolute Egoist is doubtless a mythical creature, I think we may convince ourselves of the essential truth of this position by the results of a single attempt to awaken moral ideas in one who approaches anywhere nearly this type. When you can find nothing either in heaven or on earth that he cares about, you will talk to him of obligation in vain.

The part played by the pressure of a foreign will in the phenomena of moral obligation explains the intimate relation between "you ought" and "you must." In the former case we assume the existence in you of an at least latent desire corresponding to our own, which the pressure of our will may awaken. I take it for granted that my ideal will find at any rate so much of an echo in your heart that it will command approval in the abstract, even if it be not able to rouse you to action in this particular instance. I assume, in other words, that you would like to see the action done, if it were not for

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the fact that in this particular instance you must bear the pain or toil of doing it. On the other hand, when I say "you must," I presuppose no such ideal in you, but am none the less determined to have my own way. I accordingly try to work upon the natural impulse to obedience already noticed, or, this failing of its effect, appeal to the sole motive there is left, namely, to force or to the aversion from pain. The only *ought* that Paley's ears were able to hear was in reality just such a must, as is evident from the report he gave of it. "A man is said to be obliged," he tells us, "when he is urged by a violent motive resulting from the command of another,"* and, as is well known, this "violent motive" consisted in the fear of eternal torment on the one hand, and the hope of eternal happiness on the other.

It thus appears that when the element of *the good*, or of that which is capable of clothing itself in the form of an ideal, is taken out of the conception of obligation, this latter degenerates into what is nothing more than mere submission to an arbitrary imperative. For this reason it can never be the fundamental fact of the moral experience. It is true that we have a natural impulse, as already remarked, to yield to the pressure of the will of others, especially when this pressure is felt as that of the will of the omnipotent Creator and Preserver of the universe, and the workings of this tendency are often very strikingly displayed in the sphere of morality. But the unconditional surrender to mere power can never meet with the approval of a through-and-through altruist, nor is it even in harmony with the ordinary judgments of every-day life. Prometheus chained to the rocks for bringing the gift of fire to the wretched barbarous inhabitants of the earth, in defiance of the will of the "Father of gods and men," is one of the grandest productions of the human imagination. And were the Supreme Being such a one as Augustine and Calvin imagined him, we should despise the wretched slaves that licked the dust at his feet. The authority of the Deity does not lie in his infinite power, or else we will

* Moral Philosophy, Book II., chapter ii.

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have to admit that "might makes right." It is only as we believe him a God and not a Devil,—that is to say, when we find in him the same ideals which appeal to us, and which we long to have control us more absolutely,—then and only then can we feel that what he wills is right, and even then the man of uncompromising morality complies because it is right rather than because it is commanded. Religion may indeed give us much that will strengthen the impulse to virtue. To it we may owe the support, due to the assurance of the sympathy of at least one other being in the universe, in all that we do. To it, the steadying influence arising from the consciousness that the eye of one is upon us who sees and notes each action great and small, and who can read the profoundest secrets of the heart as the words upon an open page. To it, above all, the joyful assurance of the final victory of the cause for which we battle. These are great and important services, but farther it cannot go. For the will of God in itself is incapable of supplying us with the foundation for the distinction between right and wrong. This must be sought in something that appeals to us as a good, and the ultimate criterion by which we measure out approbation and disapprobation can be given by nothing else than our chosen ideal.

FRANK CHAPMAN SHARP.

BERLIN.

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BOOK REVIEWS.

REPORT UPON THE RECENT LITERATURE OF ETHICS AND RELATED TOPICS IN AMERICA.

[Continued from the *April number.*]

1. CALMIRE. New York: Macmillan & Co., 1892. Pp. v., 742.
2. THE ETHICAL PRINCIPLE AND ITS APPLICATION IN STATE RELATIONS. By Marietta Kies, Ph.M. [A dissertation for the Doctorate at the University of Michigan.] Ann Arbor, 1892. Pp. iii., v., 131.
3. THE ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY OF SAMUEL CLARKE. By James Edward Le Rossignol. [A dissertation for the Doctorate at the University of Leipzig.] Leipzig, 1892. Pp. v., 97.
4. HUMANITY IN ITS ORIGIN AND EARLY GROWTH. By E. Colbert, M.A., formerly Superintendent of the Dearborn Observatory, and (*ex officio*) Professor of Astronomy in the (Old) University of Chicago. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1892. Pp. 409.
5. A DIRECTORY OF THE CHARITABLE AND BENEFICENT ORGANIZATIONS OF BOSTON, TOGETHER WITH LEGAL SUGGESTIONS, ETC. Prepared by the Associated Charities. Third Edition. Boston, 1891. Pp. xii., 351.

1. "Calmire" is the title of a novel just published by Macmillan & Co., a work belonging to the general type of ethical and religious tales of which "Robert Elsmere" gave so noted an example a few years since. The present work, however, differs otherwise very widely from "Robert Elsemere," as from most of its fellows and rivals, and has to be judged by a decidedly different standard.

"Calmire" appears anonymously, but the present reviewer doubts whether, in case the book receives the attention which it deserves, there will very long be great difficulty in discovering who wrote it. The author's quality and attitude are in many ways so finely and frankly revealed, that, if I am not much mistaken, his personal friends, recognizing the rarity of his temperament and training, are likely to find out at once, upon reading his pages, with whom they have to deal, and that without any further direct hints or confessions from him. He has no reason to be ashamed of his offspring, and yet, for the moment at least, it would be necessary to respect his wish as to the suppression of his name, even if one were mathematically certain of the man; and, of course, our guesses, even when, from our personal point of view, they seem most assured, may as well remain without further expression. In any case, the author, as he deliberately shows himself in his pages, is a "whole man," and one of an enviable type. One has to picture him as about the age of his principal hero, the elder Calmire, and as, like this hero, a man of the world rather than a man of letters. He is widely read, and knows well from observation how a book should be made; but he has not heretofore been regarded as a writer. His work accordingly lacks proportion and finish. The worth of it lies rather in the stuff than in the shape, and in the author's personality rather than in his theories. He himself has seen much, has suffered much, and has even dreamed much; but he prefers to be known to his acquaintances chiefly as an admirer of scientific methods and as a

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lover of cold facts. The bitterness of life, meanwhile, has not been able to affect his true gentleness of heart. When he criticises, he does so with a certain austerity of judgment that young men and ardent believers in traditional faith will find a little cruel. There is something acid and merciless about his manner as an opponent; but as a friend, as a lover, as an adviser of the erring, as a sympathetic helper in an hour of grief, he shows nothing so much as a noble simplicity and kindliness. This simplicity of mind guides him also as he studies the great theoretical problems to which his novel is largely devoted. He is a Spencerian both in morals and in his whole attitude towards the questions of philosophy and religion. There are not many Spencerians as firm in the faith as he is, and he knows it. He asserts repeatedly and earnestly that the reason for this firmness is the profoundly "scientific" character of the Spencerian formulas,—their completeness as expressions of the great recent advances of human knowledge. It is obvious, however, to the dispassionate reader, that our author actually, though unwittingly, admires in Spencer the elements which Spencer's doctrine, in common with others, has derived from a vast number of the world's great thinkers, ancient as well as recent, rather than the more peculiar qualities which characterize Spencer himself. The creed which the elder Calmire teaches in the latter part of this book is really in no wise confined to the results of recent science. And when a man such as our author has learned pretty nearly all the philosophy that he knows from Spencer, his reverence for Spencer is, in fact, unknown to himself, a reverence for philosophy in general, including the "old metaphysics" which he professes to despise as opposed to what we shall have learned only since Darwin's time. There are people who, if they were to read the Sermon on the Mount, or the Dhammapada, for the first time in their lives, not having heard of these documents before, would easily be convinced *a priori*, by the depth and dignity of the ethical teachings, that such great thoughts could only have arisen on the stage of evolution which Darwin and Spencer have lately rendered possible. But it is useless to ignore the history of thought; or to suppose that "science," while doing for us what it unquestionably has done, has also, and only recently, obtained insights which have, as a fact, long been among the most significant of humanity's intellectual possessions. Our author does not err in his historical notions as much as some do, but the historical is not the strong side of his teaching. And this I say in full consciousness of the enormous actual importance of the real contribution of science to recent thought.

Of the story itself the present reviewer can give hardly a hint. It opens unpromisingly. Not until the long book is half done are we really aroused. The close, however, is admirable. The heroine of the tale is a young woman of an almost superhuman graciousness of heart,—capable on the one hand of forgiving, with saintly condescension, her repentant lover, almost as soon as she first learns the truth concerning a very grievous wrong which he has done; incapable, on the other hand, of appearing visibly bored by even countless hours of Spencerianism and of evolution. By virtue of this divine patience under the long strain of argument, this lady far outranks even the plastic youth of the Platonic dialogues. For the elder Calmire, despite his really winning ways, is not precisely a Socrates to command attention; whilst from the younger Calmire

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the Platonic youth would have fled in scorn and terror. The scenes of the story are laid amidst an environment of luxury. The characters row, drive, sit together in beautiful houses, and philosophize. It is the younger Calmire, who, beginning the attack, discourses to the lovely lady concerning modern science and its outcome, ethical and religious, throughout the first portion of the book. He himself is a crude youth, fresh from college. His views are permitted to appear very negative and extravagant. At first one finds him an extremely disagreeable person, and wonders what the heroine can discover either in him or in his philosophy. Later on in the book, when under suffering, the young man develops more strength. At best he is never quite worthy either of the heroine's love, or of the prominent place which the author gives him. A moral catastrophe, whose complications one must not here reveal, but whose nature is quite familiar to those who know either fiction or youth, suddenly interrupts the hero's wooing, and, revealing an earlier fault of his life, sends this young man into temporary exile, whence he writes frantic letters to his uncle, the elder Calmire, and a diary of penitential reflections. In his inmost heart he is still uncorrupted, and in time he recovers himself and his moral insight, and finally even his long-suffering beloved herself. Having so sweetly endured his philosophical conversation, she is prepared to forgive in due time even his sins.

On the departure of the younger Calmire into exile, his uncle, a widower, whose heart also is not untouched by the heroine's loveliness, but who nobly represses his feelings, now takes the word. The popularized Spencerianism of the first part of the book has been permitted to seem often boyish and flippant. This first part is entitled "Chaos." The second part, entitled "Cosmos," sets forth, in the elder Calmire's speech, a teaching which, in its outcome, proves to be a sort of Esoteric Spencerianism, or, to borrow the Buddhistic phrase, a Spencerianism of the "greater vehicle." Here, as a fact, despite the length of the discussions, one reads with continually increasing interest. It is the author who now speaks through the person of his hero. Science, evolution, the moral order, the nature of right and wrong, the limits of knowledge, are all set forth to the unwearied heroine. But when, in a later conversation on the possibility of immortality, Calmire the elder (just then discoursing to his nephew) suddenly spreads the wings of his spirit, springs from the earth of the knowable, and soars, in a fine flight of metaphysical imagination, into the possible realms that *may*, for all we know, lie in the regions of the Inscrutable, transcending the limitations of space and of time, the philosophical reader, recognizing some very old and beloved friends in these thoughts, follows Calmire with a respect not unmingled with a certain gentle mirth. Truly, the Spencerianism of what we have ventured to call the "greater vehicle" promises to become in time indeed esoteric. But Calmire returns to the firm earth quite soon, and remembers that what he has been saying may be no more than a "form of words!" Best of all, however, in this part of the book, are the numerous passages in which Calmire sums up the results of a ripe experience. One may think what one will of the philosophy. One respects highly the man.

The ending of the novel is, as befits an evolutionist's tale, fairly joyous. The style of the work is unequal. The very numerous colloquial Americanisms, and the too frequent passages of inaccurate English, will be felt by many readers

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of taste as a serious drawback to their enjoyment. Yet on the whole the work is an important one, wherein a genuine ethical earnestness is well joined with a fine and manly vigor. The volume is too long, and will weary many. But it ought to be widely read.

2. "The Ethical Principle" is a thesis for the Doctorate, presented to the University of Michigan by Marietta Kies, now of Mills College, California. The essay, which contains little of novelty in its doctrine, follows the lines of the teachings of Dr. W. T. Harris, of Professor John Dewey, and of the late Professor Mulford, applies the ethical principles to the theory of the State, insists upon the inseparability of the principles of justice and of "grace" (*i.e.*, charity), and frequently dwells upon the essential agreements that lie beneath many of the seeming differences of ethical doctrine. There is a considerable wealth of illustration in the little volume, which is, on the whole, a modest and meritorious study, although marked by defects of style.

3. Decidedly more limited in the scope of the undertaking, but also much more important as a contribution to knowledge, appears to me another Doctor-Dissertation, that of J. E. Le Rossignol, a study which, although prepared for the University of Leipzig, and published there in English, may, as the work of a Canadian scholar, be claimed as belonging to this side of the water. The method is that of modern philological research; the foot-notes render verification easy, the historical outlook is broad, and this exposition and criticism of Clarke's ethics will doubtless prove of genuine service in filling a gap in the literature of the subject. Clarke's historical relations and his presuppositions are clearly set forth. The criticism, if not very profound or original, is wholesome and conscientious.

4. Professor Colbert's "Humanity" is a work of manifold learning, and of curious speculation. The learning, to be sure, in those few, of the many topics touched upon, concerning which the present reviewer has a right to possess any judgment, appears to be of a very unequal character; and one therefore feels considerable doubt as to the author's accuracy and insight in the wide regions where one cannot control his results. But as these regions include speculations of an astronomical, geological, and chronological character, one must leave to specialists the task of passing final judgment. The main theses of the book are presented in a final "Summary." The general doctrine of evolution is accepted and laid at the basis of the discussion. So far the author is on safe ground. He proceeds, however, to discuss when man was most probably differentiated, what great physical changes of the earth's surface led to his early migrations, and where the neolithic men of our hemisphere (*i.e.*, the northern hemisphere) came from. He speculates on the origin of language, the nature of primitive religion, the influence of primitive astronomical notions upon early faith and custom, and the source of the power of the priesthood. He asserts that the planets were the first gods reverenced, that the Hebrew Jahveh was a planetary god, that "the prediction of the Messiah was purely astronomical," and that "in a few score centuries hence the northern hemisphere will be partially submerged" for a period, "vast southern areas" being then uncovered. Lest we of the United States should be forgotten after this time of flood (whose physical causes he discusses in connection with speculations as to the succession of alternate

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northern and southern glacial periods), our author thinks that it "would be well for us to consider the propriety of erecting some durable monument in the United States to bear witness of us then."

Most of these opinions would concern the readers of this JOURNAL comparatively little were it not that our author includes them in a discussion which is intended to cast an especially strong light on the history and nature of religion, —a discussion, moreover, from which he draws several important morals as to the significance of human progress. On the whole, then, it is enough to say that the book is full of pretty confident assertions concerning some of the very darkest regions of the history of man's evolution. One questions whether such assertions will bring much light to anybody. One is quite sure that, in the present state of science, the author can prove very few of them, except the less important ones.

5. The "Directory of the Charitable and Beneficent Organizations of Boston" appears in a revised edition "after nearly six years' interval." The book is intended "especially to help those actively engaged in charitable work," and "it contains, therefore, many things beside descriptions of charitable societies." Among these "many things" one may note the "Legal Suggestions," which fill pages 287–316, and which are intended to "offer some general information" as to questions concerning the duties and rights of those with whom the visitors of the "Associated Charities" are likely to come in contact. This is one example only of the compact wealth of this authoritative little volume, which must interest those who are students of practical philanthropy, whether in Boston or elsewhere. To actual workers in benevolent enterprises in any American city the book must be indispensable.

JOSIAH ROYCE.

We have also received the following:

A PEDAGOGICAL LIBRARY. By Will S. Monroe, Superintendent of Schools, Pasadena, Cal. (Reprinted from the *Pacific Educational Journal.*) Oakland, 1892. Pp. 12. A brief bibliography for the use of teachers and of students of educational theory.

THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL PRISON CONGRESS AT ST. PETERSBURG. Published by the U. S. Government Bureau of Education, 1891. Pp. 253.

THE THEORY OF DYNAMIC ECONOMICS. By Prof. Simon N. Patten. Philadelphia, 1892. Pp. viii., 153. Vol. III., No. 2, of the Publications of the University of Pennsylvania.

Of the "Series of Modern Philosophers," edited by Dr. Sneath, of Yale University, and published by Henry Holt & Co., of New York, we have received the new volumes:

SPINOZA. By Prof. Fullerton.

REID. By Dr. Sneath. J. R.

CONTEMPORARY SOCIALISM. By John Rae, M.A. Second Edition. Revised and enlarged: Swan Sonnenschein & Co.

In a second and improved edition of an already good book, Mr. Rae brings copious and ready knowledge, vigor of style, economic grasp, and some asperity of tone to an expository statement and hostile criticism of contemporary

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socialism. By its title the work suggests comparison with M. Laveleye's similarly-named volume on the same subject. It will not suffer thereby. Mr. Rae's facts are more illustrative, his logical grip firmer, and his conclusions more definite. Put in brief, the drift of the book is that all that is good in socialism, popularly so called, can be justified; and justified, he would add, on the principles of "orthodox" political economy; and that whatsoever is more than this (by which we are to understand socialism strictly so called) cometh of evil in the shape of bad economic analysis; and goeth to evil in the shape of impaired industrial and commercial efficiency, and of projects unjust in their claims and visionary in most of their ends. This is the burden of a long new chapter on "State Socialism," the length of which (and it could be condensed) is justified by the author, not without reason, on the ground that it is into this "domesticated" form, this "shifty State Socialism" that "Socialism proper,"—*i.e.*, Revolutionary Social Democracy—is everywhere settling down. Gratitude is due to Mr. Rae, at the outset, for thus defining the thing he attacks. Cairnes (as Mr. Rae reminds us) had done the same long ago in his "Principles." But Cairnes, though one of the best, was not one of the most popular of economists; and, especially in a day when too many are in haste to call themselves, and too many to call their neighbors, "socialists," in both cases without reason, the need remains for making clear to the world what a socialist is, if only to prevent him from being compared with an average charitable gentleman on the one hand, and with a communist on the other. This need Mr. Rae supplies. It is, perhaps, a pity that on an early page (p. 6) he should have dropped a phrase which suggests that the socialist hope implies a swallowing up of private *property*, especially as no one knows better than he, or, indeed, makes it plainer, that socialism would be well content to leave us our private goods and chattels if it could but get rid of private *capital*. This, however, is but a slip which does not really interfere with the clearness of Mr. Rae's definition of socialism, which, as it exists at present, includes, on his diagnosis, three main features. First, the aspiration and effort after equality, material as well as moral and political; second, the insistence on this upon the ground (not of utility but) of right or "ransom;" third, the utilization of the State as the one adequate instrument for realizing the end desired. With the first of these Mr. Rae, like Cairnes, and, indeed, many a social reformer, is in fullest sympathy. Though not admitting things to be so bad, especially in tendency, as socialists make them, he does not defend the *status quo*. So far from defending it, he insists that a less unequal distribution of wealth is desirable, urgent, and, by the advent of democratic power, inevitable. "A penniless omnipotence is an insupportable presence." Nor is there wanting evidence enough in the pages of "Contemporary Socialism" that the most vehement opponent of socialism is not the conservative but the reformer.

Here, however, agreement ends. When we pass to the extent to which material equality is to run its course, the quarrel begins. And we cannot but think that on this issue Mr. Rae has taken judicious ground. There is a too easy Benthamite fashion of dealing with socialism,—to deny the existence of rights other than legal; and this done, to prove that as a socialistic pursuit of equality would menace security, it follows, in the name of utility, that security must carry the day. It is too simple. Men will continue, despite Bentham, to call what they

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consider their just claims "rights," and if only they are prepared with proof they are surely entitled to do so. This is the line taken by Mr. Rae. He does not deny that men have rights (other than legal). On the contrary, no man could more positively insist that they have. "They (*i.e.*, men) have a right, to use Smith's phrase, to an undeformed and unmutilated humanity, to that original basis of human dignity which it is the business of organized society to defend for its weaker members against the assaults of fortune as well as the assaults of men." Nor is there anything made clearer in the whole book than that these "moral rights," as he calls them, demand for their realization an alteration of material conditions.

The fallacy of socialism, therefore, on Mr. Rae's view, is not that it takes its stand on rights, but that it takes its stand on rights which are extravagant and illusive. This, at least, is what he sets himself to prove. He caps the socialistic claim that the whole product of industry is the laborers' right by refuting (convincingly enough) the economic analysis on which, by Rodbertus, Marx, or Lassalle, it is based. And he equally rejects the "less definite," "not less unjustifiable," socialism of Wagner on the similar ground that it dogmatically assumes that inequalities of wealth are as such wrong, and to be got rid of. In short, while quick enough to recognize men's rights, and to include in these the just claims for a certain measure of material well-being, Mr. Rae, surely with reason, declines to admit rights that cannot be proved.

This attitude seems to us wise, in what it admits as well as in what it resists. Socialism has a much stronger case where there is no alternative plan forthcoming, except the merely political reform that would stop short at consciousness of rights civil and political. Nay, the possession of civil and political rights just because magnified as a boon by the merely political radical, is apt, at times, to seem a mockery in the eyes of men placed at such disadvantage in respect of ways and means that struggle for livelihood swamps all else. To remind men that they have civil rights or votes is not enough where there is an economic problem; and to deny that in a rich and civilized society like our own they have a just claim at any rate to that minimum of material well-being, without which their lives as men and citizens would be maimed and obstructed, this policy would only throw a dissatisfied people into the arms of socialism, which at any rate has the merit of recognizing that there *is* a social question. Mr. Rae adopts a policy at once wiser and juster in recognizing that citizens have not only "moral rights," but moral rights which have their expression and counterpart in material conditions. The first really involves the second. It can be nothing short of a contradiction to tell men that they have "a right to an undeformed and unmutilated humanity," and then to deny that, in a society so materially productive as ours, they have a right to that modest minimum of livelihood without which these "moral rights," or even political rights, will be no better than an unusable gift or a decoration without a coat to put it on.

There is nothing socialistic in this; and, indeed, Mr. Rae's book is well fitted to show that a man can thus frankly recognize these material rights, and yet find weighty reasons against embracing a remedy so extreme and experimental as socialism. One is the inefficiency which dogs state management in all but a limited class of undertakings,—an inefficiency which would be at its maximum

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where—as necessarily under socialism—state management would be universal. Another is the power for good that lies in agencies (co-operation, trades-unionism, and so on) involving no revolutionary overturn of the existing system, not forgetting a reasonable use of state management to relieve distress, to provide wholesome conditions of life, such as parks and museums and libraries, and even to undertake management of business where it can be clearly shown that public authority has advantages over private enterprise. Still another is the consideration that to secure the modest minimum of material well-being demanded by "moral rights," it is not necessary to have recourse to so tremendous a remedy as socialism. This last reminder is as just as it is needful. Few, even among the thoughtful adherents of socialism, have realized the magnitude of the revolution it would involve (as explained, *e. g.*, in Schäffle's "Quintessence of Socialism"). Nor do they do anything like justice to the spirit of personal independence, which, it is to be hoped, will long continue to prompt the average workingman to rest content with an ideal that stops far short of equality of fortunes. The honest livelihood that will suffice for a reasonable enjoyment of home-life, for a real participation in the politics of his time, for some leisure (if there be inclination that way), for the things of the mind and spirit, for a sober prospect of provision against sickness and old age,—for these men may well struggle, by the way of socialism if they can find no other way. But as to what goes beyond these—material abundance in all its modes and forms (though no one who is not an ascetic need affect to despise it), "the man of independent mind," as Burns puts it, "He looks and laughs at a' that."

So far, indeed, is anything like a levelling equality of conditions from being an essential part of a democratic programme, that a point is comparatively soon reached at which the question of ways and means, imperious up to a certain limit, begins rapidly to dwindle in importance when set in comparison with healthy houses, decent home-life, cheap and good education, active citizenship, access to the things of the mind, and many other of the conditions of a good life of which reformers need not despair, though they stop short of socialism. And it is because it tends so unmistakably to this view that Mr. Rae's teaching seems wholesome as well as capable.

Not that we can follow him everywhere. He only weakens his case (for which he has plenty to say) when on an early page he drops the conjecture that we may find an escape from some of the evils of our present factory system in "electricity." It may be so, of course; and the suggestion is according to the fashion of our day; but it strikes me as too hypothetical to be in harmony with the usual solidity of Mr. Rae's argument. Nor can we quite accept his somewhat labored plea, even when buttressed by quotations from McCulloch, something of which might well have been spared, that "orthodox" English Political Economy can naturally find room for his own excellent doctrine as to what the state may do to enable men "to live the true life of a man and fulfil the proper ends of rational being." Passages may doubtless be cited to that effect, even from the orthodox of the orthodox; and it would be rash to say that the early economists did not recognize that the state had a function. The misfortune was that they did not always, if ever, furnish their readers with a principle to reconcile the true order of their teaching; thereby leading them to adopt *laissez-faire*

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and forget the other side. If this is not what actually happened it is hard to understand why Carlyle clamors so loudly for "new definitions of liberty;" why the friends of Factory Legislation so often held the economists as enemies; why J. S. Mill was looked askance upon (by Grote and others) as little better than a dangerous heretic because to their doctrine that society forbade much it ought not to forbid, he was bold enough to add that there were things it left alone which it ought to control. In any case the apology for McCulloch (even taking him as a type) seems, in the length of its quotations, out of proportion to the subject of the book.

Here and there, too, exception may be taken to isolated expressions: "Teeth set on edge against one are easily brought to gnash at all" is surely not a happy metaphor; "quips and arrows of fortune" does not sound right; nor can we accept the sweeping dictum (p. 419), "impracticable legislation is always unjust legislation, and unjust legislation for behoof of the laboring class is essentially socialistic."

These, however, are rare blemishes. Not only is there much in the book good, both in matter and in style, to which it has been impossible in these limits even to allude; instance the new chapters on "Nihilism" and "The Progress and Present Position of Socialism." It is from first to last the work of a mind vigorous, well-informed, evenly-balanced, and, if hostile to socialism even to bitterness, emphatically not hostile to the cause of social reform.

JOHN MACCUNN.

THE CONDITION OF LABOR: AN OPEN LETTER TO POPE LEO XIII. By Henry George, author of "Progress and Poverty," etc., with an Appendix containing the Encyclical of Pope Leo XIII. on the Condition of Labor. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1891. [Social Science Series.]

This earnest and eloquent Letter to the Pope is by far the most remarkable utterance which the Encyclical of last summer has evoked. The Pope could not have found a fitter controversialist to oppose him, for Mr. George meets him on the same basis of metaphysical theology, and appeals to the same authority of Scripture and St. Thomas of Aquino. And the whole letter seems, in its manner, curiously to echo the Pope's own dignified ecclesiastical-Latin style. Mr. George feels that the Encyclical is directed more strongly against his own "single tax" panacea than against what is vaguely called Socialism, which in a moderate form it favors. The Pope expressly puts property in land on the same level with property of any other kind, and expressly maintains that private property in this wide sense is a "natural right" of man, prior to the formation of any State. Mr. George, like the Pope, believes in "natural rights;" but he works out this vague and treacherous conception in his own way. "The right of property," he says, "attaches to things produced by labor, but cannot attach to things created by God. Thus, if a man take a fish from the ocean he acquires a right of property in that fish, which exclusive right he may transfer by sale or gift. But he cannot obtain a similar right of property in the ocean, so that he may sell *it*, or give *it*, or forbid others to use *it*" (p. 4). Does Mr. George mean that the fish was not created by God? He can hardly expect his Holiness to believe that; nor are any of us likely to believe that it was "produced" by the fisherman

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in any sense in which a great deal of land has not been "produced" by human labor. The antithesis of God or "Nature" to everything that is done by human effort runs through all Mr. George's arguments. "Socialism in all its phases," he says, "looks on the evils of our civilization as springing from the inadequacy or inharmony of natural relations, which must be artificially organized or improved. In its idea there devolves on the State the necessity of intelligently organizing the industrial relations of men, the construction, as it were, of a great machine, whose complicated parts shall properly work together under the direction of human intelligence. This is the reason why socialism tends towards atheism. Failing to see the order and symmetry of natural law, it fails to recognize God" (p. 92). Mr. George seems to think that the work of human intelligence goes on in spite of God, and is somehow outside "Nature." This, though a very common way of thinking, is very questionable philosophy, and the Pope would hardly approve of it as theology. Mr. George undertakes a hard task when he tries to persuade the head of the Catholic Church that "interest is natural and just," while land-owning is wrong. But he makes a very strong point when he shows that the Pope's argument, "that what is bought with rightful property is rightful property," could be used to justify slave-owning as easily as to justify property in land.

D. G. RITCHIE.

A SUMMER SCHOOL OF ART AND SCIENCE. Programme of Sixth Session, August, 1892. University Hall, Edinburgh.

This interesting educational experiment has now been carried on successfully for five summers, under the direction of Professor Patrick Geddes, in Edinburgh. The general objects aimed at may be gathered from the following extract:

"These Vacation Science Courses, taken separately, broadly correspond to those held in connection with the University Summer Gathering at Chautauqua (U.S.A.), or to those now also established at Oxford and Cambridge. Taken collectively, however, the present scheme of studies departs *in principle* from existing systems of education,—whether in School or University,—though mainly by carrying out more fully changes which are germinating everywhere. A word, therefore, may first be said of Teaching Methods.

"Starting from the familiar idea of working from the concrete to the abstract, from the senses towards the intellect, it is attempted in each subject of study (1) to freshen the student's mind by a wealth of impressions; (2) to introduce him to the advancing literature of the subject; (3) to supply him with the means of summarizing, arranging, and more clearly thinking out these accumulations of observation and reading. Hence, (1) the insistence upon demonstrations, experiment, and field excursions; (2) the introduction in several subjects of the Seminar, which, with its guidance to the world of books and activity in using them, is so marked a strength of the German University; (3) the extended use of graphic methods.

"The student, though first of all freshened as an observer, is regarded not as a receptacle for information, but as a possible producer of independent thought. Hence the examination method, everywhere falling into such merited disrepute, is here definitely abandoned; a keener stimulus, even a more satisfactory test

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of progress, being found in accustoming the student to take part in his own education, by attention first to the increase and systematization of his materials, next to the occasional contribution of his best results to the common stock of class notes and summaries, and thence to fuller collaboration with his teacher.

"Passing from the manner to the Matter of Education, it is attempted (1) not merely to offer a series of Special Courses, each of adequate thoroughness, but (2) to keep up as far as possible a parallelism of treatment, and (3) to co-ordinate these parallel courses into a larger whole. Hence the General Course (page 5) addressed to all students, dealing specially with the history of civilization, the historical development of the sciences, their general principles, and mutual relations. The present scheme is, in fact, an attempt to work in theory towards the organization of knowledge, and in practice towards the more rational arrangement of curricula of study.

"The legitimate claim of the man of science is affirmed by the very existence and method of these Courses; yet the corresponding claim of the scholar and humanist that, whatever be the progress of Natural Science, the study of Man must remain supreme, is also recognized: witness that subordination of Biology to Social Science which is a characteristic feature of the present scheme.

"This attempt does not, however, end with the passage from the special sciences to the classification and orchestration of these, nor even with the exposition of their essential harmony and unity: it has to find its due place within an educational synthesis. The question is not simply of the nature of our scientific conceptions, but of the view we take and the use we make of them.

"Education is not merely by and for the sake of thought, but in a still higher degree by and for the sake of action; hence each course of scientific study is not merely related to those dealing with the other sciences, but in even more immediate degree to the corresponding arts of life. Hence the introduction of the Courses associated with Technical Education.

"Each study must thus seek its highest result, not in a mere destructive analysis as of flower or verse, but in a constructive synthesis, it may be a work of art; hence these beginnings of library and museum, of garden or of gallery. The prominence given to the School of Art is thus explained; the study of Landscape and Animal Life being definitely associated with the School of Natural Science, and that of Figure with Anthropology and History, the student thus working for the artist, and the artist for the student. Hence, also, the association of a Course of Literature.

"At this point the highest principle comes into view. Every one recognizes in theory that the efficiency of a scheme of education is tested by its reality for the preparation of life; and upon this alone the present scheme might base its claim for trial, since it seeks to fit the student for some of the higher activities of life by actually sharing them. He is invited to become not a mere passive auditor, but an active collaborator in the development of an incipient college."

The courses of study this year promise to be quite as interesting as those of former sessions. Among those who are to take part in the teaching work are included, besides Professor Geddes himself, Professor Ingram, Professor James Mavor, Professor Prince, Mr. J. A. Thomson, and other well-known lecturers.

J. S. MACKENZIE.

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L'ART AU POINT DE VUE SOCIOLOGIQUE. Par M. Guyau. Paris: Felix Alcan, 1889.

This book appeared after the death of its author, who was lost to philosophy at the age of thirty-three. It was published under the care of M. Fouillée, about the same time as the book on "Education and Heredity."

The proposition laid down by M. Guyau concerns ethics, in so far as it professes to give an original and well-considered solution to the much-discussed problem of the relation between art and morals. This proposition is that art is above all a sociological phenomenon. "After having pointed out the sociological idea underlying that of religion," says M. Fouillée, in his noteworthy introduction, "Guyau has endeavored to show that the same idea lies at the very basis of art; that the fullest and most exalted æsthetic emotion is of a social character, and that art, while preserving its independence, is thus essentially bound up with religion, metaphysics, and ethics." It is important to thoroughly understand the meaning attached by Guyau to this proposition. Indeed, it might be understood in many different ways. Thus, it might mean that art, even when it seems to be the most spontaneous and unexpected creation of individual genius, is really the expression of the social environment of the genius in question. Each country, each period, is reflected in its literature, in its poetry, in all its works of art; and it is in this sense that Shakespeare makes Hamlet say that art should "hold, as 'twere, the mirror up to nature." This is not quite M. Guyau's view. He even criticises, on this point, the opinions of M. Taine and M. Hennequin, who seem to him to abandon too completely individual genius to its social environment: far from being simply the product of environment, genius, according to him, creates new environments for itself, and modifies old ones. Another meaning of the proposition that art is a sociological phenomenon is, that the object of art is to produce social sympathy among men; like speech, it always assumes the contact of at least two minds; it is the communication between them; it causes, so to speak, human intelligence and sensibility to unite in the admiration of beauty. It is this meaning which M Fouillée expands in his introduction. "At first sight, sensations and feelings are the things by which men are most separated; men do not dispute about tastes and colors since these are regarded as personal matters; and yet there is a means of *socializing* them to some degree, of making them in great measure identical as between one individual and another: it is art. From the midst of the incoherent and discordant individual sensations or emotions, art discovers a harmony of sensation and of emotion which may be shared by all at once, or by a great number, and thus give rise to mutual enjoyments. And the characteristic of these enjoyments is, that they do not exclude one another, as selfish pleasures do, but have, on the contrary, an essential solidarity. Like metaphysics, like ethics, art, then, raises the individual from his personal life, that he may participate in the life universal, no longer alone through the communion of ideas and beliefs, or that of will and action, but also through the communion of feelings and emotions." M. Guyau's book does not exclude this meaning, but he does not lay much stress upon it. It is in a more subtle manner that he understands the sociological nature of art. The society of which the notion appears to him inseparable from art is not the actual, historic society of which the artist and the

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public alike form part; it is an ideal society, unconnected with time and space, itself the creation of art, one of imaginary beings evoked by the artist. "Now, artistic emotion," says Guyau, "is, strictly speaking, the social emotion which causes us to experience a life analogous to our own, brought home to us by the artist." And further on, "Art is an extension, by means of feeling, of the term society to all nature's beings, even to those who are conceived of as supernatural, and, lastly, to fictitious beings created by the human imagination."

This amounts to saying that, according to Guyau, the object of art is the imitation, or rather the expression, of life, and that is why the basis of all artistic emotion is sympathy,—that is to say, pre-eminently the social sentiment. Such is the principle which he develops in this book with great grasp of detail, and from which he evolves a multitude of new and interesting theories on the nature of genius, the rules of criticism, the processes of art, on idealism and realism, which he distinguishes from "*trivialisme*," on the psychological and social novel, the introduction of philosophical and social ideas into poetry, on style, and, finally, on the literature of abnormal and unbalanced minds.

It is in this last chapter that the delicate question of the connection of art with morals is touched upon. Guyau reviews the characteristics of what he calls "*la littérature des détraqués* (literature of unbalanced minds), that is to say, the literature of lunatics and criminals: the bitter consciousness of internal anomaly and of frustrated destiny, the various expressions of a more than average vanity, the need of stimulants and predominance of sensual pleasures, the taste for gloomy and horrible pictures, the constant repetition of the same word, etc. He sums them up by saying that this literature represents those who are only partially and intermittently social: "they are isolated in themselves, live for themselves; they may well force us to sympathize with their sufferings, but not with their characters." Now Guyau thinks he can discover the general features of the literature of the "*détraqués*" (unbalanced) in that of the "*décadents*" (abnormal). "There is the pride of the artist, who thinks more of his own individuality than of truth and beauty; which betrays itself in the affectation of learning, in the desire to be peculiar, and to escape the commonplace by smartness and rant; there is the pursuit of pleasure with all its refinements, its mixture of bitterness and luxury." Hence, the question of morality in literature and in art resolves itself into this. In what measure and by what steps is it desirable to extend this quality which forms the basis of literature and art: sociability? There is, indeed, a certain contradiction between the too rapid increase of sociability and the maintenance in their purity, of all our social constraints. In the first place, the more numerous a society is, so much the less select is it. The art of our time is become more and more democratic, and it has even ended by preferring the society of the vicious to that of honest folk.

Moreover, art is more and more given over to passion: but every drama is a suggestion; and the suggestion may be of evil rather than of good. "Who knows the number of crimes of which murderous novels have been and still are the instigators? Who knows the number of actual libertines whom painting has allured into vice?" All the more so because the passions capable of producing that intensity of emotion sought by art are chiefly the elementary passions: hatred, revenge, anger, jealousy, envy, sensuality, etc. All must finally depend

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then on the type of society with which the artist may choose to make us sympathize: it is by no means a matter of indifference whether it be of society past, present, or future, and among these various societies whether it be one social group rather than another. Art should choose its society in the mutual interest of æstheticism and ethics. "In conclusion," says Guyau, "art being pre-eminently a social phenomenon, it is certain that it has in itself a social value: in fact, it always tends either to advance or retard the actual society in which it is exercised, in proportion as it makes it sympathize, by means of the imagination, with a better or worse society. In this, for the sociologist, consists the ethics of art, an ethics quite intrinsic and self-contained, which is not the result of calculation, but which springs up apart from calculation or the pursuit of any aim."

Upon the whole, Guyau distinguishes himself from other contemporaneous writers on æsthetics, in basing it, not like Spencer, Sully, Grant Allen, etc., upon the theory of the working of the perceptive and representative faculties (of which the first notion is found in Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason,") but upon the theory of the social sentiments and social feelings; and this new æstheticism is interesting to the moralist because it tends, though by another route, to the same result as the æstheticism of the ancients (that of Plato and Plotinus) to closely unite the beautiful with the good, art with morals.

E. BOIRAC.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE BEAUTIFUL, being an Outline of the History of Æsthetics. By William Knight, Professor of Philosophy in the University of St. Andrew's. London: John Murray, 1891. Pp. xv., 288.

The Philosophy of the Beautiful has, as Professor Knight remarks in his preface, a most intimate connection with the Philosophy of the Good. He takes as his motto the lines of Tennyson,—

> "Beauty, Good, and Knowledge are three sisters
> That dote upon each other, friends to man,
> Living together under the same roof,
> And never can be sundered without tears,"

and he says that "these lines of the chief seer among poets now living, embody the central thought of this book." It must be confessed that the high hopes thus raised are somewhat rudely dashed to the ground when it appears that the book in question is simply a short history of the various theories of æsthetics that have been held from the earliest times till now. He promises, however, that a "constructive theory" is "to follow it by and by." We shall await this constructive theory with great interest. In the mean time there is little to be said but that the sketch of æsthetic theories, within the compass of 282 pages, is wonderfully exhaustive. The chief doubt that occurs to one in reading it is, whether it might not have been more enlightening to deal only with the great writers on the subject, and to trace more fully the lines of development from one to another, and the connection of their æsthetic theories with their views of philosophy generally. It is to be feared that the mass of conflicting doctrines here presented will be somewhat confusing to most of the extension students, for

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whose use the book is primarily intended. Also, the distribution of the space allotted to different thinkers is ill balanced; and the summaries of their views are often neither clear nor accurate.

J. S. M.

THE PRESENT POSITION OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL SCIENCES: AN INAUGURAL LECTURE. By Andrew Seth, M.A., Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh. Edinburgh: Blackwood & Sons, 1891. Pp. 32.

The inaugural address of the new professor at Edinburgh will naturally attract much attention in philosophical circles. It is, of course, mainly concerned with Logic, Psychology, and Metaphysics; but it is rendered interesting to students of Ethics by the concluding paragraphs, in which Professor Seth indicates his own stand-point. This stand-point, it is perhaps needless to say, is frankly teleological. He sums it up in the following eloquent passage,—"Not to man as a creature specially located on this earth, but to man and all creatures like him who are sharers in the life of thought, and called thereby to be authors of their own perfection—to man as rational all things are relative. To him the creation looks; for him all things are made. This is the imperishable grandeur of Hegel's system that he has given such sonorous utterance to this view, and expressed it with such magnificent confidence. I cannot always emulate his confidence, nor can I adopt as perfectly satisfactory his universalistic mode of expression. The achievements of the world-spirit do not move me to unqualified admiration, and I cannot accept the abstraction of the race in place of the living children of men. Even if the enormous spiral of human history is destined to wind itself at last to a point which may be called achievement, what, I ask, of the multitudes who perished by the way? These all died, not having received the promises. What if there *are* no promises *to them?* To me the old idea of the world as the training-ground of individual character seems to offer a much more human, and, I will add, a much more divine, solution than this pitiless procession of the car of progress. Happily, however, the one view does not necessarily exclude the other; we may believe in the progress of the race and yet believe in the future of the individual. Nature's profusion and nature's work will doubtless be urged against us when we plead for the rights of the individual life. But these are objections which every theodicy has to meet. I do not wish to minimize them; on the contrary, they appeal to me with painful force. But the possibility of any theodicy depends on our being able to show that nature and nature's ways of working are not the last word of creation. Nature is non-moral, indifferent, and pitiless; but man is pitiful, and human nature flowers in love and self-denial, in purity and stainless honor. If these have no root in the nature of things, then, indeed,

> 'The pillared firmament is rottenness,
> And earth's base built on stubble.'

But we do well, as Goethe teaches in one of his finest poems, to recognize in such attributes of human-kind our nearest glimpse into the nature of the divine. The part is not greater than the whole; and we may rest assured that whatever

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of wisdom and goodness there is in us was not born out of nothing, but has its fount somewhere and somehow in a more perfect goodness and truth."

With much of the spirit of this "sonorous utterance" the present reviewer is in hearty sympathy, though the expression of it is necessarily somewhat popular, and might be objected to from a strictly philosophical point of view. It puts several points in an imaginative rather than in a rational form. Of this, however, I do not wish to complain. But I cannot quite agree with the implied slight on Hegel and the world-spirit. It is, no doubt, interesting to learn that Professor Seth has not an "unqualified admiration" for the achievements of either of them. Neither have I. I trust philosophy did not end with Hegel, and I trust the world-spirit has not come to a stand. But we are all sons of the world-spirit, and some of us are sons of Hegel; and we do not like to be told that our father accepted "the abstraction of the race in place of the living children of men," and believed in a "pitiless procession of the car of progress." Who wrote the following? "The term subjectivity is not to be confined merely to the bad and finite kind of it which is contradistinguished from the fact. In its truth subjectivity is immanent in the fact, and as a subjectivity thus immanent is the very truth of the fact. Thus regarded, the doctrine of consolation receives a newer and a higher significance. It is in this sense that the Christian religion is to be regarded as the religion of consolation, and even of absolute consolation. Christianity, we know, teaches that God wishes all men to be saved. That teaching declares that subjectivity has an infinite value. And that consoling power of Christianity just lies in the fact that God himself is in it known as the absolute subjectivity, so that, inasmuch as subjectivity involves the element of particularity, our particular and personal part too is recognized, not merely as something to be solely and simply denied, but at the same time something to be preserved." It was Hegel who said this.* He and the world-spirit have happily left us something still to do. So have Shakespeare and Goethe, Newton and Darwin; and even if Professor Seth "cannot always emulate" them, or feel "unqualified admiration" towards them, it may still be worth while to try to learn something from their "utterances," "sonorous" and other. Even a superior person who does not entirely believe either in Hegel or in history, may find on further study that Hegel and history were not so entirely wrong as he imagined.

J. S. MACKENZIE.

PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY, BEING THE FIRST EDINBURGH UNIVERSITY GIFFORD LECTURES. By James Hutchison Stirling, LL.D. (Edinburgh), Foreign Member of the Philosophical Society of Berlin. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. Pp. xvi., 407.

The interest of this work is twofold. It is the first complete set of Gifford Lectures that has been put into the hands of the public, and its author was the only philosopher selected by the Scottish universities to deliver the initial series of prelections on this foundation. Professor Max Müller, at Glasgow, Mr. Andrew Lang, at St. Andrew's, and Dr. E. B. Tyler, at Aberdeen, viewed

* "The Logic of Hegel," translated by Professor Wallace, p. 232.

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natural theology from the philological, historical, or other stand-points, with which their names are associated. It was reserved for Dr. Stirling to pursue the inquiry as such, as Lord Gifford had directed, and in his first lecture he gave forth no uncertain sound on the question of method. Speaking of historico-genetic philosophies of religion, he says, "With whatever attempt to philosophize them, there appears little for us that is vital in these religions now. They are not lively, these nondescript divinities. My reading of these parts of these philosophies has been careful enough; but I always found that a *Gesindel* (a rabble) of gods would not prove to me, as a Gesindel of ghosts had proved to a German professor, entertaining,—that is, *refreshing*. . . . In short, in the division under reference of these said philosophies of religion, the philosophizing of the various gods of the various nations failed to move me or inspire me with a will to follow in the same direction. . . . Natural Theology as Natural Theology I could not in any way find in them" (pp. 28–30). Dr. Stirling, therefore, proceeded to give in his first course an account of the affirmative or constructive attitude adopted by thinkers towards the proofs of the being of God. This discussion occupied ten lectures, and embraced the period from Anaxagoras to Anselm, chief attention being naturally devoted to the Argument from Design. The second course of ten lectures was directed to those who attacked the proofs; Hume, Kant, and Darwin being taken respectively as the representatives of positive, comparative, and superlative criticism.

This is a wide field to cover in so short a space, and the merits of the book no less than its defects are plainly due to the lecturer's conception of his task. "It would ill become the lecturer who was first selected to set the example of an episode, while it was the epic he was specially engaged for" (p. 31). Now, the "epic" treatment has its unavoidable drawbacks,—drawbacks, to wit, in printed, though not necessarily in lecture, form. There is a certain absence of due proportion, as, for example, in the relative spaces assigned to the Design Argument and to the Ontological Proof; in the apparent relegation of constructive tendencies to ancient and mediæval thought as of destructive to the modern period; in the biographical details concerning the Darwins, so fully set forth in the nineteenth lecture; and generally in the discursive treatment of, say, Socrates, the Sophists, and Hume. Liability to omit matters of distinct importance may also be noted. Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz, and Kant's practical philosophy, receive too short shrift, while Wilkie's *Epigoniad*, E. Darwin's *Botanic Garden*, and a few other matters of purely *dilettante* interest, are brought forward. The "epic" style lends itself to a series of incidents, and this at the expense of principles to which these very incidents are related as phenomena. Nevertheless, it also has its advantages.

Dr. Stirling's book is inspired by the personality of its author,—courage, humor, learning, speculative insight abundantly characterize it throughout. As in Hegel, so here, one often stumbles upon phrases which throw a flood of light upon dark problems, and suggest fresh currents of thought. To instance a few of these: "The simple takingness that is divine" of the Hebrew Scriptures is contrasted with "the tumid superiority of Mr. Buckle. He, now, who would boggle at the wife of Cain, or stumble over the walls of Jericho, is not an adult: he is but a boy still" (p. 19). Many maudlin sentimentalists, aye, and some who pose as

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philosophers in these days, might be directed with profit to the manly words on work. "The misery that is, is largely on the part of people who have nothing to do. . . . Human life, of course, is but another name for work; but that is not a fault; that is rather a *laud;* for the subject has the right of satisfaction in his work, and, according to philosophy, it is the quality of the universe to realize no less" (pp. 276–78). In a few phrases he brings *all* Lessing vividly to mind. "Lessing is not an *enormous* genius,—he knows himself that he is not a poet, but only a critic. . . . Clearness, fairness, equity constitute his quality" (p. 118). With the same penetrating suggestiveness he speaks of Kant's "wonderful constructions, toys of his own gluing" (p. 316), and of Hegel, in the latter part of the *Religions-Philosophie*, as "a marksman who has, indeed, a mark in his view, but who fires at it always carelessly, and often almost as though intentionally widely" (pp. 188–89). These gnomic qualities of the book could be further illustrated by many instances. But its "epic" conception and style receive more lengthened and valuable exemplification in several portions which may justly be called prolonged visions. The first part of the eighth lecture is of this character, and the account of Aristotle's attitude towards Deity is probably the finest consecutive passage in the work. The same spiritual touch is traceable in later lectures, more particularly in the eighteenth, where the doctrine of "accidental pullulation" receives some chastisement. It also informs the treatment of Plato, where it reaches its highest point in the very forceful discussion of the ταὐτον and the θάτερον.

Numerous other examples might be adduced did space permit. Enough has been said to show that, while rigorous system is entirely absent from Dr. Stirling's latest work, it is none the less worthy of his fame. Indeed, I question whether, on the ethical side, it will not have far deeper influence than any of his previous books. Strong, free, natural, and full of conviction, it appeals to the whole nature as no stilted logic could. If Dr. Stirling sees fit, on the one hand, to apologize for "a certain miscellaneousness" (p. 376), his readers, on the contrary, may well assure him that ample amends have been made otherwise. They can perfectly afford to forego material "in a twelvefold manner categorized," when they consider the vigorous masculine nature that is living, breathing, and energizing in every page.

R. M. WENLEY.

GLASGOW UNIVERSITY.

MORALPHILOSOPHIE. Eine wissenschaftliche Darlegung der sittlichen, einschliesslich der rechtlichen Ordnung. Von Victor Cathrein, S. J. Zweiter Band: Besondere Moralphilosophie. Freiburg im Breisgau (St. Louis, Missouri). Herder's publishing-house, 1891. (pp. xiv., 633).

The second volume of Father Cathrein's "Moralphilosophie," containing "the application of general principles to the individual human relations," is a worthy companion to the first volume, reviewed in vol. ii., No. 3, p. 251, of this JOURNAL. It is a work of great industry and bears witness to comprehensive reading.

The author endeavors to deduce all individual duties from the one fundamental principle: "Observe the system of conduct that is obligatory upon you

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in view of your position as a rational being," *—which might be more briefly expressed: Thou shalt do what thou shalt do.

The first main division of the work treats of the doctrine of individual duties and rights, and is divided into five chapters. In the first, man is discussed in his relation to God. "If there is no God," argues the author, "no eternity, no immortality, no retribution in another world; if man does not differ essentially from the ape; then there is also no true moral order worthy the name; then to talk of virtue, duty, and conscience is folly, and the wisest is he who is able to make his life, with the greatest intensity and to the greatest extent, one of pleasure." "The infidel is good only through inconsistency." The sacrifice of one's life for one's country is irrational in him who does not believe in a future life. But "no one can, unless it be his own fault, live in ignorance of God. It is in every one's power to know God, if one only so desires, and humbly and sincerely seeks the truth." The obligation to worship God constitutes the superior part of ethical duties; and he who neglects that "cannot claim to be simply called honest." In this division there is also mention of the "bad fiend," of "Satan."

The second chapter treats of man in his relation to himself. The duties in regard to the soul, to life and health, and to external possessions are here discussed. Suicide is unconditionally condemned by the author.

The third chapter deals with the personal relations of men among themselves, —the duties of love and truth, and mutual rights and obligations. Lying and duelling are absolutely condemned; but "equivocal speech is not simply to be cast aside," and the right of violence in self-defence is advocated. The fourth chapter discusses the rights of property.

The chapter which treats of Socialism—the most interesting part of the whole work—has already appeared as a separate essay, in its fourth edition, and been reviewed in vol. ii., No. 2, p. 252, of this JOURNAL. It has received several additions, in which attention is given to Bellamy's "Looking Backward." Unquestionably," says Father Cathrein, "if the atheistic-materialistic attitude is justifiable, then the demands of Socialism are legitimate." The social question can only be solved through religion, or, more precisely, by means of the Catholic Church. "Without religion, the workingman will never be content with his lot."

The fifth chapter treats of compacts.

The second main division of the work is divided into three chapters which treat of the social relations of man. The subject of the first chapter is the family. The author demands the indissolubility of marriage, in pursuance of which it should be the duty of the authorities in Christian countries to require that the marriage of Christians shall be consummated according to Church laws. The obligatory civil marriage is "a judicial offence against the Church."

The second chapter contains the doctrine of the state. If the state, as such, does not take upon itself the care of religion, tnis is, according to the author, "a crime against God and society." The government dare not tolerate any open attacks, either written or spoken, against such obvious truths of religion as the existence and presence of God, the eternal retribution in the world to come, the duty of

* "Beobachte die Dir als vernünftigen Wesen nach allen Deinen Beziehungen zukommende Ordnung."

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divine worship, and the like. "Objectively considered, the Catholic alone, among all the churches, has a right to exist, because it alone is the true one." "Every other cult is to be rejected, and has no right to be publicly practised and tolerated." "It is the province of the Church to superintend all education." The author has a very high opinion of his own profession. "No one," he declares, "contributes more to the welfare of humanity than the Catholic priests and members of religious orders." In his discussion of punishment, Father Cathrein rejects the theory of "absolute" punishment. "Even God cannot desire punishment for its own sake, but as a means to some end." "Regard for the public welfare is the reason, the rule, and the measure of punishment by the state."

The third chapter sets forth international law. The author does not believe in an eternal peace, but he does believe in a future, universal confederation, presided over by a council, composed of representatives from the different states, to whom the regulation of all international affairs will be referred.

This comprehensive work teaches us nothing of friendship, and quite as little as to our conduct towards animals. We learn only that "the entire universe was created for man, and that irrational beings have no rights as opposed to man, and the latter no duties towards them; man has, at the most, certain duties in reference to the irrational world, the violation of which involves the transgression of a duty towards God, one's self, or one's fellow-beings."

G. Von Gizycki.

Fr. Nietzsche und seine Philosophischen Irrwege. Von Dr. Hermann Türck. Dresden, Verlag der Druckerei Gloess. 1891. (pp. 72.)

This interesting little work finds the key to Frederick Nietzsche's strange teachings glorifying the brutal element in man, in the "moral insanity" of this ingenious writer, who has now fallen a victim to intellectual insanity. His family, according to Ola Hansson, was one of those "in which, both on the paternal and maternal sides, the tendency to mental diseases was transmitted from generation to generation. His father was carried off at an early age by insanity." The symptoms began in his own case in 1876, and three years later the severe head-trouble from which he suffered compelled him to request to be allowed to withdraw from the chair of classical philosophy at the University of Zurich.

All the writings which set forth his fixed notion of the change of morality into its opposite, date from the period of his sickness in 1876. Dr. Türck gives the following explanation of the later productions of Nietzsche. Through inheritance he was afflicted by murderous impulses and other perverse feelings. His good education, favorable environments, and agreeable circumstances of life produced in him such strong counteracting influences that the brutal instincts were forced into the deepest recesses of his nature, and prevented from manifesting themselves in open deeds. But they remained latent as an unsatisfied, passionate desire. Every repressal of a strong desire causes suffering, and since man is disposed to consider what causes him pain as bad and contrary to nature, and that which he desires as good and according to nature, it was possible for a man like Nietzsche, intellectually gifted but born with perverse instincts, to look upon the suppression of the rapacious instincts as irrational, and upon their satisfaction as normal and healthful. The influence of better

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habits was too powerful to allow the brute in him to manifest itself in deeds, even after 1876; but as a compensation, the satisfaction of those instincts was extolled in writing as a glorious ideal, as something "distinguished, high, noble, aristocratic, destined to rule." Criminals appeared to him as "masters;" the honest and respectable people as slaves. The ingenious defence of this "complete change of standards" is an interesting case of "*folie raisonnate*," often occurring in moral insanity and well known to all doctors of mental diseases, in which, as Dr. Schuele says, "the intelligence becomes the *advocatus diaboli* of morbid instincts."

The "insanity with method" from which Nietzsche suffers includes also the denial of the value of truth. In the motto of the oriental order of assassins, "Nothing is true, everything is permitted," he finds the fullest expression of the "freedom of the mind."

It is certainly deplorable, as the author points out, that individuals for whom there is not the excuse that applies to Nietzsche, of being mentally diseased, should have made this madman their prophet. But it is unjustifiable on the part of our author to place Henrik Ibsen in the same category with Nietzsche. Dr. Türck, however, promises to defend this proposition in a special paper.

G. VON GIZYCKI.

UNSERE MORAL UND DIE MORAL JESU. Sermons delivered by Moritz Schwalb, D.D., Minister of the Reformed Church of St. Martini in Bremen. Third collection. Leipzig, Otto Wigand, 1891. pp. vi., 163.

DAS CHRISTENTHUM CHRISTI UND DIE RELIGION DER LIEBE. Ein Votum in Sachem der Zukunftsreligion v. Th. Schultze. Second edition. Leipzig, William Friedrich. 1891. pp. v. 80.

Many who have entirely rejected dogmatic Christianity still look upon the historical Jesus as the religious and ethical ideal of all times, and revere him as their lord and master. We warmly recommend such persons to carefully study these two valuable books, after which they will hardly continue to hold that opinion.

The conclusion that Dr. Schwalb reaches is this: In many highly important points the morality of Jesus is in evident opposition to our ideal of morality, and it often leaves us in the lurch, where we had expected it to give us definite directions and advice. It is not fitted to serve as a guide to conduct in our practical life. It belongs to the past. Our views as to the ends of human labor, about the relation of husband and wife, of parents and children, are different from and more rational than those of Jesus; we differ from him in our ideas about slavery, about the duties of the State, about the political obligations of each citizen, about the right of self-defence, about the care of the poor, about permitted pleasures; we differ even as to the motives for ethical conduct. Upon all these points the views of Jesus are no longer a standard. And it would certainly be disheartening if that portion of mankind most capable of being educated had made no progress in the course of more than eighteen hundred years in the most important sphere of knowledge,—that of morality. Jesus would not have been human if he had not remained within the limits of his age,

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and not been liable to error. In other important points, to be sure,—the author mentions war, duelling, prostitution, anti-Semitism,—no small proportion of Christendom has deplorably lagged behind the views of Jesus, not only in action but also in thought.

Herr Schultze, an emeritus high Prussian official, is even more unfavorable in his judgment of the Christianity of Christ than is Dr. Schwalb. He points out the contradictions in the teachings of Jesus, his unjust condemnation of all the Pharisees and Scribes; he lays stress upon the fact that Jesus held out the prospect of heaven to man without regard to his moral worth, and threatened hell for mere verbal offences; and he shows that in other respects, also, his teaching deviates widely from what we consider right. He endeavors to prove that the ethical views of Jesus were in no wise superior to the attitude of the Old Testament. The great commandment, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself," had been, as Jesus himself declared, already proclaimed by the "Law and the Prophets." The "love for one's neighbor," according to the Old Testament, was, however, confined to members of the Jewish race, but neither was universal love, the love for all mankind (not merely of Christians among themselves), taught by the New Testament. The author finally points out the error of supposing that every good thing—all that in Christian countries has received a Christian coloring—is on that account to be attributed solely to Christianity. If essentially the same things are also found in non-Christian countries, or already existed in pre-Christian times, it may surely be assumed that they proceed from human nature, and not from a particular belief, or any religious dogmas whatsoever.

We leave it to the theologians to refute the views of these two writers.

G. von Gizycki.

Die Religion und ihr Recht gegenüber dem modernen Moralismus. Darstellung und Kritik der "ethischen Bewegung" unserer Zeit. Von Dr. Martin Keibel, Halle, a. S., C. E. M. Pfeffer (Robert Stricker), 1891. (Pp. vii. 85).

The author seeks the essence of religion solely in the cultivation of an attitude of confidence and humility towards the supernatural. The religious motives are, according to him, the chief promoters of human activity, in that they counteract faint-heartedness on the one side, and excessive self-confidence on the other. Precisely for this reason they possess a lasting significance, for, he declares, "to whatever height of perfection man may attain in the future, as a spiritual and corporeal being, he will forever remain, in all his aims and accomplishments, bound to supernatural conditions, and on that account it must always be one of his chief interests to enter into a relation with all those conditions favorable to the progress of his activity." But men's conceptions of a supernatural power are variable. Its representation as a being who feels and is susceptible to human prayers follows from assuming a view of the world that judges natural events after the analogy of human actions. And as in the prayer of petition the only essential is faith in the supernatural, so also, according to Dr. Keibel, in the prayer of thanksgiving "all that remains as essential to religion is the humble acknowledgment of the help that we receive from the supernatural. Every man

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must make this admission, in order to insure himself against vanity and arrogance." By virtue of its essential qualities, religion possesses, according to the author, "an inalienable right to a place of honor in the list of earthly possessions; it is the highest possession accessible to all mankind." There is no permanent happiness without constant and fruitful labor; man's highest possible good consists, therefore, in the possession of *all* the conditions of such labor, and "every man's highest *actual* good is the possession of such *parts* of these conditions as are accessible to all mankind: and these are contained in religion. For while opportunity and the capacity for continuous and profitable labor is not dependent upon the will of the individual, every one can, through confidence and humility, enter into such a relation with the supernatural power as is best adapted to further his work."

By "modern morality" Dr. Keibel understands the current of thought introduced by Helvetius, Bentham, and Feuerbach, which attempts to replace religion with morality. He pictures in detail the development of the free-religious congregations and ethical societies of the different countries, and attributes the hostile attitude that some often manifest towards religion to the fact that they erroneously confound the variable feelings associated with religion with the essence of religion itself. Neither the logical objections to traditional religion, directed principally against its supernaturalism, nor the moral objections, which attack above all the "virtue that seeks for reward," directly touch religion. "For confidence and humility towards the supernatural power do not lose a particle of their value, either by the conception of nature as an unbroken chain of causes and effects, or by man's claim to the possession of a direct love for the good." Regarding the "Ethical Societies" of the United States, the author praises their principle of neutrality in regard to religion, but regrets that that attitude is not always maintained. He quotes, with approval, Professor Adler's words: "And lastly, the purpose of an ethical movement is that out of it may spring an ethical belief with regard to the world, a moral optimism, a belief that the universe is making for righteousness, that there is a good tendency of things. Such a belief we need . . . We cannot logically demonstrate it. . . . Act the good and then you will believe in it. Throw yourself into the stream of the world's good tendency, then you will feel the set of the current that comes from the fountain head." (Felix Adler, "The Need of a New Moral Movement in Religion." New York, 1883.)

After disposing of the objections that have been raised against religion from the moral side, the author himself takes the offensive and endeavors "to thrust morality from the throne that belongs only to religion." "A substitution of morality for religion," he says, "is impossible, because an *ideal* cannot bestow the same thing as an *actual possession*. Religion, however, is a possession accessible to every one. For the road to God is open to all; whether or not we follow it, depends solely upon the recognition of our limitations and upon our own volition. On the other hand, we are never quite secure of a clear, undisturbed conscience.

What Dr. Keibel claims to be the *essence* of religion would be considered by most people, we think, a *remnant* of religion, whose power over man cannot be at all compared to that wielded by the revealed religions. A religion without supernaturalism, without the doctrine of immortality, will seem to most people to

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be no religion at all. That morality can be dethroned by this mere *remnant* of religion, and that the latter is man's "highest actual possession," will perhaps be doubted even by many of the adherents of the prevailing religions.

Faith in the universe, a "moral optimism," "a belief that there is a good tendency of things," is a valuable weapon in the struggle for existence, a means of furthering human labor: that much we concede to the author; and, as a matter of fact, most atheists also have this *faith* in an order of the universe. The German socialists, for instance, who have become entirely estranged from the prevailing religions, who believe neither in God nor in immortality, cling to this feeling of confidence. Eugen Dühring, whom the present writer considers the most eminent contemporary philosopher, expresses it emphatically in his "*Kursus der Philosophie als streng wissenschaftlicher Weltanschauung und Lebensgestaltung*" (Leipzig, Heimann, 1875), and in his "*Ersatz der Religion durch Vollkommeneres*" (Karlsruhe & Leipzig, H. Reuther, 1883). But this faith is not only a faith in the "supernatural power," but also in that part of the world which is closest to us and the central point of our interest, namely, *humanity*. Dr. Keibel does not seem to sufficiently realize the fact that from the stand-point of a philosophy that dismisses all supernaturalism, *man himself*—with his physical and mental powers—*is a part of sovereign nature*. "Nature" does not confront him, like the Jehovah of the Jews, as a stranger, as the master who is to be approached in humility by his servants.

But while the author declares that faith in the supernatural is a possession accessible to every one, and for that reason to be given the preference over good character, he does not prove his assertion and thereby "dethrone morality." One who maintains an attitude of absolute pessimism cannot cherish such faith; "Belief is not every man's affair."

Neither has the author proved that *humility* towards the supernatural power is requisite to successful labor. Man is sufficiently protected against "vanity and arrogance" in reflecting upon the help from his fellow-beings, of which he stands constantly in need. Let him direct his thanks, not primarily towards unfeeling nature, but towards his brethren and sisters. One should give to humanity what belongs to humanity.

Notwithstanding the above criticisms, we recommend to the attention of readers Dr. Keibel's little book, which contains a large amount of well-arranged material.

G. VON GIZYCKI.

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ERRATA.

See pages 272, 407.

Page 404, seventeenth line from top, for "Lebensanschauung," read "Lebensanschauungen;" for "Denkern," read "Denker."

Eighteenth line from top for "Lebensproblem" read "Lebensproblems."

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